Cunningham wrote the appellant, giving, in more detail, the defense to be urged by Cunningham to any suit to be brought by the appellees to enforce payment either from him or the appellant, and arranging that, in the event suit should be brought against the appellant, the attorneys for the appellant should defend the suit, but at the cost and expense of Cunningham. The appellant then wrote its Baltimore attorneys:

"I have your letter of the 10th inst., and as much as we desire to do so, Mr. Cunningham's position in the matter precludes us at this time from recognizing Lanahan & Co.'s request for payment of Mr. Cunningham's promissory_note. You may make known to Mr. Lanahan's attorneys as much of the letter as you deem wise, but I know you will appreciate that in the light of the two communications, photostat copies of which you will have upon receipt of the inclosure, it would be most unwise for us to take any step in defiance of Mr. Cunningham's instructions."

the performance of insurance contracts where surety bonds are accepted by states and municipalities."

While it is admitted by the appellant, that it had power to guarantee contracts, and that the word "contract" includes promissory note, nevertheless the argument is that in construing the power given to it by the use of the word "contract," one is not to take that word in its broad legal sense, but is confined to a narrower meaning. That is, that unless the charter contains express words giving power to guarantee promissory notes, or other obligations, purely and simply for the payment of money, then the power cannot be read into the charter by simply expressing the power as one to guarantee contracts generally. The contention then, as applied to this particular case, is that, as the charter of the appellant did not expressly provide for the guaranteeing of the In the suit subsequently brought against payment of promissory notes, the fact that the appellant, judgment was recovered for it did provide for the guaranteeing of all the full amount claimed, and this appeal contracts other than insurance policies did taken therefrom. In the court below there not confer the power upon it of guaranteewas the defense of fraud, as well as that ing promissory notes. We have been reof ultra vires, but the issue of fraud has ferred to no authorities, nor have we been been withdrawn by the appellant, and the able to discover any, to that effect. While only question before us is whether or not it is true that special authority must be conthe bond sued upon is ultra vires. ferred, by its charter, before any corporation can become the surety on any bond, yet we know of no rule of law, nor any reason for such, that would require a narrower meaning to be attached to words covering a grant of power in a charter than the words used necessarily imply, provided, of course, that the power assumed to be exercised is a lawful one.

The very nature of the business for which the appellant was chartered is that of becoming surety for a great variety of classes of suretyship, and the character of suretyship herein claimed is neither unlawful nor against public policy. The fact that the charters of some of the local surety companies, issuing bonds of the character of this one, contain the power expressed in different language than that used in the charter of the appellant can make no difference in the conclusion reached by us. That the framers of those charters preferred to express their powers by language more in detail certainly cannot be used to take away from language just as comprehensive, although more concise. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the charter provision, referred to, conferred full authority upon the appellant to issue the bond sued upon.

In our opinion, the charter provisions of the appellant render unnecessary a discussion of several legal propositions which might arise under the facts as disclosed in this record, for it must be conceded, if the power to guarantee the payment of promissory notes can be found in the charter, the obligation sued on is not ultra vires. The appellees offered in evidence a certified copy of the copy of the appellant's amended charter as filed in the office of the secretary of state as of the year 1912. The counsel for the appellant stated in open court that that copy was the latest one as of file in the office of the secretary of state. The appellant offered in evidence a certified copy of its charter as amended May 11, 1914, and effective until June 21, 1915, which amended charter was the one in effect at the time of the execution of the bond in question, June 20, 1914, but which had never been filed in this state with the secretary of state. The similarity between the sections in the two amended charters, affecting the question on this bond, is so marked that the difference is not appreciable. By section 4, art. 3, of the amended charter, filed in 1912, power is conferred upon the appellant to issue bonds, "guaranteeing the performance of There was a question raised in the pleadcontracts other than insurance contracts ings which, however, is rendered immaterial where surety bonds are accepted by states or by the conclusion we have reached on the municipalities in lieu of actual deposits." only question attempted to be raised, that By section 4, art. 3, of the amended charter, of ultra vires. The appellant for a plea set as of date the 11th day of May, 1914, the out all of the provisions as contained in its appellant is empowered to issue bonds, amended charter of May 11, 1914, previously “guaranteeing the performance of contracts referred to, and alleged that it had not then,

"No; because I was holding myself. Q. Did Starting an electric street car before a pas-it make anybody else fall in the car? A. The senger is seated, she being in the act of stepping others did not fall because the others did not into it from the rear platform, is not negli- get on. Q. Were there not other people on the gence, in the absence of any unusual circum- back platform? A. I don't remember. Q. Did stance or condition. not Mr. Difatta and Mrs. Brocato's son get on after you did? A. Yes; he was behind my sister. Q. Did either of them fall? A. No, sir; it was only when she made her step over this platform that she fell.”

