municipality has or has not acquired the legal | streets, one of which, Frederick Road or title to the land lying under them. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Electricity, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. § 4.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 4911-4913.] Inasmuch as Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 23, § 366, and Baltimore City Charter (Laws 1898, pp. 244, 272-274, 290, c. 123) 88 6, 8, 10, 11, 37, not only make the consent or permission of the city a condition precedent to using its streets and highways for an electric light business, but also authorizing it to charge a fair price for franchises granted for the use of its streets, it has a direct and special pecuniary interest in preventing the unlawful use thereof by an electric company, and may, therefore, resort to injunction for that purpose. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1502; Dec. Dig. § 697.*] Avenue, is a turnpike road, and is by means thereof distributing its electric current to its but in direct violation of law. The defendcustomers not only without legal authority, 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 697*)-UN-ant answered the bill, admitting most of its LAWFUL USE OF CITY STREETS FOR ELECTRIC allegations, including the one that it had LIGHTS INJUNCTION. never been granted the right either by the state of Maryland or the city of Baltimore to conduct its business within the limits of the city, but denying the averment that it had no power or right to place its wires, poles, or cables within the city limits, and insisting that the only public street on which its poles or wires were placed was Wilkins avenue, and that all of the other streets mentioned in the bill, including the Frederick Road, were private, and not public, ones, and that it had obtained the right to use that road for the purposes of its business from the Frederick Turnpike Company. The. answer also asserted that the defendant havDelaware for the purpose of conducting, ing been incorporated under the laws of within the state of Maryland and city of Baltimore, the business of generating and furall of the laws of this state in reference to nishing electricity, and having complied with forming corporations and having erected its poles and strung its wires on private roads Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; James P. Gorten, Judge. Suit by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore against the Patapsco Electric Company. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE, WORTHINGTON, THOMAS, and HENRY, JJ. Robert Biggs and George R. Willis, for ap- and property in accordance with the regupellant. Albert C. Ritchie, for appellee. lations of the inspector of buildings of the city, it had the right to conduct its business as it was doing, and should not be subjected to interruption by the plaintiff in the manner attempted by the bill of complaint. The case having been heard on bill and answer and on oral statement of facts made by counsel in open court, the learned judge below passed a decree in conformity with the prayer of the bill, from which this appeal was taken. The bill only charges the defendant with conducting an electric power business; but, as the court below found as a fact that it was conducting an electric light business within the limits and upon the highways of Baltimore city, and the appeal was argued before us on that basis both orally and upon the briefs, we shall assume such to have been the fact. It was also conceded that the streets occupied by the plaintiff's poles and wires other than Wilkins avenue and the Frederick Road were private streets, and that the plaintiff did not begin its operations in the city until the year 1904. SCHMUCKER, J. This is an appeal from a decree of circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore city enjoining the appellant corporation from conducting an electric lighting business with- | in the limits of Baltimore city. The decree also required the appellant to remove from the streets and highways of the city the poles, wires, and other apparatus which had been used in connection with such business. The bill of complaint in the case alleged that the plaintiff was a municipal corporation, having full power and control over the streets, highways, lanes, and alleys within its corporate limits, and that the defendant was a corporation, created by the state of Delaware, engaged in the business of transmitting and supplying electric power by means of wires or cables; that the defendant was never granted by the state of Maryland or the city of Baltimore the right to conduct its business within the limits of the city, nor had it any franchise or right to place any of its wires, cables, or poles in, on, There is practically no dispute as to the or over any of the public or private streets, facts of the case; the questions presented highways, lanes, or alleys of the city. It is by the record being legal ones. The first further alleged that, notwithstanding the one is whether a foreign corporation authorfacts mentioned, the defendant wrongfully ized by its charter to conduct an electric and illegally placed and is now maintaining light and power business in Baltimore city certain of its wires, cables, and poles in, on, can use the streets and highways of the city and over streets, highways, lanes, and alleys, for that