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cidental destruction by fire: Chalk v. Charlotte etc. R. B. Co.

, 85 N. C. 423.

Three days is held to be a reasonable length of time for removal in Columbus etc. Ry. Co. v. Ludden, 89 Ala. 612, 7 South. 471. See, too, the principal case, ante, p. 76. And the failure to remove goods one week after notice of their arrival raises a presumption that the carrier's liability has changed to that of a warehouseman: Anniston etc. R. R. Co. v. Lebetter, 92 Ala. 326, South. 73. A much greater time under some circumstances would not be unreasonable: Wilson v. California etc. R. R. Co., 94 Cal. 166, 29 Pac. 861. Under the Cali. fornia statutes, if freight is unloaded and stored in the warehouse, the consignee having notice of its arrival, and is burned that night, the carrier's character in respect thereto is that of a warehouseman: Hirshfield v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 56 Cal. 484.

Where the consignee takes part of the goods, he has a reasonable time in which to remove the residue: Schen v. Benedict, 116 N. Y. 510, 15 Am. St. Rep. 426, 22 N. E. 1073. But if he removes part of them at the time of their arrival, and leaves the remainder for six days, the liability of the carrier as such ceases: Welch v. Concord R. R., 68 N. H. 206, 44 Atl. 304. And if on the day of their arrival he takes away some of them, and puts the rest in one of the carrier's buildings, the carrier is not liable for their destruction by fire: Stapleton v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (Mich.), 94 N. W. 739.

And when, by agreement with the consignee and for mutual con. venience, the carrier stores goods at their destination in its freighthouse, for the night, and they are destroyed by fire without its fault, it is not liable: Fenner v. Buffalo etc. R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, 4 Am. Rep. 709.

Misinformation given by a carrier or his agents to the consigneo as to the arrival of goods, which prevents their removal, binds the car. rier, and makes him liable for their value if they are thereafter lost or destroyed: Berry v. West Virginia etc. R. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 538, 67 Am. St. Rep. 781, 30 S. E. 143. See, in this connection, Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Moyer, 40 Kan. 184, 10 Am. St. Rep. 185, 19 Pac. 639; Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 91 Tenn. 699, 30 Am. St. Rep. 902, 20 S. W. 312. If, through the negligence of a carrier's servants, goods are not delivered to the consignee when called for by him, and they are afterward destroyed in the freight department, the carrier is liable for the logs: Meyer v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 24 Wis. 566, 1 Am. Rep. 207.

In case the consignee refuses to accept the goods when tendered to him, the stringent liability of the carrier cannot be continued. Thereafter it is liable as a warehouseman only: American Sugar Re. fining Co. v. McGhee, 96 Ga. 27, 21 S. F. 383. See, also, Landsberg v. Dinsmore, 4 Daly (N. Y.), 490; Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. North Texas Grain Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 74 S. W. 567. In the last case, after the refusal of the consignee to receive the freight, and the failure of the parties to direct the disposition of it, the carrier, there being

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Do storage facilities at the plıce of consignment, transported it some fourteen miles and there stored it, where it was damaged by an unprecedented storm. The carrier was held not liable. In Frederick 5. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 133 Ala. 486, 31 South. 968, it was held that where goods are destroyed in the depot by fire two weeks after their arrival, but the carrier had refused to deliver them unless the consignee would accept all of them, which he refused to do because some were damaged, the action for their value should be against the carrier as warehouseman.

1. Notice of Arrival of Geods.—When a railroad company or other common carrier receives goods for transportation, safely carries them to their destination, informs the consignee of their arrival, and affords him a reasonabie opportunity to remove them, its duty and obligation as a carrier are at an end; and if the goods are left in its eustody, its liability for subsequent loss or damage is that of a warehonseman only: Kennedy Bros. v. Mobile etc. R. R. Co., 74 Ala. 430; Collins v. Alabama ete. R. R. Co., 104 Ala. 390, 16 South. 140. Having unloaded the goods, stored or put them in a safe place, notified the consignee of their arrival, and given him a reasonable time for their removal, its liability as a carrier cannot be prolonged by his failure to take them into his possession and under his control: New Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 12 Ind. 55; Stowe v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 113 Mass. 521; Pindell v, St. Louis etc. Ry. Co., 41 Mo. App. 84; Grieve v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. Supp. 949, 25 App. Div. 518.

