of the great names which, seduced for the moment by the prospects of illumination and improvement thus held out, and by the ingenuity and argumentative skill of its distinguished promulgators, allowed themselves to swell the list of convertsnotwithstanding all this, proselytes to this study are daily becoming more and more rare, and the doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim will, ere long, take their place with the myriads of brilliant and baseless speculations which have dazzled, from age to age, the scientific world.

To give an illustration of our author's object, manner of thinking and style, we will here offer to our readers a brief extract from his section "Of the Supremacy of the Moral Sentiments and Intellect." After describing an instance of the better and superior class of organization, he goes on thus:-

"Let us trace then the operation of these principles in ordinary life. Suppose a friendship formed by such an individual as I have spoken of his first and fundamental principle is benevolence, which inspires him with a sincere, pure and disinterested regard for his friend; he desires his welfare for his friend's sake; next, veneration reinforces this love by the secret and grateful acknowledgment which it makes to Heaven for the joys conferred upon the mind by this pure emotion, and also by the habitual deference which it inspires towards our friend himself, rendering us ready to yield where compliance is becoming, and curbing our selfish feelings when these would intrude by interested or arrogant pretensions on his enjoyment; and thirdly, conscientiousness, ever on the watch, proclaims the duty of making no unjust demands on the benevolence of our friend, but of limiting our whole intercourse with him, on an interchange of kindness, good offices and reciprocal affection. Intellect, acting on these principles, would point out as an indispensable requisite to such an attachment, that the friend himself should be so far under the influence of the sentiments, as to be able, in some degree, to meet them; for, if he were immoral, selfish, vainly ambitious, or, in short, under the habitual influence of the propensities, the sentiments could not love and respect him; they might pity him as unfortunate, but love him they could not, because this is impossible to the very laws of their constitution.*

Let us now attend to the degree in which such a friendship would gratify the lower propensities. In the first place, how would adhesiveness exult and rejoice in such an attachment! It would be overpowered with delight, because, if the intellect were convinced that the friend habitually acknowledged the supremacy of the higher sentiments, adhesiveness might pour forth all its ardour, and cling to its object with

* In regard to this matter, the poet is at issue with the phrenologist"I know not, I ask not, if guilt's in that heart,

"I know that I love thee, whatever thou art."

And the pity spoken of-surely "Pity is akin to love." We fear that the softer sex would side here with the poet. They have always affected Corsairs, Childe Harolds, Gilderoys, and Allen-a-dales.

the closest bonds of affection. The friend would not encroach on us for evil, because his benevolence and justice (conscientiousness) would oppose this: he would not lay aside restraint, and break through the bonds of affection by undue familiarity, because veneration would forbid this; he would not injure us in our name, person, or reputation, because conscientiousness, veneration and benevolence, all combined, would prevent such conduct. Here then adhesiveness, freed from the fear of evil, from the fear of deceit, from the fear of dishonor, because a friend who should habitually act thus, could not possibly fall into dishonor, would be at liberty to take its deepest draught of affectionate attachment; it would receive a gratification which it is impossible it could attain while acting in combination with the purely selfish faculties. What delight too, would such a friendship afford to self-esteem and love of approbation. There would be an internal approval of ourselves, that would legitimately gratify self-esteem, because it would arise from a survey of pure motives, and just and benevolent action. Love of approbation too would be gratified in the highest degree: for every act of affection, every expression of esteem from such a friend, would be so purified by benevolence, veneration and conscientiousness, that it would form the legitimate food on which love of appprobation might feast and be satisfied; it would fear no hollowness beneath, no tattling in absence, no secret smoothing over for the sake of mere effect, no envyings and no jealousies. In short, friendship founded on the higher sentiments, as the ruling motives, would delight the mind with gladness and sunshine, and gratify all the faculties, animal, moral and intellectual, in harmony with each other." p. 68.

To estimate properly the amount and force of evidence which should be demanded, before we can rationally yield our full credence to the tenets of phrenology, let us cast a brief glance at the results of its establishment, and the tendencies which it developes on examination. If the assertions of the phrenologist are true, the knowledge of ourselves, hitherto esteemed among the rarest and most difficult species of knowledge, has been made so easy of attainment, "that the way-faring man, though a fool, need not err therein." And the most careless idler may acquire it without labour, by subjecting his skull to the examination of some practised cranioscopist, who will, on inspection, inform him accurately of the state of his faculties, his propensities, his sentiments.

If these things are true, how wonderfully mistaken we have been in attributing, as we were wont, the individual condition of mind and of character, in a considerable degree at least, to education and the force of surrounding circumstances, and in conceding so much to the influence of moral causes in general. They offer us stories, and press them upon us as altogether worthy of belief, of men who have grown up under the ordinary care of parents and instructors, passed through regular courses

of liberal education, and fulfilled the common social and domestic relations, who, nevertheless, retained, throughout, the precise character stamped on them in the beginning by the hand of nature, without alteration or correction, without deterioration or improvement. How unlike this to the well-known anecdote of Socrates and his physiognomy-how contradictory to the certain and established course of familiar events. The ancients who believed firmly in the immutability of their fate, to which, indeed, even Jupiter himself was obliged to bow with submission, reconciled with this belief, as well as they could, and, perhaps, as well as our more mature philosophy can do now, the free agency, or, at any rate, the moral independence of man. They gave him his choice whether he would do what was right or not; the event, they were aware, was out of his power. Victrix causa Diis placuit-victa Cutoni! But man, in the view of the phrenologist, is what he is by virtue-not of the means of education used with him, or the moral motives by which he is taught to accustom himself to be governed-but of his peculiar cerebral formation, and of the more or less perfect and full developement of his particular and separate organs. We are bound to give honor to whom honor is due. We are indebted to Gall and Spurzheim for a more intimate knowledge of the structure of the brain, than had been previously acquired; it is universally conceded that they have been more successful and minute in their demonstrations of this most delicate organ, than any the most celebrated of their predecessors. They and their followers, among whom Mr. Combe stands pre-eminent in talent, have also given us many profound and ingenious reflections upon the nature and habits of mind, and have thrown much light upon our moral anatomy. So important, indeed, have these investigations become, that the intelligent physiologist of the present day, cannot but smile at the vain labours of the metaphysician, however acute and skilful, who is blindfolded, as to his mental vision, by his ignorance of the organic structure, and the functions of parts essentially concerned in the processes which he busies himself in discussing conjecturally.

