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formance, must be a public, and not an individual, injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution. The duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public. The individual loss results from the proper or improper and imperfect performance of a duty, for which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or, if le fails to do justice between individuals, he may be called to account by the state in such form and before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But, as the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for a civil injury, is not admissible. This is only one reason for judicial exemption from individual suits: Cooley on Torts, 380, 381.

The necessary result of the liability would be to occupy the judge's mind and time with the defense of his own interests. The effect would be to lower the dignity of the court. Said Lord Tenterden, viz.: "In the imperfection of human nature it is better even that an individual should suffer a wrong than that the general courts of justice should be impeded and fettered by constant and perpetual restraints and apprehensions on the part of those who administer it." Quoted in Williamson v. Lacy, 86 Me. 80, 29 Atl. 943.

710 These principles we believe to be sound, and apply in the present instance. The result is the judgment below is affirmed.

Judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction cannot be called to account in a civil action for their judicial acts: Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336, 71 Am. St. Rep. 254, 32 8. E. 86; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395, 6 Am. Dec. 290; Stewart v. Case, 53 Minn. 62, 39 Am. St. Rep. 575, 54 N. W. 938; and this has been held true, although they are alleged to have acted willfully, maliciously, or corruptly: Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 63, 48 Am. Dec. 652; Stone v. Graves, 8 Mo. 148, 40 Am. Dec. 131; Cunningham v. Bucklin, 8 Cow. 178, 18 Am. Dec. 432. It is otherwise, however, in the case of a judge of limited or inferior jurisdiction: Robertson v. Parker, 99 Wis. 652, 67 Am. St. Rep. 889, 75 N. W. 423.

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HOUSTON AND TEXAS CENTRAL RAILROAD COM

PANY V. PHILLIO.

[96 Tex. 18, 69 S. W. 994.] RAILWAYS, Duty of to Protect Passengers from Assaults by Third Persons.—When one has entered a depot and produced a ticket for the purpose of becoming a passenger, it devolves on the railway company and its agent to protect such passenger from assault and insulting conduct on the part of third persons, if the agent knows of such misconduct or has reasonable ground to anticipate it. (p. 869.)

RAILWAYS, Duty of to Protect Persons Assisting Others to Become Passengers.-If one goes to a railway depot with his wife, to assist her in taking a train, but without any intention of himself becoming a passenger, the railway company does not owe him the duty of protecting him while at the depot from assault or insulting conduct on the part of third persons. (p. 870.)

A. P. McCormick and Frank Andrews, for the plaintiff in error.

E. T. Johnson, T. N. Graham, and N. J. Lewellyn, for the defendant in error.

19 GAINES, C. J. The following is the statement of this case together with their conclusions upon the evidence filed by the court of civil appeals:

20 “This is an action by the appellee, Steve Phillio, against the railroad company to recover damages for injuries sustained, arising from the following state of facts, which are as substantially alleged in his petition; Plaintiff and his wife went to the depot of the appellant's road, in the town of Calvert,

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for the purpose of procuring a ticket for his wife to the town of Marlin. She at the time was sick and in feeble condition. While waiting in the waiting-room of the depot for the train, and after the ticket had been purchased and the baggage checked, the defendant permitted one Allen, who was alleged to be a strong, active, and robust white man, and being in a drunken and rowdy condition, sang vulgar and indecent songs, and used vulgar and indecent language in the presence of plaintiff and his wife, and being armed with a pocketknife open in his hand, made an unjustifiable assault upon the plaintiff and his wife, by which the plaintiff and his wife were greatly intimidated, causing them to become frightened, and causing plaintiff's wife to become very nervous and sick. There are further allegations to the effect that the agent of the plaintiff at the depot at that time was present and witnessed the assault and wrongful conduct as alleged, inflicted upon the plaintiff and his wife by Allen, or was in a position to see the same, and that no steps were taken by the agent to prevent the assault or the wrongful conduct complained of. Upon trial of the case below, verdict and judgment were in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of four hundred dollars. We find that the evidence in the record substantially sustains these averments, and the judgment and verdict below are supported by the evidence found in the record.”

The court of civil appeals found no error in the proceedings and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

We are of the opinion that the conclusions of that court, in so far as they pertain to the rights of recovery by reason of the assault upon and insulting conduct toward the wife of the plaintiff are correct, but do not concur in the proposition that the evidence showed any right of action in the plaintiff on account of the outrage of Allen upon himself personally. The wife having entered the depot and a ticket having been procured for her, became a passenger of the defendant company, and the duty devolved upon the company's agent to protect her against assault and insulting conduct on the part of third

persons, provided he knew of such misconduct or had reasonable grounds to anticipate it. As to the plaintiff the case is different. He went to the depot merely to assist his wife in taking the train and with no intention of becoming & passenger himself. He was there by the implied invitation of the company and was not a trespasser. The railway company owed him the duty which is owed by the owners of prop

