rules, either or both sustain the position that the lex loci contractus as to relations and property rights will prevail over the lex fori, unless the enforcement of the former will work an injury to the subjects of the latter, or is prohibited by the laws of the latter."

It was further said that rights and contracts arising under the laws of a foreign state will not be enforced here, except under the doctrine of the comity of states, and that this doctrine neither requires nor sanctions the enforcement in the courts -of this state of statutory rights and contracts arising under the laws of a foreign state which are repugnant to the policy and spirit of our laws.

For the reasons indicated, the decree of the court of chancery appeals is affirmed.

Conflict of Law as affecting the rights and obligations of married women is the subject of a monographic note to Locke v. McPherson, 85 Am. St. Rep. 552-578. For subsequent decisions on the same question, see Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538, 88 Am. St. Rep. 614, 62 N. E. 672; Thompson v. Taylor, 66 N. J. L. 253, 88 Am. St. Rep. 485, 49 Atl. 544; Brown v. Dalton, 105 Ky. 669, 88 Am. St. Rep. 325, 49 S. W. 443; Baer Bros. v. Terry, 108 La. 597, 92 Am. St. Rep. 394, 32 South. 353; Mandell v. Fogg, 182 Mass. 582, 94 Am. St. Rep. 667, 66 N. E. 198.

CHATTANOOGA LIGHT AND POWER CO. v. HODGES. [109 Tenn. 331, 70 S. W. 616.]

NEGLIGENCE Must be the Proximate Cause of an Injury to sustain a recovery therefor. (p. 846.)

NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause-Injuries Received in Attempting a Rescue. Where one person is exposed to peril of life or limb by the negligence of another, the latter is liable for injuries received by a third person in a reasonable effort to rescue the person so imperiled, if the rescuer does not rashly or unnecessarily expose himself to danger. (p. 846.)

NEGLIGENCE.-The Proximate Cause of an Injury is that act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act of omission occurring or concurring with another which, had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted. (p. 848.)

NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause.-A wrongdoer is liable not only for an injury which immediately results from his act, but for such consequential injuries as, according to the common experience of man, were likely to result. It will be sufficient to fix liability on a wrongdoer if the particular result is one naturally connected, either immediately or through a series of events, with the original wrongful act. (p. 848.)

NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause, What is not.-Where & result is such that no reasonable man would expect it to occur, and no knowledge is shown in the person doing the negligent or wrongful act that such state of facts exists as to make the danger probable, the injury will not be regarded as actionable as against the wrongdoer. Especially is this true where the injury results from an act committed by the injured party, so obviously fraught with peril as should be sufficient to deter one of reasonable intelligence. (pp. 848, 849.)

Act of the

NEGLIGENCE Proximate Cause-Interfering Plaintiff. The plaintiff's interfering act, rather than the defendant's negligence, may be regarded as the proximate cause of the former's injury, whether he was guilty of contributory negligence or not, if it was unexpected and of a character which could not have been contemplated or foreseen and without which no injury would have occurred. (p. 849.)

NEGLIGENCE Proximate or Intervening Cause, When a Question for the Court.-Where the facts are fairly inferable, the question of proximate or intervening cause is for the court. (p. 850.)

NEGLIGENCE Proximate or Intervening Cause-Rash Exposure to Injury.—If one has been guilty of an act of negligence exposing his property to destruction by fire, and his employé, disregarding the expostulation of a third person characterizing his conduct as foolhardiness, leaves a place of safety and goes through fire and smoke to his mortal injury, this rashness, rather than the original negligence, is the proximate cause of his injury. Hence, no recovery therefor can be sustained against the employer. (p. 850.)

Brown & Spurlock, for Chattanooga Light and Power Company.

Richmond, Chambers & Head, for Hodges.

333 BEARD, C. J. This suit was brought by the defendant in error to recover damages for the death of his intestate, Milton Palmer, resulting, as is alleged, from the negligence of the plaintiff in error. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the administrator for ten thousand dollars, and the case has been brought to this court by the light and power

company.

334 The deceased was one of the engineers of the company, and at night had charge of its power-house engines and other machinery. While he was on duty, and about 9:30 P. M., fire was discovered in a framework cover of the electric wires which led up through the hallway to the room above, where they madetheir exit from the building. The fire rapidly spread, and oc-casioned the terrible injuries from which Palmer died. The theory of the plaintiff below was that negligence on the part of the defendant company in the use of combustible lumber in making this framework, and also in the location and condition

of these wires, occasioned the fire which fatally burned the deceased while he was discharging his duty in seeking to save the property of his employer.

The record shows that on discovering the fire, young Palmer, instead of sounding the alarm through a telephone in the building, ran to a house across the street, and sought to do so with a telephone located there. After an ineffectual effort to make connection, he abandoned it, and returned to the power-house. By that time the fire had spread until it was a serious conflagration. The flames and smoke were pouring out of the main entrance and the windows in that part of the building. There were other openings or doors into the power-house, but, seeing Palmer in the act of passing in through this main entrance, a policeman on the ground expostulated with him on what he characterized as foolhardiness." Disregarding the 335 expostulation, however, Palmer entered there, and went down the burning hallway into the telephone booth or box when it was on fire. Remaining there but a short time, he came out with his clothing aflame, and so horribly burned that in catching at himself the flesh parted or slipped from his hands. From these injuries he died.