This is, in substance, all the testimony in relation to the falling of the plaintiff and con

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Rob- duct of the company in the operation of its

If there was any negligence on the part of the company, it must be found in the starting of the car before the plaintiff was in a timore. Judgment for defendant, and plain-place of safety, or in the defendant's neglitiff appeals. Affirmed.

there is some reason to apprehend danger in so doing, or the movement is in a negligent man

ner.

[2] We have already said:

and that there are certain movements to which "Electric cars do not run perfectly smoothly they are subject, and which do not justify the inference of negligence or carelessness on the part of those in charge." Dawson v. American Callis v. United Railway, 128 Md. 406, 97 Atl. Electric Railway, 119 Md. 376, 86 Atl. 1041; 715; Hagerstown & Frederick Ry. Co. v. State, 99 Atl. 376; and United Rys. Co. v. Maggie Phillips, 99 Atl. 355, decided at the present term of this court.

It is not

foot raised in the act of stepping into the car. She, at such time, was not supporting herself in any way, and while in this position she fell, as she says, from the motion of the car in starting. It can hardly be said that these facts, unassociated with any unusual circumstances or conditions, show negligence on the part of the company in starting the car while the plaintiff was still upon the platform and before she was seated. In Martin v. Boston E. R. W. Co., 216 Mass. 361, 103 N. E. 828, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 753, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 830, as in the case before us, the only question in controversy was whether the trial judge should have ruled as a matter of law that the conductor was not negligent as to the time of starting the car, instead of leaving that issue to the jury as a question of fact. In that case the plaintiff's married daughter and the latter's little boy boarded the rear vestibule and entered the car. The plaintiff followed as far as the vestibule, with a suit case, but was delayed from getting into the body of the car by an intervening woman passenger. Leaving her suit case in the vestibule, the plaintiff started to enter the car, the floor of which was one step higher than the floor of the rear platform, but before she had time to enter the door or to get hold of anything the car started suddenly, and she fell back into the rear part of the vestibule. The court in apply-sidered in connection with the facts of the ing the law of Massachusetts to the facts of the case and in affirming the judgment of the court below said:

"It is settled law in this commonwealth that under ordinary circumstances it is not negligence for a conductor to give the starting signal after the passenger is fully and fairly on the car. Sauvan v. Citizens' Electric Street Railway, 197 Mass. 176, 83 N. E. 405. In reaching that conclusion the court recognized, not only the imperative demand by the public for rapid transportation, but the fact, known from experience, that ordinarily it is not necessary for the safety of a passenger in normal physical condition that the car should be delayed until he is seated.' Saunders v. B. E. R. W. Co., 216 Mass. 355, 103 N. E. 779.

The law as stated in Martin v. B. El. R. W. Co., supra, is also the law of this state, for it was said by us in Plummer v. W. B. & A. Elec. R. W. Co., 124 Md. 200, 92 Atl. 536,

that:

"We know of no case that goes to the extent of holding that it is incumbent upon the carrier to afford them [passengers] assistance going from one part of a moving car to another, unless the passenger is laboring under some apparent or known infirmity or disability, or there are other circumstances requiring special care. In 6 Cyc. 611, it is said: 'Nor in general is there any duty to assist a passenger in entering or alighting from the train or other conveyance, unless there is some unusual danger or difficulty arising from the place or means afforded for alighting, or the passenger is, to the knowledge of the servants of the carrier, infirm or under some disability'-and it is stated on page 613 of the same volume that 'the train may be started after a passenger has got on board the car, and before he has reached a seat, unless

The car had stopped to permit the parties to board it. The jerk complained of was the motion in starting the car. shown that this motion was unusual or extraordinary. No one else fell as the result of it, although Sabatina was standing in the car and Difatta on the platform behind the plaintiff, and neither of them fell. Both of them were at such time supporting themselves, while the plaintiff was not, and the cause of her fall may be explained by her failure to do so.

It is not shown from the facts stated that the motion of the car spoken of as a "jerk" was an unusual or extraordinary motion, showing any negligent operation of the car. It is true one of the witnesses said the car "jerked hard," but this expression alone, con

case, cannot be regarded as having sufficient probative force to go to the jury as tending to show that the "jerk" was unusual or extraordinary. The court, we think, acted properly in taking the case from the jury. Judgment affirmed with cost to the appellee.

