principle is beyond our reach, and until we modify it no change in the organs can take place. On the latter bypothesis we are encouraged, with hopes of success to do our best ; for it assumes that the mind in all individuals is sound, and that the imperfections lie in the organs, which are subject to modification by means of propagation and exercise, in other words by education. According to this view, also, insanity is not a disease of the immaterial principle, but an affection of the organs, which may be cured by medicine.— Phren. Journ. Vol. ii. p. 149.

Ill. ON THE EFFECTS OF INJURIES OF THE BRAIN ON THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE MIND.

BY DR. A. COMBE.

Or all the arguments advanced for the subversion of Phrenology, not one has been more frequently or more confidently urged, than that which rests on the alleged fact of the brain having, in various instances, been wounded or destroyed in whole or in part, without in any degree impeding the usual operations of mind. When narrowly examined, however, this objection proves to be at variance with the views of those who maintain it, and completely demonstrative of their ignorance of the principles of the science against which it is directed. "The system of Gall and Spurzheim," it is said, "however ingenious or amusing in theory it may be, is annihilated by the commonest reference to fact. Experience has shown us, that a man may live in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties, although a part of his brain is destroyed by disease. Portions of the brain, various in situation and size, have been found to have been entirely disorganized, yet no single power of the mind was impaired, even to the very day of the patient's death. It would be difficult to find any one portion of the brain, that has not, in some case or another, been deranged in its structure, without injury to the mind. Certainly, of the parts specified by Gall and Spurzheim, every one has, in its turn, been found wanting, without any deficiency in that intellectual faculty

which they would represent it either to produce or sustain."* Such are the ipsissima verba of a learned and respectable, though prejudiced opponent; and although others might be quoted, who go still farther than he does, I am ready to admit, that, if the statements here recorded were as clearly substantiated as they were sweepingly made, neither the system of philosophy which we advocate, nor any other which acknowledges the necessity of the intervention of a material instrument for the manifestation of the mind, could possibly survive for a day.

At first sight, the foregoing objection appears to be highly plausible and relevant; and coming as it generally does, directly or indirectly, from the members of the medical profession, who, naturally enough, are supposed to be best qualified to judge, it is received by many with implicit confidence, and thus operates upon them with all the force of truth; and, in fact, to those who are alike ignorant of Anatomy and of Phrenology, and who, therefore, have no means of forming an accurate estimate of its force, it does present a very formidable aspect. As, however, to those who are acquainted with both these sciences, and who are consequently better qualified to judge correctly, the very facts upon which the objections are grounded, seem, instead of invalidating the fundamental principles of the new philosophy, to be clearly and unequiv ocally demonstrative of their truth; it may be useful to state such an abstract of the evidence itself, as shall enable even the unprofessional reader to determine how far it authorizes the inferences which have been deduced from it by our opponents. With this intention, I shall first make some observations on the testimony offered of the alleged integrity of all the mental faculties, in cases of extensive injury of the brain; and then examine anatomically, how far the extent, situation, and nature of the injuries sustained in the cases alluded to, authorize us to infer the partial or total destruction of any individual phrenological organ; and, lastly, I shall offer a few remarks on the possibility of discovering the functions of the brain, from noticing the effects of its injuries, a mode of proceeding lately recommended from high authority.

* Rennel on Skepticism, p. 100.

In proceeding to this inquiry, it must first be observed, that, without a single exception, all the cases alluded to are related by surgical authors, for purely professional purposes, without the remotest idea of their being afterwards founded on, to prove that entire preservation of the mental faculties may coexist with extensive disorganization of the organ of mind; consequently, in all of them, as will be seen by a reference to Dr. Ferriar's paper, in the 4th volume of the Manchester Memoirs, and to the 48th number of the Edinburgh Review, the state of the mind is mentioned merely incidentally, and in very vague and general terms, as it was, in reality, scarcely attended to. For instance, it is stated in one case, that "the senses were retained to the last;" in another, that "there was no loss of sensibility;" in a third, that there was "no alienation of mind;" and, in a fourth, that "the patient remained quite well." The want of precision, indeed, and the utter inadequacy of the statements to establish the important conclusions deduced from them, are so palpably conspicuous, that even the Reviewer already alluded to, hostile as he is to the doctrines of Phrenology, expresses a "wish to see cases more minute in all their details; and observed, with a view specially to this physiological inquiry, substituted for those we at present possess," before he ventures to pronounce an irrevocable decree; and if he hesitates, it would surely be too much to expect us to pronounce, upon testimony rejected by him, a verdict against ourselves.