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erty to persons who enter upon it by their invitation and no more. That duty is to use ordinary care to see that the premises are kept in a reasonably safe condition, so that persons entering thereupon by invitation are not injured thereby: Hamilton v. Texas etc. Ry. Co. 64 Tex. 251, 53 Am. Rep. 756; Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Best, 66 Tex. 116, 18 S. W. 224. In the case 21 of Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542, 12 Am. St. Rep. 443, 21 N. E. 31, the court say: "The defendant, in contracting to carry the passenger Naas in his sick and enfeebled condition, contracted an obligation which could only be carried out by Naas being carried upon the train and seated in the car. By thus contracting to carry Nass as a passenger, it took upon itself the obligation of allowing him assistants to place him upon the train and seat him in the car, and the compensation received by the defendant for conveying Naas from Mount Vernon to his destination included as well the right to have assistants place him in the car as the carrying him after being so placed in the car, and the defendant owed the same obligation to his assistants while necessarily entering and leaving the car with Naas as it owed to Naas himself." So far as we have been able to discover, this case, in so far as it holds that the railway company owed the same duty to the assistants which it owed to the passenger stands by itself; and unless there be a distinguished feature in the fact that owing to the enfeebled condition of the passenger, which made it necessary for his friends to assist in boarding the train and securing a seat (which we doubt), it is in opposition to all the authorities upon the question.

Our conclusion is that since the plaintiff was not a paseenger the defendant company did not owe him the duty of protection against the injurious actions of third persons, and that therefore he was not entitled to recover for the misconduct of Allen toward himself. Therefore the judgment of the district court and that of the court of civil appeals are reversed and the cause remanded.

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It is the Duty of a Carrier to protect its passengers from injury, violence, insult, and ill-treatment at the hands of strangers, fellow passengers, and employés, and for a failure to perform this duty it is answerable: Birmingham Ry. etc. Co. v. Baird, 130 Ala. 334, 89 Am. St. Rep. 43, 30 South. 456; United Ry, etc. Co. v. Deane, 93 Md. 619, 86 Am. St. 453, 49 Atl. 923; Spade v. Lynn etc. R. R. Co.

, 173 Masg. 488, 70 Am. St. Rep. 298, 52 N. E. 747; monographic notes to Rommel v. Schambacher, 6 Am. St. Rep. 734-737; Richmond etc. Ru R. Co. v. Jefferson, 32 Am. St. Rep. 90-101; Goodloe v. Memphis etc.

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R. R, Co., 54 Am. St. Rep. 89. See, also, Brunswick etc. R. R. Co. v. Ponder, 117 Ga. 63, ante, p. 152, 43 8. E. 430; Central of Georgia R. R. Co. v. Motes, 117 Ga. 923, ante, p. 223, 43 S. E. 990.

Persons Assisting Passengers or accompanying them are not ordinarily considered passengers within the meaning of the law imposing extraordinary liability on common carriers for the safety of those whom they undertake to carry: See Earl v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 109 Iowa, 14, 77 Am. St. Rep. 516, 79 N. W. 381; monographic notes to Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 61 Am. St. Rep. 97; Little Rock etc. Ry. Co. v. Lawton, 29 Am. St. Rep. 54-56.

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CAUBLE v. WORSHAM.

[96 Tex. 86, 70 S. W. 737.) PAROL GIFT OF REAL PROPERTY—Specific Performance of.-One who, upon the faith of a gift from the owner, enters into the possession of real property and makes improvements of a valuable and permanent character, becomes entitled to specific performance by the owner.

(p. 874.) A MARRIED WOMAN Entering with Her Husband upon the Possession of Real Property under a Parol Gift and making valuable and permanent improvements acquires an equitable title thereto in her separate right.

(p. 874.) PAROL GIFT OF REAL PROPERTY-Title of the Donee.-One who enters upon real property by virtue of a parol gift thereof and does such acts as entitle him to specific performance, acquires an estate of freehold and inheritance, and may maintain trespass to try title either against the vendor or other persons. (p. 874.)

MARRIED WOMAN—Conveyance of Her Equitable Title. If a married woman under a parol gift from an owner has the right to a conveyance of real property, her title cannot be devested by a conveyance made by such owner to a third person at her request. She can convey her equitable estate in the same manner only as that in which she can convey her legal estate, namely, by a conveyance executed by herself and husband, acknowledged in the manner prescribed by statute. (p. 875.)

CONVEYANCE_Quitclaim Deed-Parol Evidence to Vary Effect of.—Evidence is not admissible to show that a quitclaim deed did not pass all the title vested in the grantor at the time of its execution. (p. 875.)

MARRIED WOMAN-Estoppel to Assert Title.-A married woman who is entitled to a conveyance of her real property by the owner of the legal title and procures him to convey it to another is not estopped from afterward asserting that such conveyance is void ag against her rights. (p. 876.)

CONVEYANCE_Evidence Insufficient to Establish.--Testimony that a witness contracted for and bought from another person a "lifetime interest,” and that he does not remember the wording of the deed, is too uncertain to establish a conveyance of any particular character, and does not warrant the submission of the case to the jury on the assumption that any party might have acquired rights through the conveyance. (p. 876.)

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