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3.; Am, Law Reg. 141. However this may be, it is the
sted this state, and we are not disposed to question it, much
sa o crerrule it

. It is in entire harmony with the other de-
tiza this court which we have cited, for it is distinguish-
te fram them by the fact that the fright of the plaintiff was
zzlegal trong of the defendant against the plaintiff

, which
ra un de fast in the other cases. The question whether fright
une vould constitute such injury that the law will allow a re-
stet er it was not involved in that case,
From the consideration of the decisions of this court cited,

that there can be no recovery for fright, which results - potical injuries, in the absence of contemporaneous injury uit plaintif, unless the fright is the proximate result of a cai trong against the plaintiff by the defendant. As already said, the plaintiff's case is not within the exception, and it fol: bet the trial court rightly directed a verdict for the de

moda affirmed.

and anxiety for the safety of others cannot be made the basis for the recovery of damages.

In the case of Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 28 Am. St. Rep. 370, 50 N. W. 238, it was stated as a rule that no action for damages will lie for an act which, though wrongful, infringed no legal right of the plaintiff, although it may have caused him mental suffering. The case of Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034, was one where a pregnant woman was a passenger on one of the defendant's cars, and by its negligence in the management of its cars at a street crossing a collision seemed inevitable, and she was placed in a position of such apparent imminent peril as to cause fright, which caused a mis. carriage; and it was held, though there was in fact no collision and no impact, that the defendant's 107 negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and that she was entitled to recover for the consequences of her fright. It is to be noted in this case that the defendant's negligence which caused the fright was a legal wrong to the plaintiff as well as to all of her fellow-passengers. In other words, the act of the defendant which caused the plaintiff's fright was a tort against her.

In the case of Bucknam v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 373, 79 N. W. 98, the plaintiff, a married woman, entered with her husband the ladies' waiting-room in the defendant's depot; and the station agent unlawfully and untruthfully charged her companion with not being her husband, and used violent, offensive, threatening, and abusive language to him, and ordered him to leave the room, whereby she suffered a nervous shock which resulted in serious physical injuries. It was held that these facts afforded no legal basis for the recovery of damages by her, for the reason that the use of abusive language to her husband was not an infraction of her legal right, hence not a legal wrong to her, and for the further reason, as stated by Buck, J. (page 378, 76 Minn., and page 100, 79 N. W.), that: “She apprehended no danger to herself. At least, she could not reasonably do so.

She was not in any place of peril. If an action of this kind can be maintained, we do not see why nervous and sensitive persons present at a riot or public disturbance cannot have a cause of action, if thereby they become nervous and sick, or suffer mentally, even if they do not receive bodily injury.”

The Purcell case has been criticised by some eminent courts, and approved by others, but it would seem that the trend of the more recent cases is to approve it: See 15 Harvard Law Rev.

The Question Incolved in the Principal Case as to the recovery of mages for fright is considered in the monographic note to Gulf B. Co. v. Hayter

, 77 Am. St. Rep. 862-865. In Watson 7. Dilts, 18 Lowa, 249

, 93 Am. St. Rep. 239, 89 N. W. 1068, it is held that

prostration arising from fright to a woman caused by selbily entering her home in the night-time and committing * espan on her husband's property, justifies a recovery against the vepsat

, as the physical injury is the proximate result of his wrong.

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HOLMES . CATHCART.

[88 Minn, 213, 92 N. W. 956.) AGENCY – Fraud of Agent-Duty to Disclose facts.-An agent melhorized by his principal to sell property.on certain terms and

specified price, who learns before sale is made that other ad more advantageous terms and prices can be obtained, is bound to stanicate such facts to his principal before making the sale, and his falure to do so is a fraud for which the principal is entitled to haver of him whatever loss he actually suffers through such failuro,

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1.0. White, for the appellant. 1. 1. Fitzpatrick, for the respondents. ** BROWN, J. The facts in this case are substantially as bioma: Plaintiff, who residea at Buffalo, New York, was the under of twelve houses in the city of St. Paul, all of which

dr. St. Rep., Vol. 97--33

304; 41 Am. Law Reg. 141. However this may be, it is the law of this state, and we are not disposed to question it, much less to overrule it. It is in entire harmony with the other decisions of this court which we have cited, for it is distinguishable from them by the fact that the fright of the plaintiff was due to a legal wrong of the defendant against the plaintiff, which was not the fact in the other cases. The question whether fright alone would constitute such injury that the law will allow a recovery for it was not involved in that case.

