dence on a plea in bar did not disqualify him to serve in the main case subsequently tried.20

In an action against a city the court may on challenge, excuse from the jury all residents and taxpayers of the city.21

In a prosecution for obtaining money on bogus school warrants, school district officers and residents of the school district on which the warrants were drawn are competent jurors.22

The question on a challenge to a juror for prejudice, known in old practice as "challenge to the favor," is for the court.23

If for any reason the trial court is of the opinion or suspects that a juror is not impartial, it is its duty to excuse such juror on challenge by one of the parties.24

"Impartial," applied to jurors, means not favoring one more than another; treating all alike; unbiased; equitable, fair, and just.25

The statute providing that no person shall be disqualified as a juror for forming or expressing an opinion upon the matter to be submitted to such jury, founded upon rumor, statements in public journals, or common notoriety, provided it appears to the court that he can and will, notwithstanding such an opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matters to be submitted to him, is not violative of Const. Bill of Rights, § 20, guaranteeing a trial by an impartial jury.26

20 State v. Scott, 42 P. 264, 1 Kan. App. 748.

21 City of Oklahoma City v. Meyers, 46 P. 552, 4 Okl. 686.

It is not error for the court to excuse one from a jury, in an action for damages for personal injury against a city, when such person shows on his voir dire that he is a resident citizen and taxpayer of said city, and other com petent jurors were selected, examined, and impaneled, as provided by law. City of Guthrie v. Shaffer, 54 P. 698, 7 Okl. 459.

22 State v. McDonald, 52 P. 453, 59 Kan. 241.

23 Border v. Carrabine, 30 Okl. 740, 120 P. 1087.

24 Boutcher v. State, 111 P. 1006, 4 Okl. Cr. 576, rehearing denied Boucher v. Same, 112 P. 762, 4 Okl. Cr. 138, 130 P. 1164.

25 Tegeler v. State, 9 Okl. Cr. 138, 130 P. 1164.

26 Turner v. State, 111 P. 988, 4 Okl. Cr. 164; Rev. Laws 1910, § 5861; State v. Bussey, 50 P. 891, 58 Kan. 679; State v. Treadwell, 38 P. 799, 54 Kan. 507; Horn v. State, 13 Okl. Cr. 354, 164 P. 683; State v. Stewart, 116 P. 489, 85 Kan. 404; State v. Bane, 42 P. 376, 1 Kan. App. 537; State v. Brannon, 50 P. 986, 6 Kan. App. 765.

The formation and expression of an opinion by a juror necessary to work a disqualification must be an abiding bias of the mind, caused by substantial facts in the case, in the existence of which the juror believes,-an opinion, upon the merits of the case, upon the guilt or innocence of the accused of the

The opinion necessary to disqualify a juror must be one based on what purports to be the facts, and one that will combat the evidence.27

Light impressions constitute no sufficient objection to a juror, but those deep impressions which close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them will disqualify a juror,28

Where a juror testifies that he has a fixed opinion as to the guilt of defendant, which it will take strong evidence to remove, he is disqualified, and the mere fact that he may be of opinion that he can try the case fairly and impartially does not qualify him.29

charge laid in the indictment, and upon the evidence substantially as expected to be presented on trial. Huntley v. Territory, 54 P. 314, 7 Okl. 60.

Rev. Laws 1910, § 5861, providing when a person shall not be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed an opinion, held valid. Gentry v. State, 11 Okl. Cr. 355, 146 P. 719.

A juror's opinion based on rumor or from reading the public press will not disqualify, if the court is satisfied that the opinion will not combat the evidence or resist its force. Johnson v. State, 97 P. 1059, 1 Okl. Cr. 321, 18 Ann. Cas. 300; Turner v. State, 111 P. 988, 4 Okl. Cr. 164; Smith v. State, 14 Okl. Cr. 250, 174 P. 1107; Stone v. State, 12 Okl. Cr. 313, 155 P. 701; Jones v. State, 129 P. 446, 8 Okl. Cr. 576; Gentry v. State, 11 Okl. Cr. 355, 146 P. 719; State v. Beatty, 25 P. 899, 45 Kan. 492; State v. Truskett, 118 P. 1047, 85 Kan. 804; State v. Treadwell, 38 P. 813, 54 Kan. 513; State v. Beuerman, 53 P. 874, 59 Kan. 586; State v. Start, 56 P. 15, 60 Kan. 256; State v. Morrison, 68 P. 48, 64 Kan. 669.

It is not necessarily an abuse of discretion to sustain a challenge to a juror who has formed an opinion based on rumors or newspaper reports, when he states that he will render a fair and impartial verdict. Bradford v. Territory, 37 P. 1061, 2 Okl. 228.