purpose without having first obtained which are public highways within the lim- a right or franchise to do so from either the its and under the control of the city and city or the state of Maryland. The second particularly on and over certain named question is whether the streets and avenues mentioned in the bill are streets or highways continue in any kind of business in this of the city within the meaning of the acts state, the transaction of which by domestic of assembly hereinafter mentioned. The corporations is not permitted by the laws third question is whether the city has the thereof. The application of the right to raise by a bill in equity the issue of law thus laid down to the case before comthe plaintiff's power to conduct its business, pels us to hold that the appellant, being conas it is now doing, and obtain relief by in- fessedly without any grant from the state of junction. Maryland or the city of Baltimore of the right to conduct its business within the city, is not entitled to place or maintain any poles, wires, or cables in its public streets or highways. It is conceded by both parties that of the streets of the city occupied by the plaintiff's poles and wires Wilkins avenue is a public street of the city and the others are private streets with the exception of the Frederick Road; so that upon this branch of the case the issue is narrowed down to the question whether that road, which is the main artery and thoroughfare used by the appellant for its poles and wires, is a street or highway of the city within the meaning of the statutes to which we have referred when interpreted in accordance with the legal principles properly applicable thereto. Section 366, art. 23, Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, requires all corporations incorporated or to be incorporated under section 28 of that article, which it is conceded includes electric light and power companies, to "obtain a special grant from the General Assembly of Maryland and also the assent and approval of the mayor and city council of Baltimore before using the streets or highways of Baltimore city, either the surface or the ground beneath the same." By section 6 of the Baltimore city charter (Laws 1898, p. 244, c. 123), power is conferred on the mayor and city council to regulate the use of the streets and sidewalks for electric light and other wires and poles and to prohibit their erection or compel their removal, and by sections 8, 10, and 11 the power is conferred on them to grant and to regulate the exercise of franchises in or relating to the city's highways, streets, wharves, etc. Section 37 prescribes the method of fixing the compensation, to be paid for the franchise, before it can be granted. These laws have been fully considered by us in the light of the general principles of law relating to municipal government in the cases of Edison Co. v. Hooper, 85 Md. 110, 113, 114, 36 Atl. 113; C. & P. Tel. Co. v. City, 89 Md. 689, 722, 43 Atl. 784, 44 Atl. 1033; Purnell v. McLane, 98 Md. 589, 56 Atl. 830; Brown v. Md. Tel. Co., 101 Md. 574, 580, 61 Atl. 338. In those cases it was determined that neither domestic corporations nor natural persons could construct or maintain their lines in the streets or highways of Baltimore city without the city's consent or a franchise therefor obtained from it. The comity exhibited by the several American states toward each other secures to a corporation created by any one of them almost the same use of its chartered powers and privileges in the territory of the others which it enjoys in the one that created it. That comity, however, is always extended to foreign corporations by the domestic state in such manner as to do no violence to its own policy or injury to its own citizens, and the foreign corporation will not be permitted to exercise any powers or conduct any occupation forbidden to a domestic corporation by the laws or policy of the state. Those limitations upon the principle of comity are not only inherently just and reasonable, but they are well supported by authority. 19 Cyc. 1222-1225; 13 A. & E. Encycl. 837-842, and cases there cited. They have recently been incorporated into the statute law of this state by section 66, c. 240, p. 50, Acts 1908, which provides that "no foreign corporation shall engage or That a turnpike road is a highway in the ordinary acceptation of that term may almost be said to be a matter of common knowledge. The very purpose for which they are created is to afford safe and convenient ways for public travel. That turnpikes are also highways in contemplation of law is well settled. