Sol di là sù deriva; come fiume "Nafce da fonte, ò da radice pianta mod d E quanto qui par male,

LA

"Dove ogni ben con molto male è misto, a vaW "E ben la sù dov' ogni bens' annida, A

Be patient, Nymph, and if deriv'd from Heav'n, Thither lift up thy Eyes; all Good or Ill Derives from thence, as Streams from Fountains flow, Or Plants fpring from their Roots: And tho' all Good Here upon Earth, is greatly mix'd with Ill; Yet there, where all is good, it turns to Good.

t

This is what Mr. Pope call'd before:: Heaven destroying the Effect of Vice, eu d And fhould it be fo that all fhall at laft turn to Good and Happiness, then let human Actions, or all other Accidents be what they will, it must be allow'd,

WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT.

He blames those who expect an immediate Reward for their Virtue, in Things which are by no Means worthy to be term'd fo, and much more those enjoying many good Things, are continually uneafy, and for grafping of more.

But fometimes Virtue ftarves while Vice is fed. What then? Is the Reward of Virtue, Bread? That, Vice may merit; 'tis the Price of Toil: The Knave deferves it when he tills the Soil; The Knaves deferves it when he tempts the Main, T Where Madness fights, for Tyrants, or for Gaine The good Man may be weak, be indolent, Nor is his Claim to Plenty, but Content. But grant him Riches, your Demand is o'er? [Pow'r? No-fhall the Good want Health, the Good want

Add

Add Health to Pow'r, and every earthly Thing:
Why bounded Pow'r? why private? why no King?
Nay, why external for internal giv'n,

Why is not Man a God, and Earth a Heav'n?
Who afk and reafon thus, will scarce conceive
God gives enough while he has more to give
Immenfe the Pow'r, immenfe were the Demand;
Say, at what Part of Nature will they ftand?

Such People afking as a Reward for Virtue what 'would most certainly deftroy it, he concludes there fore on the Whole, that,

What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy, The Soul's calm Sunfhine, and the Heart felt Joy Is Virtue's Prize.

The Poet (fays our Commentator) begins therefore [from 1. 174 to 195] with confidering Riches. 1. He examines firft, what there is of real Value in them, and fhews, they can give the good Man only that very Contentment he had before, or, at moff, but burthen him with a Truft to be difpens'd for the Benefit of others:

TEAM 2ALVONs gieda For Riches, can they give but to the Juftban rocus His own Contentment, or another's Truft?

Since the good Man efteems all, befide what is fuf ficient to fupply him with the Conveniencies of Life as entrusted to him by Providence, for the Supply of others Neceffaries.

'Tis true, he tells us elsewhere, that another Sort of good Men are of a different Opinion

The grave Sir Gilbert holds it for a Rule,

That ev'ry Man in IVant is. Knave or Fools na

God

God cannot love (fays Blunt, with lifted Eyes)
The Wretch he farves-and piously denies.

k

Of the Ufe of Riches, 1. 103.

And these are they to whom he here alludes, where he says,

O Fool! to think God hates the worthy Mind, The Lover, and the Love, of Human-kind, Whofe Life is healthful, and whofe Confcience clear, Because he wants a thousand Pounds a Year!

The Poet next examines the imaginary Value of Riches, as the Fountain of Honour. For his Adverfaries Objection stands thus :-As Honour is the genuine Claim of Virtue, and fhame the juft Retribution of Vice; and as Honour, in their Opinion, follows Riches, and Shame Poverty; therefore the good Man fhould be rich. He tells them in this they are much mistaken :

Honour and Shame from no Condition rife; Act well your Part, there all the Honour lies. What Power then has Fortune over the Man? None at all. For, as her Favours can confer neither Worth nor Wifdom; fo neither can her Difpleasure cure him of any of his Follies. On his Garb indeed fhe has fome little Influence; but his Heart ftill re-mains the fame :

Fortune in Men has fome fmall Diff'rence made,
One flaunts in Rags, one flutters in Brocade.

Then, as to Nobility, by Creation or Birth, this too he fhews [from 1. 195 to 207] is, in itfelf, as .devoid of all real Worth as the reft: Because, in the firft Cafe the Title is generally gain'd by no Merit at

all:

Stuck

Stuck o'er with Titles, and hung round with Strings,
That thou may't be by Kings, or Whores of Kings.
In the fecond, by the Merit of the firft Founder of
the Family, which will always, when reflected on,
be rather the Subject of Mortification than Glory:
Go! if your antient, but ignoble, Blood
Has crept thro' Scoundrels ever fince the Flood,
Go! and pretend your Family is young;
Nor own your Fathers have been Fools fo long.

III. The Poet in the next Place [from 1. 206 to 227] unmasks the falfe Pretences of Greatness, whereby it is feen that the Hero and Politician (the two Characters which would monopolize that Quality) after all their Buftle, effect only this, if they want Virtue, that the one proves himself a Fool, and the other a Knave: And Virtue they but too generally want. The Art of Heroifm being understood to confift in Ravage and Defolation; and the Art of Politicks, in Circumvention. Now

-Grant that thofe can conquer, these can cheat, 'Tis Phrafe abfurd to call a Villain, Great: Who wickedly is wife, or madly brave,

Is but the more a Fool, the more a Knave.

It is not the Succefs therefore that conftitutes true Greatnefs; but the End aimed at; and the Means which are employed: And if thefe be right, Glory will be the Reward, whatever be the Iffue:

Who noble Ends by noble Means obtains, Or failing, fmiles in Exile or in Chains, Like good Aurelius let him reign, or bleed Like Socrates, that Man is great indeed.

IV. With regard to Fame, that still more fantaftick Bleffing, he fhews (from 1. 226 to 249] that

all

all of it, befides what we hear ourselves, is merely nothing; and that even of this fmall Portion, no more of it gives the Poffeffor a real Satisfaction, than what is the Fruit of Virtue.

All Fame is foreign, but of true Defert,

Plays round the Head, but comes not near the Heart. Thus he fhews, that Honour, Nobility, Greatnefs, Glory, fo far as they have any Thing real and subftantial, that is, fo far as they contribute to the Happiness of the Poffeffor, are the fole Iffue of Virtue, and that neither Riches, Courts, Armies, nor the Populace, are capable of conferring them.

4

V. But laftly, the Poet proves [from 1. 248 to 259] that as there are no external Goods can make Man happy, fo neither is it in the Power of all in-· ternal. For, that even fuperior Parts bring no more real Happiness to the Poffeffor, than the reft, nay, put him into a worfe Condition; for that the Quicknefs of Apprehenfion, and Depth of Penetration do but sharpen the Miferies of Life:

2

In Parts fuperior, what Advantage lies?
Tell (for You can) what is it to be wife?
'Tis but to know how little can be known;
To fee all others Faults, and feel our own, &c.
Painful Pre-eminence! yourself to view
Above Life's Weakness, and its Comforts too.

This to his Friend-nor does it at all contradict what he had faid to him concerning Happiness in the Beginning of the Epiftle: For he is now proving that nothing external to Man, or what is not in his own Power, and of his own Acquirement, can make him happy here. The most plaufible Rival of Virtue is Knowledge. Yet even this, he fays, is fo far from giving any Degree of real Happiness, that it deprives

Men