that a State has any constitutional remedy by the exercise of its sovereign authority against 'a gross, palpable, and deliberate violation of the Constitution.' He called it an idle' or 'a ridiculous notion' or something to that effect; and added, that it would make the Union 'a mere rope of sand.' Now, Sir, as the gentleman has not condescended to enter into an examination of the question, and has been satisfied with throwing the weight of his authority into the scale, I do not deem it necessary to do more than to throw into the opposite scale, the authority on which South-Carolina relies; and there, for the present I am perfectly willing to leave the controversy. The South-Carolina doctrine, that is to say, the doctrine contained in an exposition reported by a Committee of the Legislature in December, 1828, and published by their authority, is the good old Republican doctrine of '98, the doctrine of the celebrated Virginia Resolutions,' of that year, and of 'Madison's Report' of '99. It will be recollected that the Legislature of Virginia, in December '98, took into consideration the Alien and Sedition Laws, then considered by all republicans as a gross violation of the Constitution of the United States, and on that day passed, among others, the following resolution:

·

"The General Assembly doth explicitly and preremptorily declare, 'that it views the powers of the Federal Government as resulting from 'the compact to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no 'further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that 'compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous 'exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the States 'who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to inter'pose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within 'their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them.'

"In addition to the above resolution, the General Assembly of Virginia 'appealed to the other States in the confidence that they would con'cur with that Commonwealth, that the acts aforesaid [the Alien and 'Sedition Laws] are unconstitutional, and that the necessary and proper 'measures would be taken by each for co-operating with Virginia, in 'maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved 'to the States respectively, or to the people.'

"The Legislatures of several of the New-England States having (contrary to the expectation of the Legislature of Virginia) expressed their dissent from these doctrines, the subject came up again for consideration during the session of '99-1800, when it was referred to a Select Committee, by whom was made that celebrated report, which is familiarly known as 'Madison's Report,' and which deserves to last as long as the constitution itself. In that Report, which was sebsequently adopted by the Legislature, the whole subject was deliberately re-examined, and the objections urged against the Virginia doctrines carefully considered, the result was, that the Legislature of Virginia reaffirmed all the principles laid down in the resolutions of '98, and issued to the world that admirable report which has stamped the character of Mr. Madison as the preserver of that Constitution, which he had con

tributed so largely to create and establish. I will here quote from Mr. Madison's report one or two passages which bear more immediately on the point in controversy. The resolution, having taken this view of the federal compact, proceeds to infer that in case of a deliberate, palpa'ble, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto have the right, and are in 'duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for 'maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and 'liberties appertaining to them.

"It appears to your committee to be a plain principle founded in common sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the na'ture of compacts, that where resort can be had to no tribunal, superior to the authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the right'ful judges in the last resort, whether the bargain made has been per6 verted or violated. The Constitution of the United States was formed 'by the sanction of the States, given by each in its sovereign capacity. 'It adds to the stability and diguity, as well as to the authority of the Constitution, that it rests upon this legitimate and solid foundation. The States then, being the parties to the Constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no 'tribunal above their authority, to decide, in the last resort, whether the 'compact made by them be violated; and, consequently, that, as the 'parties to it, they inust themselves decide, in the last resort, such ques'tions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition.' "The resolution has guarded against any misapprehension of its object, by expressly requiring for such an interposition, 'the case of a 'deliberate, palpable and dangerous breach of the Constitution, by the 'exercise of powers not granted by it.' It must be a case, not of a light ' and transient nature, but of a nature dangerous to the great purposes 'for which the Constitution was established.

"But the resolution has done more than guard against misconstruc'tion, by expressly referring to cases of a deliberate, palpable and dan'gerous nature. It specifies the object of the interposition which it 'contemplates, to be solely that of arresting the progress of the evil of 'usurpation, and of maintaining the authorities, rights and liberties ap'pertaining to the States, as parties to the Constitution.

"From this view of the resolution, it would seem inconceivable that' 'it can incur any just disapprobation from those, who, laying aside all 'momentary impressions, and recollecting the genuine source and ob'ject of the Federal Constitution, shall candidly and accurately inter'pret the meaning of the General Assembly. If the deliberate exercise of dangerous powers, palpably withheld by the Constitution, could not 'justify the parties to it, in interposing even so far as to arrest the progress of the evil, and thereby to preserve the Constitution itself, as well as to provide for the safety of the parties to it, there would be an 'end to all relief from usurped power, and a direct subversion of the 'rights specified or recognized under all the State Constitutions, as well as a plain denial of the fundamental principles on which our indepen'dence itself was declared.'

"But, Sir, our authorities do not stop here-the State of Kentucky responded to Virginia, and on the 10th November, 1798, adopted those celebrated resolutions well known to have been penned by the author of the Declaration of American Independence. In those resolutions, the Legislature of Kentucky declare, 'that the government created by 'this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent ' of the powers delegated to itself: since that would have made its dis'cretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, ' as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, ' each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions, 'as of the mode and measure of redress.'

"At the ensuing session of the Legislature, the subject was re-examined, and on the 14th November, 1799, the resolutions of the preceding year were deliberately re-affirmed, and it was, among other things, solemnly declared, 'That, if those who administer the General 'Government, be permitted to transgress the limits fixed by that compact, 'by a total diregard to the special delegations of power therein contained, ' an annihilation of the State Governments, and the erection, upon their 'ruins, of a general consolidated government, will be the inevitable consequences. That the principles of construction contended for by sundry ' of the State Legislatures, that the General Government is the exclusive 'judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism, since the discretion of those who administer the Govern'ment, and not the Constitution, would be the measure of their powers. That the several States who formed that instrument, being sovereign ' and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infrac'tion, and that a nullification by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized ' acts, done under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.'"