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 947; 29 Encycl. of Law, p. 3. In Covington & Louisville Turnpike Road v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 198, 41 L. Ed. 560, it was said by the Supreme Court of the United States: "Turnpike roads established by a corporation under authority of law are public highways, and the right to exact tolls from those using them comes from the state creating the corporation." In Ulman v. Charles St. Avenue Co., 83 Md. 144, 145, 34 Atl. 366, this court held that the owners of land abutting on that avenue which was a turnpike road constructed by a corporation under authority from the Legislature like the Frederick Road could not acquire title by adverse possession to any portion of the bed of the avenue because it was a public road or highway. The Frederick Road, being a turnpike, is also a highway, and in our opinion the portion of it lying within the limits of Baltimore city is a "highway of Baltimore city" within the meaning of the statutes to which we have referred in this opinion. The preposition "of" used in that connection is not to be understood as descriptive of or relating to title or ownership, but as indicating location and municipal Jurisdiction, and the expression "streets or highways of Baltimore city" should be held to embrace streets or roads within the limits of that city which are currently traversed without objection by its citizens in pursuit of business or pleasure, whether the municipality has or has not acquired the legal title to the land lying under the money in his possession, is a proper party One owing money on a contract, or who has to a bill to set aside a fraudulent assignment of the debt evidenced by the contract. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. 88 741, 742; Dec. Dig. § 255.*] 3. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§ 237*)—REMEDY AT LAW. them. In other words, the provisions of the | 2. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (§ 255*) — Acstatutes to which we have referred were obtION TO SET ASIDE-PARTIES. viously to relate, not to the title, but to the use of the streets and highways to which they refer. Leaving out of view the policy strongly advocated in recent times on economic grounds of authorizing large municipalities to grant exclusive franchises for the supply of such public utilities as water, gas, and electiric light and power, the danger to the public of the presence of wires charged with deadly currents in, on, or over the thoroughfares used by the public may well have influenced the Legislature to require from persons or corporations authorized to conduct an electric light or power business to first obtain the assent and approval of Baltimore city before erecting poles or stringing wires upon any of the avenues of travel therein. We have no doubt of the right of the city to invoke, as it has done in this case, the aid of a court of equity to restrain by injunction the unlawful continuance by the appellant of its use of the streets and highways of the city. The statutes to which we have referred, not only make the obtaining of the consent or permission of the city a condition precedent to using them for the purposes of an electric light business, but they also authorize the municipality charge a fair price for all franchises grant to A receiver of an insolvent corporation, seeking to recover a balance due on a contract claimed by him to have been fraudulently assigned by the corporation, had no adequate remedy at law, since he must first proceed in equity to vacate the assignment. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Fraudulent Conveyances, Cent. Dig. 88 681-683; Dec. Dig. § 237.*] 4. EQUITY (§ 46*)-REMEDY AT LAW. Unless the remedy at law reaches the whole mischief and secures the whole right of the party at the present time and in the future, equity will interfere and give such relief as the exigency of the particular case may require. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 151, 152; Dec. Dig. § 46.*] 5. EQUITY ( 148*) — PLEADING-MULTIFARI OUSNESS. A bill for a discovery, account, and payment into court of a single debt, and for the cancellation of a fraudulent assignment of the debt and an injunction against the assignee restraining him from collecting the same, is not multifarious. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 341-367; Dec. Dig. § 148.*] Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; James P. Gorter, Judge. Bill by Horace L. Whitman, receiver, against William C. Dorsey and another. From the decree, complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE, WORTH ed by it for the use of its streets. It has Thomas F. Cadwalader and Arthur W. Machen, Jr., for appellant. Edwin J. Farber, for appellees. BRISCOE, J. The appeal in this case is from an order of circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore City, sustaining a demurrer of the appellee, one of the defendants below, and dismissing the bill of complaint as to the defendant the United Surety Company, with costs. The appellant is receiver of the Clarion Concrete Construction Company, a body corporate of this state, and was appointed under the provisions of Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 23, § 376, providing for the dissolution of insolvent corporations, in a cause entitled McCay Engineering Company v. Clarion Concrete Construction Company. The appellee the United Surety Company is also a body corporate, created and incorporated under the laws of Maryland and authorized to transact business in the state. The amended bill avers: That on the 13th of January, 1908, the appellant, as the re ceiver of the Clarion Company, was author- is, indebted to divers parties in amounts ized and directed, by an order of court, to whose total largely exceeds its assets, and, institute proceedings against William C. Dor- being thus insolvent, the making of the assey and the United Surety Company touching signment without adequate consideration was the matters set forth in the bill of complaint. a preference of Dorsey over the creditors, (3) That on the 25th day of September, 1906, and was made with the intent and effect of the Clarion Company entered