168 From the consideration of the decisions of this court cited, we hold that there can be no recovery for fright, which results in physical injuries, in the absence of contemporaneous injury to the plaintiff, unless the fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong against the plaintiff by the defendant. As already stated, the plaintiff's case is not within the exception, and it follows that the trial court rightly directed a verdict for the de. fendant.

Order affirmed,

The Question Involved in the Principal Case as to the recovery of damages for fright is considered in the monographic note to Gulf etc. Ry. Co. v. Hayter, 77 Am. St. Rep. 862-865. In Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa, 249, 93 Am. St. Rep. 239, 89 N. W. 1068, it is held that nervous prostration arising from fright to a woman caused by stealthily entering her home in the night-time and committing å trespass on her husband's property, justifies a recovery against the trespasser, as the physical injury is the proximate result of his wrong.

HOLMES v. CATHCART.

[88 Minn. 213, 92 N. W. 956.) AGENCY-Fraud of Agent-Duty to Disclose Facts.--An agent authorized by his principal to sell property on certain terms and for a specified price, who learns before sale is made that other and more advantageous terms and prices can be obtained, is bound to communicate such facts to his principal before making the sale, and his failure to do so is a fraud for which the principal is entitled to recover of him whatever loss he actually suffers through such failure. (p. 516.)

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W. G. White, for the appellant.
J. F. Fitzpatrick, for the respondents.

213 BROWN, J. The facts in this case are substantially as follows: Plaintiff, who resides at Buffalo, New York, was the owner of twelve houses in the city of St. Paul, all of which

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 97–33

henlants joined in a motion to direct a verdict, which motion

Teher to Horeish or to the apartment house company; that

best nothing by the transaction, and has no cause of action.

were clear and free of encumbrance. The houses were somewhat out of repair, and, to render them habitable, certain expenses were necessary to be incurred; and, to avoid that expense, plaintiff was anxious to exchange the houses for other property. Defendant Cathcart was her agent, and acted for her in the care and management of the houses, collecting rents, making needed repairs, placing insurance on the property, and, in a way, her general representative at St. 214 Paul. He undertook to make an exchange of the property, and at one time had under consideration a proposition which he thought might result beneficially to plaintiff; and he induced her to come on, with her husband, from her home in Buffalo for the purpose of an examination and inspection of the property proposed in exchange. The exchange did not take place, but later on Cathcart secured from one Horeish a proposition to exchange a brick block owned by him in the city of St. Paul, which was encumbered by a mortgage of fif. teen thousand dollars, for plaintiff's twelve houses; but there were back taxes against the block and overdue interest on the mortgage to the amount of sixteen hundred dollars, which plaintiff would be required to pay to effect a trade.

Pending the consideration of the proposition by plaintiffthe evidence does not show that it had been rejected-Cathcart procured from Horeish a further contract by which the latter agreed to accept two of plaintiff's houses, free and clear of encumbrance, and the sum of two hundred dollars, for his property, subject to the mortgage and the payment of the back taxes and interest. At about this time—the precise date does not clearly appear—he enteros into some sort of an agreement with the Pioneer Apartment House Company, by which that concern agreed to advance all money necessary to pay the back taxes and interest against the Horeish property, over and above the sum of one thousand. dollars, in consideration of which it was to receive ten of the houses. Cathcart then informed plaintiff that he could effect an exchange of her twelve houses for the Horeish block, subject to the encumbrance, interest, and taxes (plaintiff to pay one thousand dollars, instead of sixteen hundred dollars, according to the previous proposition); and he subsequently informed her that the balance of the sixteen hun. dred dollars necessary to pay the back taxes and interest in full would be advanced by a third party, who was to receive some of the houses. She was not informed that Horeish was willing to exchange the brick block for two of her houses and the sum of two hundred dollars, subject to the mortgage and the taxes and