But there are many authorities holding that the carrier is not required, in the absence of custom or usage, to give the consignee notice of the arrival, in order to reduce its liability to that of a Warehouseman: Southwestern R. R. Co. v. Felder, 46 Ga. 433; Georgia ete. Ry. Co. v. Pound, 111 Ga. 6, 36 8. E. 312; Merchants' Dispatch etc. Co. v. Moore, 88 III. 136, 30 Am. Rep. 541; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 72 IM. App. 105; Bansemer v. Toledo etc. Ry. Co., 25 Ind. 434, 7 Am. Dec. 367; Francis v. Dubuque etc. Ry. Co., 25 Iowa, 60, 95 Am. Dec. 769; Spears v. Spartenburg etc. Ry. Co., 11 8. C. 158. So far as this rule permits the carrier to escape responsibility as sueh merely by storing the goods, without giving any notice to the consignee, as seems to be the holding of some of the courts, those of Georgia, Illinois, and Indiana, for example, it is hardly defensible. Clearly, if no notice is given, it is not unreasonable to hold the carrier to its stringent liability until the consignee has had a reasonable time to take charge of the goods: Berry v. West Virginia ete. R. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 538, 67 Am. St. Rep. 781, 30 S. E. 143; Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. The Tangier, 1 Cliff. 396, Fed. Cas. No. 12,266. The reasonable time, under this theory, begins to run notwithstanding no notice given: Columbus etc. Ry. Co. v. Ludden, 89 Ala. 612, 7 South. 471. A still more satisfactory doctrine, to our mind, is that the liability carrier continues until the consignee has been notified of the ar

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rival of the goods, and has had a reasonable time in the common course of business to take them away after such notification: Railway Co. v. Nevill, 60 Ark. 375, 46 Am. St. Rep. 208, 30 S. W. 425; McMillan v. Michigan etc. R. R. Co., 16 Mich, 79, 93 Am. Dec. 208; Buckley v. Great Western Ry. Co., 18 Mich. 121; Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 413, 37 Am. Rep. 574. In the last case Justice Miller says: It is his duty not only to transport the goods, but he has not per: formed his entire contract as a common carrier until he has delivered the goods, or offered to deliver them, to the consignee, or has dono what is equivalent, by giving to the consignee, if he can be found, due notice after their arrival, and by furnishing him a reasonable time thereafter to take charge of, or to remove them.'

Again, in Fenner v. Buffalo etc. R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, 4 Am. Rep. 709, Com. missioner Earl says: If the consignee is present upon the arrival of the goods, he must take them without reasonable delay. If he is not present, but lives at or in the immediate vicinity of the place of delivery, the carrier must notify him of the arrival of the goods, and then he has a reasonable time to take and remove them. If he is absent, unknown, or cannot be found, then the carrier can place the goods in its freight-house, and, after keeping them a reasonable time, if the consignee does not call for them, its liability as a com. inon carrier ceases. If, after the arrival of the goods, the consignee has a reasonable opportunity to remove them, and does not, he cannot hold the carrier as an insurer. The carrier's liability thus applied and limited, I believe, will be found consonant with public policy, and sufficiently convenient and practicable."

In California a carrier, in order to reduce his responsibility to that of a warehouseman as to freight stored at its destination, must give notice to the consignee: Wilson v. California etc. R. R. Co., 94 Cal. 166, 29 Pac. 861. And a carrier's liability as such is not terminated by the fact that goods have not for two or three weeks after their arrival been called for, if the consignee has not bad notice thereof, such notice, in fact, being given to a person who fraudulently personated the consignee: Cavallaro v. Texas etc. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 348, 52 Am. St. Rep. 94, 42 Pac. 918.

A statute providing that a carrier can change its character to that of a warehouseman on the arrival of goods in a city or town of two thousand inhabitants only by giving a certain notice, does not make any distinction between incorporated and unincorporated cities and towns: Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 Ala. 232, 33 South. 661.

Notice of the arrival of freight given to a third person, when con. signed with instructions to notify him, is sufficient to exonerate the carrier from his rigorous responsibility: Collins v. Alabama etc. R. R. Co., 104 Ala. 390, 16 South. 140. But notice given to one fraudu. lently personating the consignee will not suffice: Cavallaro v. Texas etc. Ry. Co., 110 Cal. 348, 52 Am. St. Rep. 94, 42 Pac. 918.

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Of course, want of notice to the consignee may be excused if his whereabouts or residence is unknown, and a reasonable attempt is made to ascertain the same, but without success. Then the carrier's liability, upon the storage of the goods and the lapse of a reasonable time thereafter, changes to that of a warehouseman: Pelton v. Rensselaer etc. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y, 214, 13 Am. Rep. 568.

In Illinois, where notice of the arrival of goods is not essential to the termination of a carrier's liability, it is held that when notice is given requiring the removal of freight within twenty-four hours, it does not follow that the responsibility as carrier continues for that time: Richards v. Michigan Southern etc. R. R. Co., 20 Ill. 405.