2. PARTNERSHIP 157(4) — REPRESENTATION OF FIRM BY PARTNER-NOTE FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBT.

A partnership note given in payment of the individual debt of one of the partners is generally binding on the partnership, if the other partners acquiesce therein or recognize it as a firm obligation.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 287; Dec. Dig. 157(4).] 3. PARTNERSHIP 157(4)-REPRESENTATION OF FIRM BY PARTNER-NOTE FOR INDIVIDUAL DEBT.

Where defendant assented to the giving of a partnership note in payment of his father's subscription to a church, drew, signed, and delivered the note himself, and paid a year's interest thereon after his father's death, the note

was binding upon him as a member of the partnership.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 287; Dec. Dig. 157(4).] 4. PARTNERSHIP 34-RELATION TO THIRD PERSONS HOLDING OUT AS PARTNERS.

A defendant holding himself out to plaintiff as his father's partner, is liable for a partnership note given for the father's individual debt, although no actual partnership existed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 49; Dec. Dig. 34.]

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; James M. Ambler, Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Trustees of the Eutaw Methodist Protestant Church against Harry S. Erdman, individually and as surviving partner of F. S. Erdman & Son. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed. The plaintiff's fourth prayer is as follows: "The plaintiff prays the court to instruct the jury should it find from the evidence in this case that the defendant, Harry S. Erdman, on December 28, 1910, signed and delivered to the plaintiff the promissory note for $500 sued on in this case, and should the jury further find that the said promissory note was given to and accepted by the plaintiff in payment of a subscription for that amount made by the said Francis S. Erdman, deceased, and that upon the faith of such subscription the plaintiff had incurred obligation to third parties, and that said note is still unpaid, and if the jury shall believe from all the evidence in the case that at the time of the making of the note upon which this suit is brought, the defendant, Harry S. Erdman, held himself out to the plaintiff or to its treasurer, Frederick G. Reinicker, as a copartner in the firm of F. S. Erdman & Son, and the said plaintiff or its treasurer had reasonable grounds to believe that he was such partner of the firm, which he believed so to exist, and had no knowledge to the contrary, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover against the defendant the amount of said note, with interest from the date thereof to date of verdict, less such sum or sums as the jury may find to have been paid thereon, notwithstanding the jury may find that the said Harry S. Erdman was not, in fact, a partner in said firm of F.. S. Erdman & Son by any contract of partnership." Argued before BRISCOE, BURKE, AS, PATTISON, URNER, and BRIDGE, JJ.

THOM-
STOCK-

And for that the defendant Harry S. Erdman and Francis S. Erdman, now deceased, copartners trading as F. S. Erdman and Son, during the lifetime of the said Francis S. Erdman Sory note, now overdue, promised to pay to the on the 28th of December, 1910, by their promisyears after date, but did not pay the same or plaintiff five hundred dollars, with interest four any part thereof, except one year's interest thereon paid by the defendant on April 1, 1912.

The defendant pleaded to the declaration the general issue pleas and also three special pleas. The third plea denied the partnership; the fourth, that the signature, "F. S. Erdman & Son," on the promissory note mentioned in the declaration, while in the handwriting of this defendant, was written by him at the request of his father, Francis S. Erdman, now deceased, and that said signature was made by this defendant for and on behalf of said Francis S. Erdman, and was not intended to bind this defendant individually, there being no copartnership between "F. S. Erdman & Son" being the name under the defendant and his father and the name, which said Francis S. Erdman, conducted his individual business, and the fifth plea, that there was no valuable consideration whatsoever for the giving of the promissory note on which the suit was brought. The case was tried upon issue joined upon the defendant's first and second pleas, and upon issue joined on the plaintiff's replication to the defendant's third, fourth, and fifth pleas, as set out in the record. The judgment being for the plaintiff for the sum of $632.50, the defendant has appealed.

The questions for our consideration are presented by a single exception, and that is to the action of the court in granting the plaintiff's fourth prayer, and in rejecting the defendant's prayers. The defendant's special exception to the plaintiff's first and second prayers need not be considered because these prayers were refused by the court. The same questions, however, are raised by the defendant's second and third prayers, and will be disposed of here.

The defendant sought by these prayers (the second and third) to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury, upon the ground: First, that there was no evidence in the case legally sufficient to show a partnership, as alleged in the declaration, between the father and son; second, that there was no evidence legally sufficient to show that the plaintiff, in accepting the note on which the suit was brought, relied upon the belief that S. Erdman & Son. These prayers were propthe defendant was a member of the firm of F. erly refused, because they involved and contained questions of fact, to be submitted to the jury upon proper instructions from the court, and to be ascertained by the jury under all of the evidence in the case, and on the testimony in this case as set out in the record could not have been withdrawn by