sons annually charged with crimes is 40 per cent. less in Belgium than in France. The average annual number of persons accused of crimes in Belgium was,

Years 1826 to 1830. 767, or 1 in every 5007 inhabitants. 1831 to 1834. . . 620, or 1 in every 6724

which exhibits a general diminution of about 25 per cent. The diminution appears to have been the greatest in the province of Brabant (in which Brussels is situate), where it was as much as 42 per cent., and the least in Luxembourg, where it was only 4 per cent. In speaking of crimes, we mean offences of a grave nature, and tried by the courts of assize. In regard to minor offences, (delits correctionnels) the average number is also less in Belgium than in France, but it has remained nearly stationary in Belgium during the two periods referred to; the numbers charged having been,

Years 1826 to 1829 ... 22,641, or 1 to every 171 inhabitants. 1831 to 1834 23,443, or 1 to every 173

The acquittals are stated at from 15 to 20 per cent. of the accusations for crime, and at nearly 25 per cent. of the correctional charges.*

Capital punishment forms a part of the criminal code of Belgium, but its execution is gradually becoming less and less frequent. Its secondary punishments consist wholly of different degrees of imprisonment, the bugnes, or galleys, having been for some time past abolished. The penal prisons consist of the Maison de force at Ghent; the Maison de reclusion at Vilvorde; the house of correction at St. Bernard, near Antwerp, for correctional offenders, with a separate ward for boys; and the military prison at Alost. The number of persons confined in these prisons has lately averaged from 3600 to 3700. In addition to these a distinct prison for convicted females is in progress of erection at Namur. In the chief town of each province there is a maison d'arrêt et de justice, for the accused, and those condemned for short terms; at the chief town of each arondissement a maison d'arrêt; and about 150 maisons de depôt, or police stations.

We have devoted some personal observation to the management of these prisons, and have no hesitation in pronouncing them very inadequate to their purpose, both as penal institutions and places of safe custody. The old vicious system of association continues to prevail, and the legitimate ends of punishment are made so subordinate to those of profit derivable from the prisoner's labour, that the establishments at Ghent and Vilvorde

See the official document entitled, "Compte de l'Administration de la Justice Criminelle en Belgique pendant les années 1831 à 1834," published by the minister of justice in 1836. The account has not been continued to a later date.

are, in fact, great manufactories rather than prisons. The Belgian army is almost entirely equipped by the labour of the prisoners, which is assigned to contractors for each particular branch of work. As an inducement to labour, the prisoners are allowed a portion of their earnings; and of this portion one third only is required to be set aside as a reserved fund, the other two thirds being allowed to be spent at the canteens, which are to be found in all the large prisons. Meat, tea, coffee, beer, and tobacco, are permitted to be sold in the canteens; and, we were assured, that but for this indulgence, it would be found difficult to get the work done by the prisoners. Now we are fully aware that the treatment of prisoners confined for long terms will always require considerable modifications of general rules; and in the penal prisons of Belgium, offenders are confined for terms of twenty years, and upwards, or for the residue of their lives. We even saw an old man in the Maison de force at Ghent, who had been a prisoner for sixty years! But we are convinced that it is perfectly idle to expect in Belgium or any other country either the repression of crime, or the reformation of offenders, from a system of prison discipline such as that we have been describing. M. Ducpétiaux, the inspector-general, is fully aware of its worthlessness, and in his valuable work on the Penitentiary system, prefixed to this article, has given the most satisfactory reasons for preferring a system of entire separation of the prisoners from each other. The government has also so far approved the latter system, as to cause an addition to be made to the Maison de force at Ghent, comprising thirty-six cells of sufficient dimensions to become the habitation of prisoners in a state of complete separation. We have some doubts whether the construction of these cells is such as effectually to preclude communication; but at all events the experiment is creditable to the Belgian government, as manifesting a desire to introduce into its prisons the system which the most experienced persons concur in recommending, as that which alone affords a prospect of any satisfactory moral results.

Discharged criminals are placed under the surveillance of the administrative commissions, and colleges of regents, who take measures to provide them with employment. This is no light difficulty in any country; and continually brings us back to the paramount importance of the systematic education of the people. For upon a recent inquiry, it was found, that out of every hundred offenders detained in the penal prisons of Belgium, sixtyone could neither read nor write, fifteen had received partial instruction, and twenty-four only could read and write fairly. Such facts speak more than volumes of argument, for sending the schoolmaster abroad, with all speed, throughout the Belgic pro

vinces.

ART. V.—1. Kant's, Im., sorgfältig revidirte Werke. Gesammtausgabe, in 10 Banden.-(Kant's Works, carefully revised. Complete edition, in 10 vols.) Leipzig. 1837 to 1839.

2. Kant's, Im., Sämmtliche Werke. Herausgegeben von Karl Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert. (Kant's Complete Works, edited by Rosenkranz and Schubert.) Vol. I. to VIII. Leipzig. 1837 to 1839.

It is not when the cold grey dawn of morning is first visible above the horizon and the student recruited by rest feels empowered to grapple anew with the intricacies of some subtle argument; it is not when the sun attains his meridian, and the sense delights in visions of spar-studded grottoes and crystal fountains; it is not at the gentle vesper hour when sweet emotions and kind sympathies are busy with our nature,-but in the dead hush of night when outward scenes and earthly relationships seem lost in the silence of Solemnity; when the soul retires from the external sphere, into the inmost world, and marvels that the common cases of Life should ever disturb her sublime repose; when she hearkens, a loving disciple, to the teachings of intuitive conscience— then is the time when the Philosophy of Kant is most worthily appreciated. The state of mind which he requires is not activity that is too restless; not lassitude-that is too dormant; not affection-that is too tender; but an elevated and wakeful submission, wherein truths are communicated by Reason, rather than acquired by Perception.

