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for the purpose of procuring a ticket for his wife to the town of Marlin. She at the time was sick and in feeble condition. While waiting in the waiting-room of the depot for the train, and after the ticket had been purchased and the baggage checked, the defendant permitted one Allen, who was alleged to be a strong, active, and robust white man, and being in a drunken and rowdy condition, sang vulgar and indecent songs, and used vulgar and indecent language in the presence of plaintiff and his wife, and being armed with a pocketknife open in his hand, made an unjustifiable assault upon the plaintiff and his wife, by which the plaintiff and his wife were greatly intimidated, causing them to become frightened, and causing plaintiff's wife to become very nervous and sick. There are further allegations to the effect that the agent of the plaintiff at the depot at that time was present and witnessed the assault and wrongful conduct as alleged, inflicted upon the plaintiff and his wife by Allen, or was in a position to see the same, and that no steps were taken by the agent to prevent the assault or the wrongful conduct complained of. Upon trial of the case below, verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of four hundred dollars. We find that the evidence in the record substantially sustains these averments, and the judgment and verdict below are supported by the evidence found in the record.”

The court of civil appeals found no error in the proceedings and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

We are of the opinion that the conclusions of that court, in so far as they pertain to the rights of recovery by reason of the assault upon and insulting conduct toward the wife of the plaintiff are correct, but do not concur in the proposition that the evidence showed any right of action in the plaintiff on account of the outrage of Allen upon himself personally. The wife having entered the depot and a ticket having been procured for her, became a passenger of the defendant company, and the duty devolved upon the company's agent to protect her against assault and insulting conduct on the part of third persons, provided he knew of such misconduct or had reasonable grounds to anticipate it. As to the plaintiff the case is different. He went to the depot merely to assist his vife in taking the train and with no intention of becoming a passenger himself. He was there by the implied invitation of the company and was not a trespasser. The railway company owed him the duty which is owed by the owners of property to persons who enter upon it by their invitation and no more. That duty is to use ordinary care to see that the premises are kept in a reasonably safe condition, so that persons entering thereupon by invitation are not injured thereby: Hamilton v. Texas etc. Ry. Co. 64 Tex. 251, 53 Am. Rep. 756; Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Best, 66 Tex. 116, 18 S. W. 224. In the case 21 of Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542, 12 Am. St. Rep. 443, 21 N. E. 31, the court say: "The defendant, in contracting to carry the passenger Naas in his sick and enfeebled condition, contracted an obligation which could only be carried out by Naas being carried upon the train and seated in the car. By thus contracting to carry Naas as a passenger, it took upon itself the obligation of allowing him assistants to place him upon the train and seat him in the car, and the compensation received by the defendant for conveying Naas from Mount Vernon to his destination included as well the right to have assistants place him in the car as the carrying him after being so placed in the car, and the defendant owed the same obligation to his assistants while necessarily entering and leaving the car with Naas as it owed to Naas himself.” So far as we have been able to discover, this case, in so far as it holds that the railway company owed the same duty to the assistants which it owed to the passenger stands by itself; and unless there be a distinguished feature in the fact that owing to the enfeebled condition of the passenger, which made it necessary for his friends to assist in boarding the train and securing a seat (which we doubt), it is in opposition to all the authorities upon the question.

Our conclusion is that since the plaintiff was not a paseenger the defendant company did not owe him the duty of protection against the injurious actions of third persons, and that therefore he was not entitled to recover for the misconduct of Allen toward himself. Therefore the judgment of the district court and that of the court of civil appeals are reversed and the cause remanded.

It is the Duty of a Carrier to protect its passengers from injury, violence, insult, and ill-treatment at the hands of strangers, fellow. passengers, and employés, and for a failure to perform this duty it is answerable: Birmingham Ry, etc. Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 89 Am. St. Rep. 43, 30 South. 456; United Ry. etc, Co. v. Deane, 93 Md. 619, 86 Am. St. 453, 49 Atl. 923; Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co., 172 Mass. 468, 70 Am. St. Rep. 298, 52 N. E. 747; monographic notes to Rommel v. Schambacher, 6 Am. St. Rep. 734-737; Richmond etc. R. R. Co. v. Jefferson, 32 Am. St. Rep. 90-101; Goodloe v. Memphis etc. R. R. Co., 54 Am. St. Rep. 89. See, also, Brunswick etc. R. R. Co. v. Ponder, 117 Ga. 63, ante, p. 152, 43 8. E. 430; Central of Georgia R. R. Co. v. Motes, 117 Ga, 923, ante, p. 223, 43 S. E. 990.

Persons Assisting Passengers or accompanying them are not ordinarily considered passengers within the meaning of the law imposing extraordinary liability on common carriers for the safety of those whom they undertake to carry: See Earl v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 109 Iowa, 14, 77 Am. St. Rep. 516, 79 N. W. 381; monographic notes to Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 61 Am. St. Rep. 97; Little Rock etc. Ry. Co. v. Lawton, 29 Am. St. Rep. 54-56.

CAUBLE v. WORSHAM.

[96 Tex. 86, 70 S. W. 737.) PAROL GIFT OF REAL PROPERTY—Specific Performance of.-One who, upon the faith of a gift from the owner, enters into the possession of real property and makes improvements of a valuable and permanent character, becomes entitled to specific performance by the owner. (p. 874.)

A MARRIED WOMAN Entering with Her Husband upon the Possession of Real Property under a Parol Gift and making valuable and permanent improvements acquires an equitable title thereto in her separate right. (p. 874.)

