Cas . & Eng Hillary v. Great Northern R. Co. HILLARY V. GREAT NORTHERN R. Co. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, May 11, 1896.) Service of Process on Railroad Company.-The ticket agent at a union de pot held to be the "acting ticket agent of each of the railroads using the depot, within the meaning of a statute providing for the service of process in civil actions upon railroad companies. APPEAL from Hennepin county district court. Affirmed. W. E. Dodge, for appellant. Frank Morrill and William Kennedy (Wilkinson & Traxler, of counsel), for respondent. MITCHELL, J.-The only question in this case is whether the ticket agent in what is known as the "Union Depot" at Minneapolis was an acting ticket agent" of the defendant, within the meaning of Gen. St. 1894, § 5202, providing for the service of process in civil actions upon railroad companies. The facts, as distinguished from mere legal inferences, are practically undisputed, and are quite fairly and fully stated in the memorandum of the trial judge. They may be summarized as follows: The Union Depot is owned and operated by the Minneapolis Union Railway Company. A number of lines of railway, including that of the defendant, use this depot for general depot purposes, and as a regular station on their respective roads, under contracts with the Union Railway Company, whereby, for a specified compensation to be paid. to it by each of the other railroad companies, it is to furnish each of them trackage facilities into and through the Union Depot, transfer its cars, transfer and deliver baggage, furnish accommodations for passengers arriving or departing, and also sell tickets for each company; maintaining for that purpose a ticket office in the depot, where tickets are regularly sold at all hours of the day. The Union Railway Company employs the agents selling tickets at this ticket office, and such Hillary v. Great Northern R. Co. 66 . IV . B. agents are responsible, and under bonds, to that company for the faithful performance of their duties. The different railroad companies furnish their tickets to these ticket agents, who report the sales thereof daily to the respective companies, and account to them at regular intervals for the proceeds of such sales. It also appears from the affidavits used on the motion that the defendant, in its folders and otherwise, holds out and represents to the public the ticket office in this depot as one of its ticket offices, and the ticket agent in that office as its ticket agent. We are of opinion that under these facts the ticket agent in the Union Depot was an acting ticket agent" of the defendant, within the meaning of the statute. The contention of defendant is that the word agent" means "an agent in the eye of the law arising from a contract of employment; one responsible to his principal, and subject to be discharged by it," and that within this definition the "ticket agent" at this depot is not its agent, but the agent of the Union Railway Company. We do not concur in this view. While the ticket agent is hired by, and under the control of, the Union Railway Company, yet he is performing all the duties of a ticket agent of the defendant, and the defendant is availing itself of his services for that purpose. The word "acting" must have been used in the statute for a purpose, and it seems to us that the essential thing, under the statute, is not the existence of a contract of service, but the actual performance of the duties of ticket agent for the railroad company. As bearing more or less on this question, see Van Dresser v. Navigation Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 202; Norton v. Railroad Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 618; Railway Co. v. Novak, 61 Fed. Rep. 573; Railway Co. v. Bigelow, 68 Ga. 219; State v. Northwestern E. & L. Assoc. 62 Wis. 174. We do not wish to be understood as intimating that scalpers or ticket brokers to whom a railroad company may furnish its tickets for sale would be its "acting ticket agents," within the meaning of the statute. The service in this case was made on the assistant ticket agent in the office, while performing its duties during the temporary absence of the head ticket agent, to whom, on his return, he delivered the copy of the summons. We think this service was regular, and, even if irregular, there was, under the facts, no ground for setting it aside on motion. Railway Co. v. Novak, supra. Order affirmed. Wilson v. Duluth Street R. Co. WILSON ย. DULUTH STREET R. Co. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, May 11, 1896.) Stations on Street Railways. In the charter of a street railway company, a provision referring to “stations at each end of the lines" held to mean stations at each end of the tracks, and not at each end of the run of particular cars. APPEAL from municipal court of Duluth. Affirmed. Allen & Baldwin, for respondent. MITCHELL, J.