are to believe the testimony of the expert witnesses, her dress must have been as near as one-half inch to the shaft, otherwise the accident could not have occurred, for it is only over such space that the latent power of suction can operate, unless the fabric attracted be frayed, in which event it might attract for a greater distance; but there is no evidence whatever in the case that her dress was frayed. herself showed that she was 35 years old, | necessarily be taken in connection with the and that she held the position of forelady in physical facts of the case. It must be rethe overall factory of the defendants in the membered, in the first place, that her back city of Baltimore, having been so employed was turned to the danger, and therefore she for about 6 months prior to the date of the was unable to speak with accuracy, and as accident, but having had an experience of 15 the space in which she stood, as above statyears in other factories in which shafting ed, was only about 35 by 161⁄2 inches, the latand other machinery was used. In this fac- ter being the distance from the edge of the tory were about 30 other female employés; table to the shaft, it will be irresistibly forc it being the duty of the appellant to instructed upon the mind that the "good distance" them and to superintend their work. The spoken of by plaintiff must necessarily have sewing machines were arranged in two paral- | been a very small space. Furthermore, if we lel rows on the floor of the factory, with an aisle between them, and were operated by steam power transmitted by shafting which ran under the center of the tables at a height of 8 inches from the floor. This shafting was boxed for the safety of the employés, in order to prevent their skirts and clothing from catching in it. On Monday, December 2, 1907, when the appellant came as usual to her work, she observed that one end of the shaft, which projected beyond the table, and which was properly covered on the Friday previous when the employés quit work, had been uncovered for the purpose of making an extension to connect with a button machine, about 35 inches distant from the end of the table. This extension of the shaft was made by an iron coupling, fastened with a set screw, that projected about one-half inch beyond the surface. She was aware that the object of boxing the shaft was to prevent catching the clothing of the employés, though she had no knowledge of machinery. On the day in question, in the afternoon, she left her desk, about 22 feet away, and went down the aisle for the purpose of giving instructions to the young woman who operated the machine at the end of the table next to the uncovered shafting. In doing this, without thinking about the danger, she took a position in the narrow space about 35 by 161⁄2 inches, between the new button machine, the end of the table, and the shafting, facing the employé, and with her back turned towards the shafting She stated on cross-examination, in reply to a question as to how near her clothing was to the shafting, that: "It wasn't near it. It was a good distance from it. I don't know exactly how far it was." Shortly after putting herself in this position, her skirts were caught by the shafting, pulling her under it, with the result that her leg was broken and her body otherwise mangled. Two expert witnesses, produced by the plaintiff, testified that shafting made as that above described had a power of suction that would draw around it a light fabric that came as close as one-half inch to it, and, if such fabric were frayed, this latent power might operate at a greater distance than onehalf inch. No notice was given to the appellant by her employers of any danger from this uncovered shafting. While we do not mean to reflect in the slightest degree upon her veracity, yet the statement of the plain We can avoid, and properly so, in our opinion, some of the difficulties presented in the argument by not attempting to separate the shaft, as a physical object, from the invisible force which it exerted a slight distance away, and to draw the distinction in the law of master and servant between these risks which, being obvious, are assumed, and those which, being latent, are not assumed; in other words, not to consider the existence of two dangers, one caused by the shaft itself and another by the latent power which it generated when in revolution, the plaintiff being familiar with the one and ignorant of the other. The circumstances of this case do not require us to do this. The testimony in this case shows that the plaintiff had knowledge that the shafting was boxed for the purpose of preventing it from catching to the clothing of the employés. Possessing this knowledge, it was her duty to avoid and keep at a safe distance from it when uncovered. There was an ample aisle between the two rows of sewing machines, from which she could have given instructions to her subordinate, and it does not appear that it was either necessary or more convenient for her to take the dangerous position, as described in the evidence, a position that was dangerous whether the shafting did or did not have the power of suction, or whether there was, or was not, a set screw extending a half inch beyond the surface. When an experienced employé and a mature woman, possessing such knowledge of the danger as she admits, either thoughtlessly or deliberately puts herself, with turned back, in such proximity to a known danger, we think that her conduct mounts up to that marked and decisive character which will warrant a court in declaring it, as matter of law, contributory negligence whereby her right to recover damages is defeated. Such conduct cannot be reconciled with that ordinary care which the plaintiff was bound to exercise herself before she (110 Md. 374) F. W. DODGE CO. v. H. A. HUGHES CO. (Court of Appeals of Maryland. March 23, 1909.) from the negligence of another. The position | a prayer is erroneous which instructs the she took was a dangerous one. She took such jury that, if the defendant relies upon the position thoughtlessly, and unnecessarily, and defense that the plaintiff was guilty of negli must bear the responsibility of her act. gence, that fact must be proved by the deShearman & Redfield on Negligence, vol. 1, § fendant by preponderating testimony." 