SENATE.]

Apportionment Bill.

[MARCH 5, 1832.

of each State by the simple rule of proportion. Taking as the fifteen distributed on the fractions created by the the representative numbers of the United States as the use of a ratio of 47,000. In the first case, New York and first term, the number of the House (256) as the second Pennsylvania would not get members, but Maine and Misterm, and the representative population of each State as sissippi would; in the second, New York and Pennsylvania the third term, forty-six thousand nine hundred and nine- would each get a member, and Maine and Mississippi ty-seven would be the common representative number; would not. There are at least 700 ratios, and I believe and, at this ratio, the number of the House would be 240. many more, which, when applied to the federal number There would then be left sixteen members to distribute of each State, will produce the same number of represento the large fractions, that is, to fractions exceeding a tatives, yet each of these ratios will produce different moiety of the ratio; the other fractions left would be ex-fractions. This fact proves that the fraction does not indiceedingly small.

cate the true relative loss of the State. The truth is, sir, you may sport almost as you please with the fractions, and produce almost any result. This alone shows, if there were no constitutional objection, the impropriety of allotting members for fractions. I might ask the honorable mover of the amendment why he adopts 47,000 instead of 47,700, or any other number between these two; why he designates 255 for the number of his House; or why he takes 25,000 for the ratio to be applied to the fractions to give additional members. But I will not press these ques tions, because he has intimated an intention to make some changes in these numbers.

Mr. MARCY said, having been a member of the select committee to which the apportionment bill from the other House was referred, and also one of the majority that instructed the chairman to report that bill as it came to us, it is proper that I should submit to the Senate my views in relation to it, and in opposition to the amendment offered by the honorable Senator from Massachusetts. He places his opposition to the bill on two grounds; upon its inequality and its unconstitutionality. If I rightly apprehend his remarks, the latter objection is a consequence of the former. He holds it to be unconstitutional, because it is strikingly unequal. I think, sir, I shall be able to show that The honorable mover of the amendment contends that the amendment, on his own principles, is liable to the the bill is unconstitutional. The constitution requires, it same objections, and, in my opinion, to another still more is said, members to be apportioned among the States acforinidable: it is not only unequal, but it allots members cording to their respective numbers. New York gets upon fractions, contrary, as I conceive, to a construction forty members by the bill, and the six New England States, of the constitution, settled forty years ago. The ratio of with a population of between 30 and 40,000 more than forty-seven thousand seven hundred was adopted by the New York, get only thirty-eight. This is so; it is occa House; and, when applied to the federal or representative sioned by the loss on account of fractions. There must be, numbers of the several States, it resulted in bringing out I contend, a loss on fractions, and the inevitable conse a representation of two hundred and forty members. The quence is, that six States will be exposed, in the operation, fractions produced by this ratio, it is said, are very unequal. to lose six times as much as one State. But, sir, does the They are large in small States, and small in large States. amendment improve the matter? It is true it restores an As the honorable Senator grouped the States together, he equality between the representation of New York and presented cases of considerable inequality: this inequality New England, but it creates inequalities in other parts of he would remove by adopting a second ratio, much smaller the Union. It gives to New York forty-one members, and than his principal one, and applying it to the large frac- to New Hampshire, Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, tions, and thereby allot fifteen additional members upon Maryland, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi, whose ag the fractions. He distributes these additional members gregate federal or representative numbers are less than for the express purpose of producing equality; but it is a that of New York, forty-three members. Again, sir, the little remarkable that he does not allot them to the frac-States of Maine, Connecticut, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, tions which he has used to show the inequality of the bill. and Tennessee can raise the same complaint on the amend He uses a different ratio from that in the bill, which, ment as to inequality, when compared with New York, though it does not alter the number of the representatives that New England can, on the bill. These States have an in any one State, it makes great and striking changes in aggregate representative population about equal to New the fractions on which he allots the additional members. York, yet the amendment gives them two less representa He does not apply his remedy to the same patient whose tives than are apportioned to New York. case he has presented to us. The fractions produced by The bill gives to New York one-sixth of the whole rethe use of his principal ratio are not small in large States, presentatives in the other House; but she has not, it is and large in small States. The ratio of forty-seven thou- said, but one-seventh of the representative numbers of the sand produces large fractions in the four largest States. Union. This is stating the case too strongly. She has New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio, the four one-sixth and twenty-two hundredths of one-sixth of the largest States, have fractions in each, varying from 32 to population of the Union. It is true she has less than one42,000. Their aggregate fractions amount to more than sixth of the whole population, and a full one-sixth of the 150,000; almost equal to the aggregate fractions of any representation; but if this is objectionable in the bill, a other four States that can be selected from the remaining similar objection lies against the amendment. Delaware twenty. If the States are divided into large and small has only a hundred and fifty-eighth part of the whole popu States, the twelve large ones have an amount of fractions lation, and the amendment gives her more than a hundred of 40,000 more than the twelve small States. The Senator and twenty-seventh part of the whole representatives. If from Massachusetts says that the seven hundred in the the other States should be all represented as fully as Dela ratio in the bill is illusory, because the number of repre- ware will be, if we adopt the amendment, the flouse sentatives in each State, and consequently, in the whole would have three hundred and sixteen members; if repre House, will be the same whether the ratio be 47,000 or sented as Maine would be, according to the amendment, 47,700. Whether the one or the other be used, is material it would be composed of two-hundred and thirty-nine only when members are allotted to fractions. If the ratio of members. If the largest States were to be as fully repre 47,700 is used, and an additional member is allotted to every sented by the amendment as Delaware is, New York would fraction of 25,000, there will be only nine fractions that be entitled to nine more members than is assigned to her, will draw a member; but if the ratio of 47,000 be used, as Pennsylvania to six, Virginia to five, and Ohio to four. it is in the amendment, there will be fifteen fractions over We were asked by the honorable Senator from Massa25,000 each, which will be each entitled to a member. If chusetts, if a tax of $240,000 were to be levied on the fifteen members are distributed on the fractions produced United States, would New York pay $40,000? I answer by the ratio of 47,700, they will not fall to the same States no? I would ask, in return, in reference to the amend