When goods arrive at their destination out of time, the carrier must notify the consignee, or make a diligent attempt to, if he would reduce his liability to that of a warehouseman. This is so held in a jurisdiction where, under ordinary circumstances, the liability as carrier may be terminated without notice to the consignee: Frank V. Grand Tower etc. Ry. Co., 57 Mo. App. 181.

g. Delay or Stoppage in Transit.-If property is ready for shipment and the carrier is about to take it away, but the shipper requests that the car remain until he can see the person to whom he has sold the property, the carrier's liability, during the detention, is that of a warehouseman only: St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Mont. gomery, 59 II). 336. And where the shipper orders goods to be stopped in transitu, and to be held for him on arriving at their destination, the contract of carriage ends, and the liability as ware. houseman begins, on their arrival: MacVeigh v. Atchison etc. R. R. Co., 3 N. Mex. 327, 5 Pac. 457. But when a carrier deposits property in its warehouse at some intermediate place in the course of its route, for its own convenience, its duty as carrier is not ended: Ladue v. Griffith, 25 N. Y. 364, 82 Am. Dec. 360.

h. Continuance of Lien for Freight.---A railroad company is not necessarily responsible as i carrier during the whole time of the ex. istence of its lien for freight on goods transported. Its liability as Carrier may be terminated without its lien being destroyed: Spears V. Spartanburg etc. R. R. Co., 11 S. C. 158.

III. Goods in Hands of Connecting Carrier. &. Change of Liability to that of Warehouseman.-When there is a shipment of goods over a route or line of transportation made up of two or more connecting carriers, the contract of the parties contemplates, and it is the policy of the law, that the relation of carrier shall continue in respect to the goods throughout their transportation, and not at any time, under ordinary circumstances, be reduced to that of warehouseman. Under an "arrangement for a continuous line and joint or through rates it is the duty of the first or receiving carrier, on receiving goods for carriage to any point on the continuous line beyond its own line to carry them with due dispatch to the end of its line, and there deliver them to the next

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carrier, whose duty it is to receive them and carry them with due dispatch to their place of destination, and deliver them to the owner or consignee, or, if the place of destination be beyond its own line, to deliver them at the end of its line to the next carrier, to which a like duty will then attach. In such case, the owner, by delivering his goods to be carried through, does not contemplate nor make a contract for storage. His contract is for carriage, and, until the goods reach their final destination, he has a right to a continuous carrier's duty and responsibility, which cannot, without his consent, be changed to the duty and responsibility of a warehouseman, how. ever convenient that might be for the carrier, And, from the time its duty of carrier attaches, any carrier in the line can discharge itself of responsibility as such only by performing its full duty by carrying the goods, and delivering them to the next carrier if they are to go beyond its line. The responsibility of the preceding carrier does not cease until the responsibility of the next one attaches. Any other rule would make any arrangement for a continuous line and through rates a snare to the public'': Webmann v. Minneapolis etc. Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 22, 59 N. W. 546, per Chief Justice Gilfillan.

So long as a connecting or interniediate carrier holds goods, either on his vehicles or in his warehouses, for delivery to a succeeding carrier, he holds them as a carrier, and not as an ordinary bailee; and although the succeeding carrier refuses or unreasonably delays to receive them, the first carrier continues to hold them as carrier until he does some unequivocal act indicative of a purpose to change his office. Storing the goods in a warehouse at the end of his line to await the pleasure or convenience of the next carrier does not change the character of the bailment. To exonerate himself as insurer, he must in some way clearly indicate his renunciation of the relation of carrier: Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 68 III. 471, 18 Am Rep. 564; Grand Rapids etc. R. R, Co. v. Diether, 10 Ind. App. 206, 53 Am. St. Rep. 385, 37 N. E. 39, 1069; Bancroft v. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co., 47 Iowa, 262, 29 Am. Rep. 482; Lawrence v. Winona etc. R. R. Co., 15 Minn, 390, 2 Am. Rep. 130; Irish v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 19 Minn, 376, 18 Am. Rep. 340; Bennitt v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 46 Mo. App. 656, 670; Mills v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 622, 6 Am. Rep. 152; Rawson v. Holland, 59 N. Y. 611, 17 Am. Rep. 594; Conkey v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 31 Wis. 619, 11 Am. Rep. 630; Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Clayton, 173 U. 8. 348, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421.

In such cases,” says Justice Davis, “it is the duty of the carrier, in the absence of any special contract, to carry safely to the end of his line and to deliver to the next carrier in the route beyond. This rule of liability is adopted generally by the courts in this country, although in England, at the present time, and in some of the states of the Union, the disposition is to treat the obligation of the carrier who first receives the goods as continuing throughout the entire route. It is unfortunate for the interests of

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