96; 20 Encyc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 120; Booth The judgment will be affirmed. v. McLean Contracting Co. (Md.) 70 Atl. 104. Judgment affirmed, with costs. The case is different in its facts from the case of the American Tobacco Company v. Strickling, 88 Md. 500, 41 Atl. 1083, 69 L. R. A. 909, which was relied on by the appellant. In that case the employé was a young girl, aged 17, wholly ignorant of and inexperienced in the operation of machinery, whose duty it was to sweep down an aisle in which was placed a vertical smooth shaft, about 3 inches in diameter, and making about 170 revolutions a minute. She did not know, and had not been warned, that the shaft was dangerous, in that it might catch her clothing, and one morning, when engaged at her work, her apron was caught by this shaft, and she was whirled around with violence and seriously injured. In the case before us the employé was a mature and experienced woman, to whom the uncovered shafting was, or ought to have been, a signal of danger to put her on guard against the very accident which happened, though it may be that she did not know the precise manner in which the shaft might exert its force. An objection made to the fifth prayer is that it segregates the testimony of the appellant herself, ignoring the testimony of the other witnesses. We do not so construe it. Neither the language itself, nor the purpose of the prayer, nor the time at which it was offered, justify us in so considering it. It was presented at the close of all the evidence, and we think is sufficiently comprehensive in its terms to embrace all the evidence produced on the part of the plaintiff. The word "own," instead of restricting the evidence to an individual, we assume was used by way of emphasis to show that, instead of the fact of contributory negligence being proved, as is customary, by the defendant, in this case the plaintiff's own evidence had developed this matter of defense. 1. CONTRACTS (§ 213*)-CONSTRUCTION-TIME. INSTRUC 2. CONTRACTS (§ 353*) - ACTIONS [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contracts, Dec. Dig. § 353.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, p. 5684; vol. 7, p. 6040.] 3. TRIAL (8 261*)-INSTRUCTIONS-CorrectING REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. The court need not make a necessary cor rection in a prayer, but may simply refuse it. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. § 671; Dec. Dig. § 261.*1 Appeal from Circuit Court, Harford County; Geo. L. Van Bibber, Judge. Action by the F. W. Dodge Company against the H. A. Hughes Company. From a judgment for plaintiff for less than prayed, it appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, PEARCE, SCHMUCKER, BURKE, WORTHINGTON, THOMAS, and HENRY, JJ. Thomas F. Cadwalader, for appellant. Harry E. Karr, for appellee. It is further objected that this prayer is defective, because it takes from the jury the decision of a fact the onus of proof of which is on the party asking such instruction. However much some of the earlier decisions may give countenance to this objection, it can no longer be maintained since the ruling in the case of Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R. Co. v. Hand, 101 Md. 233, 61 Atl. THOMAS, J. The F. W. Dodge Company, 285. The syllabus of that case says: "In an appellant, was engaged in the business of action to recover damages for an injury caus- securing information in regard to building ed by defendant's negligence, if it appear operations and construction enterprises confrom the plaintiff's evidence that his own templated or in progress, and furnishing it negligence contributed to the occurrence of to subscribers to its reports. This informathe injury, he is not entitled to recover, and tion was obtained through canvassers or the defendant is not obliged to offer proof of agents, and reported to the office of the comsuch contributory negligence. Consequently pany. George C. Nagle, manager of the four hundred dollars per annum, payable quarterly, in advance, less discount of $50.00, making net rate $350.00. Specifications. Construction where slate products may be required or specified (also slate, tile and shingle roofing). It is further expressly agreed by the undersigned: (1) That all information, whether printed, written or verbal, in answer to special inquiry or voluntarily furnished by the said company or its agents or employés, shall be held in strict confidence and for their business only. (2) The conditions of this contract, as set forth herein, embody all the agreements and understandings concerning it, made or had, with the said company, or its agents or employés acting in its behalf, either verbal or written. This agreement cancels contract signed January 19th, by H. A. Hughes. H. A. Hughes Company, H. A. Hughes. Calvert Bldg., Balto., Md. Must be signed by either a proprietor, one of a firm, a corporation officer with his name and official title, or by a duly empowered attorney. 