MARCH 5, 1832.]

Apportionment Bill.

[SENATE.

ment, if she would pay $41,000 of a tax on the United to those States. I would not withhold from any one of States of $255,000. No! Not precisely. Would Delaware pay of such a tax $2,000? No, sir, she would only pay $1,580, or thereabouts. Taking into view these inequalities produced by the amendment, I come to this conclusion--a conclusion from which I think the Senator from Massachusetts cannot escape-that, if the bill is unconstitutional, by reason of the inequalities it produces in the representation of the different States, his amendment is unconstitutional. If his argument on this point is strong enough to overthrow the bill, it is equally potent for the destruction of his own amendment. Indeed, sir, it will apply to any bill that can be formed. Equality, perfect equality, cannot be obtained; and, therefore, it is beyond the ingenuity or the wit of man to form a bill that will not be obnoxious to the constitutional objection interposed to the bill now before the

them the smallest particle of its legitimate power or influence, nor would I transfer to it any power or influence that rightfully belongs to any large State. Let each have all that the constitution gives, and no more. New York and Delaware, the largest and the smallest States, are the two prominent points of comparison. When reference is made to the former to sustain an objection to the bill for giving large States too much, it would be injustice to infer that the reference is prompted by illiberal feelings towards that State; and when reference is made to Delaware to show that the amendment confers on her undue advantages, it is done only to prove an objection or illustrate an argument, and should not, I presume, will not, be considered an exhibition of an unkind spirit towards that State. The amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts presents to us for adoption the principle of allotting members to States for fractions. This is a grave constiInequality, which I regard as inevitable, arises when the tutional question, which was raised, much discussed, and apportionment is made, as it is by the bill, and as it always settled, as I think, in 1792. The Senator has attempted ought to be made, by the application of a single division with great ingenuity, but, so far as regards myself, without to the federal number of each State. In that case, each success, to convince us that his amendment does not preState is exposed to a loss on account of fractions; and sent either of the constitutional objections which General that loss may be--indeed, sir, it will be, as large in some Washington interposed to the apportionment bill to which of the smallest States as in some of the largest. If the he affixed his veto. It does not, I concede, present the sefractions in a small State and in a large one are absolutely cond ground of objection, but it meets the first directly equal, there will be great relative inequality. If Dela- in the face; and we cannot adopt this amendment, without ware has a fraction as large as that of New York, and the trampling it under our feet. He attempts to avoid that ob chance is equal that she will have, her relative loss must jection, by raising a second ratio of 25,000, and applying be twenty-five times as large as New York, because New it to the fractions. This he calls a complex ratio. I call York has twenty-five times her population. it a double ratio, and the use of it effectually destroys the

Senate.

