manding character of Clark, excited among the troops a spirit of insubordination which neither the commands, nor the entreaties, nor the tears of the general could subdue. At an encampment near the mouth of the Vermillion river, about three hundred men in a body left the army, and proceeded on their way homeward. The remainder of the troops, under the command of General Clark, then abandoned the expedition and returned to Post Vincennes. XXVII.-Late in the summer, or early in the fall, of the year 1786, before General Clark moved from his encampment near the Falls of the Ohio, on his expedition against the Wabash Indians, he directed Colonel Benjámin Logan, of Kentucky, to "raise a party with all practicable speed," and march against the Shawanees, whose villages were situated in the country lying about the headwaters of Big Miami river. Colonel Logan soon raised four or five hundred mounted riflemen, crossed the river Ohio at the point where the town of Maysville now stands, and penetrated the Indian country as far as the headwaters of Mad river. In the words of one of the actors* in this expedition, "Colonel Logan would have surprised the Indian towns against which he marched, had not one of his men deserted to the enemy, and gave notice of his approach. As it was, he burned eight large towns, and destroyed many fields of corn. He took seventy or eighty prisoners, and killed about twenty warriors, and among the rest, the head chief of the nation. This last act caused deep regret, humiliation, and shame to the commander and his troops." The murder of the chief was, however, perpetrated in direct violation of the orders of Colonel Logan. In the course of this expedition the Kentuckians lost about ten men.† *The late Gen. William Lytle, of Cincinnati. +McDonald's Sketches. CHAPTER XVII. GARRISON ESTABLISHED AT VINCENNES - INDIAN AND SPANISH IN the month of October, 1786, a board, composed of fieldofficers in the Wabash expedition, met in a council at Post Vincennes, and "unanimously agreed that a garrison at that place would be of essential service to the district of Kentucky, and that supplies might be had in the district more than sufficient for their support, by impressment or otherwise, under the direction of a commissary to be appointed for that purpose, pursuant to the authority vested in the field-officers of the district by the executive of Virginia. The same board appointed Mr. John Craig, jr., a commissary of purchases; and resolved that one field-officer and two hundred and fifty men, (exclusive of a company of artillery, to be commanded by Captain Valentine Thomas Dalton,) be recruited to garrison Post Vincennes; and that Colonel John Holder be appointed to command the troops in this service." In order to carry these resolutions into effect, General Clark, who "assumed the supreme direction of the corps," began to levy recruits, appoint officers, and impress provisions for the support of a garrison at Post Vincennes. He dispatched messages to the Indian tribes that lived on the borders of the Wabash, and invited those tribes to meet him in a great council, at Clarksville, on the 20th of November, 1786, to make a treaty of peace and friendship. A few chiefs, of different bands, sent answers to General Clark, and expressed their willingness to meet him in council, not at Clarksville, but at Post Vincennes. The following is an extract from the answer of "the Goose and Fusil:" "My Elder Brother: Thou oughtest to know the place we have been accustomed to speak at: it is at Post Vincennes. There our chiefs are laid. There our ancestor's bed is, and that of our father the French-and not at Clarksville, where you required us to meet you. We don't know such a place; +Ib. 312. *Secret Journals of Congress, iv, 311. but at Post Vincennes where we always went when necessary to hold councils. My Elder Brother-thou informest me I must meet you at the place I have mentioned; yet, thou seest, my brother, that the season is far advanced; and that I would not have time to invite my allies to come to your council, which we pray to hold at Post Vincennes." In replying to this message, and to other communications of a similar nature, General Clark said: "I propose the last of April [1787], for the grand council to be held at this place, Post Vincennes, where I expect all those who are inclined to open the roads will appear, and we can soon discover what the Deity means." At this period the Spanish minister, Mr. Gardoqui, and John Jay, the Secretary of the United States for Foreign Affairs, were carrying on negotiations for the establishment of a treaty between the United States and Spain. On the 3d of August, 1786, Mr. Jay made before Congress a certain statement, from which the following is an extract: "It appears to me that a proper commercial treaty with Spain would be of more importance to the United States than any they have formed, or can form, with any other nation. I am led to entertain this opinion from the, influence which Spain may and will have both on our politics and commerce. France, whom we consider as our ally, and to whom we shall naturally turn our eyes for aid in case of war, etc., is strongly bound to Spain by the family compact; and the advantages she derives from it are so various and so great, that it is questionable whether she could ever