2-16 1905 (Nagle).'” Philadelphia office, at the trial of this case in the circuit court for Harford county, testified: That as manager of that office he had charge of the business of the company in the territory including Southern Pennsylvania, Southern New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and District of Columbia. That in that territory the company employed 17 canvassers, who were "charged with the duty of securing information of building operations and construction enterprises contemplated or in progress, and of transmitting such information to the Philadelphia office for the benefit of subscribers to the reports of the plaintiff. That the method employed by said canvassers is to make every effort to get information at first hand by means of personal visits to architects, contractors, and owners at their offices and places of business and by making personal inquiries of the parties themselves or the clerks or other members of their office force, if the parties are out. That information from trade journals is also resorted to in the matter of sealed proposals for enterprises, which information cannot be got elsewhere. That as to other construction enterprises the information is always sought and obtained from people directly interested in the operations, as architects, contractors, or owners, or from the clerks or employés in charge of their offices. That the method of furnishing this information to subscribers is by mailing reports immediately upon receipt of such information by the Philadelphia or other central office. The reports are numbered, and each number refers to a single operation; subsequent reports on the same job being lettered, the first one being, e. g., No. 101269A, the next number 101269B, and so on, and each report specifying the condition of the work upon the date on which it is issued. That the reports from the Philadelphia office were furnished at a rate from 50 to more than 200 per day during the time covered by the contract hereinafter set out, and were mailed to all subscribers in the aforesaid territory. That, so far as witness knows, these reports were substantially correct, but witness could not guarantee that the informers were always truthful, or that the reports were absolutely correct in all particulars. That the plaintiff company makes a specialty of reports upon enterprises requiring roofing and structural slate products. That FebruH. A. Hughes testified in behalf of the apary 16th, in the year 1905, the defendant pellee: That he "has been in the slate busicompany, through H. A. Hughes its president, ness for 11 years, during 8 of which he repexecuted the following contract: "The under-resented the Peach Bottom Company; that signed hereby employs the F. W. Dodge Com- he started in business for himself in October, pany for the term of one year from February 1, 1905, to make inquiries, investigate and report such information as they are able to obtain as hereinafter specified pertaining to the construction enterprises contemplated or in progress throughout Eastern Ohio, West Va., Penna., So. N. J., Del., Md., and D. C. In consideration of said services, the under The H. A. Hughes Company, the appellee, paid on account of the $350 mentioned in the contract $87.50, but refused to pay the remaining $262.50, and this suit was brought to recover it. George C. Nagle further testified: That the appellee's contract "covers the territory centering in the Pittsburg office, as well as that centering in the Philadelphia office. * That the reports were regularly forwarded from both said offices to the defendant; first to defendant's address in the Calvert building, Baltimore, Md., then later to the defendant's address at Delta P. O., Pa., upon receipt of a notice from the post office that the defendant's address had been changed to that point. That the said reports were regularly mailed to the defendant company until March 6, 1906. * That during the time of the aforesaid contract the plaintiff maintained 1 resident canvasser in Baltimore and 5 in Philadelphia; there being 17 altogether connected with the office. * That the plaintiff, at the time of the contract, maintained 15 men in Pittsburg district, and that the reports obtained by the canvassers are turned in each night by mail to the central office of the territory, and when received are at once forwarded to subscribers." 1904, and organized the defendant company on February 1, 1905"; that he "executed the contract of February 16, 1905, on behalf of the defendant company, and that he made use of the services furnished in pursuance of the said contract until the 10th or 20th of April, 1905; that the reports were inaccurate; that when reports of inaccurate char offered in evidence in this case, the plaintiff is not bound to show that the information furnished or forwarded by it to the defendant was in all respects accurate; provided the jury believe that the plaintiff did forward or furnish promptly and regularly to the defendant such information as it was able to obtain after making in good faith all reasonable efforts to obtain the same." ice that character the defendant discontinued, As modified. The plaintiff prays the court the service; that from February 1 to April to instruct the jury that, under the contract 19, 1905, the defendant received one reply, from parties communicated with in consequence of the plaintiff's report that led to business, and the value of said business was but $38; that upon receipt of