Stearns v. Page. been guilty of such laches as shall debar him? Upon what ground will the court not be called into activity? The case furnishes no presumption of payment. It is not a case for presumption. The answer negatives it. Whatever error or fraud ever existed now exists. Whatever wrong was done remains. It furnishes no evidence of acquiescence. The nature of the wrong, and the mode of doing it, so far as appellants were concerned, and proportions, three eights, forbid almost discovery. The then administrator disposed to peace, a woman. No means of redress then but at law; no means of proof; no opportunity for a discovery from defendant. It seeks to disturb no innocent person's possessions, but is against the original wrongdoer. It is not against the representatives of the original party, and who may be supposed to be left without the means of defence, &c., as in Mooers v. White, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch., 369. It will scarcely be urged by defendant, that, whatever errors or mistakes were committed, they did not originate in his representations. They could arise from no other source. Nobody else had the means of furnishing the data. Nobody else had inducements to falsify. The answer admits that he gave all the information in his power. It will be said the answer denies all fraud. This is not sufficient; it does not deny, but admits, the gross errors which are the result of that fraud. A denial of fraud is not sufficient nor conclusive, if the facts and circumstances are such as to lead to a different conclusion. Howard v. Camp, Walk. (Mich.) Ch., 427. Fraud may be presumed in equity, though it must be proved at law. Lord Chesterfield v. Jannsen, 1 Atk., 352; Denton v. McKenzie, 1 Desaus. (S. C.), 300; Warner v. Daniels, (cases cited by court,) 1 Woodb. & M., 103; Watkins v. Stockett, 6 Har. & J. (Md.), 435; Boyden v. Walker, 2 Id., 292. *But if there remains any doubt as to the fraudulent representations of defendant, we are entitled to relief [*825 on the ground of mistake. The court will open a settlement made by mistake, though receipts have passed and a note has been given. 4 Desaus (S. C.), 122. "But if there has been any mistake, or omission, or accident, or undue advantage, or fraud, by which the account stated is in truth vitiated, and the balance is incorrectly fixed, a court of equity will not suffer it to be conclusive upon the Stearns v. Page. parties, but will allow it to be opened and reëxamined." 1 Story, Eq., § 523. In some cases the whole account will be opened, in others a more moderate remedy given. Ib. seq. And though an account be settled by arbitrators, it is not conclusive if an error can be shown in the account. Patterson v. Pearl, 3 Atk., 530; 1 Mad. Ch., 101. There must be error enough upon the bill to show there is reason for it; and if plaintiff proves some of the errors, he entitles himself to a decree. Twogood v. Swanton, 6 Ves., 486. He may take advantage of errors in law, as well as in fact. Roberts v. Kuffin, 2 Atk., 112. Mistake is within the same rule as fraud, both as regards time and reliefs. 2 Younge & Coll., 58, cited in 2 Story, Eq., 739, note. Time does not run against the remedy for a mistake until it be discovered. 4J. J. Marsh. (Ky.), 77; Bertine v. Varian, 1 Edw. (N. Y.), 343; 1 Paige (N. Y.), 564. See also 1 Woodb. & M., p. 107, cases cited by Woodbury and remarks, showing what is equivalent to a fraud, such as availing himself of false representations of others, enjoying fruits, &c. The relation of these parties was of a fiduciary character, whether it were a copartnership or not, a relation which the courts regard and watch with great scrutiny. Much in any aspect was intrusted to defendant; his control was great, his account large. 1 Story, Eq., 497, note :-" A settled account between attorney and client, or between other persons standing in confidential relations to each other, will be opened more readily than any others; and even, it is said, upon general allega tions of error, without any errors being pointed out, when the answer admits errors.' So if a partner, who exclusively superintends the business of the concern, should, by concealment of the true state of the affairs, purchase the share of the other partner for an inadequate price, the purchase will be held void. 1 Story, Eq., § 220; Maddeford v. Austwick, 1 Sim., 89; Smith in re Hay, 6 Mad., 2; E. I. Co. v. Donald, 9 Ves., 275. *826] *Mr. Allen said, that, where a bill calls for a general account on the ground of fraud, it is not sufficient to make a charge of fraud in general terms; it should be pointed out, and the point stated. 1 Story, Eq. Pl., 251. This court will be governed by the decisions of the State courts, where the transactions arose in the construction given by them to the statute of limitations. 16 Pet., 455-457. Stearns v. Page. The statute applies to this case. February, 1787; 1 Maine Laws, 297. 1 Mass. Laws, 280, 13th This court will not interfere after so great a lapse of time as has passed in this case. 1 How., 161, 189. The decisions of the State court upon the subject are found in 3 Pick. (Mass.), 212, 237–248. Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court. A brief history of the conceded facts of this case, anterior to the filing of the amended bill, may save the trouble of a more tedious analysis of the bill and answer, with their numerous amendments, and tend to elucidate the merits of the case and the questions decided by the court. John O. Page, the complainant's intestate, was a merchant in Hallowell, Maine. He built and owned shares in vessels employed in trade, and had a retail shop or store, which, for some years before his death, was managed by his brother, Rufus K. Page. In 1810, John O. Page went to England, leaving his business chiefly in the care of his brother, and died there, in February, 1811, intestate, leaving a widow and three minor children. Sarah Page, the widow, took out letters of administration on the estate. She filed an inventory of the property, amounting to the sum of $64,000, and charged herself with additional receipts of cash in the administration accounts afterwards filed, showing the whole amount of the estate to be over $80,000. Rufus K. Page claimed to have been a partner with his brother in the