They are strong by the situation of their countries, strong in cities, mariners, and shipping; by reason of the country and fortified towns, they are able to defend themselves; and by reason of the multitude of their ships, they are in a condition to offend others.

There are no people more industrious in all things, or more provident. Witness these two particulars: the first, that having in Holland neither timber nor iron, they build more ships, and cheaper, than either England or Spain, which have plenty of both.

The second is, that whereas their grounds are in effect all pastures, and have no wheat growing of their own, they not only serve themselves cheap, but have used (when the trade was open) to furnish both Spain, Portugal, and Italy, with the same grain. Now whether it will stand with your majesty's safety to abandon a nation so near, so strong, and so industrious, will be the question. I answer, that for your majesty to leave the Netherlands to themselves, as they are considered strong, can bring no other danger to your majesty than is common to all princes that have strong neighbours.

But if they cannot subsist of themselves, nor without their subjection to some other prince, or state, they shall not be able to defend themselves; then the peril which may ensue is very likely, or rather assured to Britain. It is first therefore to be inquired, whether they can subsist, or no? If they can, it is formerly answered; if they cannot, on what prince they are likeliest to rely?

First, that they have means to defend themselves, experience denies; and that experience is grounded upon good reason for as your majesty best knows it, as from the beginning of their revolt they have made strangers to their bodies their defenders, so are their own people altogether unapt for soldiers: if they were otherwise, yet have their estates now such dominion, as they can employ them otherways; most part of their people are mechanics, and live by their handicrafts, their craftsmen maintain their trades, and navigation produces their revenues, which maintain

their wars. And though there have been certain troops erected of Frysons, and out of other island parts; yet these do rather serve to make up their numbers, and furnish their garrisons, than that they have used them in any important service, or in the field: so that the strength of their armies have consisted, for the most part, of English, Scotch, and French.

If then such be the composition of their armies, it is first apparent that they cannot defend themselves by their proper forces; and that they will rely and give themselves to one of these princes; viz. to the English, (accounting now England and Scotland all one,) or French; or else return again, in the end, to the archduke, or to the Spanish king.

The reason why they bind themselves to this choice is, power and neighbourhood: your majesty and the French being best able and the next adjoining.

To expect succour from the Germans, or from other princes which are remote, they cannot :

First, because those princes have dependance on the emperor.

Secondly, because they are not of ability to maintain the quarrel.

And thirdly, and chiefly, because their succour cannot come so far, being to march over-land, the charge being double to all armies that pass through the territories of other princes; which must either be able to master the territories, or pass by safe conducts whither they march.

So great armies, as shall master countries, the States need not; and the lesser will be always in danger to be cut off, or resisted. The neighbouring princes being more fearful of the Spaniard's greatness, than careful of the States' amity.

But the Netherlands require often supply, and few in number, such troops as may be transported by sea, in the Netherlands' own shipping, and at an easy rate, and in lesser time for as England, Scotland, and France may supply them in twenty-four hours; so from any prince or state

else, they may be, in coming over-land, twenty-four weeks. It is therefore likely, that if your majesty refuse them, they will offer themselves to the French, or return to the Spanish obedience; both which will bring equal danger to your majesty's state.

The reasons are many; but I will rehearse them in a few words, because your majesty can better judge by a word, than another can by a volume.

There are two ways by which England may be afflicted. The one by invasion, being put to the defensive, in which we shall but cast lots for our own garments.

The other by impeachment of our trades; by which trades all commonwealths flourish, and are enriched.

Invaded or impeached we cannot be, but by sea; and therefore that enemy which is strongest by shipping is most to be suspected and feared.

It is certain the Netherlands are able to furnish more ships of war, and mariners, than all England and Scotland can do, with greater facility, and in shorter time: what advantages your majesty hath by the powerfulness of your own ships, the same advantages are answered by the Netherlands in their numbers; who by reason of their long wars with Spain, and diligent search over the world for trade, are become the most orderly and best disciplined men of war by sea in all Europe.

This great strength of shipping is not so much to be accounted of, if it were not in these two respects.

The one, because it is so exceeding near us.

The other, because Holland and Zealand are situate between us and our best trades, which are all eastward.

For our Muscovia fleets, our merchant adventurers, our companies of Eastland, and all which trade through the Sound, from whence we have our materials for shipping, must pass by Holland.

And if those trades were impeached, all sorts of people would suffer together, and the commonwealth fall into extreme poverty and decay.

And whereas it may be objected, that our Muscovia fleet,

and our merchant adventurers are of sufficient strength to make their own passage, and need not fear the force of the Netherlands; I confess, that, as they may pass, so they may perish.

But this is a general and infallible rule in all the course of merchandise, that wheresoever the adventure is great and the profit little, the adventurer will soon give up.

But if the English merchants shall be driven to double man their ships, and furnish them with double munition, and pay double wages, then the charge will be double to that which now it is; the hazard will also be manifest, for the reasons before alleged.

And that which will prove as great an inconveniency as the rest will be, the great price of merchandise returned from all these burdens will light upon the buyer, and upon all sorts of people, in the end.

Example may be taken by the merchants of Seville in Spain; who, by reason of our scattering men of war upon their coasts in the Indies, did pay 20 per cent. for convoy. This new charge so impoverished the merchants, that both the banks of Seville broke, as the first misfortune that befell them, for little less than twenty millions.

There is a great difference between the strength of the Netherlands and that of the Spanish king. When he maketh any great armado, he is driven to take up and embark in the shipping of all nations; some of his own, others from Venice, or Ragusa, others out of all the parts of the Eastlands, and from the Hanse Towns, from the Danes, Hamburgers, Lubeckers, and Bremers.

These ships are of divers conducts, and divers swiftnesses, so as they cannot either assail or defend in gross, as the English or Netherlands can.

The Spanish king is also constrained to press the mariners of other nations; as the Italian, French, Flemming, and Dutch, to mingle with those of the Spanish nation. When these come to any extremity, either by foul weather or by fight, the confusion is infinite; and sometimes a ship

may be cast away by mistaking of a rope: there cannot be found any masters or captains that can speak all these languages; and if they could, yet were it to little purpose; for men are directed at sea by multitude, not in a single voice.

Furthermore, these men that are of strange nations, and are taken up by violence, fight with their hands, but not with their hearts; they rather desire liberty than victory; and rather seek to hide themselves, and save themselves thereby, than to hazard their lives in a quarrel that neither appertains to them, their princes, or their country.

Lastly, when the Spanish king shall attempt any thing upon England, or Ireland, or any such remote country, his fleets are subject to great variety of winds and weather, and to many storms, by reason whereof the late great Spanish admiral lost both his enterprises upon England: the last fleet also that came for Ireland was dispersed and much broken; and in the year 1588, after the duke of Medina was once beaten from the narrow seas, he lost the best part of his fleet by tempest.

On the contrary, the Netherlands have as many ships of their own as any Christian prince hath; their ships are of one fashion, conduct, and swiftness; their mariners of their own nation and language, valiant and well ordered men ; and, as it is said before, so near us, as they will be in our ports in a summer's day: so no people are so fitted by art and nature to annoy these kingdoms as they.

It may perchance be objected, that when king Henry VIII. had wars with the emperor Charles V., who was also lord of the Low Countries, that the English received no prejudice by the main ships of the Netherlands: it is true, and I myself remember, that within these thirty years two of her majesty's ships would have commanded one hundred sail of theirs.

I remember also, when myself was a captain in Ireland, that a hundred foot and a hundred horse would have beaten all the force of the strongest provinces: but of late, I have