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commerce that there is any diversity of opinion on such a subject, especially in this country, but the rule that holds the carrier only liable to the extent of his own route, and for the safe storage and delivery to the next carrier, is in itself so just and reasonable that we do not hesitate to give it our sanction. Public policy, however, requires that the rule should be enforced, and will not allow the carrier to escape responsibility on storing the goods at the end of bis route, without delivery or an attempt to deliver to the connecting carrier. If there be a necessity for storage, it will be considered å mere accessory to the transportation, and not as changing the nature of the bailment. It is very clear that the simple deposit of the goods by the carrier in his depot, unaccompanied by any act indicating an intention to renounce the obligation of carrier, will not change or even modify his liability. It may be that circumstances may arise after the goods have reached the depot which would justify the carrier in warehousing them, but if he had reasonable grounds to anticipate the occurrence of these adverse circumstances when he received the goods, he cannot, by storing them, change his relation toward them!': Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318.
"We think these cases," says Justice Cooley, “lay down a rule which is just to shippers of goods, and not unreasonably burdensome to carriers. The shipper delivers his goods to a carrier who becomes insurer for their safe transportation; and if the operations of one carrier cover a part only of the line of transit, and another is to receive the goods from him, the shipper has a right to understand that the liability of an insurer is upon someone during the whole period. The duty of one is not discharged until it has been imposed upon the succeeding carrier; and this is not done until there is a delivery of the goods, or at least such a notification to the succeeding carrier as, according to the course of business, is equivalent to a tender of delivery'': Condon v. Marquette etc. R. R. Co., 55 Mich. 218, 54 Am. Rep. 367, 21 N. W. 321.
If a connecting carrier would escape the rigorous liability imposed by law upon common carriers, he must, then, make a delivery of the goods, to the sueceeding carrier, or do that which may be considered an equivalent or substitute therefor: Goold v. Chapin, 20 N. Y. 259, 75 Am. Dec. 598; McDonald v. Western R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 497; Dunson v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 265. "What constitutes a sufficient delivery to the connecting carrier is sometimes a doubtful question. A manual transfer of possession is not essential. A constructive change of possession from the first to the second carrier may amount to a delivery. It may be safely affirmed, as a proposition applicable to all cases, that a deposit of the goods with notice, express or implied, at any place where the second carrier has control of them, conformably with usage created by the course of business between the two carriers, is a sufficient delivery, and discharges the first carrier. The liability of the second
Am. St. Reg., Vol. 97—7
carrier begins where that of the first ends: Van Stanvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 157; Mills v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 622, 6 Am. Rep. 152. In Insurance Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y, 616, where connecting carriers had, at the point of connection, a warehouse used in common for the transfer of goods from one line to the other, the expenses of handling being paid in common, it was held that the delivery of goods there by one carrier, with notice to the other of their arrival and ultimate destination, placed them in possession of the latter, and subjected him to responsibility as a carrier. In Converse v. Norwich etc. Transp. Co., 33 Conn. 166, a railroad company and a steamboat company had a covered wharf in common, at their common terminus, and it was the established usage of the steamboat company to land goods for the railroad on the arrival of its boats at night upon a particular place on the wharf, whence they were taken by the railroad company at its convenience, for further transportation. There was no evidence of an actual agreement that the goods thus deposited were in the possession of the railroad company, but the court was of the opinion that there was a tacit understanding that the steamboat company should deposit its freight at that particular place, and that the railroad company should take it hence at its convenience. It was held that a deposit of goods accordingly by the steamboat company was a sufficient delivery to the railroad company, and a recovery for the loss of the
foods was reversed. In Pratt v. Railway Co., 95 U. S. 43, the Michigan Central Railroad Company and the Grand Trunk Railway Company used a freight depot of the former, and when goods were deposited by the latter in a certain part of the depot, destined over the road of the former, they were set apart by the employés of the latter; and, after they were so placed, the employés of the Grand Trunk Railway did not further handle them. After being so set apart, the Michigan Central Railroad Company would obtain from the Grand Trunk Railway Company a list describing the goods and their ultimate destination, and make out a waybill for their transportation over its own road. Certain goods which had thus been set apart for transportation over the line of the Michigan Central Railroad Company were burned before they were loaded into its cars, but after it had obtained the descriptive list. It was held that there had been a delivery to the Michigan Central'': Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Clayton, 84 Fed. 305, 28 C. C. A. 142.
