on this occafion. They faid, that by this timid plan, neither fuited to the emergency, nor to the language held up on it, the opportunity was loft, by some fudden, great, and fignal blow, of reand character;

butill difguifed her defign, to bring matters to the prefent crifis. To the period of that treaty, however, her policy lay open to the influence of circumftances, and her conduct was, and undoubtedly would have been in any cafe, governed

and of infpiring that

national vigour and military prowess, which it was fo neceffary for us to main tain and establish with other nations, whether friendly or inimical, at the outfet of fuch a war.

It was fuppofed, that a double scheme of partial accommodation, the one part avowed, and the other fecret, and founded upon fyftems directly oppofite, was about that period prevalent, and had no fmall share in influencing the conduct of publick affairs. The first part of this fcheme was founded on the idea of detaching America, through the intervention of the Commiffioners, from the alliance with France. Nothing could poffibly have been more effential to the interefts, the reputation, and to the grandeur of Great-Britain, than the fuccefs of this meafure. France would then have been left to encounter all her force alone, which, if properly directed, the was yet by no means capable of enduring.

The event of that part of the fcheme we have already feen. The fecond, was that of detaching France from America; and confequently leaving the latter exposed to that refentment, which in the other inftance, would have been directed against the first. Although this part of the fcheme, even fuppofing it capable of fuccefs, could not stand in any degree of real comparative value with the former, yet it held out certain flattering ideas, which might even render it, in fome degree, a favourite. For the dereliction of America by France, would have left the former open, and now totally hopelefs, to that complete and final fubjuga tion, or unconditional fubmiffion, which had fo long been the great object of court and minifters. But this scheme feemed from the beginning hopeless, though it for a while entertained the imaginations of many. Great Britain had no bribe of fufficient magnitude to purchafe from France this dereliction of her object. If such could have been offered, and offered with effect, it must have been before the conclusion of the treaty but the treaty was concluded.

Every part of the conduct of France from the commencement of the American troubles, either tended directly, or

ken the decided and dangerous part, of publickly avowing her fentiments and views, and of openly binding herself in the face of the world to the performance and fupport of those treaties which she had concluded with the Americans, it was then not only evident that she had gone too far to recede, but that she had alfo chofen her ground, and was fully difpofed and determined to abide the confequences. So that every hope founded upon her change of fyftem, feemed little better than vifionary.

There were fome strong indications, that a third, and more comprehenfive fcheme of pacification than either of the foregoing, was at one time in agitation. This was no lefs, than the conclufion of an immediate peace and alliance with the Colonies, under the acknowledgment of that independence, which it was laid down as a principle, they had already virtually and irretrieveably obtained, and thereby cutting off at one ftroke, every caufe of war, and of difpute with America. In that cafe, if a plan of prudence, not very glorious, had been purfued, there was an end of the quarrel both with America and France. If the reduction and punishment of France was the object, the war against her might be purfued with undiffipated force. On the very day of the delivery of the French refcript, a paper to that purpose, written by an old and strong advocate for the American war, was delivered at the doors of the two Houfes.

If this fcheme ever had any fubftantial being in the ministry, it was, however, but of short duration; and was fo far from being brought forward, or any more heard of in that quarter, that when propofitions of a fimilar nature, were foon after made by the oppofition in both Houfes of Parliament, and ftrongly fupported, on the ground both of expedience and neceffity, they were violently oppofed, and accordingly overruled (as we have formerly feen) by the minifters.

To fome fuch variety of opinions, with refpect to the means of accommodation, the grand questions of peace and war, and the mode of profecuting the latter may probably be attributed thofe appear

ances of fluctuation, and indecifion, which, at that period, were fo ftrongly and repeatedly charged, as the charac teristick marks of our councils and meafures. And to fuch caufes must be attributed, the reception of the report, of a reproach faid to be thrown out by the French minifter, at the moment of his departure from London, viz. "That the British counfels were fo totally undetermined and indecifive, in every matter, whether of publick or private concern, that he never could get a pófitive answer from the minifters, upon any bufinefs, whether of fmall, or of the highest importance." March 13th. On the very day that the French refcript had 1778. been delivered to the Secretary of State, an addrefs and petition from the City of London, praying for the adoption of fuch measures as would moft forward the restoration of internal peace, tend to rescue publick affairs from unwife and improvident management, and obtain, iinprove, and fecure, the returning confidence of the people, was prefented to his Majefty. This piece, which was of unufual length, and a masterly compofition in point of writing, contained, in the most qualified language, and the moft guarded and refpectful terms, a feries of the fevereft obfervations and cenfures, on (what they termed) thofe fatal counfels, and that conduct of publick affairs and meafures, which equally misleading and deceiving the Prince and the people, led to the prefent dangerous and unhappy crifis. Along with a recapitulation of the loffes, misfortunes, and difgraces of the war, with a ftriking picture of the various calamities and miferies, which they attribute to that publick conduct they fo ftrongly condemn, they by no means forgot to take notice, how repeatedly they had deprecated, and how truly foreboded, in their former applica

