Ch. II. elementary Sounds, we owe that variety of articulate Voices, which have been fufficient to explain the Sentiments of fo innumerable a Multitude, as all the prefent and paft Generations of Men.

Ir appears from what has been faid, that THE MATTER OF COMMON SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE IS that Species of Sounds called VOICES ARTICULATE.

WHAT remains to be examined in the following Chapter, is Language under its characteristic and peculiar FORM; that is to fay, Language confider'd, not as a Sound, but as a Meaning.

enim quo potentiore eft facultate, eo minore fit magnitudine, difficillimum eft vifu. Hoc autem reperto, facilius eft adjungere et conferre quod reliquum eft. De Sophift. Elench. c. 34.

CHAP.

CHA P. III.

Upon the Form, or peculiar Character of

W

Language.

HEN to any articulate Voice there Ch. III. accedes by compact a Meaning or Signification, fuch Voice by fuch acceffion is then called A WORD; and many Words, poffeffing their Significations (as it were) under the fame Compact (a), unite in conftituting a

PARTICULAR LAN

GUAGE.

Y 4

IT

(a) See before Note (r) p. 314. See alfo Vol. I. Treatife II. c. 1. Notes (a) and (c).

The following Quotation from Ammonius is remarkable. Καθάπερ ἔν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τόπον κινεῖθαι, φύσει, τὸ δὲ ὀρχεῖθαι, θέσει καὶ καλὰ συνθήκην, καὶ τὸ μὲν ξύλον, φύσει, ἡ δὲ θύρα, θέσει· ὕτω καὶ τὸ μὲν φωνεῖν, φύσει, τὸ δὲ δι ̓ ὀνομάτων ἢ ῥημάτων σημαίνειν, θέσει καὶ ἔοικε τὴν μὲν Φωνητικὴν δύναμιν, ὄργανον ὅσαν τῶν

ψυχικῶν

Ch.III. It appears from hence, that A WORD be defined a Voice articulate, and

may

fignificant

ψυχικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεων γνωστικών, ἢ ορεκτικῶν, κατὰ φύἔχειν ὁ ἄνθρωπος παραπλησίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις· τὸ δὲ ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ρήμασιν, ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τέτων συγκειμέν τοις λόγοις χρῆσαι πρὸς τὴν σημασίαν, (ἐκέτι φύσει ἔσιν, ἀλλὰ θέσει) ἐξαίρετον ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, διότι καὶ μόνῳ τῶν θνητῶν αὐτοκινήτα μετέχει ψυχῆς, και τεχνικῶς ἐνεργεῖν δυναμένης, ἵνα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ Φωνεῖν ἡ τεχνική αυτῆς διακρίνηται δύναμις· δηλᾶσι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ εἰς κάλλο συντιθέμενοι λόγοι μετὰ μέτρων, ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων. In the fame manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exifts in Nature, but a Door is fomething pofitive; fo is the Power of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining ourfelves by Nouns, or Verbs, Jomething peftive. And bence it is, that as to the simple power of producing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or Inftrument to the Soul's faculties of Knowlege or Volition) as to this vocal power I fay, Man feems to possess it from Nature, in like manner as irrational animals: but as to the employing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences compofed out of them, in the explanation of our Sentiments (the things thus employed being founded not in Nature, but in Pofition) this he feems to poffefs by way of peculiar eminence, becaufe be alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul,

fignificant by Compact

and that LAN-Ch.III.

GUAGE may be defined a Syftem of fuch
Voices, fo fignificant.

Ir is from notions like these concerning Language and Words, that one may be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the Words are as the Figures or Images of all particulars,

AND

which can move itself, and operate artificially; so that even in the Subject of Sound his artificial Power fhews itfelf; as the various elegant Compofitions both in Metre, and without Metre, abundantly prove. Ammen. de Interpr. p. 51. a.

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, (EVEPYEN TEXVIXUS) of which Ammonius here fpeaks, and which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the Human Soul, means fomething very different from the mere producing works of elegance and defign; else it could never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many other Species of Animals, fuch as the Bee, the Beaver, the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. P. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159, &c.

Ch. III. AND this is true.

AND yet it may be doubted, how far For if Pictures and Images. are all of them Imitations, it will follow, that whoever has natural faculties to know the Original, will by help of the fame faculties know alfo its Imitations. But it by no means follows, that he who knows any Being, should know for that reason its Greek or Latin Name.

THE Truth is, that every Medium thro' which we exhibit any thing to another's Contemplation, is either derived from Natural Attributes, and then it is an IMITATION; or elfe from Accidents quite arbitrary, and then it is a SYMBOL (b).

Now,

(3) Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ὉΜΟΙΩΜΑ ΤΙ ΣΥΜ. ΒΟΛΟΥ, καθόσον τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωμα τὴν φύσιν αυτὴν τα πράγματος κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀπεικονίζεθαι βέλεται, οἱ ἐκ ἔστιν ἐφ ̓ ἡμῖν αὐτὸ μεταπλάσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῇ · εικόνε