Opinion of the Court.

a

Fig. 1.

Figure 2 shows the compound staple fastening separately; and Figure 3 is an elevation of the washer. The wood work, a, represents part of a pail or tub, and the bail, b, is of wire, having eyes, c, at the ends, which are bent so as to stand parallel, or nearly so, to each other. The compound staple-fastening, d, is made with the penetrating points 2, 3, loop 4 for the eye c, and the body 5. The ends 2, 3, of the wire are cut-diagonally, so that, in driving them into the wood, the tendency is to bend upwardly and clinch, and they will usually be long enough to pass through the wood and be clinched. The body of the fastening stands vertically or nearly so, and will usually be partially imbedded in the wood. The sheet-metal washer e prevents the eye c coming against the wood. The points of the staple penetrate the wood upwardly so as effectually to prevent the staple pull

Fig. 2.

ing out under the ordinary strain to which it is subjected."

The claims of the patent were these:

"1. The compound staple-fastening d for bails, made with the diagonally cut penetrating points 2 and 3, loop 4, and body 5, said diagonally cut points being positioned as set forth, so as to bend upwardly in driving into the wood, as set forth. 2. The convex metallic washer e, in combination with the compound bail-fastening staple d, having upwardly penetrating points 2, 3, and loop 4, as and for the purposes specified."

The case was argued by Mr. Arthur v. Briesen, for the appellant; Mr. Wm. P. Lynde, for the appellee.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. The gist of the invention set forth in the descriptive part of

Opinion of the Court.

the specification, so far as the first claim is concerned, is to cut the two penetrating ends of the wire diagonally, and in such a way that, while the staple is being driven, the cut faces will both of them be on the lower side, and the two penetrating ends will both of them incline upwardly. It is shown to have been commonly known that the effect of a bevel or a diagonal cut on a penetrating point was to force the point, in being driven, in a direction away from the bevel or cut. Doublepointed staples, with a diagonal cut on each point, but the diagonal cut on one point on the upper and outer side and on the other point on the lower and outer side, as the staple was driven, were old. They were used to secure wire screens as guards for windows. The effect in driving them was to bring the two points together, by throwing them towards each other, through their movements in opposite directions. The mechanical action embodied was the forcing each point, in being driven, in a direction away from its bevel or cut. The result was that the legs of the staple were bent and came together, and were thus clinched in the driving, and it was more difficult to pull out the staple than if the legs had gone in without bending. In view of this state of the art, there was no patentable invention, and nothing more than mechanical skill, in putting the diagonal cuts or bevels on the same side of each leg of the staple, so as to give both points, in driving, an inclination in the same direction, that direction being one away from both bevels, and in using the device to fasten a bail. This was the view taken by the circuit court. There is no suggestion in the specification or claims as to any invention or novelty in the form of the loop, or of the body, or in the relative lengths of the two penetrating points, or as to the angles formed by such points with the loop or the body, before driving. The so cutting the penetrating ends that they will both of them incline upwardly in driving is the only feature of invention set forth, and to this the patent must be limited, so far as the first claim is concerned.

The second claim is for the washer in combination with the staple of the first claim. This is not a patentable combination. There is only an aggregation of parts when the staple is used

Syllabus.

with the washer. The use of the washer is stated in the specification to be to keep the eye at the end of the bail from contact with the wood or the paint thereon. The upper point or leg of the staple goes through the eye and through the centre of the washer. But, the presence of the washer does not modify or affect the action of the staple, nor does the staple modify or affect the action of the washer. The washer keeps the eye of the bail from rubbing the wood of the pail. It would have the same effect if it were fastened in some other way than by having the leg of the staple pass through it, and the staple would in such case have the same operation which it now has. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed.

MANHATTAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. BROUGHTON, Trustee.

IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

Argued October 22d, 1883.-Decided November 5th, 1883.

Evidence-Insanity-Insurance-Judgment-Parties-Statutes-Suicide.