tions to the throne (and in concurrence. with the fenfe of many other refpectable publick bodies, and of many of the wif eft and belt of his Majesty's fubjects) the prefent evils and dangers, as well as those greater to which the nation is still liable, as the inevitable confequences of the meafures which were pursued; neither did they pafs without notice the inefficacy of their former applications, and the anfwers which had been given to their addreffes and remonftrances upon publick affairs.

Among other political obfervations, all implying or charging neglect or mifconduct on the fide of government, they particularly noticed in the prefent inftance, that there was no appearance of our having formed any alliance with any of the other great powers of Europe,in, order to cover us from the complicated' perils fo manifeftly imminent over this nation, at a time when there was but too much reafon to apprehend, that alliances of the most dangerous kind were formed against us.

The anfwer, which was longer than ufual, feemed alfo to indicate a greater attention, both to the fubject of the addrefs, and to the body whofe act it was, than had been always manifefted upon fimilar occafions. It comprehended in fubftance, that, although it could not be allowed, that the force and refources of the ftate, had been unwifely and impro vidently exerted, when the object was the maintenance of that conftitutional fubordination which ought to prevail through its feveral parts; yet, the calamities infeparable from a state of war had been conftantly lamented; and, an affurance was given, that his Majefty would most earnestly give all the efficacy in his power, to thofe meafures which the legiflature had adopted, for the purpose of reftoring, by a happy and permanent conciliation, all the bleflings and advantages of peace. [To be continued.]

No. III.

to pay with, or power to improve fuch refources to proper ends. There is a confufion of ideas, neceffarily arifing from the prefent American arrangement. The thirteen States, for the purpose of contracting debts, are one entire nation, and yet each State is an entire nation of

itself. If Congress contract a debt, we know not how the payment can be fecured, but by a duty, excife, or tax: and fhould this State have a debt upon it, we know not what duty, or excife, to fund, for its payment, because the other States affembled in Congrefs, may wish to pledge the fame duty or excife, for the congreffional debt. If we mortgage the taxes for a particular year, perhaps the other States, in their united capacity, will call for a tax the fame year, for the exigencies of the union. This heterogeneous mixture of government, muft, while it militates with the establishment of a credit in the whole, prevent a particular fyftem of finance being formed in each feparate State.

In the year 1763, the province was about eleven hundred thousand pounds in debt: Great Britain aided us near three hundred thousand; and fo great were the exertions, and fo efficacious were the measures of government, that by the year 1773, people were obliged, againft their own confent, to take their money out of the treasury. The measures with respect to private debts, were equally beneficial for acts of limitation were made, obliging creditors to call in their debts, and hurrying debtors to pay, fo that growing intereft, that canker worm of all profperity, had not opportunity to devour the people, as it lately has done. When the fyftem of tyranny, forged by Great-Britain, in 1773, was prefented to us, we were a quite happy people.

The quantity of fpecie in the province, was about one hundred and twenty thousand pounds, when hoftilities were commenced. This was not enough for the exigencies of a war; and in July, in the year 1775, the General Court emitted one hundred thousand pounds. This, with the hard money then in currency, we may fuppofe was about two hundred thousand pounds, because we may suppose a part of the hard money, was inftantly, on the beginning of the war, fhut up in Boston, and elfe where.

The hundred thousand pounds in paper bills above mentioned, was funded on a tax to be made in the year 1776. Soon after, the Treasurer was directed to borrow money, but the credit of the colony was not fufficient to produce any confiderable loans. Another emiffion foon took place, which was foon followed by a poftponement of the tax, propofed to call in the firft emiffion. Here then would have ended all credit

if it had been previously established; the faith of the government, as to the tax intended as a fund for the emiffion, was violated, and the quantity of paper bills in circulation, was vaftly more than was neceffary to reprefent the articles in commerce. Congress at the fame time, threw in large quantities of paper money, and though no body would confefs, yet all practiced upon the depreciation.

