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An Act extending the criminal laws of this state to and over the Indians therein. Approved February 20, 1885, 34.

Indians Amenable to Criminal Law. 4655. SECTION 1. All the laws of this state concerning crimes and punishments, or applicable thereto, and all the laws of this state concerning proceedings in criminal cases or applicable thereto, are hereby extended to and over all Indians in this state, whether such Indians be on or off an Indian reservation, and all of said laws are hereby declared to be applicable to all crimes committed by Indians within this state, whether committed on or off an Indian reservation, save and except an offense committed upon an Indian reservation by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.

Essence of Crime.

CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

4656. SECTION 1.

An Act concerning crimes and punishments.
Approved November 26, 1861, 56.

-PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES.

In every crime or public offense, there must be a union or joint operation of act and intention, or criminal negligence.

1. CRIMINAL INTENT, HOW DETERMINED. State v. Trolson, 21 Nev. 419.

2. CRIMINAL INTENT NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE CRIME. The essence of a criminal offense is
the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist. State v. Gardner, 5 Nev. 377.
3. INTENT, WHEN ELEMENT OF CRIME. Where a specific intent is required by statute to con-
stitute the crime, such specific intent enters into the nature of the act itself, and must
be alleged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304.
WHEN INTENT NOT ELEMENT OF CRIME. When the statute forbids the doing of a certain
thing, and is silent concerning the intent with which it is done, a person who does the
forbidden act is not guiltless because he has no wrongful intent beyond that which is
involved in the doing of the prohibited act. (State v. Gardner, 5 Nev. 377, overruled.) Id.
4. INSTRUCTION. When innocent act becomes criminal, intent must be proved, but when the
act is in itself unlawful, the justification or excuse lies on defendant. State v. Marks,
15 Nev. 33.

5. INTENT TO KILL WHEN ESSENTIAL TO CONSTITUTE MURDER. An intent to take life is an
essential element in the constitution of murder in the first degree, except where it is
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, or burglary.
State v. Newton, 4 Nev. 410.

6. BURGLARY-INTENT. In order to constitute the crime of burglary, it is just as essential to prove the intent as it is to prove the entry. State v. Cowell, 12 Nev. 337.

Intent.

4657. SEC. 2. Intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused.

Of Sound Mind.

4658. SEC. 3. A person shall be considered of sound mind who is neither an idiot or lunatic, or affected with insanity, and who hath arrived at the age of fourteen years, or before that age, if such person knew the distinction between good and evil.

Infant Incapable.

4659. SEC. 4. An infant under the age of fourteen years, shall be deemed incapable of knowing the distinction between good and evil, unless the contrary be clearly shown.

Wrong Counsel.

4660. SEC. 5. Any person counseling, advising, or encouraging an infant under the age of ten years, a lunatic, or idiot, to commit any offense, shall be prosecuted for such offense, where committed, as principal, and if found guilty, shall suffer the same punishment that would have been inflicted on such person counseling, advising, or encouraging, as aforesaid, had he or she committed the offense directly, without the intervention of such idiot, lunatic, or infant.

Married Women Under Coercion.

4661. SEC. 6. A married woman, acting under the threats, command, or coercion of her husband, shall not be found guilty of any crime not punishable with death; provided, it appear, from all the facts and circumstances of the case, that violent threats, command, or coercion were used; and, in such case, the husband shall be prosecuted as principal, and receive the punishment which would otherwise have been inflicted on the wife, if she had been found guilty.

Drunkenness.

4662. SEC. 7. Drunkenness shall not be an excuse for any crime, unless such drunkenness be occasioned by the fraud, contrivance, or force of some other person or persons, for the purpose of causing the perpetration of an offense, in which case the person or persons so causing said drunkenness, for such malignant purpose, shall be considered principal or principals, and suffer the same punishment as would have been inflicted on the person or persons committing the offense, if he, she, or they had been possessed of sound reason and discretion.

Misfortune or Accident.

4663. SEC. 8. All acts committed by misfortune or accident shall not be deemed criminal, where it satisfactorily appears that there was no evil design or intention or culpable negligence.

Committed Under Duress.

4664. SEC. 9. A person committing a crime not punishable with death, under threats or menaces, which sufficiently show that his or her life was in danger, or that he or she had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that his or her life was in danger, shall not be found guilty, and such threats or menaces being proved and established, the person or persons compelling, by such threats or menaces, the commission of the offense, shall be considered as principal or principals, and suffer the same punishment as if he or she had perpetrated the offense.

Definition.

II-ACCESSORY.

4665. SEC. 10. An accessory is he or she who stands by and aids, abets, or assists; or who, not being present, aiding, abetting, or assisting, hath advised and encouraged the perpetration of the crime. He or she who thus aids, abets or assists, advises, or encourages, shall be deemed and considered as principal, and punished accordingly.

1. ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT SAME AS PRINCIPAL-Robbery by Absent Person-Doctrine of Agency as to Accessories Before the Fact-Indictment. State v. Chapman, 6 Nev. 320. 2. PRINCIPAL OR ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT-What Held to Be. State v. Laurie, 13 Nev. 386.

CONFEDERATES ARE PRINCIPALS. Where several confederates act in pursuance of a common plan, in the commission of an offense, all are held to be present where the offense is committed, and all are principals. Id.

3. TRIAL OF ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT-Charge as to Principal-Proof of Guilt of Principal Not Necessary. State v. Jones, 7 Nev. 408.

4. ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT-Robbery--Evidence Necessary to Show Guilt. State v. O'Keefe, 23 Nev. 127.

Accessory After the Fact.

