36 Fed. Rep. 252. And an officer who arrests a judgment debtor on execution, cannot lawfully hold him in custody against his consent, in order to procure an interview with the creditor or his attorney for the purpose of negotiating with the debtor, or for any other purpose designated by the creditor alone. Such detention is unlawful, and renders the officer liable: French v. Bancroft, 1 Met. 502.

Unavoidable delay of a peace officer in taking bail for a prisoner does not render him liable: Cargill v. State, 8 Tex. App. 433. And an officer will always be allowed a reasonable time in which to procure an examination for the party arrested. Thus, if an arrest is made on Sunday, the prisoner need not be taken before a magistrate for a warrant or examination on that day, and if the attendance of witnesses cannot be procured until the following Tuesday, and the prisoner is given as speedy a hearing as the circumstances will permit, the detention until such hearing is not unreasonable: Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121-131; 50 Am. St. Rep. 598. Or, if a person is arrested under a peace warrant in the forenoon on Saturday and at that time committed to jail without an examination because of his drunken condition, the justice is not liable unless the imprisonment is continued for an unreasonable time, although it does continue without examination over the following Sunday: Pepper v. Mayes, 81 Ky. 673. If the court is in session at the time that the warrant is delivered to the officer, but is not in session when the officer, acting promptly, arrives with his prisoner at the place where the court is sitting, it is his duty to detain his prisoner until the court is în session, and he may lodge him in jail, in the meantime, without becoming liable therefor: Kent v. Miles, 68 Vt. 48. The fact that a drunken man's first proposition when arrested is to give a bond, and that is refused and he is detained in jail for an hour, does not constitute a false imprisonment: Beville v. State, 16 Tex. App. 70. Or, if a drunken man is confined in jail for three hours after his arrest before he is regularly charged before a justice of the peace, the arresting officer is not liable, as such detention is not unreasonable: Wiltse v. Holt, 95 Ind. 469.

Arrest by Private Party.-The right of a private person to arrest without a warrant is more restricted than that of an officer, but it is the right and duty of such party who witnesses the commission of a felony or breach of the peace to apprehend the offender at once: Phillips v. Trull, 11 Johns. 486; Morley v. Chase, 143 Mass. 396-398; Brockway v. Crawford, 3 Jones, 433; 67 Am. Dec. 250; Vendeveer v. Mattocks, 3 Ind. 479. But a private person can only justify for an arrest without a warrant on suspicion of felony by proving that a felony has actually been committed, and that he has probable cause for believing that the person arrested is the person who committed it: Morley v. Chase, 143 Mass. 396, 398; Maliniemi v. Gronlund, 92 Mich. 222; 31 Am. St. Rep. 576; Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. St. 352; 100 Am. Dec. 645; Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350; 20 Am. Dec. 702; Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. 463; Reuck v. McGregor, 32 N. J. L. 70. If an innocent person is arrested upon suspicion by a private person, such person is excused if a felony has in fact been committed and there is reasonable ground to suspect the person arrested.

But if no felony has been committed, and an arrest is made by a private party without warrant, such arrest is illegal, though an officer would be justified if he acted, in making such an arrest, upon information from another which he had reason to rely upon: Hawley v. Butler, 54 Barb. 490; Holley v. Mix, 3 Wend. 350; 20 Am. Dec. 702. An arrest which is justifiable when made regularly by a proper officer cannot be justified if made by a private party irregularly: Reuck v. McGregor, 32 N. J. L. 70. While a private person is permitted to arrest without a warrant and take before a magistrate a person who has committed a felony, yet for mere misdemeanor an arrest made in such way after their commission has entirely ended is illegal and false: Phillips v. Trull, 11 Johns. 486; People v. Adler, 3 Park. C. C. 249. An arrest by a private individual without warrant, for the purpose of forcibly abducting him from the state, followed immediately by such abduction, cannot be justified, and renders the party guilty thereof liable in damages for a false imprisonment: Mandeville v. Guernsey, 51 Barb. 99. If a private person without warrant arrests another as a fugitive from justice, he must take him without delay before the nearest magistrate qualified to receive an affidavit and issue a warrant, and if he is detained beyond a reasonable time without being taken before such magistrate the person arresting or detaining him commits false imprisonment, and is liable therefor, especially if the party arrested and detained is not the alleged fugitive: Lavina v. State, 63 Ga. 513. Private Citizen Aiding Officer.-A private individual is bound to assist a known public officer in making an arrest when called upon to do so, and is protected in so acting without inquiring into the regularity or legality of the process in the hands of the officer: McMahan v. Green, 34 Vt. 69; 80 Am. Dec. 665; Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 44; 19 Am. Dec. 122; Forrest v. Leavitt, 52 N. H. 481; Payne v. Green, 10 Smedes & M. 507; Jennings v. Carter, 2 Wend. 446; 20 Am. Dec. 635; Coyles v. Hurtin, 10 Johns. 85; Goodwine v. Stephens, 63 Ind. 112. A person who responds to the call of a known officer to assist in making an arrest is protected by the call against suit for false imprisonment, if in his acts he confines himself to the order and direction of the officer: Firestone v. Rice, 71 Mich. 377; 15 Am. St. Rep. 266. "We do not think that a man called upon by a sheriff is required, at his peril to ascertain whether the sheriff has a proper warrant or whether the offense charged against the person to be arrested is a felony, or that he may refuse to act until he is satisfied that the sheriff is acting legally, or within the scope of his office in a criminal case. Therefore, the person who responds to the call of one whom he knows to be an officer is protected by the call from being sued for rendering the requisite assistance. The officer may not be acting legally, and may, therefore, be a trespasser, but the person assisting him, at his request or command, and who relies upon his official capacity and call, is protected by the law": Firestone v. Rice, 71 Mich. 380; 15 Am. St. Rep. 266. Persons called upon by an officer holding a warrant to assist in the search for and arrest of a party charged with crime, are protected against actions for false impris

