rival of the goods, and has had a reasonable time in the common course of business to take them away after such notification: Railway Co. v. Nevill, 60 Ark. 375, 46 Am. St. Rep. 208, 30 S. W. 425; McMillan v. Michigan etc. R. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79, 93 Am. Dec. 208; Buckley v. Great Western Ry. Co., 18 Mich. 121; Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 413, 57 Am. Rep. 574. In the last case Justice Miller says: "It is his duty not only to transport the goods, but he has not performed his entire contract as a common carrier until he has delivered the goods, or offered to deliver them, to the consignee, or has done what is equivalent, by giving to the consignee, if he can be found, due notice after their arrival, and by furnishing him a reasonable time thereafter to take charge of, or to remove them." Again, in Fenner v. Buffalo etc. R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, 4 Am. Rep. 709, Commissioner Earl says: "If the consignee is present upon the arrival of the goods, he must take them without reasonable delay. If he is not present, but lives at or in the immediate vicinity of the place of delivery, the carrier must notify him of the arrival of the goods, and then he has a reasonable time to take and remove them. If he is absent, unknown, or cannot be found, then the carrier can place the goods in its freight-house, and, after keeping them a reasonable time, if the consignee does not call for them, its liability as a common carrier ceases. If, after the arrival of the goods, the consignee has a reasonable opportunity to remove them, and does not, he cannot hold the carrier as an insurer. The carrier's liability thus applied and limited, I believe, will be found consonant with public policy, and sufficiently convenient and practicable."

In California a carrier, in order to reduce his responsibility to that of a warehouseman as to freight stored at its destination, must give notice to the consignee: Wilson v. California etc. R. R. Co., 94 Cal. 166, 29 Pac. 861. And a carrier's liability as such is not terminated by the fact that goods have not for two or three weeks after their arrival been called for, if the consignee has not had notice thereof, such notice, in fact, being given to a person who fraudulently personated the consignee: Cavallaro v. Texas etc. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 348, 52 Am. St. Rep. 94, 42 Pac. 918.

A statute providing that a carrier can change its character to that of a warehouseman on the arrival of goods in a city or town of two thousand inhabitants only by giving a certain notice, does not make any distinction between incorporated and unincorporated cities and towns: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 Ala. 232, 33 South. 661.

Notice of the arrival of freight given to a third person, when con. signed with instructions to notify him, is sufficient to exonerate the carrier from his rigorous responsibility: Collins v. Alabama etc. R. R. Co., 104 Ala. 390, 16 South. 140. But notice given to one fraudulently personating the consignee will not suffice: Cavallaro v. Texas etc. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 348, 52 Am. St. Rep. 94, 42 Pac. 918.

Of course, want of notice to the consignee may be excused if his whereabouts or residence is unknown, and a reasonable attempt is made to ascertain the same, but without success. Then the carrier's liability, upon the storage of the goods and the lapse of a reasonable time thereafter, changes to that of a warehouseman: Pelton v. Rensselaer etc. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 214, 13 Am. Rep. 568.

In Illinois, where notice of the arrival of goods is not essential to the termination of a carrier's liability, it is held that when notice is given requiring the removal of freight within twenty-four hours, it does not follow that the responsibility as carrier continues for that time: Richards v. Michigan Southern etc. R. R. Co., 20 Ill. 405.

When goods arrive at their destination out of time, the carrier must notify the consignee, or make a diligent attempt to, if he would reduce his liability to that of a warehouseman. This is so held in a jurisdiction where, under ordinary circumstances, the liability as carrier may be terminated without notice to the consignee: Frank ▼. Grand Tower etc. Ry. Co., 57 Mo. App. 181.

g. Delay or Stoppage in Transit.—If property is ready for shipment and the carrier is about to take it away, but the shipper requests that the car remain until he can see the person to whom he has sold the property, the carrier's liability, during the detention, is that of a warehouseman only: St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 59 Ill. 336. And where the shipper orders goods to be stopped in transitu, and to be held for him on arriving at their destination, the contract of carriage ends, and the liability as warehouseman begins, on their arrival: MacVeigh v. Atchison etc. R. R. Co., 3 N. Mex. 327, 5 Pac. 457. But when a carrier deposits property in its warehouse at some intermediate place in the course of its route, for its own convenience, its duty as carrier is not ended: Ladue v. Griffith, 25 N. Y. 364, 82 Am. Dec. 360.

h. Continuance of Lien for Freight.-A railroad company is not necessarily responsible as a carrier during the whole time of the existence of its lien for freight on goods transported. Its liability as earrier may be terminated without its lien being destroyed: Spears v. Spartanburg etc. R. R. Co., 11 S. C. 158.