It will be seen that Mr. Hayne does no more than rest his argument on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799-which, in themselves, would seem to comprise all that can be said in favour of the right "of a State to interfere for the preservation of its reserved rights, in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise on the part of the General Government, of powers not granted by the compact."

issue.

Before, however, we proceed to consider any of the topics which necessarily arise out of this argument, it will be just to Mr. Webster, that by as copious an extract as our limits will permit, we present such portions of his speech as are most cogently applicable to the constitutional questions involved in the And we would be ready to concede that his reply was as solid and unanswerable, as it is confessedly ingenious and eloquent, if we were prepared to admit his premises-that this is a government formed by the people in their aggregate capacities, and not by the States in their sovereign function-and that the Supreme Court is the final and absolute arbiter between the States and the General Government-positions we

not only utterly deny, but the admission of which, we earnestly and emphatically maintain, would destroy the distinctive character of our confederate government, by making it, de facto, one of unlimited powers.

That this gentleman's reply is skilful and acute, and marked by that dexterity which enables an advocate to make the worse appear the better cause, no one can deny. He enjoys, moreover, the benefit of occupying the vantage ground, by having, on his side, those popular sympathies which exist in favour of the Union, as the source of our past glory and present security and renown. He spoke, too, to a majority, interested in the abuses to which the Union is made subservient, which majority gave him a sustaining countenance, willing ears and cheering tongues. National glory, that delusion which has betrayed so many nations to their ruin, combated by his side, and what is far less honourable to human nature, a base avarice perceived that his were doctrines, to make colonies of those States, whom it was profitable to plunder and oppress.

Mr. Hayne, on the contrary, was the champion of a truth, which might almost be called new, and in some respects, unacceptable, from the Egyptian darkness which had fallen upon the eyes of the people, since the great civil revolution of 1798. He spoke with fearful odds against him-before those, who were unwilling to have the titles disputed, by which they claimed not only the right of exaction, but the prerogative of immunity. He could hope for no indulgent hearing from the imperial Senate, bent on the oppression of distant provinces, although his voice might penetrate the remote vales and hamlets of our vast country, and meet with a response in the bosoms of a free and gallant people. Paul found a different judge even in a single despot, on whom the language "of soberness and truth" was not utterly lost.

But it is time for us to permit Mr. Webster to speak for himself:

"Mr. Webster resumed: So, Sir, I understood the gentleman, and am happy to find that I did not misunderstand him. What he contends for is, that it is constitutional to interrupt the administration of the Constitution itself, in the hands of those who are chosen and sworn to administer it, by the direct interference, in form of law, of the States, in virtue of their sovereign capacity. The inherent right in the people to reform their government, I do not deny; and they have another right, and that is, to resist unconstitutional laws, without overturning. the Government. It is no doctrine of mine, that unconstitutional laws bind the people. The great question is, whose prerogative it is to decide on the constitutionality, or unconstitutionality of the laws? On

that, the main debate hinges. The proposition, that in case of a supposed violation of the Constitution by Congress, the States have a constitutional right to interfere, and annul the laws of Congress, is the proposition of the gentleman: I do not admit it. If the gentleman had intended no more than to assert the rights of revolution, for justifiable cause, he would have said only what all agree to. But I cannot conceive that there can be a middle course, between submission to the laws, when regularly pronounced constitutional, on the one hand, and open resistance, which is revolution, or rebellion, on the other. I say, the right of a State to annul a law of Congress, cannot be maintained, but on the ground of the unalienable right of man to resist oppression: that is to say, upon the ground of revolution. I admit that there is an ultimate violent remedy, above the Constitution, and in defiance of the Constitution, which may be resorted to, when a revolution is to be justified. But I do not admit, that, under the Constitution, and in conformity with it, there is any mode in which a State Government, as a member of the Union, can interfere and stop the progress of the General Government, by force of her own laws, under any circumstances whatever.

"This leads us to inquire into the origin of this Government, and the source of its power. Whose agent is it? Is it the creature of the State Legislatures, or the creature of the people? If the Government of the United States be the agent of the State Governments, then they may control it, provided they can agree in the manner of controlling it; if it is the agent of the People, then the People alone can control it, restrain it, modify or reform it. It is observable enough, that the doctrine for which the honourable gentleman contends, leads him to the necessity of maintaining, not only that this General Government is the creature of the States, but that it is the creature of the States severally; so that each may assert the power, for itself, of determining whether it acts within the limits of its authority. It is the servant of four and twenty masters, of different wills and different purposes; and yet bound to obey all. This absurdity, for it seems no less arises from a misconception as to the origin of this Government and its true character. It is, Sir, the People's Constitution, the People's Government; made for the People; made by the People; and answerable to the People. The People of the United States have declared that this Constitution shall be the Supreme Law. We must either admit the proposition, or dispute the authority. The States are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law. The State Legislatures as political bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the People. So far as the People have given power to the General Government, so far the grant is unquestionably good, and the Government holds of the People, and not of the State Governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the People. The General Government and the State Governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary. The national Government possesses those powers which it can be shown the People have conferred on it and no more.