the reports, or within a few days thereafter, the defendant company would communicate by mail with contractors or owners named in said reports, and the answers stated either that slate products were not required, or that the contract had already been let, or that the building operation was abandoned; that the reports were sent to Delta after the defendant company moved its office there; that on or about April 20, 1905, owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the service, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff refusing to receive any more of the reports, and discontinuing the service, and from that time on the defendant refused to receive any of said reports; that the time defendant received said reports constituted one-quarter of the contract, and defendant paid for one quarterly installment." In construing contracts courts "look to the language employed, the subject-matter, and the surrounding circumstances. They are never shut out from the same light which the parties enjoyed when the contract was executed, and in that view they are entitled to place themselves in the same situation as the parties who made the contract, so as to view the circumstances as they viewed them, and so to judge of the meaning of the words and of the correct application of the language to the things described." Machen v. Hooper, 73 Md. 342, 21 Atl. 67; Varnum v. Thurston, 17 Md. 470; Roberts v. Bonaparte, 73 Md. 191, 20 Atl. 918, 10 L. R. A. 689; Brown v. Deford & Co., 83 Md. 311, 34 Atl. 788; 9 Cyc. 587. In the case of B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Brydon, 65 Md. 198, 611, 3 Atl. 306, 9 Atl. 126, 57 Am. Rep. 318, the court said: "We must consider the subject-matter of the agreement and the knowledge of it which the parties possessed, the objects which they sought to accomplish, and the inducements which they had for dealing with each other as they did." As we have said, the appellant was engaged in the business of securing and furnishing to its subscribers information in regard This is substantially all the evidence in the record having any bearing on the questions presented by this appeal by the plaintiff below, from a judgment in its favor for $87.50. The record contains only one exception, and that is to the action of the court below in rejecting plaintiff's first prayer and modifying its second prayer. Plaintiff's first prayer, and second prayer as offered and as modified, are as follows: "(1) The plaintiff prays the court to instruct the jury that if they find that the contract between plaintiff and defendant offered in evidence dated February 16, 1905, was executed by the defendant, to construction enterprises contemplated or and if they further find from the evidence in progress, and the appellee was a manuthat the plaintiff furnished to the defendant facturer and seller of slate and slate produring the term of one year from February ducts used in construction. The undertaking 1, 1905, such information as it was able to of the appellant was to furnish, and the obobtain as to the matters specified in said ject of the appellee was to obtain, such incontract, and that said information was reg- formation as was thought would enable the ularly forwarded to the defendant's address appellee to sell its slate or slate products. by mail, then whether the defendant declined In order to accomplish this undertaking of to receive the same or not, during said the appellant and object of the appellee, it period, the verdict must be for the plaintiff, was as essential that the information, when even though the jury are of opinion that all obtained, should be promptly furnished to the the information so furnished was not in all appellee, as that it should be reasonably acrespects accurate; provided they shall be curate. Reports of construction enterprises satisfied from the evidence that the informa- contemplated or in progress, unless promptly tion actually forwarded to the defendant received, would not afford the subscribers an was obtained and forwarded by the plain- opportunity to sell material to be used in tiff in good faith and after making every rea- such construction. It was therefore the duty sonable effort to obtain and verify the same. of the appellant not only to make "every (2) The plaintiff prays the court to instruct reasonable effort" to secure accurate inforthe jury that, under the contract offered in mation, but, when so obtained, to promptly evidence in this case, the plaintiff is not forward it to the appellee in order that he bound to show that the information furnished might secure the benefits of it contemplated or forwarded by it to the defendant was in by the parties to the agreement. A failure to all respects accurate; provided the jury be- make such prompt delivery would practically lieve that the plaintiff did forward or furnish defeat the purpose for which the information to the defendant such information as it was was obtained. The appellant, by its course able to obtain after making in good faith all of business, recognized the importance of im leges in the territory of the others which it enhowever, to exercise privileges inconsistent with joys in its home state; it not being permitted, the policy and laws of the state to which it is foreign. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 2529; Dec. Dig. § 638.