PAROL GIFT OF REAL PROPERTY—Title of the Donee.One who enters upon real property by virtue of a parol gift thereof and does such acts as entitle him to specific performance, acquires an estate of freehold and inheritance, and may maintain trespass to try title either against the vendor or other persons. (p. 874.)

MARRIED WOMAN—Conveyance of Her Equitable Title. If a married woman under a parol gift from an owner has the right to a conveyance of real property, her title cannot be devested by a conveyance made by such owner to a third person at her request. She can convey her equitable estate in the same manner only as that in which she can convey her legal estate, namely, by a conveyance executed by herself and husband, acknowledged in the manner prescribed by statute. (p. 875.)

CONVEYANCE_Quitclaim Deed-Parol Evidence to Vary Effect of.-Evidence is not admissible to show that a quitclaim deed did not pass all the title vested in the grantor at the time of its execution. (p. 875.)

MARRIED WOMAN–Estoppel to Assert Title.—A married woman who is entitled to a conveyance of her real property by the owner of the legal title and procures him to convey it to another is not estopped from afterward asserting that such conveyance is void as against her rights. (p. 876.)

CONVEYANCE Evidence Insufficient to Establish.—Testimony that a witness contracted for and bought from another person a “lifetime interest, and that he does not remember the wording of the deed, is too uncertain to establish a conveyance of any particular character, and does not warrant the submission of the case to the jury on the assumption that any party might have acquired rights through the conveyance. (p. 876.)

COTENANTS

Statute of Limitations—Effect of a Suit by Some of the Cotenants.—A suit by one cotenant does not stop the running of the statute of limitations against another in favor of whom no right is asserted by such suit. (p. 877.)

Ivy & Scruggs and A. P. McKinnon, for the plaintiffs in

error.

R. M. Vaughan and F. P. Works, for the defendants in error.

00 WILLIAMS, A. J. Defendants in error hrought this suit to recover of plaintiff in error one hundred and fifty-three acres of land in two tracts, one of one hundred acres and the other of fifty-three acres; and in the district court judgment was rendered for plaintiff, Mrs. Worsham, for an undivided half of the one hundred acres, and for defendant, Cauble, for the fifty-three acres. The appeal of Cauble to the court of civil appeals involved only the title to the one hundred acres, and the judgment of that court, affirming that of the district court, is brought in review by this writ of error. The titles of both parties proceed from D. B. Cauble, who, prior to 1876, was the owner of the land in controversy. In that year he made a verbal gift of the one hundred acre tract to his daughter, Mrs. S. E. Kirkpatrick, who with her husband took possession of and made valuable improvements upon it and occupied it as their homestead for about two years. In 1878 they sold the land to F. D. De Chaumes, and, as D. B. Cauble had made no deed to Mrs. Kirkpatrick, it was orally agreed between all the parties that he should convey it directly to De Chaumes, which he did August 9, 1878. This deed was not recorded until March 18, 1895. Kirkpatrick and wife received the consideration and surrendered possession to De Chaumes and moved to another county, where they remained until 1884, when they returned to the neighborhood of the land. In the meantime F. D. De Chaumes had died and his widow had married one Williams, who was living with her upon the one hundred acre tract. Kirkpatrick and wife bought from Mrs. Williams an interest and obtained a deed, the character of both of which is very indefinitely stated in the oral testimony in the record, the deed not having been produced. Concerning this transaction Mrs. Kirkpatrick testified: “We bought the land from the old lady and got a lifetime dowry.

... Mrs. De Chaumes had married again, and was Mrs. Williams then. I don't know whether she had made me &

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deed, what you call a deed; she made me a lifetime 91 dowry; she made the deed, or whatever you might call it, to me and Mr. Kirkpatrick. We turned it and all the papers over to Mr. Surginer when we sold the place. .. We sold it to him [Surginer] after we bought it back from the old lady De Chaumes. .... Mrs. De Chaumes had married Williams when I returned to buy the place from her; she had been married but a short time and her children were living with her. I contracted to buy from her the lifetime interest; she is dead; she died four or five years after I bought her lifetime interest. We moved off the place and Surginer took possession of it. When I bought the place from Mrs. Williams I moved on it and moved off again inside of a year. The instrument that I got from Mrs. Williams was acknowledged before Calloway, I did not file it for record. Nobody joined in the deed besides Mrs. Williams; none of the children by either marriage joined in it. .... When I bought the land back from Mrs. Williams, I bought the entire one hundred and fiftyfour acres; I gave her five or six hundred dollars for the land when I bought it back. .... I bought a lifetime interest from Mrs. De Chaumes; I don't remember the words of the deed. I don't remember what the wording of the deed was.” After this transaction Mrs. De Chaumes left the place and Kirkpatrick and wife, claiming under it alone, took and retained possession for less than a year, when Columbus Surginer bought the land, taking a warranty deed from D. B. Cauble, March 14, 1885, and a quitclaim deed from Kirkpatrick and wife April 1, 1885. Surginer paid the value of the land, and the testimony of Mrs. Kirkpatrick is that she received this consideration. Surginer took possession and afterward conveyed part of the land to M. Wilhoit, April 7, 1887, and the other part to plaintiff in error, J. L. Cauble, August 19, 1887. Wilhoit conveyed his interest to J. L. Cauble, October 22, 1887. Surginer, Wilhoit and Cauble have kept up continuous possession under their deeds, which were duly registered, and have paid the taxes on the land. Mrs. Williams died in 1891 or 1892 and this suit was begun December 19, 1889. The plaintiffs assert the title of the ten children of De Chaumes, some of whom were the children of the widow who survived him and others the fruit of a former marriage. Five of them were held by the district court to be barred by limitation, but the other five, having been under disability, were held not to be barred, and, as Mrs. Worsham held their

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