without just cause be dispossessed by the prince; and those people having had dependency of their lords and their ancestors, do ever bear unto them a certain natural love and dutiful respect: whoso therefore compareth these principalities shall perceive, that to conquer a state signioril there is great difficulty, but being conquered it may easily be maintained; for the difficulty to conquer such a state proceedeth from the lack of mean lords to call in and assist the prince that doth invade: who therefore desireth to subdue a nation thus governed must of force assault all the people, and rather trust in his own strength than the aid of the country. But if he can prevail, then one only fear remaineth, which is the prince's posterity, which necessarily must be extinguished, because the prince's race only hath interest both in the people and soldiers. But to enter a monarchy royal is an enterprise of no great difficulty, when he that doth enter hath the friendship and aid of some mean lords to take his part, and prepare the place where he is to arrive.

CHAP. IV.

Of monarchies royal, with the means to maintain them. MONARCHIES royal are for the most part ancient and hereditary, and consequently easy to be governed. For it is sufficient for the prince to maintain the old laws, and on occasion temporise with those accidents that happen: such a state cannot be taken from the prince without excessive force; and if it be, it shall be soon recovered. Example, England and France.

But if a monarchy newly conquered be annexed unto an old, and not properly ancient, then is it with much more difficulty maintained.

First, For that men naturally inclined to variation are easily induced to take arms against him that newly governeth.

Secondly, Every new prince is forced to exact as well upon those subjects that joined with him as those that did resist him, and therefore shall offend both. Example, Ire

land annexed to the crown of England, Sicily and Naples to Spain.

The means to maintain such a monarchy is,

First, To extinguish the race of him that was anciently prince.

Secondly, To continue all laws and customs in the former force; for so shall the subject find nothing altered but the prince, and therefore will soon rest contented; and the rather if that new monarchy and the ancient dominion of the prince be of one language; but if the people be of a contrary language and humour, then to hold it there needeth great industry and fortune: in that case, the best way is that the prince should inhabit there, as well to encounter all inconveniencies proceeding from the subject, as to preserve the people from oppression of his own ministers. Another way is to send thither certain colonies, and plant them in fit places, or else to settle some garrisons both of horse and foot; but colonies are less chargeable to the prince. As for the people inhabitant, (who must necessarily remove, they being a small number, and dispossessed,) they cannot have power to offend; for in that case this rule or maxim shall be found true, that men must be either kindly entreated, or with all extremity oppressed; because of light injuries they may be revenged, but of utter oppression they

cannot.

A third way to hold a conquered dominion is, to cherish and defend the neighbours of little power, and oppress or keep under those that are most potent, and, above all, to take order that no foreign prince or power do enter; for it is ever to be looked for, that so many of the nation as are discontented, either for ambition or fear, will be ever ready to bring in strangers; and to conclude this matter of principality annexed, I say it behoveth every prince possessed of such a state never to increase the power of any potent neighbour, never to oppress those that are of small power, never to permit any foreign potentate to enter, but ever to plant colonies and garrisons, or else to make that dominion his chief habitation.

CHAP. V.

Of monarchies tyrannical.

TYRANNICAL princes are not advanced by favour, neither do they trust unto fortune, but by degrees of war, or else by some other indirect means, do aspire unto greatness; and therein do maintain themselves by all ways either honest or dishonest, without respect of justice, conscience, or law either of nations or nature: a prince by such impious means aspired, and desiring to hold that he hath gained, will take order that the cruelties he committeth may be done roundly, suddenly, and, as it were, at an instant; for if they be executed at leisure, and by piecemeal, then will the prince's fears continue long, and the terror in subjects take deeper impression, whose nature is such that either they must be bound by benefits, or by cruelty made sure from offending. Example, Dionysius and Agathocles.

CHAP. VI.

Of new-found monarchies and principalities, with the means to perpetuate them.

SOME other princes there are that from private estate have aspired to sovereignty, not by unnatural or impious proceedings, as the former, but by virtue and fortune, and being aspired have found no great difficulty to be maintained; for such a prince having no other dominion, is forced to settle himself where he is become a prince. But here is to be noted, that albeit such a man be virtuous, yet wanting fortune his virtue proveth to small purpose, and fortune without virtue doth seldom work any great effect. Howsoever it be, a prince being aspired, both by the aid of the one and of the other, shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten; because he is forced to introduce new laws and new orders of government differing from the old, as well for his own security as confirmation of the government; for avoiding of which dangers, he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compel his subjects to obey, or must pray in aid of others. If he can

do the first, he needeth not doubt; but being driven to the other, his greatness cannot long continue: for albeit a matter of no difficulty it is to persuade a people, yet to make them constant is a work well near impossible. Example, Theseus, Cyrus, Romulus. The second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favour or corruption, or by the virtue or greatness of fortune or friends: a prince by any or all these means advanced, and desirous to hold his estate, must endeavour by his own virtue to maintain himself without depending upon any other, which may be done by this means: first, to assure all enemies from offending; secondly, to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may; thirdly, to compass all designs tending to his honour or profit, and bring them to pass either by fraud or force; fourthly, to make himself honoured and followed of captains and soldiers; fifthly, to oppress all those that would or can offend; sixthly, to be obsequious and liberal to friends, magnanimous and terrible to foes; seventhly, to casse all old and unfaithful bands, and entertain new; eighthly, to hold such amity with kings and princes, as they ought reasonably to favour him; or if they would offend, easily they cannot. Example, Giovannic, Torrigiani, Cæsar Borgia.

The third and last means, whereby private persons do aspire to principalities, is not force and violence, but mere good-will and favour of men. The cause or occasion thereof is only virtue or fortune, or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness, because he aspireth either by favour of the people, or by favour of the nobility; for these contrary humours are in all commonwealths to be found; and the reason thereof is, that the great men do ever endeavour to oppress the people, and the people do labour not to be oppressed by them. Of these divers appetites one of these three effects do proceed; viz. principality, liberty, or licentious life. Principality may come either by love of the multitude, or of the great men; for when any of these factions do find themselves oppressed, then do they soon consent to make one a prince, hoping by his virtue and

valour to be defended. Example, Francesco Sforza, Alessandro de Medici.

A prince in this sort aspired, to maintain his estate, must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced; for if by favour of great men he be aspired, then must he meet with many difficulties; for having about him divers persons of great quality, and such as were but lately his equals, hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth: but if the prince be advanced by the people, few or none shall hardly disobey him. So it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude is much more secure than he whom the nobility preferreth; for common people do not desire to enjoy more than their own, and to be defended from oppression; but great men do study, not only to hold their own, but also to command and insult upon inferiors. Note, That all monarchies are principalities, but all principalities are not monarchies.

CHAP. VII.

Of councils, and counsellors in general.

A SENATE or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors, to give advice to him or them that have in the commonweal power sovereign.

A counsellor is called in the Latin senator; which word signifieth in effect an old man. The Grecians and Romans also most commonly composed their councils of ancient and expert persons; for if they, or the greater part of them, had been young men, then might the council have more properly been called a juvenate than a senate.

The chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is, to have no dependance on any other prince or commonweal; either oath, homage, natural obligation, pension, or reward. In this point the Venetians have been ever most precise, and for that reason do not admit any cardinal or other clergyman to be either of or at their councils; therefore, when the Venetian senate is assembled, the usher being ready to shut the door, crieth aloud, Fuora preti, De