In prosecuting the inquiry as to the actual functions and powers of the brain, unquestionably the organ of mind, we are

Take an example, (see Combe's Phrenology, p. 343) "Mr. B. D. of London, sent to a phrenologist in Edinburgh, a caste of the head of a gentleman, without mentioning the name, or any circumstances of his life or profession, and requested that he would draw the character indicated by the developement. The character was inferred to be as follows, &c. A minute description being given.' The following answer was received. 'You hit off the character, &c. to a nicety. Your letter has been shewn to the most intimate acquaintances of the deceased, and in all material points is fully assented to by them."

disposed to lay much stress on the statements offered us by Fleureus. They are not only, in the main, confirmed by other writers, as Magendie and Fodera, but have received the sanction of a Commission of the Academy of Sciences at Paris, consisting of Cuvier, Portal, Berthollet, Pinel and Dumeril-a constellation of names of the first magnitude. Fleureus thinks that he has proved that the faculties of perception and volition, reside in the cerebral lobes. When these lobes are removed, in experimenting upon any animal, it evidently loses at once the senses of sight and hearing; from this he infers, that here also reside all the other perceptions. The Commission above enumerated, do not admit so extensive an inference. "We shall be content," say they, " with holding, that the cerebral lobes are the sole receptacle where impressions on the senses of sight and hearing become perceptible to the animal. If we were to add any thing to this concession, it would be that they are also the part where all sensations take a distinct form, and leave durable traces-in a word, that they are the seat of memory, by which property, they supply the animal with the materials of judgment." Both Fleureus and Rolando scem to have been satisfied that volition also, as well as perception, was abolished by the removal of these lobes; and, indeed, it was evidently much impaired, to say the least, in their experiments. But in those of Magendie, who took more precise care in the avoidance of incidental result, "young rabbits, jackdaws and magpies, ran about and jumped vigorously and spontaneously after the removal of every part of the brain in front of the Optic Thalami."

The cerebellum is proved, conclusively, by Fleureus, to be the organ of associated action, or as it may be otherwise phrased, the regulator of voluntary motion. When removed in experiments, the power of muscular motion is not thereby taken away; but the animal can neither stand, walk, run nor fly. The senses too are perfect, and it struggles with vain efforts, yet not convulsively. Its limbs are moved strongly enough, but locomotion, which is the result of a series of successive actions performed regularly and in association or connection, is impossible. It is an ancient opinion that the cerebellum possesses some influence over the generative propensities and powers. It is interwoven by Gall and Spurzheim into their fanciful system, and advocated strongly by Serres.

While then we confess ourselves believers in some of the general doctrines of phrenology, we regard the details with which its outlines have been filled up as most distinctly absurd and untenable. Nor are we in any degree credulous of crani

oscopy.

We deny that either organ or faculty can be detected by handling the scalp or measuring the skull. They could not be thus detected, if, as is falsely assumed, they were separate and even distant from each other, for, as in the muscular and other structures, cultivation and exercise will give energy and activity to a small organ-a condition which could not be exhibited within a bony case. Besides this, some of the organs cannot, in the very nature of circumstances, act independently of exterior structures, as has been already hinted. Of what avail would be the largest organ of tune if the ear were defective, or there were an inequality in the nicety of organization of the two ears. Or what would be the result of the greatest fulness of the organ of colour, if the eye were ill-constructed, or the optic nerve deficient in sensibility.

To what condition of organization shall we attribute the peculiarities of the negro race in relation to music. The negro is universally fond of musical sounds, and it is well known will imitate with remarkable facility and precision any tune which he hears. Now the negro is not ready at imitation as a general power; nor have we any expressive melody, however brief or simple, composed by or originating with the negro.

We are, however, ready to acknowledge that although we consider cranioscopical phrenology to have fallen by its own weight, as unsupported by sufficient evidence, we are under special obligations to the eminent phrenologists whose names we have used so freely, for the facts which they have brought together relative to the intimate connexion between organization and intellect, or mind. It is owing to their vigorous exertions and frank example that we can at this day, safely and in tranquillity, discuss sentiments and opinions which would formerly, and not very long since, have been denounced and cried down without a hearing. Our respect and gratitude in the meanwhile does not in the least hinder us from freely dif fering from them when we conceive them to be in the wrong.

We regard education as almost omnipotent in giving both character and capacity. We do not limit the application of the word merely to the labours of the schoolmaster, with his primer, slate and ferule; but would comprise under it all the circumstances which can act upon the individual during his growth and maturation. Mrs. Hamilton has well remarked, that example is the most important part of education. We will not go with Mr. Owen to his extreme, and say that "man is the creature of circumstances;" but we will venture the opinion that if truth here does not lie exactly in the medium, she leans rather to Mr. Owen's side than to that of the phrenologists.