There are considerations which I must be pardoned for proportion which the constitution requires. He applies alluding to, that ought to repress, at once, any rising dis- both ratios--the large and small one-to fifteen States, content which the small States may at first view feel dis- and the large one only to nine States; and this is called apposed to indulge on account of this comparative inequality portioning equally among the States the representatives of loss. If New England, with a little larger population according to their numbers. This twofold operation viothan New York, gets by the bill a less number of repre- lates, necessarily violates, the rule of proportion. sentatives in the other House than New York, by two, she General Washington's first objection to the bill of 1792 has in this House ten more voices than New York. She was, that "there was no proportion or divisor which, aphas six times the power here that New York has. She plied to the respective numbers of the States, will yield has eight more votes in the clection of a Chief Magistrate. the number and allotment of representatives proposed by The Senate has a check upon every thing the House does; the bill." Now, sir, I ask the mover of the amendment but in many things it is without any check from the House. to tell us what proportion or divisor, applied to the reWhen we consider the amount and importance of Execu-spective numbers of the States, will produce his House of tive business, and the preponderating, unequal power 255 members. I venture to assert there is none. If Genewhich the small States have in the choice of a President ral Washington had conceived that he was at liberty to and in legislation, we ought not to feel so much anxiety resort to what the Senator from Massachusetts calls a comand sympathy for their comparatively small loss of power plex ratio, and what I think would be better described by in the other House, occasioned by an inevitable loss on being called double ratios, he could soon have worked out fractions, nor ought we to busy ourselves in inventing cu-a result corresponding to the provisions of the bill of 1792. rious theories of allotting members, unknown in any for- If two ratios would not have done it, I see no stronger obmer practice, and contrary to a settled construction of the jection to three than to two, provided equality, or a greater constitution, for the purpose of repairing and more than approximation to it, is thereby obtained. The bill of 1792 repairing their loss. I do not allude to the advantages of confessedly produced a great degree of equality. The the small States, by way of complaint. They have them truth is, sir, the bill of 1792, and the amendment, proby the constitution, and they are entitled to them. The ceed on the same principle; and that principle, and not the large States submit to this condition of things as to a dis- second ground of objection mentioned in the message of pensation of Providence, designed and operating, as we General Washington, was mainly considered in pronouncare willing to believe, for our common good; but we think ing that bill unconstitutional. Neither Judge Marshall's the small States ought to submit, in the same spirit, to the account of this measure, nor the debates in the House, so little loss they sustain in organizing the other House; it is far as I have seen them, have a single allusion to the second imposed on them by the constitution, and they have abun-ground of objection stated in the President's message. dant reasons for resignation to it; for, in the organization will read those passages in Marshall's Life of Washington, of the Senate, and in the choice of a Chief Magistrate, which relate to the bill of 1792: they are most munificently rewarded for any loss they may sustain by apportioning members in the long established

mode.

I trust that neither the remarks I have made on the superior power that the small States have in this House and in the choice of the President, nor the frequent allusion to such States to show the unequal operation of the amendment under consideration, will be regarded as furnishing the slightest evidence of an unfriendly disposition

I

"Construing the constitution to authorize a process by which the whole number of representatives should be ascertained on the whole population of the United States, and afterwards'apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,' the Senate applied the number thirty thousand as a divisor to the total population; and taking the quotient, which was one hundred and twenty, the number of representatives given by the ratio which had been adopted in the House where the bill had

SENATE.]

Apportionment Bill.

[MARCH 5, 1832.

originated, they apportioned that number among the se- plicit condemnation of that principle of the amendment, veral States by that ratio, until as many representatives as it would give were allotted to each. The residuary numbers were then distributed among the States having the highest fractions."