remain neutral in case of a rupture between us and Spain. Besides, we are well apprised of the sentiments of France relative to our western claims, in which I include that of freely navigating the river Mississippi. I take it for granted that, while the compact in question exists, France will invariably think it her interest to prefer the good will of Spain to the good will of America; and although she would very reluctantly give umbrage to either, yet, if driven to take part with one or the other, I think it would not be in our favor. Unless we are friends with Spain, her influence, whether more or less, on the counsels of Versailles, will always be against us. * * * On general principles of policy and commerce, it is the interest of the United States to be on the best terms with Spain. *** My attention is chiefly fixed on two obstacles which at present divide us, viz: the navigation of the Mississippi, and the territorial limits between them and us. "My letters from Spain, when our affairs were the least promising, evince my opinion respecting the Mississippi, and oppose every idea of our relinquishing our right to navigate it. I entertain the same sentiments of that right, and of the importance of retaining it, which I then did. Mr. Gardoqui strongly insists on our relinquishing it. We have had many conferences and much reasoning on the subject, not necessary now to detail. His concluding answer to all my arguments has steadily been that the king will never yield that point, nor consent to any compromise about it-for that it always has been, and continues to be, one of their maxims of policy to exclude all mankind from their American shores. "I have often reminded him that the adjacent country was filling fast with people; and that the time must and would come when they would not submit to seeing a fine river flow before their doors without using it as a highway to the sea for the transportation of their productions; that it would therefore be wise to look forward to that event, and take care not to sow in the treaty any seeds of future discord. He said that the time alluded to was far distant, and that treaties were not to provide for contingencies so remote and future. For his part he considered the rapid settlement of that country as injurious to the States, and that they would find it necessary to check it. Many fruitless arguments passed between us; and though he would admit that the only way to make treaties and friendship permanent, was for neither party to leave the other any thing to complain of; yet he would still insist that the Mississippi must be shut against us. *** Circumstanced as we are, I think it would be expedient to agree that the treaty should be limited to twenty-five or thirty years, and that one of the articles should stipulate that the United States would forbear to use the navigation of that river below their territories to the ocean. Thus the duration of the treaty and of the forbearance in question would be limited to the same period. Whether Mr. Gardoqui would be content with such an article, I can not determine, my instructions restraining me from even 1 sounding him respecting it. I nevertheless think the experiment worth trying for several reasons. 1. Because, unless that matter can in some way or other be settled, the treaty, however advantageous, will not be concluded. 2. As the navigation is not at present important, nor will probably become much so in less than twenty-five or thirty years, a forbearance to use it while we do not want it is no great sacrifice. that navigation, and with a She will not yield it peace 3. Spain now excludes us from strong hand holds it against us. ably, and therefore we can only acquire it by war. Now, as we are not prepared for a war with any power; as many of the States would be little inclined to a war with Spain for that object at this day; and as such a war would, for those and a variety of obvious reasons, be inexpedient, it follows that Spain will, for a long space of time yet to come, exclude us from that navigation. Why, therefore, should we not, for a valuable consideration, too, consent to forbear to use what we know is not in our power to use? *** With respect to territorial limits, it is clear to me that Spain can justly claim nothing east of the Mississippi but what may be comprehended within the bounds of the Floridas. How far those bounds extend, or ought to extend, may prove a question of more difficulty to negotiate than to decide. Pains, I think, should be taken to conciliate and settle all such matters amicably; and it would be better even to yield a few acres than to part in ill humor. *** It is much to be wished that all these matters had lain dormant for years yet to come; but such wishes are vain. These disputes are agitating-they press themselves upon us; and must terminate in accommodation, or war, or disgrace. The last is the worst that can happen; the second we are unprepared for; and, therefore, our attention and endeavors should be bent to the first. * * * 66 Spain is now able and willing to grant us favors. Other treaties and other dispositions and views may render her in future both unable and unwilling to do the like. At a time when other nations are showing us no extraordinary marks of respect, the court of Spain is even courting our friendship by |