-Defendant's charter (Sp. Laws 1881, Ex. Sess., c. 200) granted it the right to construct and operate a single or double track for a passenger railway, with all necessary tracks for turnouts, side tracks, and switches, in any of the streets of the village of Duluth and its suburbs, including New London and Oneota, and in the roads connecting the same. Section 15 of the act provides that its cars shall be run in conformity with the following, among other, rules and regulations: (4) No car shall be left to remain standing on any street at any time unless the same is waiting for passengers or is unavoidably detained. (5) No car shall be allowed to stop on a cross walk or in front of any intersecting street except to avoid collision or to prevent danger to persons in the street or to take in or leave off passengers.' "(10) No car shall remain standing on any of the stations more than ten minutes except at each end of the lines and the stations nearest the passenger depots of any other railway companies. at which excepted stations they may stay a longer time." The court instructed the jury that "the end of the lines, as used in this tenth and last rule, "referred to the defendant's system as a system," and that the "termination of the meant simply the "termination of the system." The correctness of this definition of the expression "the end of Wilson v. Duluth Street R. Co. the lines" is the only question presented by the record and the assignments of error. The defendant contends that a 66 station at the end of a line " means the station at the end of the run of any particular cars, while plaintiff contends that it means the station at the end of a particular track. While it is not entirely clear what the court meant by the word system," yet it seems to be conceded or assumed by both parties that the instruction was in substantial conformity with plaintiff's present contention as to the meaning of the term 66 end of the line." A reference to the facts will illustrate the meaning of the parties: Defendant had two parallel tracks on Superior street, which were several miles long. It had a track on Fourth street which connected with the Superior street tracks at Third avenue west, three blocks distant from the point on the Superior street tracks at which the car in question was left standing more than ten minutes. This car was one of those called "14th Ave. East Cars." One of the terminal points of the run of these cars was on the Superior street tracks between Fifth and Sixth avenues (the place at which the car in question was left standing), at which point, on their arrival, they were turned round, and then run back on one of the Superior street tracks to its connection with the Fourth street track, over which it ran to the other terminus of its run. The point however, on the Superior street track which constituted one terminus of the run of these Fourteenth avenue cars was not the end of the Superior street track. Defendant's contention, applied to the particular facts of the case, is that this point, being the end of the run of these particular cars, was a station at the end of the line, within the meaning of the statute, although not at the end. of the track. Inasmuch as street railways usually have no station," properly so called, but receive and discharge passengers at any point along the route of the cars, it is not entirely clear what the legislature meant by that term, especially as there is no other part of the act that tends to throw any particular light on the question. Neither is there anything in the act clearly and positively indicating what the legislature meant by the word "line." The act, as has been seen, authorizes the defendant to construct a single or double track on every street in the village (now city), thus enabling it to cover the streets with a network of tracks. There is nothing in the act to prevent the defendant from making the Cas . & Eng Ratzer v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. end of the "run" of any particular cars at any point on any street it sees fit. Conceding that cars must be run on schedule time, and that for the purpose of receiving passengers, and waiting for the arrival of the schedule time for its departure, it would be necessary for a car to be left standing longer at the terminus of its run than would be required at any intermediate point on its route, yet it is a matter of common knowledge that, under any ordinary circumstances, 10 minutes. would be ample time for such purposes, even at the terminus of its run. We attach much importance to the length of time thus allowed, as tending to indicate what exceptions the legislature intended to make to the general rule. The end of a track will usually be out in the suburbs, where no great public inconvenience will result from allowing cars to stand in the street, and where circumstances might often require that they be allowed to stand longer than at other places. It might often be necessary for a car to stand longer than 10 minutes at or near a railway station, while waiting for passengers to arrive on incoming trains. These, we think, were the cases which the legislature must have intended to except from the general rule. Our conclusion, therefore, is that plaintiff's contention is correct, and that "stations at the end of the lines," in this statute, means stations at the end of the tracks. This being so, the instruction of the court, even if not verbally accurate, was, under the evidence, without prejudice. Order affirmed. RATZER V. BURLINGTON, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. (Supreme Court of Minnesota, April 24, 1896.) Delivery of Goods by Carrier.-The shipper of goods consigned them to himself, and received a bill of lading from the railway company accordingly. The railway company delivered them, with a proper waybill, to the next connecting railway company, who, at the shipper's request, delivered the goods to him in transit at an intermediate point, without the surrender or cancellation of the bill of lading, which he thereafter, and before the goods would have arrived at their original destination if |