1. A judgment of nonsuit is no bar to a new action, and of no weight as evidence at the trial of that action.

2. Pending an action in a court of the State of New York against a corporation established in that State, by a widow, a citizen of New Jersey, upon a policy of insurance on the life of her husband, the plaintiff assigned the policy to a citizen of New York in trust for her benefit, and was afterwards nonsuited by order of the court. Upon a subsequent petition by the trustee to another court of the State to be relieved of his trust, a citizen of New Jersey was at her request appointed trustee in his stead. One object of this appointment was to enable a suit on the policy to be brought in the Circuit Court of the United States, which was afterwards brought accordingly: Held, that the suit should not be dismissed under the act of 3d March, 1875, c. 137, § 1, 5.

3. A self-killing by an insane person, understanding the physical nature and consequences of bis act, but not its moral aspect, is not a death by suicide, within the meaning of a condition in a policy of insurance upon his life, that the policy shall be void in case he shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, or of the violation of any law.

Argument for the Plaintiff in Error.

The main facts in this case are stated in the opinion of the court. For the purposes of the reported argument below it is sufficient to say that the plaintiffs in error insured the life of one Ferguson for $10,000, payable to his wife in ninety days after proof of his death; that the policy was to be void if Ferguson should die by suicide; that Ferguson hanged himself; that suit was brought in the Court of Common Pleas of the City of New York by the widow to recover on the policy, in which under a ruling of the court the plaintiff became nonsuited; that the claim, after commencement of suit and before nonsuit, was assigned to a trustee, a citizen of New York, to secure a debt; and that after nonsuit the trustee was removed by amicable judicial proceedings, and the defendant in error, a citizen of New Jersey, substituted, the object being to have this suit brought.

Mr. James Otis Hoyt for the plaintiff in error.

1. The expression, "in case he shall die by suicide," includes all cases of voluntary self-destruction. If a man takes his life, knowing and intending the consequences of his act, it is his act within the meaning of the policy, and it is immaterial whether he did not know the difference between right and wrong; but if he was so insane that he did not know that his act would kill him, and did not intend it should, it was not his act within the meaning of the policy. The question is whether the self-killing was his own act, and not whether it was his responsible act. This is the law of New York, the locus of the contract.

Van Zandt v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 169; McClure v. M. L. I. Co., 55 N. Y. 651; De Gogorza v. Knickerbocker I. Co., 65 N. Y. 232; Weed v. Mut. Benefit Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 561.-Of Massachusetts. Dean v. Am. I. Co., 4 Allen, 96; Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227.-Of Pennsylvania and other States. Am. L. I. Co. v. Isett's Admrs., 74 Penn. 176; St. Louis Mutl. L. I. Co. v. Graves, 6 Bush (Ky.), 268.—Of England. Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Man. and G. 639; Dufaur v. Professional Ass. Co., 25 Beav. 599.

Opinion of the Court.

2. The cases of Life Insurance Company v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580; Insurance Company v. Rodel, 95 U. S. 232, though seeming to adopt a somewhat different doctrine from the above case, do not go as far as the learned judge below in his charge. There is no evidence of any insane impulse in the case. On the contrary, the evidence shows a deliberately planned and intelligently executed act of suicide.

3. The evidence shows that the plaintiff was made trustee by the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and for the purpose of bringing an action in the United States Court, Mrs. Ferguson having failed to recover under the New York rule. The court below had no jurisdiction; or if the plaintiff was a citizen of New Jersey, it should not have exercised its jurisdiction, the appointment having been made merely to bring the action where it was supposed a more favorable rule existed than in New York.

4. The same issues involved in this action were tried in the case in the Court of Common Pleas for the City of New York, and the judgment in that case was a bar to the present one and an estoppel. Krekeler v. Ritter, 62 N. Y. 372. In the event of a recovery by plaintiff, the amount of the judgment in the Court of Common Pleas should be deducted.

Mr. Erastus F. Brown for the defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action brought on the 9th of June, 1879, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York by John G. Broughton, a citizen of Bloomfield, in the State of New Jersey, against a corporation established in the city and State of New York, upon a policy of insurance in the sum of $10,000 on the life of Israel Ferguson, of New York, dated the 15th of June, 1864, made and payable to his wife, and containing a condition that it should be null and void "in case he shall die by suicide, or by the hands of justice, or in consequence of a duel, or of the violation of any law of these States, or of the United States," or of any other country which he might be permitted by this policy to visit or reside in. At the trial the plaintiff offered evidence that Ferguson died