But, even granting that these cases had been observed, with a view specially to this physiological inquiry; still this testimony, to be of the slightest value in establishing the point contended for, necessarily supposes two conditions or requisites in those by whom they are narrated, which were manifestly not possessed, viz. 1st, A perfect knowledge of the number and nature of the primitive faculties of the human mind; and, 2dly, A previous knowledge of their relative degrees of endowment and energy during health, in the individual cases under consideration.

Now, as to the first of these, it is well known that scarcely any two metaphysicians who make the philosophy of mind their particEdinburgh Review, No. 48, p. 448.

ular study, are agreed either upon the number or nature of the primitive mental powers. Much less, then, can we expect the surgeon, engaged in the hurry of general practice, to be better informed. "Certain crude ideas," says the Edinburgh Reviewer, In his notice of Sir E. Home's paper on the Functions of the Brain, 66 are attached to the words Intellectual Faculties; a vague conjecture arises as to the seat and nature of these faculties."* How, then, I would ask, can any one certify, even after the most scrupulous attention, that all the powers of the mind are retained, when he is ignorant what these powers are? When he is ignorant, for instance, whether the propensities of Destructiveness, Acquisitiveness, or Secretiveness exist, and whether the sentiments of Veneration, Hope or Conscientiousness, are primitive emotions. The state of these, and other feelings and propensities, proved by Phrenology to be primitive, is never once alluded to in the history of injuries of the brain; and, consequently, for any thing we are told to the contrary, they, along with their respective organs, might have been entirely wanting, in every one of the cases which are advanced as instances of entire possession of the faculties. The opponents never speak of any except intellectual faculties; and in expecting lesion of these powers, when, for instance, it is only the cerebellum, or posterior lobes of the brain, that are diseased, they display at once their own ignorance of the nature and number of the primitive faculties, and their most profound ignorance of the doctrines which they impugn. If any injury occurs in that portion of the brain lying under the most prominent part of the parietal bone, which the phrenologist states to be the organ of Cautiousness, and if we be in doubt as to the accuracy of the function assigned to it, and wish to have our observations confirmed or refuted by the phenomena attending such a case, one would naturally suppose that, as the organs are all double, we would begin by observing, whether the corresponding portion of brain on the opposite side partook in the disorganization or not; and that we would then proceed to investigate the state of that particular faculty, of which these parts constitute the organs, and thus ascertain whether Edinburgh Review, No. 48, p. 439.

*

the feeling of Cautiousness ever remained undiminished, where, from the extent of the disease, it ought, according to the ordinary laws of the animal economy, to have been either impaired, or entirely wanting.

This mode of proceeding, plain and simple as it appears, is not that pursued by the opponents of Phrenology. The opponent does not care, and does not inquire, whether it is one side only, or both sides, which are diseased: he makes no inquiry about the presence or absence of the manifestations of the sentiment of Cautiousness he proceeds at once to the state of the intellectual powers, with which Phrenology most distinctly teaches that that part of the brain has no direct connexion; and finding none of the faculties which he calls Attention, Perception, Memory or Imagination at all impaired, he, with great confidence, concludes, that the part in question cannot be the organ of Cautiousness; and so satisfied is he with his own reasoning, that he thinks himself entitled to ridicule those who do not see its cogency as clearly as he does himself. On any other subject, this mode of reasoning would be looked upon as proceeding from a very blameable and lamentable degree of ignorance; but such was once the state of the public mind, that, when directed against Phrenology, it was hailed almost universally as highly philosophical and satisfactory.

Even supposing, however, that the number of primitive facultics was known, still no dependence can be placed upon cases not clserved, with a view "specially to this physiological inquiry;" for daily experience proves, that whenever a patient is able to return a rational answer to any simple question about his health, the surgeon and attendants, whose attention is not directed to the point, invariably speak of him as in full possession of all his faculties, although he is as unable to think or reason on any serious subject, with his accustomed energy and facility, as a gouty or rheumatic patient is to walk with his accustomed vigor. In one sense, no doubt, the former may be said to be in possession of all his faculties, just as the latter, merely because he can drag himself across a room, may be said to possess the power of muscular motion; but then the power of exercising the faculties may be, and is, as much dimin