III. Goods in Hands of Connecting Carrier.

a. Change of Liability to that of Warehouseman.-When there is a shipment of goods over a route or line of transportation made up of two or more connecting carriers, the contract of the parties contemplates, and it is the policy of the law, that the relation of carrier shall continue in respect to the goods throughout their transportation, and not at any time, under ordinary circumstances, be reduced to that of warehouseman. Under an "arrangement for a continuous line and joint or through rates it is the duty of the first or receiving carrier, on receiving goods for carriage to any point on the continuous line beyond its own line to carry them with due dispatch to the end of its line, and there deliver them to the next

carrier, whose duty it is to receive them and carry them with due dispatch to their place of destination, and deliver them to the owner or consignee, or, if the place of destination be beyond its own line, to deliver them at the end of its line to the next carrier, to which a like duty will then attach. In such case, the owner, by delivering his goods to be carried through, does not contemplate nor make a contract for storage. His contract is for carriage, and, until the goods reach their final destination, he has a right to a continuous carrier's duty and responsibility, which cannot, without his consent, be changed to the duty and responsibility of a warehouseman, however convenient that might be for the carrier. And, from the time its duty of carrier attaches, any carrier in the line can discharge itself of responsibility as such only by performing its full duty by carrying the goods, and delivering them to the next carrier if they are to go beyond its line. The responsibility of the preceding carrier does not cease until the responsibility of the next one attaches. Any other rule would make any arrangement for a continuous line and through rates a snare to the public': Wehmann v. Minneapolis etc. Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 22, 59 N. W. 546, per Chief Justice Gilfillan. So long as a connecting or intermediate carrier holds goods, either on his vehicles or in his warehouses, for delivery to a succeeding carrier, he holds them as a carrier, and not as an ordinary bailee; and although the succeeding carrier refuses or unreasonably delays to receive them, the first carrier continues to hold them as carrier until he does some unequivocal act indicative of a purpose to change his office. Storing the goods in a warehouse at the end of his line to await the pleasure or convenience of the next carrier does not change the character of the bailment. To exonerate himself as insurer, he must in some way clearly indicate his renunciation of the relation of carrier: Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 68 Ill. 471, 18 Am Rep. 564; Grand Rapids etc. R. R. Co. v. Diether, 10 Ind. App. 206, 53 Am. St. Rep. 385, 37 N. E. 39, 1069; Bancroft v. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co., 47 Iowa, 262, 29 Am. Rep. 482; Lawrence v. Winona etc. R. R. Co., 15 Minn. 390, 2 Am. Rep. 130; Irish v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 19 Minn. 376, 18 Am. Rep. 340; Bennitt v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Mo. App. 656, 670; Mills v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 622, 6 Am. Rep. 152; Rawson v. Holland, 59 N. Y. 611, 17 Am. Rep. 594; Conkey v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 31 Wis. 619, 11 Am. Rep. 630; Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Clayton, 173 U. S. 348, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421.

"In such cases," says Justice Davis, "it is the duty of the carrier, in the absence of any special contract, to carry safely to the end of his line and to deliver to the next carrier in the route beyond. This rule of liability is adopted generally by the courts in this country, although in England, at the present time, and in some of the states of the Union, the disposition is to treat the obligation of the carrier who first receives the goods as continuing throughout the entire route. It is unfortunate for the interests of

commerce that there is any diversity of opinion on such a subject, especially in this country, but the rule that holds the carrier only liable to the extent of his own route, and for the safe storage and delivery to the next carrier, is in itself so just and reasonable that we do not hesitate to give it our sanction. Public policy, however, requires that the rule should be enforced, and will not allow the carrier to escape responsibility on storing the goods at the end of his route, without delivery or an attempt to deliver to the connecting carrier. If there be a necessity for storage, it will be considered a mere accessory to the transportation, and not as changing the nature of the bailment. It is very clear that the simple deposit of the goods by the carrier in his depot, unaccompanied by any act indicating an intention to renounce the obligation of carrier, will not change or even modify his liability. It may be that circumstances may arise after the goods have reached the depot which would justify the carrier in warehousing them, but if he had reasonable grounds to anticipate the occurrence of these adverse circumstances when he received the goods, he cannot, by storing them, change his relation toward them": Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318.