which proposes to distribute members on fractions; and, coming from the quarter this language does, I cannot withhold from it the highest respect. It was uttered by the framers of the constitution, who are to be presumed It is admitted by Judge Marshall that this resulted in a to have understood, better than any others, the import of more equitable apportionment. It produced what the the expressions they had used. Though we are not absoSenator from Massachusetts thinks his amendment will do. lutely concluded, by any authority on such a question, Looking at the effects of the amendment, some of which we ought to yield the greatest deference to such opinions. I have stated, it may well be doubted whether his expec- They are a contemporaneous exposition of the constitutations, in this particular, will be realized. "But the tion, given by five of Virginia's most distinguished sonsrule," says Judge Marshall, "was novel, and overturned more distinguished, probably, than any other State, in any opinions which had been generally assumed, and were other age, will ever produce. On another occasion, which supposed to be settled." There was a difference of opi- I may not specify, there was an emphatic call on Virginia nion in the President's cabinet. "The Secretary of for an opinion on what was regarded a constitutional ques State, (Mr. Jefferson,) and the Attorney General, (Mr. tion. It was then said, “I want to hear a voice from VirEd. Randolph,) being of opinion that the act was at vari-ginia; I want to see if she will stand by the constitution." ance with the constitution; the Secretary of War, (Gene- On this most important constitutional question, we have ral Knox,) rather undecided; and the Secretary of the heard a voice from Virginia, and she did stand by the conTreasury, (General Hamilton,) thinking that, from the ex-stitution. That voice was uttered forty years ago by her pression in the clause relating to the subject, neither con- most wise and patriotic sons, then on the scene of action. struction could be absolutely rejected, and that, therefore, It was powerful in effect; it put to rest this pretension of it would be proper to accede to the interpretation given distributing members on fractions, which has remained by the Legislature." "After weighing the arguments quiet for forty years. It is now awakened again. I which were urged on each side of the question, the Pre- want, on this occasion, to hear the voice of Virginia, and sident was confirmed in the opinion that the population of to see if she yet stands by the constitution. I flatter my each State, and not the total population of the United self that the distinguished men of that State, now on the States, must give the numbers to which alone could be stage of action, will speak as her sages did in times past; applied the process by which the number of representa-and will again put this pretension to rest, where, I hope, tives was to be ascertained." it will not only sleep forty years, but to the end of all

The bill was returned to the House wherein it originat-time.

ed, and it was rejected. "Thus," says Judge Marshall, The constitution requires us to apportion members ac "was this interesting part of the American constitution cording to numbers. This is said to mean as nearly as finally settled." I have read, I believe, all those passages possible. The qualification is not expressed in the conthat have a bearing on the constitutionality of the ques-stitution. Our powers are circumscribed by a line; and tion decided by the rejection of the bill of 1792, and it it is contended that if we cannot come up to the line on will be remarked that there is not a single observation that one side, which I call the constitutional side, by reason of has relation to the second ground of objection in the mes- a natural impossibility, we may get around on to the sage. The proposition of dividing on fractions is expli- other side, and take our position there, provided we can, citly considered, directly passed, and clearly repudiated as in that way, get nearer to that line. unconstitutional. The number of representatives is to be ascertained by a single process, not by a series of processes, applied to the population of each State; it must result from the application of a proposition or divisor, and not two or more propositions or divisors, to the respective I know, sir, that supposititious cases, though intended

numbers of the States.

To show what the views of Mr. Madison were on this constitutional question, I will present to the Senate two short extracts from the debate on the apportionment bill

of 1792.

We are bound to approach as nearly to it as practicable, but it must be on the constitutional side, and not on that side that lies beyond the limits of our power. The amendment attempts to come to this line on the wrong side.

for elucidation, very often produce confusion; but I think I can state one that will give to the Senate a better comprehension of my views than I have yet been able to convey to it. I will suppose that a company of twenty-four persons are the owners of certain property, and, as we "The idea of fractions, said he, was not there contend- have been made during the last six weeks exceeding fami ed for, but has since become the very essence of the oppo- liar with cotton, I will name, as this property, two hundred sition; and we are called on to violate the constitution, and fifty-five bales of cotton. The interest of the respect by adopting a measure that will give representatives to ive partners in this cotton corresponds with, and varies those separate and distinct fractions in the respective according to, the population of the respective States. States. If this reasoning is good, why do the gentlemen They wish to distribute among themselves the bales of stop at this boundary of representation by States? Why cotton according to their interest in it; but, not being able not proceed to erect the whole United States into one dis- to do it to the satisfaction of all, they call upon some cointrict, without any division, in order to prevent the inequality mon friend to do it for them. He undertakes the friendly they conceive to exist in respect to individual States?"--office, and calls upon them for their directions. They ex. Debate, 19th Dec. 1791. plain to him the amount of their respective interests, and "Mr. Madison repeated the substance of what he had then say, apportion among the owners according to their before offered in objection to this proposition. Fractions respective interests; but understand no bale can be divid will exist, said he, on every possible plan. This is to be a ed into parts. He meets with no difficulty in distributing permanent law, and in its operation will probably increase two hundred and forty of the bales, but serious embarrassthose fractions. The constitution refers to the respectivement exists as to the residuary fifteen. He finally con numbers of the States, and not to any aggregate number. cludes that it is best to dispose of these fifteen bales, by The proposition breaks down the barriers between the giving one to each of the fifteen partners who he finds have State and General Governments, and involves a consolida- an interest in them exceeding one-half of a bale. He tion."-Debate, February 16, 1792. calls the company together, and explains his views relaI cannot understand, from the language of these pas- tive to the surplus bales. Fifteen of the company, who sages in the Life of Washington, and these extracts from own each a major fraction of a bale, see no objection on the debates on the bill of 1792, any thing less than an ex- the score of interest, and are disposed to approve of the