27 Scribner v. State, 108 P. 422, 3 Okl. Cr. 601, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 985.

The overruling of a challenge to a juror is ground for reversal, where he stated that the facts had been detailed to him and that he had a fixed opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence. Morehead v. State, 12 Okl. Cr. 62, 151 P. 1183, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 416.

The exclusion of a question to a juror on voir dire, if it would have any bearing on him if it should develop during the trial that the defendant had previously been convicted of manslaughter, was proper. Manning v. State, 123 P. 1029, 7 Okl. Cr. 367.

Where the state relies in part upon the testimony of an accomplice, and a juror testifies that he would disregard the testimony of the accomplice however corroborated, it is not error to sustain a challenge for cause. Gilbert v. State, 127 P. 889, 8 Okl. Cr. 329.

It is not error to overrule challenge to juror for cause, where juror is indebted to one of the parties. Forbes v. Madden, 158 P. 850, 98 Kan. 559. 28 Tegeler v. State, 9 Okl. Cr. 138, 130 P. 1164.

29 Tegeler v. State, 9 Okl. Cr. 138, 130 P. 1164; Scribner v. State, 108 P. 422,

The rejection of a juror turns not on whether he says he has an opinion, but whether as matter of late had such opinion as under the law is a disqualification.30

In the summary hearing of a challer ge to a juror, on the ground of predetermined opinion, formed or expressed, the real question is whether the juror knows facts or nas received information of facts which he believes to be true, and from such facts has a settled conviction or opinion as to the issue or as to any material fact to be tried by the jury.31

A juror is not disqualified to sit by reason of having formed or

3 Okl. Cr. 601, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 985; State v. Snodgrass, 34 P. 750, 52 Kan. 174; State v. Vogan, 42 P. 352, 56 Kan. 61; State v. Brownfield, 73 P. 925, 67 Kan. 627.

In an action against a railroad company for personal injuries, a juror admitted that it would require a continual effort to deal with the railroad company in the same way that he would with an individual, and that, perhaps, he could not consider the case in an impartial way. Held incompetent. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Chance, 45 P. 60, 57 Kan. 40.

In an action by a nonresident to recover for personal injuries, where a juror states that he has a prejudice against nonresidents bringing such actions where they might have been brought in the state of plaintiff's residence, and that he will require more evidence in such case on the part of plaintiff, it is error to overrule a challenge for cause. Naylor v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 71 P. 835, 66 Kan. 407.

30 State v. Van Wormer, 103 Kan. 309, 173 P. 1076.

Where juror on his voir dire stated that he had no opinion, and had expressed no opinion as to result of defendant's trial for rape, and denied testimony of three witnesses that they had heard him say that "they will stick Dr. McLemore," the defendant, his acceptance was not error. State v. McLemore, 164 P. 161, 99 Kan. 777, judgment reversed on rehearing 166 P. 497, 101 Kan. 259.

A juror's mere expression of an opinion in common conversation, without anything showing ill will or a fixed belief, is not a legal ground of challenge for cause. Pope v. State, 15 Okl. Cr. 162, 175 P. 727; Rev. Laws 1910, § 5858. 31 State v. Smith, 85 P. 1020, 74 Kan. 383, judgment reversed on rehearing, 89 P. 21, 74 Kan. 383.

Whether what a juror calls an opinion disqualifies him is a question of fact to be determined from his appearance, manner, character of his answers, and source of his information, and from these the court is to determine wheth er his opinion is fixed and positive, and if it appears that he is an unprejudiced man, whose opinion is wholly contingent on the report he has read, he is not subject to challenge. State v. Stewart, 116 P. 489, 85 Kan. 404.

A juror, who states that he "would think" defendant "was guilty, or he would not be charged," is incompetent. Grant v. State, 11 Okl. Cr. 396, 146 P. 919.

expressed an opinion on matters involved in the case over which there is no dispute.82

One otherwise qualified is not disqualified as a juror because he is more in favor of the enforcement of the law that appellant is charged with having violated than of any other law.33

32 State v. Everett, 62 P. 657, 62 Kan. 275.

Where the examination of a juror in a criminal trial on his voir dire discloses that he has formed an opinion as to a fact material to be proven, and on his belief thereof has formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt, he should be excused on a challenge for cause. State v. Smith, 85 P. 1020, 74 Kan. 383, judgment reversed on rehearing 89 P. 21, 74 Kan. 383.

Disputed questions. On the trial of defendant charged with having received deposits as an officer of a bank, knowing its insolvency, a challenge to a juror, who has a fixed opinion as to the insolvency of the bank when the deposits were received, should be sustained, the questions as to the solvency, and the knowledge the defendant had being the principal ones to be tried. State v. Tomblin, 48 P. 144, 57 Kan. 841.