"We think these cases," says Justice Cooley, "lay down a rule which is just to shippers of goods, and not unreasonably burdensome to carriers. The shipper delivers his goods to a carrier who becomes insurer for their safe transportation; and if the operations of one carrier cover a part only of the line of transit, and another is to receive the goods from him, the shipper has a right to understand that the liability of an insurer is upon someone during the whole period. The duty of one is not discharged until it has been imposed upon the succeeding carrier; and this is not done until there is a delivery of the goods, or at least such a notification to the succeeding carrier as, according to the course of business, is equivalent to a tender of delivery": Condon v. Marquette etc. R. R. Co., 55 Mich. 218, 54 Am. Rep. 367, 21 N. W. 321.

If a connecting carrier would escape the rigorous liability imposed by law upon common carriers, he must, then, make a delivery of the goods, to the succeeding carrier, or do that which may be considered an equivalent or substitute therefor: Goold v. Chapin, 20 N. Y. 259, 75 Am. Dec. 598; McDonald v. Western R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 497; Dunson v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 265. "What constitutes a sufficient delivery to the connecting carrier is sometimes a doubtful question. A manual transfer of possession is not essential. A constructive change of possession from the first to the second carrier may amount to a delivery. It may be safely affirmed, as a proposition applicable to all cases, that a deposit of the goods with notice, express or implied, at any place where the second carrier has control of them, conformably with usage created by the course of business between the two carriers, is a sufficient delivery, and discharges the first carrier. The liability of the second Am. St. Rep., Vol. 97-7

carrier begins where that of the first ends: Van Stanvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 157; Mills v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 622, 6 Am. Rep. 152. In Insurance Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y. 616, where connecting carriers had, at the point of connection, a warehouse used in common for the transfer of goods from one line to the other, the expenses of handling being paid in common, it was held that the delivery of goods there by one carrier, with notice to the other of their arrival and ultimate destination, placed them in possession of the latter, and subjected him to responsibility as a carrier. In Converse v. Norwich etc. Transp. Co., 33 Conn. 166, a railroad company and a steamboat company had a covered wharf in common, at their common terminus, and it was the established usage of the steamboat company to land goods for the railroad on the arrival of its boats at night upon a particular place on the wharf, whence they were taken by the railroad company at its convenience, for further transportation. There was no evidence of an actual agreement that the goods thus deposited were in the possession of the railroad company, but the court was of the opinion that there was a tacit understanding that the steamboat company should deposit its freight at that particular place, and that the railroad company should take it hence at its convenience. It was held that a deposit of goods accordingly by the steamboat company was a sufficient delivery to the railroad company, and a recovery for the loss of the goods was reversed. In Pratt v. Railway Co., 95 U. S. 43, the Michigan Central Railroad Company and the Grand Trunk Railway Company used a freight depot of the former, and when goods were deposited by the latter in a certain part of the depot, destined over the road of the former, they were set apart by the employés of the latter; and, after they were so placed, the employés of the Grand Trunk Railway did not further handle them. After being so set apart, the Michigan Central Railroad Company would obtain from the Grand Trunk Railway Company a list describing the goods and their ultimate destination, and make out a waybill for their transportation over its own road. Certain goods which had thus been set apart for transportation over the line of the Michigan Central Railroad Company were burned before they were loaded into its cars, but after it had obtained the descriptive list. It was held that there had been a delivery to the Michigan Central': Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Clayton, 84 Fed. 305, 28 C. C. A. 142.

It is said that a connecting carrier is bound only to use reasonable diligence to secure further transportation by tendering the goods to the succeeding line, and, if acceptance is refused, then to notify the consignor or consignee, without unreasonable delay, and store or otherwise take care of the goods while awaiting instructions. Having done this, his liability as carrier ceases, and his responsibility as a warehouseman begins: Boston v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 119 Fed. 808, citing Johnson v. Railroad Co., 35 N. Y. 610, 82 Am. Dec. 416; Rawson v. Holland, 59 N. Y. 611, 17 Am. Rep. 394.

Its