may

Ch. III. ing in every district arbitrarily applied, be unknown to those, who know the Language perfectly well, and can hardly therefore with propriety be confidered as parts of it. The other and more artificial Method is that of DEFINITIVES or AR

TICLES (g), whether we affume the pronominal, or those more frittly so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquifite Art of Language, which, without wandring into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to fay, in other Words, which by the fmall Tribe of Definitives properly applied to general Terms, knows how to employ these last, tho' in number finite to the accurate expreffion of infinite Particulars.

To explain what has been faid by a fingle example. Let the general Term be MAN. I have occafion to apply this Term

to

(g) See before p. 72, &c. 233, &c.

to the denoting of fome Particular. Let Ch. III. it be required to exprefs this Particular, as unknown; I say, A Man-known; I lay, THE Man-indefinite; ANY Man-definite; A CERTAIN Man-present and rear; THIS Man-prefent and diftant; THAT Manlike to fome other; SUCH A Man—an indefinite Multitude; MANY Men-a definite Multitude; A THOUSAND Men ;—the ones of a Multitude, taken throughout; EVERY Man-the fame ones, taken with diftinction; EACH Man-taken in order; FIRST Man, SECOND Man, &c.—the whole Multitude of Particulars taken collectively; ALL Men -the Negation of this Multitude; No Man. But of this we have spoken already, when we inquired concerning Definitives.

THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENERAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND

IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR,

ONLY

Ch. III.ONLY SECONDARILY,

ACCIDENTALLY,

AND MEDIATELY.

SHOULD it be asked," why has Language this double Capacity?"-May we not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind of reciprocal Commerce, or Intercourse of our Ideas? Should it not therefore be framed, fo as to express the whole of our Perception? Now can we call that Perception intire and whole, which implies either INTELLECTION without Senfation, or SENSATION without Intellection? If not, how fhould Language explain the whole of our Perception, had it not Words to exprefs the Objects, proper to each of the two Faculties ?

To conclude As in the preceding Chapter we confidered Language with a view to its MATTER, fo here we have confidered it with a view to its FORM. Its MATTER is recognized, when 'tis confidered

dered as a Voice; its FORM, as 'tis fignifi-Ch. III. cant of our several Ideas; so that upon the whole it may be defined-A SYSTEM OF ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRINCIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL.

CHAP

Ch.IV.

CHA P. IV.

Concerning general or universal Ideas.

MUC

CH having been said in the preceding Chapter about GENERAL OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps be amifs to inquire, by what process we come to perceive them, and what kind of Beings they are; fince the generality of men think so meanly of their existence, that they are commonly confidered, as little better than Shadows. These Sentiments are not unusual even with the Philosopher now a days, and that from caufes much the fame with thofe, which influence the Vulgar.

THE VULGAR merged in Senfe from their earliest Infancy, and never once dreaming any thing to be worthy of purfuit, but what either pampers their Appetite, or fills their Purfe, imagine nothing to be real, but what may be tafted, or touched.