4666. SEC. 11.

An accessory after the fact, is a person who, after full knowl

edge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of the crime. Any person being found guilty of being an accessory after the fact, shall be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, and fined a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, to be regulated by the circumstances of the case and enormity of the crime.

Competency Of.

III-WITNESSES.

4667. SEC. 12. The rules for determining the competency of witnesses in civil actions are applicable also to criminal actions and proceedings, except as otherwise provided for in this Act. The party or parties injured shall in all cases be competent witnesses; the credibility of all such witnesses shall be left to the jury, as in other cases. In all cases when two or more persons are jointly or otherwise concerned in the commission of any crime or misdemeanor, either of such persons may be sworn as a witness against another, in relation to such crime or misdemeanor; but the testimony given by such witness shall in no instance be used against himself in any criminal prosecution; and any person may be compelled to testify, as provided in this section. As amended, Stats. 1881, 83.

Husband and Wife.

4668. SEC. 13. Except with the consent of both, or in cases of criminal violence upon one by the other, neither husband nor wife is a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both are parties. As amended, Stats. 1865, 403; 1881, 84.

Affirmation Sufficient.

4669. SEC. 14. The solemn affirmation of witnesses shall be deemed sufficient. A false or corrupt affirmation shall subject the witness to all the penalties and punishments provided for those who commit willful and corrupt perjury.

Murder.

IV-OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS.

4670. SEC. 15. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by which death may be occasioned.

Express Malice.

4671. SEC. 16. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

EXPRESS MALICE-MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. Under the statute of this state, express malice necessarily renders any murder, murder of the first degree. State v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 408.

Degree of Murder-Punishment.

4672. SEC. 17. Malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree; and the jury before whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, designate by their verdict whether it be murder of the first or second degree; but, if such person shall be convicted on confession in open court, the court shall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and give sentence accordingly. Every person convicted of murder of the first degree shall suffer death, and every person

convicted of murder of the second degree shall suffer imprisonment in the state prison for a term not less than ten years, and which may be extended to life.

LENGTH OF TIME FOR DELIBERATION is not an essential ingredient in murder in the first degree. It is sufficient if the design to murder was formed before the striking of the fatal blow. State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 410.

Manslaughter.

4673. SEC. 18. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice express or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation. It must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible; or, involuntary, in the commissions of an unlawful act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection.

Voluntary Manslaughter.

4674. SEC. 19. In cases of voluntary manslaughter, there must be a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an attempt by the person killed to commit a serious personal injury on the person killing.

When Punished as Murder.

4675. SEC. 20. The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse of passion supposed to be irresistible; for, if there should appear to have been an interval between the assault or provocation given and the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge, and punished as murder.

Involuntary Manslaughter.

4676. SEC. 21. Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a human being, without any intent so to do, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act which probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner; provided, that where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder.

Punishment.

4677. SEC. 22. Every person convicted of the crime of manslaughter shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not exceeding ten

years.

Death Within a Year and a Day.

4678. SEC. 23. In order to make the killing either murder or manslaughter, it is requisite that the party die within a year and a day after the stroke received, or the cause of death administered, in the computation of which the whole of the day on which the act was done shall be reckoned the first.

Place of Trial.

4679. SEC. 24. If the injury be inflicted in one county, and the party die within another county, or without the state, the accused shall be tried in the county where the act was done, or the cause of death administered. If the party killing shall be in one county, and the party killed in another county, at the time the cause of death shall be administered, the accused may be tried in either county.

Justifiable Homicide.

4680. SEC. 25. Justifiable homicide is the killing of a human being in necessary self-defense, or in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends, or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against any person or persons who manifestly intend and endeavor, in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another, for the pur

edge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the person charged with or found guilty of the crime. Any person being found guilty of being an accessory after the fact, shall be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, and fined a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, to be regulated by the circumstances of the case and enormity of the crime.

Competency of.

III-WITNESSES.

4667. SEC. 12. The rules for determining the competency of witnesses in civil actions are applicable also to criminal actions and proceedings, except as otherwise provided for in this Act. The party or parties injured shall in all cases be competent witnesses; the credibility of all such witnesses shall be left to the jury, as in other cases. In all cases when two or more persons are jointly or otherwise concerned in the commission of any crime or misdemeanor, either of such persons may be sworn as a witness against another, in relation to such crime or misdemeanor; but the testimony given by such witness shall in no instance be used against himself in any criminal prosecution; and any person may be compelled to testify, as provided in this section. As amended, Stats. 1881, 83.

Husband and Wife.

4668. SEC. 13. Except with the consent of both, or in cases of criminal violence upon one by the other, neither husband nor wife is a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to which one or both are parties. As amended, Stats. 1865, 403; 1881, 84.

Affirmation Sufficient.

4669. SEC. 14. The solemn affirmation of witnesses shall be deemed sufficient. A false or corrupt affirmation shall subject the witness to all the penalties and punishments provided for those who commit willful and corrupt perjury.

Murder.

IV-OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS.

4670. SEC. 15. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by which death may be occasioned.

Express Malice.

4671. SEC. 16. Express malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

EXPRESS MALICE-MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. Under the statute of this state, express malice necessarily renders any murder, murder of the first degree. State v. Lopez, 15 Nev. 408.

Degree of Murder-Punishment.

4672. SEC. 17. Malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder of the second degree; and the jury before whom any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, designate by their verdict whether it be murder of the first or second degree; but, if such person shall be convicted on confession in open court, the court shall proceed, by examination of witnesses, to determine the degree of the crime, and give sentence accordingly. Every person convicted of murder of the first degree shall suffer death, and every person

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