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the rights of the parties”: Hubble v. Morristown Land Co., 95 Tenn. 585, 32 S. W. 965. In 2 Parsons on Contracts, 586, it is said: “So if one in New York orders goods from Boston, either by carrier whom he points out, or in the usual course of trade, this would be a completion in the making of the contract, and it would be a Boston contract, whether he gave a note, or a note payable in Boston, or one without express place of payment.” We think it quite plain that the note in suit is an Ohio contract, notwithstanding it was signed by Mrs. Harley 241 in Tennessee, it having been delivered and consummated in Ohio, and is payable in that state, as the place of performance: Armstrong v. Best, 112 N. C. 59, 34 Am. St. Rep. 473, 17 S. E. 14; Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241.
The next inquiry is whether the plea of coverture to a note made in Ohio, valid and enforceable against a married woman in that state, is available in a suit on said note in this state, where such a contract is voidable at the election of the married woman. In Story on Conflict of Laws, chapter 4, section 103, it is said: "In regard to questions concerning infancy, competency to marry, incapacities incident to coverture, guardianship, and other personal qualities and disabilities, the law of the domicile of birth, or other fixed domicile is not generally to govern, but the lex loci contractus aut actus, the law of the place where the contract is made or the act done,” or, as he elsewhere sums it up, "although foreign jurists generally hold that the law of the domicile ought to govern in regard to the capacity of persons to contract, yet the common law holds a different doctrine, namely, that the lex loci contractus is to govern”: Story on Conflict of Laws, secs. 103, 241.
Chancellor Kent, while at one time inclined to the doctrine of the civilians, afterward approved the doctrine which has just been quoted from Mr. Story: 2 Kent's Commentaries, 233, note, 458, 459, and note. The 242 same doctrine was announced by this court in Pearl v. Hansborough, 9 Humph. 426, in an opinion by Judge Turley. Applying this rule, it was held in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241, Mr. Justice Gray delivering the opinion of the court, that a contract of guaranty, signed by a married woman, domiciled with her husband in Massachusetts, and sent by mail to Maine, where it was accepted and acted on, was a contract made in the state of Maine, and, when sued on in the state of Massachusetts, would be determined by the law of Maine. In that case it appeared
that by the statutes of Maine, in force at the date of the contract of guaranty, the contracts of a married woman were valid and enforceable as if made by a feme sole, while the law of Massachusetts, as then existing, did not allow her to enter into a contract as surety or for the accommodation of her husband. But it further appeared that, since the making of the contract sued on, and before the bringing of the action, the law of Massachusetts had been changed so as to enable married women to make such contracts. The court of Massachusetts therefore permitted a recovery against a married woman on the contract of guaranty made in Maine: See, also, Bell v. l'ackard, 69 Me. 105, 31 Am. Rep. 251. But in Tennessee the contracts of a married woman are voidable, and will not be enforced against her when there is a plea of coverture. It would be a strange anomaly to hold 243 that such a contract made by a married woman in Tennessee would not be enforced by our courts, while the same contract, if made in another state, would be valid and enforceable.
As stated by Mr. Justice Gray, in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am. Rep. 241: "As the law of another state can neither operate nor be executed in this state by its own force, but only by the comity of this state, its operation and enforcement here may be restricted by positive prohibition of statute. .... It is possible, also, that in a state where the common law prevailed in full force, by which a married woman was deemed incapable of binding herself by any contract whatever, it might be inferred that such utter incapacity, lasting throughout the joint lives of husband and wife, must be considered as so fixed by the settled policy of the state for the protection of its own citizens that it could not be held by the courts of that state to yield to the law of another state in which she might undertake to contract.”
While it is true, as contended by counsel in his very able argument, that the tendency of legislation in Tennessee is to enlarge the contractual power of married women, yet such power is very limited and circumscribed, and the settled policy of this state is to declare nugatory contracts made by her whenerer her plea of coverture is inter posed.
In Bank of Columbia v. Walker, 14 Lea, 299, it was held that the lex loci contractus would govern when not repugnant 244 tɔ the lex fori. The court stated the rule to be: “Whether we consider the subject matter under the head of comity and its rules, or under that of real and personal statutes and its
rules, either or both sustain the position that the lex loci contractus as to relations and property rights will prevail over the lex fori, unless the enforcement of the former will work an injury to the subjects of the latter, or is prohibited by the laws of the latter."
It was further said that rights and contracts arising under the laws of a foreign state will not be enforced here, except un-der the doctrine of the comity of states, and that this doctrine neither requires nor sanctions the enforcement in the courts of this state of statutory rights and contracts arising under the laws of a foreign state which are repugnant to the policy and spirit of our laws.
For the reasons indicated, the decree of the court of chancery appeals is affirmed.
Conflict of Law as affecting the rights and obligations of married women is the subject of a monographic note to Locke v. McPherson, 85 Am, St. Rep. 552-578. For subsequent decisions on the same ques. tion, see Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538, 88 Am. St. Rep. 614, 62 N. E. 672; Thompson v. Taylor, 66 N. J. L. 253, 88 Am. St. Rep. 485, 49 Atl. 544; Brown v. Dalton, 105 Ky, 669, 88 Am. St. Rep. 325, 49 S. W. 443; Baer Bros. v. Terry, 108 La. 597, 92 Am. St. Rep. 394, 32 South, 353; Mandell v. Fogg, 182 Mass. 582, 94 Am. St. Rep. 667, 66 N, E. 198.