onment, whether they had the warrant at the time of the arrest or not: Kirbie v. State, 5 Tex. App. 60. And where an officer calls upon private citizens to assist him in making an arrest, those who aid him have a justification as broad as his own: Main v. McCarthy, 15 Ill. 442. If an officer, unable alone to arrest rioters assembled in a house, calls upon private citizens to guard such house and prevent the escape of the rioters while he goes away some distance for assistance, the citizens are protected by such call against any consequences arising from the arrest of such rioters by them during the absence of such officer: Coyles v. Hurtin, 10 Johns. 85. But private persons are only bound to aid an officer in making an arrest upon his call, in such cases as he himself is authorized to act, and they are held to the same strictness of authority as is required of the officer. Hence, if the act of the officer is unlawful, anyone assisting him with knowledge is equally liable with him, although he acts by the officer's commands: Mitchell v. State, 12 Ark. 50; 54 Am. Dec. 253. If a known public officer calls upon a citizen to aid him in the execution of process, the former can justify under the process, although the officer himself is guilty of a trespass, but where the party making the arrest is not a known officer, but only assumes to act in that particular case by special appointment, persons aiding the supposed officer are bound to know whether he is authorized to make the arrest or not, and in case he is a trespasser for want of authority, those aiding him are also liable: Dietrichs v. Schaw, 43 Ind. 177. So a mere volunteer who aids an officer in making an arrest is held to knowledge of his right to interfere, and acts at his peril: Kirbie v. State, 5 Tex. App. 60. If an arrest is made under a void process, the officer and anyone who aids and assists him, even though the latter acts under his command, are guilty of and liable for false imprisonment: Batchelder v. Currier, 45 N. H. 460; Hooker v. Smith, 19 Vt. 151; 47 Am. Dec. 679.

Judicial Officers.—It is a general rule that judges of superior courts or courts of general jurisdiction are not liable for false imprisonment for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly: Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12; 29 Am. Rep. 80; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395; 6 Am. Dec. 290; Johnston v. Moorman, 80 Va. 131; Cooke v. Bangs, 31 Fed. Rep. 640; Trammell v. Russellville, 34 Ark. 105; 36 Am. Rep. 1. “The exemption of judges of the superior courts of record from liability for civil suit for their judicial acts existing when there is jurisdiction of the subject-matter, though irregularity and error attend the exercise of the jurisdiction, cannot be affected by any consideration of the motives with which the acts are done. A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter. Where there is clearly no Jurisdiction over the subject matter, any authority exercised is an usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible": Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335-352. It may be laid down as a proposition of universal application that for a mere error of judg

ment in the exercise of his jurisdiction and the execution of an act, no action can be maintained against the judge of any court of record: Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393; 25 Am. Rep. 688; Atwood v. Atwater, 43 Neb. 147. Thus a rule for a contempt is the judicial act of the court issuing it, and therefore cannot be the foundation for an action for false imprisonment, however erroneously issued: Tavenner v. Morehead, 41 W. Va. 116; Landt v. Hilts, 19 Barb. 283; Gaines v. Newbrough, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 466.