In a prosecution for larceny, a juror, while being examined, stated upon his voir dire that he had an opinion that the defendant took stolen cattle to market. This being a material question in the case, towards which the testimony of several witnesses for the state was directed, it was error to overrule the defendant's challenge of the juror for cause. State v. Otto, 58 P. 995. 61 Kan. 58.

Undisputed questions.—A juror is not incompetent in a contested will case because he knew and saw the testator prior to the time of the unsoundness of mind alleged by those attacking the will to exist, though he had an opinion as to the condition of the testator's mind at the time he last saw him. Delaney v. City of Salina, 9 P. 271, 34 Kan. 532.

Where the fact that a bank burglary had been committed was notorious and unquestioned, opinions of jurors that the bank had been broken into and robbed did not disqualify them in the trial of one charged with the crime. State v. Hoerr, 129 P. 153, 88 Kan. 573.

The mere fact that a person called as a juror had formed or expressed an opinion that defendant shot and killed the deceased did not disqualify him as a juror, where the shooting and killing was conceded by defendant, who claimed that it was done in self-defense. State v. O'Shea, 57 P. 970, 60 Kan. 772; State v. Sorter, 52 Kan. 531, 34 P. 1036.

On trial for murder, where defendant justifies on the ground of self-defense, the act of killing is not the issue to be tried, and the juror who states that he has formed an opinion as to the guilt of defendant is not for that reason disqualified, though it appears that the opinion is based on the belief that defendant killed deceased, but he has expressed no opinion, or formed any, as to whether the defendant was justified in so doing. State v. Morrison, 72 P. 554, 67 Kan. 144.

That jurors had formed an opinion as to the killing, which was admitted, did not disqualify them where no opinion concerning the sanity of the defendant, which was the material question, was shown. State v. Olsen, 127 P. 625, 88 Kan. 136; State v. Gould, 19 P. 739, 40 Kan. 258,

33 State v. Kelley, 78 P. 151, 70 Kan. 98.

Prejudice of the individual jurors against a particular crime is no ground

HON.PL.& PRAC.-70

(1105)

A conviction would not be reversed because the court retained on the jury, over defendant's objection, one who believed the punishment fixed by law too severe for the offense charged.3*

In a prosecution for homicide, a juror is not disqualified by implied bias because he states on his voir dire that he has previously sat as a juror on the trial of a murder case.3

35

Persons with conscientious scruples against the infliction of death as a punishment for crime are incompetent jurors in a case where such penalty may be inflicted, though the statute permits the jury to fix the punishment either at death or imprisonment for life.36 When the common-law method of summoning and impaneling jurors in a criminal case is resorted to, the jurors so selected must have the qualifications prescribed in the statutes, or, in the absence of any statutory provisions, must have the common-law qualifications of freeholders of the vicinage.37

for a challenge to the panel or to the individual jurors. Remer v. State, 109 P. 247, 3 Okl. Cr. 706.

On a prosecution for larceny of a horse the fact that it is shown by the answers of some of the jurors on their voir dire that they are members of an association for the prevention of horse stealing, and to reclaim stolen horses, and bring the offender to justice, does not render them incompetent, where there is nothing in the rules of the association or elsewhere that would require them to prosecute or convict an innocent person, or to convict on less or weaker evidence than is required, or that would affect their duties as j rors. State v. Flack, 29 P. 571, 48 Kan. 146.

The fact that a person is a member of the "Good Templars" society, the object of which is, not the enforcement of the prohibitory liquor law, but the promotion of temperance among its members by moral suasion, does not disqualify such person from serving as a juror in a criminal prosecution for the violation of the prohibitory liquor law. State v. Estlinbaum, 27 P. 996, 47 Kan. 291.

34 State v. Vogan, 42 P. 352, 56 Kan. 61.

35 Johnson v. State, 97 P. 1059, 1 Okl. Cr. 321, 18 Ann. Cas. 300. 36 Smith v. State, 114 P. 350, 5 Okl. Cr. 282.

Under the express provisions of Comp. Laws 1909, § 6812, subd. 8, a juror in a murder case was incompetent who stated on his voir dire that he had conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty. Hopkins v. State, 9 Okl. Cr. 104, 130 P. 1101, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 736.

37 Goodson v. United States, 54 P. 423, 7 Okl. 117.

The statute requiring the jury list to be selected from the assessment roll of the preceding year, has reference to the assessment roll of real estate as well as that of personal property. State v. Gereke, 86 P. 160, 74 Kan. 196, judgment reversed on rehearing Same v. Gerike, 87 P. 759, 74 Kan. 196.

A township assessor, by failing to enter on the assessment rolls the name of a person who is duly assessed, and is otherwise qualified to sit as a juror