MARCH 5, 1832.]

Apportionment Bill.

[SENATE

determination of the distributor; but a member, who has hundred and forty, was thirty-eight; but the bill gave her, an interest equal to two-fifths of a bale, says to the distri- as the result of the ratio, forty members. Suppose the butor, will you be so good as to explain to me by what population of New York to be double, as it soon will be, right you assume to give my interest in one of those bales and 3,837,106, divided by the ratio of 47,700, will give to my partner? The common friend replies, your partner eighty members; but the number to which the State would owns more of that bale than you do; he owns three-fifths, be fairly entitled, according to the rule of three, would and you only two-fifths of it. I admit that; but does be but sixty-six. Fourteen members would be gained by his right to three-fifths give him a right to my two-fifths the application of a common division, not one of whom also? The friend says, strictly considered, perhaps it would have a single man at home to form his constituency. does not, but he owns more of it than you do, and it will He would like to know if this was constitutional, if this be more equitable to give it to him than to you, and I shall was an apportionment according to numbers. This evil therefore give it to him, and it will be generous in you to has heretofore been submitted to, because it was not very consent to this disposition of it. The reply to this would great; but as the large States increase, or as the divisions be, I do not ask you to give the bale of cotton to me, and increase, the evil will become intolerable. By the very therefore there is no question as to the balance of equity. next census, if the principle of apportionment by the comYou talk about generosity where it is strictly an affair of mon division be continued, New York will have six memjustice. When you are disposing of your own property, bers on the floor, who have no constituency; for, if her you may be generous; but in this matter you are disposing population be then two and a half millions, as it probably of my property, and you have no right to show your gene- will be, the ratio will give her fifty-two representatives, rosity at my expense. Your authority is to distribute in a though her population would entitle her only to forty-six. particular manner. A deviation from this manner is a vio-Delaware and South Carolina had hitherto suffered more lation of your instructions. You cannot apportion one of than any other States by the present system of apporthe fifteen bales, without a violation of those instructions. tionment. The aggregate fractions of South Carolina, The question is asked, what shall be done with the undis- since the last census, had been 118, and those of Detributed bales? If you cannot distribute them in the man-laware 111,000. The unrepresented fractions of those ner you are directed to distribute them, let them alone. States had been 229,000, while the aggregate fracThey must remain the joint, undivided property of the tions of New York were only 40,133. It was not pos company. Our situation, Mr. President, I consider to sible that the small States, in assenting to the constitutions, be precisely similar to the person appointed to appor- contemplated such striking inequality in the popular retion the bales of cotton. We cannot distribute on frac-presentation. But the Senator from New York says, it tions without violating the rule given us to regulate our was foreseen that the small States would suffer by fracconduct in this matter. Will Maine consent that her fractions, and, therefore, they were compensated for the antition shall be transferred to Massachusetts, for the purpose cipated loss by their admission to equality of representaof having another member apportioned to the latter State? or, if it is not regarded as a transfer, will she consent that member shall be given to Massachusetts, by the use of a ratio of 25,000, applied to a part of her members, while we refuse to apply to Maine, and several other States, any ratio less than 47,000? Maine is disposed, I presume, to stand on her strict rights. She will not, and she ought not, to yield a single inch of her territory to the British provinces; and I venture to say she will not submit to the transfer of a single particle of her political power to Massachusetts, or any other State. Will her champion near me, [Mr. HOLMES,] after being devoted to her service for thirty years, now, when about retiring, as he has publicly announced, from the bustle of public life, to meditate on death and eternity, be unfaithful to her interest, and sit silent, and see her curtailed of any portion of her positive or relative power? No, sir. I venture to affirm