CHATTANOOGA LIGHT AND POWER CO. v. HODGES.
[109 Tenn. 331, 70 S. W, 616.] NEGLIGENCE Must be the Proximate Cause of an Injury to sustain a recovery therefor. (p. 846.)
NEGLIGENCE—Proximate Cause-Injuries Received in At tempting a Rescue.-Where one person is exposed to peril of life or limb by the negligence of another, the latter is liable for injuries received by a third person in a reasonable effort to rescue the person so imperiled, if the rescuer doos not rashly or unnecessarily es. pose himself to danger. (p. 846.)
NEGLIGENCE.—The Proximate Cause of an Injury is that act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the injury; an act of omission occurring or concurring with another which, had it not happened, the injury would not have been inflicted. (p. 848.)
NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause.—A wrongdoer is liable not vnly for an injury which immediately results from his act, but for such consequential injuries as, according to the common experience of man, were likely to result. It will be sufficient to fix liability on a wrongdoer if the particular result is one naturally connected, either immediately or through a series of events, with the original wrongful act. (p. 848.)
NEGLIGENCE— Proximate Cause, What is not.-Where are result is such that no reasonable man would expect it to occur, and no knowledge is shown in the person doing the negligent or wrongful act that such state of facts exists as to make the danger probable, the injury will not be regarded as actionable as against the wrong. doer. Especially is this true where the injury results from an act committed by the injured party, so obviously fraught with peril as: should be sufficient to deter one of reasonable intelligence. (pp. 848, 849.)
NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause-Interfering Act of the Plaintiff.—The plaintiff's interfering act, rather than the defendant's negligence, may be regarded as the proximate cause of the former's injury, whether he was guilty of contributory negligence or not, if it was unexpected and of a character which could not have been contemplated or foreseen and without which no injury would have occurred. (p. 849.)
NEGLIGENCEProximate or Intervening Cause, When & Question for the Court.-Where the facts are fairly inferable, the question of proximate or intervening cause is for the court. (p. 850.)
NEGLIGENCE-Proximate or Intervening Cause--Rash Ex-posure to Injury.—If one has been guilty of an act of negligence exposing his property to destruction by fire, and his employé, disregarding the expostulation of a third person characterizing his conduct as foolhardiness, leaves a place of safety and goes through fire and smoke to his mortal injury, this rashness, rather than the original negligence, is the proximate cause of his injury. Hence, no recovery therefor can be sustained against the employer. (p. 850.)
Brown & Spurlock, for Chattanooga Light and Power Company.
Richmond, Chambers & Head, for Hodges.
333 BEARD, C. J. This suit was brought by the defendant in error to recover damages for the death of his intestate, Milton Palmer, resulting, as is alleged, from the negligence of the plaintiff in error. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the administrator for ten thousand dollars, and the case has been brought to this court by the light and power company.
334 The deceased was one of the engineers of the company, and at night had charge of its power-house engines and other machinery. While he was on duty, and about 9:30 P. M., fire was discovered in a framework cover of the electric wires which led up through the hallway to the room above, where they made their exit from the building. The fire rapidly spread, and occasioned the terrible injuries from which Palmer died. The theory of the plaintiff below was that negligence on the part of the defendant company in the use of combustible lumber in making this framework, and also in the location and condition
of these wires, occasioned the fire which fatally burned the de. ceased while he was discharging his duty in seeking to save the property of his employer.
The record shows that on discovering the fire, young Palmer, instead of sounding the alarm through a telephone in the building, ran to a house across the street, and sought to do so with a telephone located there. After an ineffectual effort to make connection, he abandoned it, and returned to the power-house. By that time the fire had spread until it was a serious conflagration. The flames and smoke were pouring out of the main entrance and the windows in that part of the building. There were other openings or doors into the power-house, but, seeing Palmer in the act of passing in through this main entrance, a policeman on the ground expostulated with him on what he characterized as foolhardiness.” Disregarding the 335 expostulation, however, Palmer entered there, and went down the burning hallway into the telephone booth or box when it was on fire. Remaining there but a short time, he came out with his clothing aflame, and so horribly burned that in catching at himself the flesh parted or slipped from his hands. From these injuries he died.
This is a meager outline of the fire and its results, so far as they affect the present case. While the evidence attributing the origin of the fire to negligence of the company was attenuated, it may be assumed that, with its inferences, it was sufficient to preclude us, under the rule, from saying that there was not material evidence to support the verdict on this point. Assuming, therefore, that the jury were warranted in finding that the defendant company was guilty of such negligence, were they also warranted in finding that this negligence was the proximate cause of Palmer's fatal injuries? For there must be a concurrence of these essentials in order to maintain the present action.
It seems to be well settled that, where one person is exposed to peril of life or limb by the negligence of another, the latter will be liable in damages for injuries received by a third party in a reasonable effort to rescue the one so imperiled: Pennsylvania Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453, 46 Am. Rep. 113; Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506, 30 Am. Rep. 692; Eckert v. Long Island R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. 503, 3 Am. Rep. 721; Gibney v. State, 137 N. Y. 6, 33 Am. St. Rep. 690, 33 N. E. 142. But even in such a case the rescuer must not rashly and unnecessarily expose himself to danger: Pennsylvania Co. F.