Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Páginas 83-104;Páginas 107-117Cambridge University Press, 26 de out. de 1990 - 152 páginas Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organizations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.) |
Conteúdo
An introduction to institutions and institutional change | 3 |
Cooperation the theoretical problem | 11 |
The behavioral assumptions in a theory of institutions | 17 |
A transaction cost theory of exchange | 27 |
Informal constraints | 36 |
Formal constraints | 46 |
Enforcement | 54 |
Institutions and transaction and transformation costs | 61 |
Stability and institutional change | 83 |
The path of institutional change | 92 |
Economic performance | 105 |
Institutions economic theory and economic performance | 107 |
Stability and change in economic history | 118 |
Incorporating institutional analysis into economic history prospects and puzzles | 131 |
141 | |
147 | |
Outras edições - Ver todos
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Douglass C. North Prévia não disponível - 1990 |
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Douglass C. North Prévia não disponível - 1990 |
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Douglass C. North Prévia não disponível - 1990 |
Termos e frases comuns
actors agents agreements alter bargaining strength behavioral assumptions capital market century Chapter characteristics characterized choices cliometric common law consequence constitutional context contracts costs of transacting define Douglass North economic history economists efficient economic entails entrepreneurs evolution evolved existing experimental economics explore formal rules forms of exchange gains from trade game theory hence human interaction ideologies impersonal exchange implications incentives increasing returns individuals informal constraints institutional change institutional constraints institutional framework institutional matrix institutional structure Integrating institutional issues knowledge labor law merchant marginal maximizing measurement and enforcement merchant modern neoclassical economics nomic norms of behavior Northwest Ordinance organizations outcomes parties path dependence performance of economies players prisoner's dilemma problems production property rights reflect relative prices result role shape simple social societies specific story straints subjective models subjective perceptions tacit knowledge Third World third-party enforcement tional tions transaction costs uncertainty underlying wealth-maximizing Weingast