tion with the large States in the Senate. A reference, said Mr. C., to the history of the adoption of the constitution, will convince the Senator that he is wholly mistaken in supposing that the representation of the small States in the Senate was allowed in consequence of the surrender by them of any right to equal representation in the popu lar branch. If he looks to the bond which Delaware signed, he will find that she made equal representation of the States in the Senate a sine qua non. That was a fundamental and unchangeable provision of the constitution, without which the small States would have preferred a foreign alliance to a Union. It was this provision which marked the Government as a confederated instead of a consolidated republic. Mr. C. made several statements, showing the unequal and unfair operations of the ratios adopted under this and former apportionments, in regard to the State of Delaware; and he urged the necessity of The honorable mover of the amendment arresting the evil now, by adopting a different rule of apscarcely need be reminded that inequality is as certainly portionment. He contended that the representation of and fully produced by giving too much, as by not giving fractions was constitutional and unavoidable. Pennsylvaenough. He has truly said that what one gains, another nia has twenty-eight members by the bill; but her propormust lose. The result of my reflections is, that the ine- tion was only twenty-seven and one-tenth. But Delaware has quality is not essentially diminished by the amendment. but one member, and her proportion is one and six-tenths. In some respects there is a greater approximation to Do you give a member to the fraction of one-tenth in equality than is produced by the bill; but, every thing Pennsylvania, and refuse it to a fraction of six-tenths in considered, the improvement is not, I presume, as great as Delaware? The proportion of Rhode Island is one and was expected. The great, and, to my mind, invincible nine-tenths, and you give her two members; and yet you objection to the amendment is, that it establishes the prin- say to represent fractions is unconstitutional. cple of allotting members upon fractions. This I regard considered the objections urged by General Washington as unconstitutional, and must, therefore, ever resist it. against the bill of 1792, and argued that they applied Mr. CLAYTON had, he said, formed the opinion that chiefly to the fact that the bill gave more than one memthe bill is unconstitutional, incorrect, as it does not appor- ber to every thirty thousand, and that it did not affect this tion the representatives according to the respective numbill.

he will not.

Mr. C. then

ber of the several States. Congress, he thought, had fall- Mr. FOOT remarked, that the great injustice done to en into an error in applying to the several States a common his native State, Connecticut, at the last apportionment division. The principle was unequal in its operation, and in 1822, by which she was deprived of one member, and led to monstrous results. The injustice to the smaller left with one of the largest fractions in the Union, had States, from the application of a common ratio or division, called his attention particularly to this subject; and he had would increase every census. The fair proportion of New examined it with care and attention, with a view to find York, with her population of 1,908,553, in a House of two a remedy for the unequal representation, produced by the

SENATE.]

Apportionment Bill.

[MARCH 5, 1832.

present mode of apportioning representatives to the seve- among the several States according to their respective numral States. He could feel no particular interest in this bers. It is impossible to make the distribution more equal bill; his State would not be affected by it. by any calculation which I have been able to make. By such a distribution equal justice will not only be

On glancing at this bill when it came from the House of Representatives, said Mr. F., my mind was forcibly done, but a complete check will be provided against com. struck with the great inequality in the representation it proposed, and the palpable injustice to the smaller States. Believing, as I do, that it is the right as well as the special duty of the Senate to guard the interests of the States, whose representatives we are, in a peculiar sense, my at tention was turned to the constitution, to see whether some remedy might not be found; or whether that sacred instrument had left us without the power of securing an equal representation, or had failed to secure the rights of the States, and their citizens, on this all-important and fundamental principle of free Government.

binations of States, for the purpose of securing an undue proportion of representatives. Under any other mode of distribution, it is very apparent that, by fixing a ratio which shall throw the fractions upon the smaller States, it is in the power of a few large States to combine their influ ence so as to have their whole population represented, and exclude two-fifths of the population of some small States. By this bill, New York, with a population less by 227,000 than seven smaller States, has the same number of representatives! and is left with a small fraction, when these seven States have a fraction of 233,178. Does not this injustice and inequality require correction? Look for a moment at its effects upon the ratio of representation as fixed by the bill. The ratio for New York is 47,700: the ratio of representation for the other seven States, collectively, is 57,540, for Missouri, 65,000; and for Delaware, 75,417!