Whoever fays, that the circulation of the paper bills, was evidence, or the confequence of publick credit, knows nothing of the terms. Publick credit at all times must be founded, in ideas of the power, and faithfulness of government. At that time, whether there was, or ever would be a government for the purposes under confideration, was a question with many at least, and the idea of redeeming fuch a vast quantity of paper at its nominal value in filver, was quite inadmiffible. A glorious enthufiafm answered at that time, the purpofes of publick faith, and a variety of compulfory methods, juftified by the dangerous fituation of the country, excufed by the abfence of a regular government, though quite incompatible with that civil freedom we are entitled to under the prefent conftitution, carried measures into effect, the attempting of which, would have fhaken the foundations of the moft abfolute monarchy in Europe.

Confolidating the paper money, and other publick debts, either emitted by, or due from Congrefs, or the separate States, is no mark of credit; for the people in doing this, did not part with any property, but only followed directions which they could not oppose, to fecure the property they had parted with before.

Without the establishment of publick credit, both to the union, and the feparate States, I believe you have concluded, fir, that America cannot long exist as a nation, and whoever would point out the method of fo important a measure, would come like another Camillus to fave his country. I fhall not pretend to do it, but will give you fome general ideas on the fubject.

It is evident, that publick credit must be founded on the ideas of publick wealth. It is as clear that the United States, as a power in Congrefs affembled, have no kind of eftate in, or power to levy money from property, and confe quently have no funds to obtain credit upon. To give them the power of le

vying money on the property of the people, or an estate in any thing, would be to give them a fettled definitive power over fomething in itself productive, with civil coercion to compel a payment. This must be I think altogether from a duty on the importation of goods, or an excife on the luxuries of life. This may be done by giving the United States the authority, of fuperintending and regulating trade, of fixing impofts and duties, annexing penalties to the breach of the laws of trade, appointing tribunals to recover the penalties, and officers to carry the decrees of their judges into execution, with power to remove all judicial officers for misbehaviour, and all executive officers at pleasure.

How Congress ought to apply the revenue, is no part of the subject I treat of, faving that it is to be managed for the fupport of publick credit. But when I am treating of the finances of a particular State, perhaps the fame principles may in fome inftances apply to the whole union.

When Congrefs has obtained a line of jurifdiction between the property from which is to arife the revenue of the United States, and the refidue of the property in each feparate State, from fuch part of that refidue as may be most imperceptibly productive, is to arife the revenue of the particular governments. From this State, an excife of thofe articles of luxury, which Congrefs has not taxed, would perhaps be very eligible. Dry taxation has been carried too far already; the fame articles taxed by Congress, muft not be taxed by a feparate State, for fhould that be al lowed, the productiveness might be detroyed by making the tax a premium to running the goods, or by difcouraging the importation, and thus the

power of Congrefs might be fubverted.'

When this Commonwealth has taken a view of its refources, it must find them adequate to the payment of the annual intereft of the debt it owes; if this is not the cafe, we are completely infolvent, for having no war or extraordinary charge upon us, unless we can pay the annual intereft, the debt will accumulate fo much, as to be infupportable in a fhort space of time.

If the refources of the State are fufficient to pay annually the intereft and incidental charges of government, all the creditors of every denomination ought to be treated alike; because doing otherwife would be an implicit denial of the juftice of fome of the debts. And if a part of the principal can be annually paid, it ought to be a part of every debt, without diftinction.

Whenever money is raised by a tax of duty, it ought to be fpecially appropriated, and then confidered facredly the property of the creditors to whofe payment it is appropriated. To prevent mifappropriation or the violation of publick faith, the Governour ought to be (as I think he is) the conflitutional comptroller of the revenue; he ought to keep a book wherein he shall credit every fund to its particular appropriation, and debit every draft, until he finds a balance. Should the Legislature after that, draw again, the Governour could then tell them, the fund is exhausted, and new refources must be adverted to. If they should draw in favour of other perfons, or creditors, than those to whofe ufe the fund is appropriated, he can difapprove of the draft, and by a message convince them of their errour. way publick faith would be established, and publick credit finally restored. TRIBUNUS,

In this

compofed of barley, about one third, and two thirds of oats, ground together very fine: I then fift the mixture through a very fi... fieve; put into it, the quantity of water mentioned below, and boil it half an hour; I then take it off the fire, and let it remain until it is milk warm : I then give each calf, about a quart in the morning, and the fame quantity in the evening; and encrease it as the calf grows older-it requires very little troubie to make them drink it. After the