This is a meager outline of the fire and its results, so far as they affect the present case. While the evidence attributing the origin of the fire to negligence of the company was attenuated, it may be assumed that, with its inferences, it was sufficient to preclude us, under the rule, from saying that there was not material evidence to support the verdict on this point. Assuming, therefore, that the jury were warranted in finding that the defendant company was guilty of such negligence, were they also warranted in finding that this negligence was the proximate cause of Palmer's fatal injuries? For there must be a concurrence of these essentials in order to maintain the present action.

It seems to be well settled that, where one person is exposed to peril of life or limb by the negligence of another, the latter will be liable in damages for injuries received by a third party in a reasonable effort to rescue the one so imperiled: Pennsylvania Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453, 46 Am. Rep. 173; Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506, 30 Am. Rep. 692; Eckert v. Long Island R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 503, 3 Am. Rep. 721; Gibney 336 v. State, 137 N. Y. 6, 33 Am. St. Rep. 690, 33 N. E. 142. But even in such a case the rescuer must not rashly and unnecessarily expose himself to danger: Pennsylvania Co. v.

Langendorf, 48 Ohio St. 316, 29 Am. St. Rep. 553, 28 N. E. 172.

But whether the benefit of this rule is to be extended to one injured in an effort to save his own or another's property, exposed to danger by the wrongdoing or negligence of a third party, is a question that has provoked much difference of judicial opinion. Opposed to this extension are found the cases of Eckert v. Long Island R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721; Morris v. Lake Shore etc. Ry. Co., 148 N. Y. 186, 42 N. E. 579; Condiff v. Kansas etc. R. R. Co., 45 Kan. 260, 25 Pac. 562; Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 55 Am. Rep. 703, 25 N. W. 388; Seale v. Gulf etc. Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 274, 57 Am. Rep. 602. On the other hand, in Berg v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 70 Minn. 272, 68 Am. St. Rep. 524, 73 N. W. 648, Liming v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 81 Iowa, 246, 47 N. W. 66, Pullman Car Co. v. Laack, 143 Ill. 242, 32 N. E. 285, Rexter v. Starin, 73 N. Y. 601, and Wasmer v. Delaware Co., 80 N. Y. 212, 36 Am. Rep. 608, the rule has been extended so as to give the party injured redress where his effort to save property has been such as a reasonably prudent man would have made under similar circumstances.

In his charge to the jury the trial judge gave the 337 administrator of the deceased the benefit of the rule as announced in Berg v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 70 Minn. 272, 68 Am. St. Rep. 524, 73 N. W. 648, and the other like cases. We do not, however, feel called on to choose determinately between the divergent decisions on this point, and certainly we are not prepared to say the trial judge was in error. But granting that he laid down the law correctly, the question recurs, Was the injury received by Palmer, which resulted in his death, the proximate result of the negligence of the plaintiff in error?

An examination of the cases will confirm the statement of Mr. Archibald Watson of the New York bar, in his recent and very valuable work, entitled "Damages for Personal Injuries," that "no branch of the subject of personal injuries presents greater difficulty than the determination of liabilty for a specific loss, with reference to its naturalness and proximity as a consequence of the wrongful act complained of."

So great has this uncertainty been felt, that many courts have reached the conclusion that, at last, "to a sound judgment must be left each particular case": Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. 547, 47 Am. Dec. 578. The same view was expressed by the supreme court of the United States in Insurance Co.

v. Tweed, Wall. 49, in the following language: "We have had cited to us a general review of the doctrine of proximate and remote causes, as it has arisen and been decided by the courts in a great variety of cases. It would be an unprofitable labor to enter into an 338 examination of these cases. If we could deduce from them the best possible expression of the rule, it would remain, after all, to decide each case largely upon the special facts belonging to it, and often upon the nicest discrimination."

While there is much of practical truth in these statements, and the most careful study of the best text-books and opinions of courts will fail to discover an infallible guide, yet it will be found that all agree on certain general formulas or rules, which, though difficult of application in some, are of value in all, cases involving this question of proximate or remote cause.

In Deming v. Cotton Press Co., 90 Tenn. 353, 17 S. W. 99, this court said: "The proximate cause of an injury may, in general, be stated to be that act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act or omission occurring or concurring with another, which, had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted." This definition was approved in the later cases of Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 369, 24 S. W. 633; Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 91 Tenn. 699, 30 Am. St. Rep. 902, 20 S. W. 312, and Anderson v. Miller, 96 Tenn. 35, 54 Am. St. Rep. 812, 33 S. W. 615.

In each of these cases, while the injury complained of was not the necessary effect of the particular act of negligence held to be the proximate cause, yet it was the natural result, and one which, in the face of 339 human experience, might well have been anticipated as possible, if not probable. In all of them the principle recognized was that a wrongdoer is liable not only for the injury which immediately results from his act, but for such consequential injuries as, according to the common experience of man, were likely to result.

But the consequential injury, according to the authorities, must be natural, "following upon the original wrongful act, in the usual, ordinary, and experienced course of events"; Wiley v. West Jersey R. R. Co. 44 N. J. L. 248; Milwaukee etc. R. R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469. But it is to be observed that the result will not be unnatural, so as to relieve the original wrongdoer of responsibility, because he did not foresee or contemplate the precise consequence of his misconduct. It will be sufficient to fix liability on him if the particu