Šie understood all along that all of her houses were se musierred and exchanged for that property, and she was satin med at any time that the apartment house company was i receive ten of her houses for the amount of money it was to JBx. She finally 215 accepted this proposition, deeded the gas to the Pioneer Apartment House Company, and paid the a bazard dollars toward the back taxes and interest. The se pressary to pay the same in full was paid by the apart2 were company. The precise amount paid by it is not are by the record

, but it was probably in the neighborhood bare hundred dollars or fourteen hundred dollars, includ

commission to Cathcart of the sum of five hundred dollars, Selid was directed for defendants at the trial in the court sala plaintiff rested. Defendants were not required to 2 st evidence, and the facts in defense of the action, or a thich they would rely if required to defend, do not ap2. This action was brought against both defendants-Cathat the agent, and the apartment house company—on the theSy het those parties were in collusion, and that plaintiff was

10 recover against both for any damage she had suffered a failure of her agent to disclose to her all the material

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te in reference to her exchange of the properties. Res enidence is insufficient, perhaps

, to show a collusive agreeen etween the defendants, though it is somewhat strange, or to take nok wholly clear, that the apartment house company and receive ten of plaintiff's houses for the nominal consideraLa di alboat twelve hundred dollars, when they were worth at as the sum of four thousand dollars. But at the trial below

The mantied; and, if the court erred in granting the motion as keber, a reversal must apply to both, and the case will be left us theich no trial had ever been had, and must be tried again

s to both defendants.

The theory on which the learned court below directed a verdict mes that the plaintiff had not been injured by any act on the part of defendants

, and she could not recover; that, as she was ng to part with all her houses in exchange for the briek love

, it was immaterial to whom they were in fact deeded

It think the court was in error. It is not controlling whether sirif was willing, or not, to make the exchange on the terms proposed to her. The action involves the duty of an agent wben

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interest. She understood all along that all of her houses were to be transferred and exchanged for that property, and she was not informed at any time that the apartment house company was to receive ten of her houses for the amount of money it was to advance. She finally 215 accepted this proposition, deeded the houses to the Pioneer Apartment House Company, and paid the one thousand dollars toward the back taxes and interest. The balance necessary to pay the same in full was paid by the apartment house company. The precise amount paid by it is not shown by the record, but it was probably in the neighborhood of twelve hundred dollars or fourteen hundred dollars, includ. ing a commission to Cathcart of the sum of five hundred dollars.

A verdict was directed for defendants at the trial in the court below when plaintiff rested. Defendants were not required to offer any evidence, and the facts in defense of the action, or upon which they would rely if required to defend, do not appear. This action was brought against both defendants-Cathcart, the agent, and the apartment house company-on the the. ory that those parties were in collusion, and that plaintiff was entitled to recover against both for any damage she had suffered for the failure of her agent to disclose to her all the material facts in reference to her exchange of the properties.

The evidence is insufficient, perhaps, to show a collusive agreement between the defendants, though it is somewhat strange, or at least not wholly clear, that the apartment house company should receive ten of plaintiff's houses for the nominal consideration of about twelve hundred dollars, when they were worth at least the sum of four thousand dollars. But at the trial below defendants joined in a motion to direct a verdict, which motion was granted; and, if the court erred in granting the motion as to either, a reversal must apply to both, and the case will be left as though no trial had ever been bad, and must be tried again as to both defendants.