It is said that a connecting carrier is bound only to use reasonable diligence to secure further transportation by tendering the goods to the succeeding line, and, if acceptance is refused, then to notify the consignor or consignee, without unreasonable delay, and store or otherwise take care of the goods while awaiting instructions. Having done this, his liability as carrier ceases, and his responsibil. ity as a warehouseman begins: Boston v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 119 Fed. 808, citing Johnson v. Railroad Co., 33 N. Y. 610, 82 An. Doc. 416; Rawson v. Holland, 59 N. Y. 611, 17 Am. Rep. 394. Its
renunciation of the relation of carrier is often shown by a con. zeeting carrier, when the succeeding carrier unreasonably delays to receive the goods, by giving notice to the succeeding carrier that the goods will be kept or stored at its risk until compliance with the request to remove them; Reiss v. Texas etc. Ry. Co., 98 Fed. 533, 39 C. C. A. 149.
IV. Goods Transported by Water. 4. Termination of Carrier's Liability.-When goods transported by water reach their destination, the carrier's responsibility as such ordinarily continues until the consignee has notice of the arrival of the goods and a reasonable time and opportunity to accept and remove them: Graves v. Hartford etc. Steamboat Co., 38 Conn, 143, 9 Am. Rep. 369; McAndrew v. Whitlock, 52 N. Y, 40, 11 Am. Rep. 657; Solomon v. Philadelphia etc. Steamboat Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 104. Delivery of the goods on the wharf, without a tender or notice, is not sufficient to exonerate the carrier: Hemphill v. Chenie, 6 Watts * 8. 62; Eagle v, White, 6 Whart, 505, 37 Am, Dec. 434. Compare Cope v. Cordova, 1 Rawle, 203. And while placing the goods on the wharf at a seasonable time and upon notice to the consignes may discharge the carrier from its stringent liability in many cases, yet the rule should not be enforced too rigorously: Segura v. Reed, 3 La. Ann. 695; Redmond v. Liverpool etc. Steamboat Co., 46 N. Y. 578, 1 Am. Rep. 390; Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Tangier, 3 Ware, 110, Fed. Cas. No. 12,267; De Grau v. Wilson, 17 Fed. 698; Richardson v. Goddard, 25 How. 28.
If the carrier would reduce his liability to that of a warehousemaa, be must, if practical le, give the consignee notice of their arrival: Shenk 5. Steam Propeller Co., 60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. Dec. 541; except where it is the uniform custom not to: Turner v. Huff, 46 Ark. 222, 55 Am. Rep. 580; or where it has been the accustomed course of dealing for the consignee to call daily and receive goods daily: Russell Nig. Co. 7. New Haven Steamboat Co., 52 N, Y. 657. And the carrier must, moreover, give the consignee a reasonable time to take charge of the goods: McAndrew v. Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. Rep. 657; Tho St. Laurent, 7 Ben. 7, Fed. Cag. No. 12,231; and, in uploading them on the wharf, it must place them so that they can be removed with reasonable convenience: Goodwin v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 58
But the consignee cannot unreasonably prolong the extraordinary liability of the carrier. If he fails to take away the goods after notice of their arrival, and after having had a reasonable time and opportunity for taking possession of them, the carrier 's liability be comes reduced to that of a warehouseman: Labar y. Taber, 35 Barb, 305; Brand v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 30 N. Y. Supp. 903, 10 Misc, Rep. 128; Wynantskill Knitting Co., v. Murray, 36 N. Y. Supp. 28, 80 kun, 554; The Richard Winslow, 67 Fed. 259; The Titania, 124 Fed. 975. If the consignes requests that the carrier keep the goodo
until demanded, its liability is changed to that of a warehouseman: National Line Steamship Co. v. Smart, 107 Pa. St. 492. And when goods are transported under a special contract that they remain on board for ninety days after arriving at their destination, a refusal by the consignee to receive them puts an end to the carrier's liability as such: Hathorn v. Ely, 28 N. Y. 78.
