State v. Mayor, Etc., of City of Bristol. Section 29 provides that "the general assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties and incorporated towns in this State to impose taxes for county and corporation purposes, respectively, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law." Now, the respondent contends that, before a tax can be validly imposed, it is necessary that the manner of imposing the same shall be prescribed by law, and that it is also necessary that the law should prescribe the manner in which the value of the property to be taxed shall be ascertained, and that therefore, there can be no implied power to levy a tax to pay bonds, because, where one relies upon such implication, the manner of imposing the tax and the manner of ascertaining the value of the property to be taxed can not be said to have been prescribed by law. In other words, the contention is that every act which authorizes a tax must likewise go further, and prescribe the manner in which it shall be imposed, and the manner in which the value of the property to be taxed shall be ascertained. But we think that the general law prescribes the manner in which municipal authorities shall impose taxes, and the manner in which the value of the property to be taxed shall be ascertained; that is, it prescribes what authorities of a city shall have a right to impose taxes, how they shall make their levies, how the assessments shall be made, how the taxes shall be extended on the tax books, how they shall be collected, State v. Mayor, Etc., of City of Bristol. and what proceedings shall be taken in case of delinquencies, and that, whenever an act authorizes the 'levy of a tax, the general law steps in and prescribes the manner in which it shall be imposed, and the manner of ascertaining the value of the property to be taxed, etc., City of Memphis v. Bethel, 3 Tenn. Cas., 206; Town of Bristol v. Dixon, 8 Heisk., 864. It may be conceded that if a special act gives the power to tax, and couples with it the manner of imposing such tax, or prescribes any prerequisite, such as a vote of the people, different from the general law upon the subject, the special provision of the special act must be followed in order to make a legal tax; still, if no provisions are made, the general laws relating to taxation govern and control. The permission given by the legislature to municipalities to levy and collect taxes may be enlarged or restricted according to the legislative will, by special act, so that it is not contrary to the provisions of the constitution. This permission or grant need not necessarily be comprised in one statute alone, nor be set out in express terms. We have held that Acts 1887, ch. 88, conferred upon the city of Bristol the power to issue the bonds, and by necessary implication it conferred also the power to levy a tax to pay them and the interest upon them. The mode and manner of making the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes, not being provided speci State v. Mayor, Etc., of City of Bristol. ally in the acts, is regulated by the laws in force for the assessment and collection generally, as contained in the biennial assessment and revenue acts passed by the general assembly. Certainly, a special power of taxation could have been conferred in the same act which authorized the debts or obligations. And it may be said that such is the wisest and best policy, but it is not absolutely necessary when there are general provisions in other statutes which cover the entire ground. It is also insisted that the power of the city of Bristol to levy this tax is conferred by Acts 1855-56, pp. 138-143, which is the charter of the city; also by Acts 1897, ch. 214, p. 499, in which the charter and amendments are incorporated into one act; also by chapter 50 of Acts 1870-71. This latter act is almost a literal copy of section 29, art. 2, of the constitution. It was evidently, among other things, its purpose to carry that provision of the constitution into effect, and to confer upon municipal corporations the taxing power, and at the same time to lay down rules and prescribe the method for holding elections under the requirements of the constitution in regard to the lending of credit by corporations for internal improvement purposes. In holding that the act of 1887 was good and valid, this court necessarily and as a fact held that the act of 1870-71 had been complied with and the power to tax followed as an inevitable conclusion. State v. Mayor, Etc., of City of Bristol. It appears that the city of Bristol is now levying a tax of only $1.25 on the $100 of assessed value of its property. The assessed valuation of property taxable is $1,650,000. Of the levy now being made .0065 is for the purpose of paying interest on outstanding bonds and other indebtedness; the latter amounting to not over $300. The levy for interest is not for any special bonds, but for interest on all of the city's bonded debt. It is also levying a tax of twelve cents on the $100 for sinking-fund purposes, and it is insisted that relators should share in these funds. But we think these matters are not embraced within the pleadings and scope of the suit, nor properly before the court, as the city can levy a tax sufficient for relators' present purposes, as set out in the bill, without exceeding, or even filling up, its limit of $2 on the hundred. It follows that the decree of the court of chancery appeals is affirmed. Chattanooga Light & Power Co. v. Hodges. CHATTANOOGA LIGHT & POWER Co. v. HODGES. (Knoxville. September Term, 1902.) 1. NEGLIGENCE. Proximate cause-"Concurrence of these essentials." To warrant a recovery in an action for personal injuries sustained through the alleged negligence of defendant, the plaintiff must show not only that the defendant was guilty of negligence, but that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of. (Post, p. 335.) 2. PROXIMATE CAUSE. What is-Determined by the special facts of each case. The determination of the proximate cause of a specific injury, and whether such injury is the natural consequences of the wrongful act complained of, must at last be left to a sound judgment upon the special facts of each case and often upon the nicest discrimination. (Post, pp. 337-338.) Cases cited and approved: Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob., 547 (47 Am. Dec., 578); Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall, 49. 3. SAME. Same. General definition approved. The proximate cause of an injury may, in general, be stated to be that act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent an injury; an act or omission occurring, or concurring with another, which had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted. (Post, p. 338.) Cases cited: Deming v. Cotton Press Co., 90 Tenn., 353; Telegraph Co. v. Zopfi, 93 Tenn., 369; Railroad v. Kelly, 91 Tenn., 699; Anderson v. Miller, 96 Tenn., 35. 4. SAME. when. Wrongdoer liable for consequential injuries, It is well settled that a wrongdoer is liable not only for the proximate results of his acts, but for such consequential in |