The inequality and injustice, in the apportionment by this bill, are too palpable to require from me any elucidation; and they have been already fully exposed; and, in my opinion, its provisions are inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution, which declares that "representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers." Can it be possible It will be readily perceived that, as the population and that New York, with a population of 1,919,136, can be the ratio increased, the loss to the smaller States will be entitled to forty representatives, while the New England constantly increasing--the aggregate fractions always States, with 1,954,593, is entitled to only thirty-eight re- bearing a proportion to the number of States whose popresentatives? Is this equal? Is it just? Is this consist-pulation will entitle them to the same number of repreent with the provisions of the constitution' sentatives as one of the largest States.

The second section of the first article of the constitution By adopting the principles of the constitution as our contains every provision in relation to this subject. What guide, without any dispute about fractions, and appor is the language? "Representatives and direct taxes shall tioning the eleven representatives to those States having be apportioned among the several States which may be the highest numbers unrepresented, we shall not only ap included within this Union, according to their respective proximate very nearly to perfect equality, but produce a numbers." It then proceeds to declare in what way the very equal distribution of this surplus apportionment in representative population shall be ascertained: "the num- the different sections of the country, as they have often ber of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty been classed. thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative."

To the six New England States, having an aggregate fraction of near two hundred and fifty thousand, it will give The language of the constitution is perfectly plain, and three representatives. By this bill, New York, with a less its meaning cannot be misunderstood. The entire popu- population than New England of near fifty thousand, has lation, entitled to representation under the constitution, two more representatives than New England. This will is to be represented as nearly as it can be done. The re-adjust the claims and rights of each. presentatives are to be distributed among the several States in proportion to their relative population; and it is the duty of Congress to make such distribution as will do as equal justice as possible in the apportionment--exact equality is impossible; for there will be fractions in any distribution which can be devised; and it is our duty to approximate as near to equality as possible. The question then presents itself, in what way is this to be effected?

To the four Middle States it gives three representatives, to which their fractions entitle them.

To the four Southern States it gives one, upon the same principle of equality.

To the five Northwestern States it gives one, their fractions being small.

To the four Southwestern States it gives three--and I will cheerfully give my vote for it.

What objection can be made to this apportionment, which comes so near equality, and gives an equal representation?

The House of Representatives in this bill have declared that the ratio of representation shall be 47,700. Taking this ratio as a divisor for the whole representative population, and it gives two hundred and fifty-one representa- It is said fractions cannot be represented; and why? tives, with a small fraction. The bill apportions to the The Senator from New York [Mr. MARCY] has told us that several States but two hundred and forty representatives; General Washington returned the bill of 1792 as uncon leaving eleven representatives, to which the people are stitutional, because it represented fractions. I do not so entitled, under the ratio fixed, to be provided for, unap-understand his objections. Nothing is said of fractions. portioned, or rejected. Did the framers of the constitu- His objections were, that eight States were represented tion ever contemplate such a result? Does the constitu- by more members than one for each thirty thousand, tion warrant such a measure? Can Congress, acting which is clearly unconstitutional. But this objection does under the constitution, say to 480,000 citizens of the Unit- not apply, at all, in the present case. No member will ed States, you shall not be represented? Impossible! represent less than thirty thousand. Congress has not the power to deprive any portion of the Representation and taxation are to be equally appor citizens of their just proportion of representatives. They tioned; and we only require that they shall be made equal. are entitled to those representatives which your ratio gives, On what principle was your tax of six millions of dollars and we are bound to apportion them among the several laid in 1815? The answer is, in exact equal proportions. States according to their "respective numbers," as the The quota of New England was $1,328,555 90-that of constitution has directed. If these eleven members are New York was $860,283 24. How is the representation? apportioned to those States which have the largest unre- New England has but thirty-eight members; New York, presented fractions, the distribution will be in strict ac- by this bill, has forty members. Apply the same princi cordance, not only with the spirit, but the letter of the ple to the direct tax which this bill apportions to repre constitution. The representatives will be apportioned sentatives, and you will find New England pays per capita