Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain. cepts cases of unliquidated damages for injuries to persons, property and character. (Post, pp. 64-65.) Code construed: Section 6109 (S.); 5043 (M. & V.) 4. EQUITY. Discovery. Multiplicity of suits. Injunction. Case in judgment. Complainant filed its bill against twenty-one parties as defendants to enjoin their separate actions at law against complainant to recover damages for alleged injuries to their property from sulphurous smoke and noxious vapors emitted from the sulphur and copper plant of complainant. Said bill alleged that all the defendants had entered into champertous agreements with their attorneys to prosecute their separate suits against complainant for injuries to their land on the ground that complainant's aforesaid plant was a nuisance; that defendants had unlawfully combined and agreed to bring their separate suits, instituted about the same time, to vex and harass complainant with a multiplicity of suits, but that the particular terms and provisions of said agreement were unknown to complainant, and it had no means of discovering the same except from the parties themselves. Injunction and discovery prayed. Demurrer by defendants. HELD: 1st. Complainant not entitled to discovery, its remedy, in the actions at law, being adequate and complete. 2d. There was no such community of interest in the subject-matter, or common right or title involved as would warrant an injunction to prevent a multiplicity of suits. 3d. That the averments in respect to the unlawful combination charged, properly construed, were intended as a basis for the discovery prayed and were insufficient to authorize an injunction. Post, pp. 58-66.) FROM POLK. Appeal from the Chancery Court of Polk County. T. M. MCCONNELL, Chancellor. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain. JAMES G. PARKS and MAYFIELD & SON, for Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., Limited. W. A. GUINN, B. B. C. WITT and INGERSOLL & PEYTON, for Fain et al. MR. JUSTICE MCALISTER delivered the opinion of the Court. The object of this bill was to enjoin the defendants from prosecuting separate suits against the complainant corporation to recover damages alleged to have been inflicted upon their property by the sulphurous smoke and noxious vapors emitted from the works of complainant. Demurrers to the bill were overruled by the chancellor, and defendants permitted to appeal. The court of chancery appeals reversed the decree of the chancellor, sustained the demurrers, and dismissed the bill. The cause is before this court on the appeal of the complainant from the decree of the court of chancery appeals. The material allegations of the bill are that there are now pending against complainant in the circuit court, 21 separate suits brought by the defendants, and the amount of damages sought to be recovered aggregates over $42,000; that the gravamen of said suits is the alleged injury to timber standing on the respective tracts of land of defendants, alleged to have been caused by the smoke and gases emitted from complainant's works; that defendants, in bringing these actions, unlawfully combined to vex, harass Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain. and annoy complainant with a multiplicity of suits; that they made and entered into champertous and un: lawful agreements with their attorneys, by which the latter's fees were made contingent and to depend upon the recoveries to be had in the several actions, if at all; that the complainant does not know, and has no means accessible in Tennessee to ascertain, what estates, if any, said defendants hold in said lands upon which their respective damage suits aforesaid are predicated; that the records in Polk county were destroyed several years ago, and but few title papers have been registered, and hence complainant is unable to determine what rights, if any, the defendants have in the premises; and it insists that it is entitled to have a discovery from defendants, and each of them, as to the quantities of estate held, and by what title, if any, and how evidenced and acquired, and to have a proper reference in this behalf, which can not be had and made in said actions at law. It is alleged that the gravamen of each of said suits against complainant is identical, and arises from the same identical cause, that is, from alleged injuries occasioned by smoke and gases emitted from the roast piles and works of complainant, which defendants in their said suits insist constitutes an actionable nuisance; that, as before stated, defendants in their said suits are making common cause of their actions, co-operating and having themselves subpœnaed as witnesses, and manipulating the cases so Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain. as to pile up enormous bills of costs, which they seek to cast upon complainant. It is further alleged, that, even assuming the naked legal legal right right of defendants to be in some sense impaired, the matters involved form rather the basis of an equitable accounting, under proper orders, than grounds for actions at law by a multiplicity of suits, seeking recovery of compensatory and punitive damages by the unmeasured and uncertain modes applicable to trials at law. It is, moreover insisted that inasmuch as the alleged right of action in said suits originates from the same cause, constituting, as insisted, a nuisance, a court of equity, exercising rightful jurisdiction, will intervene in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, and stay, by injunction, actions at law, and administer relief in its own court, according as the parties may be entitled. As already stated, each of the defendants interposed a demurrer to this bill, assigning 12 different causes. The main assignment of demurrer is that a court of chancery has no jurisdiction of the matters and grievances alleged in the bill, and the same are purely cognizable in a court of law. The fourth ground of demurrer is that the bill is multifarious on its face, and seeks a joinder of parties whose interests are distinct, whose legal rights are distinct, and in which the recovery of one plaintiff does not depend upon the law and evidence of any other litigant; each plaintiff Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Fain. relying for a recovery of damages in an action at law for injuries done to his property. The sixth demurrer is that a court of law has full and plenary jurisdiction of all champertous contracts, and the bill alleges no ground showing that it has not a full and complete remedy at law to prove said champertous contracts, if any existed. Moreover, there is to-day no law against such contracts in force in Tennessee, since the champerty law was repealed by Acts 1899, c. 173, and has been declared not in force. The ninth ground of demurrer is that the discovery of title and quantity of estate owned by defendants, which is sought in the bill, could have been accomplished at law. Moreover, it is claimed that defendants' suits did not involve the title to land, but are personal actions, and not local actions. The tenth cause of demurrer is that the bill shows on its face that each defendant has brought his separate and distinct suit for himself, and that said suits are not at all brought by the same person or persons, holding in common or claiming title under a common grantor. The chancellor overruled the demurrers, holding they were to the whole bill. The court of chancery appeals reversed the action of the chancellor, sustained the demurrers, and dismissed the bill. We will first notice the question of discovery. It will be observed that the present bill is sought to be |