into a contract hindering and defrauding creditors and was with the United Surety Company, whereby, undue, unlawful, fraudulent, and void, and in consideration of the sum of $5,800 pay- the assignment, if so made, should be set able at the time or times and in the manner aside. That if, under the terms of the allegin the contract provided, the Clarion Com- ed assignment, any good and sufficient conpany was to do and complete certain work sideration were due from Dorsey to the Clarupon a certain church building, to wit, St. ion Company therefor, Dorsey should make David's Episcopal Church, at Roland Park full discovery of and accounting for the in Baltimore county, Md. A copy of the same, and that he be allowed such credits in agreement is filed with the original bill in the accounting as he can show himself legally this cause; the original not being in the and equitably entitled to, and no more. The plaintiff's possession, but as he believes, and bill then charges: That Dorsey, as assignee therefore avers, in the possession of one or of the Clarion Company has instituted two other of the defendants. That in pursuance suits in the superior court of Baltimore City of the contract the Clarion Company did per- against the United Surety Company claiming form all the work which by the terms there moneys alleged to be due to him under the of it was required to perform, and a part of contract and assignment, and, if the suits are the money due thereon has been paid on ac- prosecuted to final judgment, they will result count to the Clarion Company by the United in turning over to Dorsey the whole amount Surety Company, but a considerable balance still unpaid on the original contract, whether yet remains due and unpaid, but the plain- the aforesaid assignment thereof to Dorsey tiff has no means whatever of ascertaining be an unlawful preference or not, and withor verifying the state of the account between out leaving to the receiver of the Clarion the United Surety Company and the Clarion Company any security for any debt or debts Company, inasmuch as the books and pa- of Dorsey that must be due and payable by pers turned over to him as receiver by the him to the Clarion Company if said assignofficers of the Clarion Company fail to dis- ment is not a mere voluntary instrument. close the same. The bill further alleges: And the plaintiff has no remedy at law to That it is claimed by William C. Dorsey, prevent the prosecution of the suits to judgone of the defendants, that by virtue of a ment and the collection of its moneys by Dorcertain alleged assignment (whereof the orig- sey from the United Surety Company. inal is not in the plaintiff's possession, but, The specific relief asked by the prayer of if it hath any existence, is in the possession the bill is as follows: (1) That the United of Dorsey, purporting to be executed by the Surety Company be directed to answer this Clarion Company through its proper officers, bill under oath and to render an account of in the terms set out in a paper alleged to be all moneys owing by it, under the contract a copy thereof and filed in this cause) the or about the erection of the church, to the Clarion Company set over and assigned to Clarion Company or its assigns, and to pay Dorsey all its title, interest, claim, and de- over into this court the balance shown to be mand in and to its contract with the United so due and owing, to wait the final adjudicaSurety Company and in and to all money | tion of the court in the premises. (2) That then due or thereafter to become due under William C. Dorsey be directed and commandsaid contract or otherwise for work done and material furnished in and about the construction of the church building. That the copy of the alleged assignment fails to disclose what consideration, if any, passed from Dorsey to the Clarion Company, and, as the books and papers in hand as receiver fail to disclose this matter, he cannot inform himself thereon without a full and frank discovery by the defendant William C. Dorsey. The bill also charges: That, if the assignment was made without consideration, it amounts to an undue preference in favor of Dorsey, and was made for the purpose and with the effect of defrauding the stockholders and creditors of the Clarion Company and is void, and ought to be set aside by this court. That, at the time the alleged assignment was ed to answer the allegations of the bill under oath, and to make full and complete discovery of his transactions with the Clarion Company, its officers and agents, touching the matters herein set forth, and to render an accounting of and pay over into this court all moneys that may be due by him to the Clarion Company or its assigns. (3) That Dorsey produce into court or otherwise satisfactorily account for the original, if any, of the alleged assignment and state in his answer under oath what consideration, if any, moved from him for the same, and whether, when, and how he hath satisfied or discharged the same. (4) That if the assignment shall appear to be voluntary or founded on inadequate consideration, or shall not appear to be genuine and duly executed by the aside by this court and delivered up to be | Oliver v. Palmer et al., 11 Gill & J. 449, it is canceled. (5) That in the meantime an in- said: "It is a fundamental rule of equitable junction be issued restraining Dorsey from jurisprudence that where a bill is filed to