The theory on which the learned court below directed a verdict was that the plaintiff had not been injured by any act on the part of defendants, and she could not recover; that, as she was willing to part with all her houses in exchange for the brick block, it was immaterial to whom they were in fact deeded whether to Horeish or to the apartment house company; that she lost nothing by the transaction, and has no cause of action. We think the court was in error. It is not controlling whether plaintiff was willing, or not, to make the exchange on the terms proposed to her. The action involves the duty of an agent when

bra is bound to use reasonable care to protect his guests and area from injury at the hands of vicious or lawless persons whom boringly permits to be in or about his saloon. Hence, he is e a guest who, in his presence, is injured by the act of a

nyeres gustained by the plaintiff while in the saloon of the de

acting for his principal, 216 and whether he performed that duty in accordance with the law. The principal may authorize his agent to sell or exchange his property, but it does not necessarily follow that the agent, by carrying out the specific instructions given him, fully performs his duty, and is relieved from liability. He is bound to the exercise of the most perfect good faith, and to keep his principal informed of facts coming to his knowledge affecting his rights and interests. If, after receiving instructions to sell property on certain specified terms, the agent learns that other and more advantageous terms can be obtained, it is his plain duty, and he is under every legal and moral obligation, to communicate the facts to the principal, that he may act advisedly in the premises. As stated by Chief Justice Gilfillan, in Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 5 Am. St. Rep. 808, 32 N. W.785: Upon this contract of agency, we are of the opinion that when the agent learned of a fact affecting the value of the property, and of which fact he knew the principal was ignorant when she fixed the price, and if the agent had reason to believe that, had she known the fact, she would have fixed a higher price, then good faith toward his principal required him, and it was his legal duty, to disclose the fact to her before he proceeded to sell, so that she might, if so disposed, fix the selling price in accordance with the actual condition of things. This being so, his selling upon the basis of the price first fixed, without disclosing to her the fact he had learned, was, of course, & fraud upon her. That case is in accord with the unanimous voice of the authorities : Mechem on Agency, sec. 538;

1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 1969; Arrott v. Brown, 6 Whart. 9; Devall v. Burbridge, 4 Watts & S. 305; Harvey v. Turner, 4 Rawle, 223; Tilleny v. Wolverton, 46 Minn. 256, 48 N. W. 908.

Plaintiff was not informed at any time prior to the closing of the transaction that she could obtain the brick block for two of her houses and the payment of about sixteen hundred dollars in money, and the question arises whether defendant. Cathcart should have communicated that fact to her. If, as now claimed by plaintiff, that bargain was a better one for her-more beneficial in its results—it was the clear duty of Cathcart to communicate the facts to her; and if, by his failure to do so, plaintiff was damaged, she is entitled to recover whatever loss she actually suffered.

Whether defendant 217 did fail in his duty in this respect is, of course, a question of fact, which we do not attempt to pass upon; but we do hold that the evidence offered by plaintiff on the trial was such as to require a finding on the question

the trial court

, or the submission of the same to a jury. The Act of ter relief would be the actual damage suffered in kine of defendant's failure of duty. The case must Te're be reversed. I na ako claimed by plaintiff that she was entitled to the origtion received by defendant, Cathcart, her agent, and that 2 934 erred in holding otherwise. It appears, without dis12 fat stheart did receive from the apartment house com27 a commission of five hundred dollars for his services in try the exchange of properties. We do not concur with siis sunsel, however, that plaintiff is entitled to any porcodic The evidence disclosed by the record fairly shows sapientif contemplated that defendant should receive some

commission, and this is clearly shown by the correShane between the parties. As a condition to the acceptance e inal ofer to exchange the properties, she distinctly stated mis must include all commissions to be received or claimed Crisert. It therefore appears from the record that Cath2. Ta entitled to negotiate for and accept and receive a comcern for his services in the premises, and this with the knowlad consent of plaintiff

. And having done so with her ex

As consent, he is entitled to retain the same, Wala reversed and new trial granted. Der Prioripal Case is supported by Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 4:42, 86. Rep. 808, 92 N. W. 785.

CURRAN v. OLSON.

[88 Minn. 307, 92 N. W. 1124.) NEGLIGENCE of Saloon-keeper — Injury to Guest.—A saloon.

person in pouring alcohol on such guest while he is asleep, and

setting it on fire. (p. 518.) 1.4. Sorley and F. C. Massee, for the appellants. I. A. Bronson, for the respondent.

START, C. J. Action to recover damages for personal

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