In a sympathetic estimation of Kant's Philosophy, there is first generated within the breast an indifference to, if not a doubt of, the world's material existence. The thoughts are then directed to a different order of things, where we are fully compensated for losing the empirical charms of sense, by a more dignified perception of moral and legislative Reason. Kant, it is true, deprives that reason of a hundred interests with which other Teachers have associated it. He neither looks with Fichte at the combat which ensues between Reason and the outward world as a sort of knightly tournament, wherein the Mental Power is the perpetual antagonist of Sense. He seeks not with Wolf to impose upon the Sovereign Faculty the mighty task of harmoniously perfecting the relationships of Spirit and Matter. He neither demands of it with Schelling enthusiasm for a religious system, nor presents to it the ideals of Hegel to be realized in national, social, or family life. All these are interesting theories which vanish with the close of day, and are lost in the oblivion of the midnight hour, when Kant summons before our eyes the magic

power of Will, and commands us to submit implicitly to practical reason's abstract law, called Duty.

This law Kant renders most prominent, impressive, and distinct, by divesting it of all the insinuating and alluring garbs wherewith, for the sake of attraction, both ancient and modern philosophers had apparelled it. They pointed out the beneficial results accruing from a strict fulfilment of duty, and sought to enlist the mental and moral faculties for the service of a stern though just Sovereign by holding out hopes of speedy psychical promotion, and the realization of whatever ideal majesty Poets had ascribed to the soul. These were the highest motives exhibited to induce obedience to the law Duty; others of a less elevated character were not wanting. Kant however considered all such coaxing discipline equally futile and injurious. Reason demanded acquiescence; and she would make no compact with Inclination for the honours which Deity had chartered to her

sway.

The novel mode of thought opened by Kant is not only distinguished by its contemplative depth and the strange mental world which it opens to the disciple; but for its immense progeny of notions, now become inalienably connected with all metaphysical theories. How many use with fluency and instinctive refinement of diction, the categories of subject and object, without once reflecting that Kant, in his criticism on Reason, first moulded those notions by a slow and persevering process into that philosophical profundity which has since rendered their application general and practical. Indeed every existing mode of thought is thoroughly tinctured with the categories of Kant, not to mention the various theories professedly based upon his system. Nor can we by any possibility travel out of his sphere. We shall now endeavour to sketch as briefly and clearly as possible the outlines of that powerful system which has wrought so great a revolution in modern philosophy.

The doctrine of Kant is Idealism; and, not common, but transcendental, Idealism. The difference between the two is this-Common Idealism considers the whole existing world as deception and shadow; and admits not the existence of objects in themselves, but only of the notions which we entertain concerning them. Transcendental Idealism on the other hand allows the existence of an external universe, but denies that we know it as it really is. It permits us only to be conversant with those apparitions of Nature which rise before our perceptive or cognitive faculties. Common Idealism never deals with the outward world as a result, but with its constituting qualities; while the transcendentalist only denies a perfect correspondence between

objects themselves and the virtues which simple and uncritical consciousness supposes in them. Thus simple Consciousness considers that all which comes in contact with sensible perception; such as colour, form, continuation of parts, their connection etc.; are contained in the object itself and constitute its real substance-while Transcendental Idealism discerns in the object the mere reflection of the cognitive Power in Man, which engraves upon the surface of sensible nature the impression of an innate law, resident in human existence. With the transcendental philosopher, the whole of the material world rests between two inscrutable points, as its two poles;-between the objects themselves, on the one side, and the power of Cognition, on the other. These two extreme polar points,-absolute object and absolute subject-have undergone further investigation by Kant's successors. According to his theory, however, Object and Subject form the boundaries of both Theory and Experiment:

All the notions which we form of objects-all the qualities which we attribute to them--are derived either from the impression of external Nature on the Senses, or from the innate forms which dwell in human perception. All we really know therefore of outward objects is, that they ARE; but WHAT they are remains, according to Kant, a perfect mystery. With the same mystery he likewise shrouds the true character of the pure subject in man, since its existence is real, and it may be contemplated as an object by itself. All the proper qualities which the subject discovers in itself, to wit, the faculties of thought, feeling, desire, &c., only indicate PARTS of the innate experience and conceptions of which it is capable. Thus our real knowledge of the subject is bounded by its existence :-We are ignorant of its absolute essence. On the other hand the manifold FORMS of our perception, (which perception may be termed the eye of the subject) and the objects of the outward world, Kant admits to be perfectly intelligible, and fully developed. He divides Forms into two classes; the one he distinguishes as à priori, the other as à posteriori. By the former he understands all that is necessarily contained in our intellect, apart from experience. The latter, on the contrary, signifies with him, everything that is deduced from the exhibition of facts.

The à priori class is of a twofold character. It comprises forms by which we behold and view, and forms by which we deliberate and judge. Of the former kind are SPACE and TIME, together with all that we know in, and by them; viz. the three dimensions as the properties of space; the mathematical figures as its possible divisions and sections; the arithmetical progressions which originate in the ascent and descent in the sphere of