*] 2. CORPORATIONS (§ 639*)-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-POWERS AND PRIVILEGES-USE OF CITY STREETS OR HIGHWAYS BY ELECTRIC COMPANY. information secured. Witness Nagle testi-, the same use of its chartered powers and privified that "the method of furnishing this information to subscribers is by mailing reports immediately upon receipt of such information" at the central office, and, further, that "the reports obtained by the canvassers are turned in each night by mail to the central office of the territory, and when received are at once forwarded to subscribers." Considering "the objects which they sought to accomplish and the inducements which they had for dealing with each other as they did," the obvious meaning of the agreement was that the appellant was to promptly forward to the appellee the information it undertook to furnish, and there was, accordingly, no error in the modification of plaintiff's second prayer so as to require the jury to find that the information sent to the defendant was forwarded "promptly and regularly." Plaintiff's first prayer, while it required the jury to find that the information furnished was "regularly" forwarded to the defendant, ignored the duty of the plaintiff to forward the reports promptly, and for that reason was defective. It is true that "regularly" may mean "in due order or time," but it is generally understood as meaning in compliance with some prescribed or adopted rule or order, while "promptly," in the sense in which it was employed in the modified prayer and was doubtless understood by the jury, meant without unnecessary delay. Webster's International Dictionary; Imperial Dictionary; Century Dictionary & Ency. As plaintiff's first prayer did not require the jury to find that the reports were promptly forwarded to the defendant, it was properly rejected. In the case of Insurance Cos. v. Bathhurst, 5 Gill & J. 159, the court, on page 225, said: "Courts of justice are not bound to modify or fashion the instructions moved for by counsel, so as to bring them within the rules of law. They may, if they see fit, content themselves with a simple refusal of any prayer not sanctioned by the rules of law." Doyle v. Com'rs of Balt. Co., 12 Gill & J. 484; Birney v. Telegraph Co., 18 Md. 357, 81 Am. Dec. 607; Kettlewell v. Peters, 23 Md. 316; Hutzler v. Lord, 64 Md. 534, 3 Atl. 891. Finding no error in the rejection of plaintiff's first prayer or in the modification of plaintiff's second prayer, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed, with costs. (110 Md. 306) PATAPSCO ELECTRIC CO. v. MAYOR, 1. CORPORATIONS (§ 638*)-FOREIGN CORPO- Comity between the states secures to a corporation created by any one of them almost Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 23, § 366, requires corporations incorporated under seceral Assembly and the assent and approval of tion 28 to obtain a special grant from the Genthe mayor and council before using the streets and highways of Baltimore. Section 6 of the city charter (Laws 1898, p. 244, c. 123) conlate the use of the streets and sidewalks for fers power on the mayor and council to reguelectric light and other wires and poles, and to prohibit their erection or compel their removal. By sections 8, 10, and 11 power is conferred franchises in the city streets. on them to grant and regulate the exercise of Section 3 prescribes the method of fixing compensation to be paid therefor before the franchise can be granted. Acts 1908, p. 50, c. 240, § 66, provides that no foreign corporation shall engage or continue in any kind of business in this state, the transaction of which is not permitted by the laws thereof. Held, that a foreign electric company conduct its business within the city, or place could not without a grant from the state or city or maintain any poles, wires, or cables in its public streets or highways. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 2530-2532; Dec. Dig. § 639.*] 3. TURNPIKES AND TOLL ROADS (§ 2*)-TURNPIKE ROAD AS "HIGHWAY." That a turnpike road which is created for the very purpose of affording safe and convenient ways for public travel is a highway in the ordinary acceptation of the term may be almost said to be a matter of common knowledge; and that turnpikes are also highways in contemplation of law is well settled. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Turnpikes and Toll Roads, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dec. Dig. § 2.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, pp. 3304, 3305; vol. 8, p. 7678.] 4. ELECTRICITY (§ 4*)-LIGHT AND POWER COMPANIES-FRANCHISES AND USE OF CITY STREET AS "HIGHWAY." A turnpike road is a "highway," and a portion thereof within the limits of Baltimore is a "highway of Baltimore city" within the meaning of Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 23, § 366, and Baltimore City Charter (Laws 1898, pp. 244, 272-274, 290, c. 123) §§ 6, 8, 10, 11, and 37, relating to the use of highways in such city by electric light and power companies, and the granting of franchises for that purpose. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Electricity, Cent. Dig. § 1; Dec. Dig. § 4.*] 5. ELECTRICITY (§ 4*)-LIGHT AND POWER COMPANIES-USE OF CITY STREETS OR HIGHWAYS "OF." The preposition "of," as used in Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art. 23, § 366, relating to the "streets or highways of Baltimore city," and the granting of franchises for their use to electric light and power companies, is not to be understood as descriptive of or relating to title or ownership, but as indicating location and municipal jurisdiction; and the expression quoted should be held to embrace streets or roads within the limits of that city which are currently traversed without objection by its citizens in pursuit of business or pleasure, whether the |