As to courts of limited jurisdiction, the rule is that their judges are liable in a private action only for such acts as are either in excess of or outside of their jurisdiction, but they are not liable for errors in judgment. As to such judges, if they act in excess of their powers judicially, the whole proceeding is coram non judice and void, and they are personally liable; but if they act within their jurisdiction, adjudicating upon matters lawfully submitted to them, they are not so liable, no matter how erroneous their opinions may be: Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 Johns. 39; 10 Am. Dec. 189; People v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y. 559; 19 Am. Rep. 211; Adkins v. Brewer, 3 Cow. 209; 15 Am. Dec. 264; Pepper v. Mayes, 81 Ky. 673; Blythe v. Tompkins, 2 Abb. Pr. 468; Johnson v. Von Kettler, 66 Ill. 63. Thus a justice of the peace committing a person illegally arrested is liable if he has no jurisdiction over the latter: Dietrichs v. Schaw, 43 Ind. 175. So a justice issuing a warrant of arrest is liable if the affidavit therefor s ates none of the grounds required by the statute: Hauss v. Kohlar, 25 Kan. 640; Spice v. Steinruck, 14 Ohio St. 213; Von Kettler v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109; Johnson v. Von Kettler, 66 Ill. 63; Proctor v. Prout, 17 Mich. 473. To justify an inferior magistrate in committing a person, he must have jurisdiction both of the subject matter of the complaint and of the person of the defendant, and where such person is charged with the commission of an act not constituting a crime, the justice acquires no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter, and if he attempts to enforce any process of commitment in such case, he is answerable to the defendant as a trespasser: De Courcey v. Cox, 94 Cal. 665. But a justice of the peace acting within his jurisdiction is not liable for mistakes of judgment in arriving at his conclusions, although the facts upon which he acts do not justify his conclusions: Marks v. Sullivan, 9 Utah, 12; Banister v. Wakeman, 64 Vt. 203; Atwood v. Atwood, 43 Neb. 147. If a magistrate has jurisdiction, defects or irregularities in the commitment do not render him liable: Heard v. Harris, 68 Ala. 43. A judge of a municipal court may imprison for contempt a witness who refuses to answer questions properly propounded to him, in an action in which the court has jurisdiction, and he is not liable therefor in a civil action under the rule that a judicial officer, acting within his jurisdiction, in a judicial capacity, is not liable in a private action for his judicial acts: Rudd v. Darling, 64 Vt. 456. Thus a justice of the peace has jurisdiction to issue a warrant for the arrest of a garnishee, who, having been summoned, refuses to appear and answer, and he is not liable for such arrest: Kelsey v. Klabunde, 54 Neb. 760. But if the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant is upon a warrant issued by a justice of the peace

upon an affidavit which gives him no jurisdiction, he is liable for false imprisonment: Paulus v. Grobben, 104 Mich. 43. A justice of the peace having jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter of the suit, is not liable to respond in damages, because, in the exercise of his honest judgment, he holds an unconstitutional ordinance valid, and enforces it by the arrest and imprisonment of one who violates its provisions: Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich. 577; 24 Am. St. Rep. 137; Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa, 878. A magistrate or justice has jurisdiction to order, the arrest of one for a public offense committed in his presence, but he has no power, without an examination or hearing, to commit him to prison, and he is liable for so doing: Touhey v. King, 9 Lea, 422; Tracy v. Williams, 4 Conn. 107; 10 Am. Dec. 102. So it is false imprisonment if a justice orders a person accused of a criminal offense to be committed until a subsequent day for examination without having such person first brought before him: Pratt v. Hill, 16 Barb. 303. And an attachment against a person for contempt, issued by the registrar of a justice's court on affidavit, but without any order of the court, is invalid, and no justification in an action to recover for false imprisonment thereunder: Thompson v. Ellsworth, 39 Mich. 719.

Arrest under Void Ordinance.-A justice of the peace, acting in good faith and having jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter, is not civilly liable in damages for an error of judgment, in holding an unconstitutional ordinance valid, and enforcing it by imprisoning the violator of it, nor is the officer making the arrest liable in such case: Brooks v. Mangan, 86 Mich. 576; 24 Am. St. Rep. 137. Nor is a person who, in good faith and without malice, makes the complaint in such case, liable in damages for the arrest made thereunder: Gifford v. Wiggins, 50 Minn. 401. A town is not responsible for the passage of an illegal ordinance by its council nor for the acts of the mayor in issuing a warrant, nor for the act of an officer making an arrest thereunder, nor is either of the latter personally liable: Trammell v. Russellville, 35 Ark. 105; 36 Am. Rep. 1. Cities are not liable for the acts of their police officers in the enforcement of police regulations and ordinances, and cannot make themselves liable by the ratification of such acts: Calwell v. Boone, 51 Iowa, 687; 33 Am. Rep. 154; Odell v. Schroeder, 58 Ill. 353. And a party who has been arrested for the violation of an unconstitutional ordinance requiring a license fee to be paid by nonresident peddlers, and, on conviction, has served out his fine in jail, cannot maintain an action against the municipal corporation enacting such ordinance for false imprisonment: Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Rep. 593.

Jailers.-The rules applicable to officers who make an arrest are generally applicable to jailers, or those who detain the person arrested after the arrest. It has been held that a jailer holding a prisoner as agent for the private purpose of a sheriff who has illegally arrested such prisoner must stand or fall upon the defenses which the sheriff makes, although the process under which the jailer is acting is regular on its face: Arteaga v. Connor, 88 N. Y. 404. But the right, under proper and legal process, given to a city marshal to arrest and imprison a person in the county jail comes with