afprosecuting the actions in the superior court fect a fund, in which different persons have of Baltimore City or from collecting the an interest, all the persons interested theremoneys, or any part thereof, from the United in must be made parties ut finis sit litium, Surety Company, until the final adjudication that a multiplicity of actions may be avoidby this court in the premises. (6) And for ed." Earnshaw v. Stewart, 64 Md. 513, 2 Atl. other and further relief as the case may re- 734; Vetterlein v. Barnes, 124 U. S. 169, 8 quire. Sup. Ct. 441, 31 L. Ed. 400; Talbott v. Leatherbury, 92 Md. 167, 48 Atl. 733; Greer v. Wright, 6 Grat. (Va.) 154, 52 Am. Dec. 111; Barrett v. Reid, Wright (Ohio) 700; Stone v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 52 Ala. 589; Ladd v. Harvey, 27 N. H. 372; Thompson v. Thompson, 107 Ala. 163, 18 South. 247; Small v. Atwood, 1 Younge, 458. In the case at bar, the allegations of the bill are admitted by the demurrer, and for the purposes of the case we are to treat them as true. The bill charges that a part of the money due on the contract has been paid on account to the Clarion Company by the surety company, but a considerable balance yet remains due and unpaid, and the appellant can only ascertain the amount by a discovery from the appellee. It is also charged by the bill: That the assignment is without consideration, and, if without consideration, it amounts It appears from the record that on the 5th of March, 1908, the application for an injunction was granted by the court and directed to be issued, restraining the prosecution of the actions at law by Dorsey, and further restraining the collections of the moneys by him, from the appellee corporation, as prayed by the bill. Nothing further appears from the record to have been done in the case until the 24th of June, 1908, when the United Surety Company, one of the defendants, appeared and filed a demurrer to the plaintiff's bill, assigning three reasons as grounds of demurrer: (1) That the plaintiff has not stated in his amended bill such a case as entitles him to any relief in equity against this defendant. (2) That the plaintiff has a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law against this defendant. (3) And for that the amended bill is bad for multifariousness: to an undue preference and was made for First, in that this defendant the United Surety Company should not be joined as a party defendant in this proceeding, and the bill should be dismissed as against it; second, because this defendant is not charged with, nor is it a party to any fraud with which Dorsey, its codefendant, is charged; third, because the amended bill embraces several distinct subject-matters with which this defendant has nothing to do; fourth, because it states several distinct and different causes of action. And from the order of court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the plaintiff's original and amended bill, this appeal has been taken. the purpose and with the effect of defrauding the stockholders and creditors of the Clarion Company and is void; that at the time the assignment was made the Clarion Company was insolvent, and, being insolvent, the assignment was an unlawful and fraudulent preference over the creditors and should be set aside. Now, the appellees do not deny these and the other allegations of the bill by an answer, but they are admitted by the demurrer to be true and must be so considered by us on this appeal. The person owing the money on the contract, or who has the money in his possession, is, under all the authorities, a proper party to a bill to set aside a fraudulent assignment of the debt. Heinz v. German Bldg. Association, 95 Md. 160, 51 Atl. 951; Buckner v. Abrahams, 3 Tenn. Ch. App. 346; Bragg v. Gaynor, 85 Wis. 468, 55 N. W. 919, 21 L. R. A. 161; Hitt v. Ormsbee, 14 Ill. 233; Dillon v. Mutual Ins. Co., 44 Md. 386; McKim v. Thompson, 1 Bland, 150. The bill of complaint, it will be seen, is filed by a statutory receiver, under sections 376 and 377 of article 23 of the Code of Public General Laws of 1904, to set aside a fraudulent or preferential assignment by the insolvent corporation, of money due, or to become due under a contract and for a discovery and account, by the defendants, of the amount due under the contract at the The second ground of demurrer, that the time of the assignment and how much re- plaintiff has an adequate and complete rememains due and unpaid. There can be no dy at law, is also without merit. The receivquestion, it seems to us, that a court of equi-er, the appellant here, must first proceed in ty has jurisdiction to grant the equitable re- a court of equity to vacate the alleged fraudlief sought by this bill, and the defendant ulent assignment, because, until this is done, the United Surety Company is a proper par- he has no legal title to sue at law. He has ty, upon the allegations set out in the bill therefore no present, plain, and adequate and admitted by the demurrer to be true. remedy at law. Wanamaker v. Bowes, 36 The general rule, as supported by the weight Md. 56; Refining Co. v. Campbell, etc., 83 of authority, is that all persons having a Md. 56, 34 Atl. 369; N. Y. Ins. Co. v. Flack, present interest in the property should be 3 Md. 341, 56 Am. Dec. 742. In C. & P. R. made parties defendant in an action to set R. Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 57 Md. 267, it is |