eminence or predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So in the Roman state, the people had their plebiscita, and gave the suffrage in the election of magistrates; yet the senate (as the state stood) for the most part swayed the state, and bare the chief rule. So in the Venetian state, the duke seemeth to represent a monarch, and the senate to be his council; yet the duke hath no power in state matters, but is like a head set on by art, that beareth no brain. And so that state is senatorical or aristocratical. Causes of states and commonwealths in general. 1. Measure. 2. Parts, and their qualities. 3. Changing and altering a state. Founding a state. In founding a state are to be considered two things; 1. Proportion. 2. Parts. 1. Proportion is a just measure or mediocrity of the state, whereby it is framed and kept in that order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind; to wit, so that a monarch be not too monarchical, strict, or absolute, as the Russe kings; nor aristocratical, that is, over-mated, or eclipsed by the nobility, as the Scottish kingdom, but ever respective to the other degrees. That aristocracy be not too magnificent nor entire to itself, but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government, as the Venetians, and sometimes the Romans allowed the people to elect certain magistrates out of themselves, to have a tribune, to make plebiscita, &c. So a free state or commonwealth, that it be not over popular, viz. that it depress not too much the richer, wiser, nor learned sort; but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and mysteries of that state, that they seek no alteration of the present state. The reason, because the moderate states in their se veral kinds (as all other things that observe the mean) are best framed for their continuance, because they give less cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the wealth, honour, and liberty, which they see in others that govern the state; and so are less subject to stirs and commotions, and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set. 2. The parts of the state, or those magistrates that bear place or sway in the public government. Parts or partakers of public government are, 1. Council or senate, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to war and peace, magistrates, &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be more special care, that they may be men expert in matter of policy, because it is their trade and vocation, as men use to choose for pilots and masters of ships such as know the art of navigation, and not husbandmen, &c. and so the contrary. 2. Magistrates and officers, which are to be executioners of that which is consulted, and found to be expedient for the commonwealth, wherein are to be observed the kinds of magistrates, that they be such as fit that kind of government; the time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be chosen. 3. Judges, to determine in civil and criminal matters, where are to be observed out of whom they are to be chosen, what kinds are necessary, and the manner of judgment and judicial proceeding. In magistracies are to be observed their kinds; as 1. Civil. 2. Eccle- 1. Superiors, which are to be such, and of that kind, as agree with the state; as consuls for a year, and not perpetual dictators in a senatory state. Pretors and censors, that oversee manners and orders of the people. For a kingdom, lieutenants of shires, marshals, masters of horse, admirals, &c. Inferiors, as conservators of peace, constables, &c. Overseers of youth, that take care of their education for civil and warlike exercise. Clerks of the market, that provide for the quantity and price of victual. Ediles, for buildings, streets, bounds. Questors or treasurers, to keep and dispense the public treasury. Actuaries or recorders, which keep the public records. Jailors to keep prisons and prisoners. 1. As bishops or pastors, elders, wardens. 2. Time of magistrates, whereof some are perpetual, some for a time, viz. for more years, a year, half a year, according to the necessity of the commonwealth, and not perpetual; or at least not hereditary in a kingdom. Yearly in an aristocracy, or half yearly in a free state. 3. Manner of choice, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage, and not by lot. Causes of preserving a state, or commonwealth. In preserving of ries, or states two sophisms. 2. Particular, for every several state. 1. General, for all states. 2. Particular, for every state. Mysteries, or sophisms. Mysteries, or sophisms of state, are certain secret practices, either for the avoiding of danger, or averting such effects as tend not to the preservation of the present state, as it is set or founded. State mysteries are of two sorts. 1. General; that pertain to all states; as first, to provide by all means, that the same degree or part of the commonwealth do not exceed both in quantity and quality. In quantity, as that the number of the nobility, or of great persons, be not more than the state or commonwealth can bear. In quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more than it is meet for that degree: for as in weights, the heavier weights bear down the scale; so in commonwealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in quality and quantity overswayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations, and conversions of state. Secondly, to provide by all means, that the middle sort of people exceed both the extremes, viz. of nobility and gentry, and the base rascal and beggarly sort. For this maketh the state constant and firm, when both the extremes are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band; as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggarly sort together, it is not to be feared. To these two points the particular rules in sophisms of every commonwealth are to be applied. 2. Particular; that serve for preservation of every commonwealth in that form of state wherein it is settled. As in a kingdom; that the nobility may be accustomed to bear the government of the prince, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the prince's eye, it is expe dient to call them up at certain times to the prince's court, under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence, and to have their children, especially their eldest, to be attendant upon the prince, as of special favour towards them and theirs, that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince, and be as hostages for the good behaviour and faithful dealing of their parents, especially if they be of any suspected note. To that end serves the Persian practice, in having a band or train of the satraps' children, and other nobles, to attend the court; which was well imitated by our train of a henchmen, if they were of the nobler sort. Again, sometimes to borrow small sums of his subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow greater sums, and never pay so in an oligarchy, lest it decline to a popular state, they deceive the people with this and the like sophisms; viz. they compel their own sort, to wit, the rich men, by great penalties, to frequent their assemblies for choosing of magistrates, for provision of armour, warlike exercises, making and execution of laws, &c. By that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer, but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to be absent, and to neglect these assemblies, under pretence that they will not draw them from their business, and private earnings: yet withal to cite thither some few of them, viz. so many as are easily overmatched by the richer sort, to make a show that they would have the people, or poorer sort, partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies with the tediousness of consultations, greatness of fines, if they should misdo, to the end, to make them unwilling to come again, or to have to do with those consultations; by which means the richer sort do still govern the state, with the people's liking, and good contentment. Axioms or rules of preserving the state are, |