The law governing the terinination of the liability of a carrier by water is stated by the New York court of appeals in this language: “The general principle that the duty and obligation of a common carrier by water does not, ipso facto, cease on the unloading of goods from the ship and their deposit upon the wharf, and especially where the place of discharge is also the terminus of the particular voyage, is the settled doctrine of this court and the generally accepted doctrine of the maritime law. The obligation of the ship owner is not only to carry the goods to the port of destination, but to deliver them there to the consignee. But a delivery which will discharge the carrier may be constructive and not actual. To constitute a constructive delivery the carrier must, if practicable, give notice to the consignee of the arrival, and when that has been done and the goods are discharged in the usual and proper place, and reasonable opportunity afforded to the consignee to remove them, the liability of the carrier as such terminates. The duty of the consignee to receive and take the goods is as imperative as the duty of the carrier to deliver. Both obligations are to be reasonably construed, having reference to the circumstances. The stringent liability of the carrier cannot be continued at the option, or to suit the convenience of the consignee. The consignee is bound to act promptly in taking the goods, and if he fails to do so, whatever other duty may rest upon the carrier in respect to the goods, his liability as insurer is by such failure terminated''. Tarbell v. Royal Exchange Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 170, 6 Am. St. Rep. 350, 17 N. E. 721, per Justice Andrews. See, also, Miller v. Steam Navigation Co., 10 N. Y. 431; King v. ew Brunswick Steamboat Co., 73 N. Y. Supp. 999, 36 Misc. Rep. 555.
V. Goods Sent by Express. 2. Termination of Carriers' Liability.—The liability of express companies as to goods arriving at the point of destination differs from that of railroad companies and carriers by water, in that actual delivery to the consignee is usually necessary to the termination of their responsibility as common carriers, whereas in the case of other carriers a constructive delivery by storage and opportunity to remove the goods is sufficient. “Ag to express companies, the rule seems be well settled that, generally, they are required to deliver the goods or packages to the consignee at his residence or place of business. But this rule has received modification where the place of delivery is at small way stations, where the business will not justify the keeping of special delivery messengers and wagons, in which case
personal notice of the arrival of tho goods or packages, and depositing them in a safe receptacle, if that be the known custom of the company, will be treated as a delivery, when the consignee has had a reasonable time, after such notice, to remove the goods or receive the packages'': Southern Express Co. v. Holland, 109 Ala. 562, 19 South. 66. To the same effect, see Baldwin v. American Exp. Co., 23 Ill, 197, 74 Am. Dec. 190; American Exp. Co. v. Baldwin, 26 Ill. 504, 79 Am. Dec. 389; American Exp. Co. v. Hockett, 30 Ind. 250, 95 Am. Dec. 691; Witbeck v. Holland, 38 How. Pr. 273.
However, the duty of the express company to deliver and the duty of the consignee to receive are reciprocal. The liability of the company as carrier ends if the consignee is absent, and his whereabouts or place of business or residence cannot, after diligent inquiry, be ascertained: Adams Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20, 99 Am, Dec. 582. And its liability as carrier is terminated if the consignee requests that the goods be kept until the next day: Southern Exp. Co. v. Holland, 109 Ala. 362, 19 South. 66; or if the consignee refuses to receive the goods: Kremer v. Southern Exp. Co., 46 Tenn, (6 Cold.) 356.
When goods are sent C. O. D., the obligation of the express company is safely to carry them to their destination, notify the consignes of their arrival and to offer delivery upon payment of the amount due; and when such duty is fully performed, its liability as a common carrier terminates: Hasse v. American Exp. Co., 94 Mich. 133, 34 Am. St. Rep. 328, 53 N. W. 918. If the goods are tendered to the consignee and payment demanded, but after a reasonable time he fails to pay the charges and receive the goods, the express company thereafter becomes a warehouseman in respect to its duty and obligation: Weed v. Barney, 45 N. Y. 344, 6 Am. Rep. 96; Grossman v. Fargo, 6 Hun, 310. If the consignor, upon learning of the con. signee's refusal to accept the goods, notifies the company to hold them until the consignor calls for them, the liability to him becomes that of a warehouseman: Byrne v. Fargo, 73 N. Y. Supp. 943, 36 Misc, Rep. 543.
VI. Baggage and Effects of Passengers. 2. Commencement of Liability as Carrier.—The exact time at which a carrier becomes responsible as insurer for the baggage of a passenger is not easy to determine. It is clear, however, that such responsibility is not necessarily postponed until actual transportation begins, but that it attaches to baggage delivered at the station at such a time before the starting of the train as shall give the owner a reasonable opportunity to obtain bis ticket, check his baggage, and the like: Goldberg v. Ahnapee ete. Ry. Co., 105 Wis. 1, 76 Am. St. Rep. 899, 80 N. W. 920. The liability as carrier attaches to baggage at the time of its delivery, when it is received, not for storage, but for transportation in the usual course of business: Shaw v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 40 Minn. 144. 41 N.