store, by a parol agreement with him, whereby John should furnish the capital, and Rufus conduct the business, dividing the profits, five eighths to John and three eighths to Rufus. The sureties of Sarah Page in her administration bond were Nathaniel Dummer, her father-in-law, and Thomas Bond, Esq., her brother-in-law, who also aided and counselled her in settling the estate. In February, 1812, Chandler Robins, register of the Probate Court, and John Agry, a respectable merchant and ship-owner, were mutually chosen by the administratrix and Rufus K. Page to settle all accounts between the estate of John O. Page and Rufus K. Page. By their settlement or award, Rufus was charged as debtor to John, *For capital advanced to store, *827] For five eighths of profits of store, Amounting in all to. $10,769.00 12,934.00 $23,703.00 7,828.00 Leaving a balance due by Rufus to the estate, $15,875.00 From which was deducted John's debt to store, Stearns v. Page. After adding and subtracting various other matters of account not connected with the partnership, they found the balance due by Rufus to the estate to be $17,190, of which $8,106 was cash, and the remainder, $9,084, consisted of John's share of the notes and accounts due to the store, and which Rufus retained in his hands for collection. The first administration account filed by Sarah Page acknowledges the receipt in cash of the sum of $8,106 from R. K. Page, and the accounts afterwards filed show that she had received the balance of $9,804, partly in cash and partly in notes. Sarah Page settled the final account of her administration on the 20th of February, 1816. She died in 1826. In 1828, Stearns, the complainant, intermarried with Louisa, one of the daughters and heirs of John O. Page. In 1834, he took out letters of administration de bonis non on the estate of John O. Page, for the purpose of prosecuting claims under the treaty, of the United States with France. After this he commenced an examination of the administration accounts of Sarah Page, and began to entertain suspicions that Rufus K. Page had taken advantage of her ignorance of accounts, and had defrauded her in his settlement. And finally, at November term, 1838, more than twenty-six years after the settlement of defendant's account with the administratrix, this bill was filed against Rufus K. Page for a discovery and account. The amended bill abounds in general charges of fraud against the defendant; alleges that he concealed from the administratrix the true state of the affairs of the deceased, which had been intrusted to his care; that the partnership claimed by him with the deceased was a false pretence, "and that the said Sarah did not distrust, or had it not in her power to disprove, the same "; that the accounts exhibited of the partnership transactions were totally false and fraudulent in their statements and aggregates, calculated and designed to deceive and mislead. It charges, also, that some ten thousand dollars of private debts due by Rufus to John were intermingled with the partnership accounts so as to produce an erroneous result, and that he had sold and converted to his own use the brig Emmeline, which was owned, in whole or in part, by John, and rendered no account of the same. *Afterwards, in October, 1841, by a further amend*828] ment to the bill, the complainant admits, that, "from means of information which he now has," there was a partnership between John and Rufus, but insists that the profits were to be divided between them in the ratio of two thirds to John and one third to Rufus. Stearns v. Page. The defendant, in his answer, after denying the general charges of fraud and mistake, asserts, that he entered into partnership, by parol agreement, with his brother, John, in 1806; that the business of the firm was transacted in the name of Rufus K. Page; that John advanced the capital, and Rufus superintended and conducted the business of the store, and the profits thereof were to be divided five eights to John and three eights to Rufus; that the books of the firm were kept on these principles, and always open to the inspection of John, and frequently examined by him; that when John advanced money or goods for the use of the firm, he took the notes of the firm; and that defendant gave notes to John for goods and money supplied, and (to use his own phrase) "for equalizing the capital," to the amount of over $10,000; that immediately on the announcement of the death of John O. Page, an inventory of the goods in the store was taken and placed in the hands of Bond, the attorney of Sarah Page, the administratrix; that he afterwards settled fully and fairly all accounts with the administratrix and her attorney, and produces the books, and the statement of their final settlement as made out by Robins and Agry, the referees chosen by the parties to make the settlement and adjust the accounts, and shows, moreover, by the administration accounts filed by said Sarah, that he had paid her the balance of over $17,000 found to be due by him according to the account thus stated. He asserts, moreover, that John owned but one half of the brig Emmeline, which the administratrix afterwards sold to the defendant for the sum of $3,000, with which she charged herself in her administration account. And finally, the answer relies on the settlement of accounts thus made more than twenty-five years before the filing of the bill, as a bar to all further account, especially after so great a lapse of time, when papers are lost, witnesses dead, and transactions forgotten, and pleads the statute of limitations. Statutes of limitation form a part of the legislation of every government, and are necessary to the peace and repose of society. When they are addressed to courts of equity as well as to courts of law, as they seem to be in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction (as in matters of account), they are equally obligatory on each court. In other cases, courts of equity act upon the analogy of limitations at law, and sometimes upon their own inherent doc- [*829 trine of discouraging, for the peace of society, antiquated demands, by refusing to interfere where there has been gross laches or unreasonable delay. They also interfere in many cases to prevent the bar of the statutes, where it would be |