cision of a jury": 1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 1057. The subject came under discussion in the case of Southern Ry. Co. v. Watson, 110 Ga. 682, 690, 36 S. E. 209, wherein the question arose as to whether or not a carrier of passengers could lawfully undertake to limit the time in which a railroad ticket should be used. In this connection, Mr. Justice Little, who delivered the cpinion of the court, said: "All the authorities which support the doctrine that a railroad company may by rules and regulations limit the time in which a ticket can be used for passage concur in the view that such regulations must be reasonable, and whether or not a regulation of this character is or is not reasonable is a question to be determined by the court. On this subject, the rule, as we understand it, is, that where the facts are not disputed, the reasonableness of a regulation of a common carrier affecting the transportation of passengers is one of law for the court, and not of fact for the jury: See, also, the cases cited on page 690, 110 Ga., and page 213, 36 S. E.

2. We shall not at this time undertake to do more than determine whether or not, as regards a waiting-room in a city such as Macon, where weary travelers may, if they wish, procure suitable accommodations for rest and comfort, regulations forbidding the use by passengers of benches as beds, or any other attempted transformation of a railroad waiting-room into a lodging-house, tend to deprive passengers of inalienable rights, or are for any other reason to be regarded as despotic and unreasonable. It is pertinent here to remark that there was no evidence introduced on the trial touching any rule promulgated by the railroad commission of this state with respect to the duty of a common carrier to furnish lodgings to such of its patrons as find it convenient to present themselves at the carrier's depot during the night, there to remain until the scheduled departure of a morning train several hours later. Nor have we been cited to any common-law or statutory rule which imposes upon a railway company any such duty toward such patrons, or to one holding a ticket, who, through his own fault or misfortune, has missed an evening train. Accordingly, we shall endeavor to decide on principle whether such a duty does or does not, as a general thing, exist. It seems reasonable to assert that a 931 railway company could not be considered unreasonable if it adopted regulation whereby a passenger was not admitted to its waitingroom until an hour or so before the departure, on schedule time, of a train the passenger desired to take. Nor would it appear more unreasonable for the carrier to actually keep its waiting

room open all night for the accommodation of its patrons, permitting them to enter it at any time they chose, on condition that they would not abuse the privilege thus accorded them, by undertaking to wrest from the carrier a night's sleep to which they were not entitled. Many good reasons might be suggested why the carrier would be unwilling to extend an unqualified invitation to enter at will and stay as long as desirable. For instance, passengers expecting to take a particular train might, if permitted to indulge in opportune sleep, miss the train and be left complaining on the carrier's hands, instead of making a timely and orderly departure and giving place to other passengers entitled to enter its waiting-room and partake of the accommodations it afforded. Again, the carrier could have a laudable ambition to so conduct its waiting-room that passengers of culture and refinement might be spared the disgust of witnessing the uncouth and unseemly behavior of a different class of travelers, whose sense of decency fails to suggest to them the impropriety of sprawling over or upon benches or seats designed for a purpose ether than that of affording an opportunity to retire for the night in a grotesque, if not offensive, attitude of repose. The reasonableness of a regulation adopted by a carrier of passengers with respect to the use to be made of its premises is not to be arbitrarily determined by applying the test whether or not such regulation would be reasonable if adopted by a carrier of livestock. The circumstances of time and place are to be given due consideration. On the western frontier, years ago, the reasonableness of attempting to regulate the "shooting out" of station lights by waiting passengers might have been seriously questioned by at least some members of the traveling public. To-day there is doubtless a growing sentiment in all parts of the country against converting into a smoking apartment a general waiting-room provided for the accommodation of both sexes, as well as against treating with contempt the invitation held out by the station-house "sand-box" or cuspidor, and other minor infractions of the laws of etiquette which obtain in polite society. The evolution which has taken place along this line 932 cannot properly be ignored by the courts; for carriers of passengers are to be encouraged, rather than disheartened, when they manifest a disposition to improve conditions which have become almost intolerable. To furnish adequate and comfortable accommodations to the traveling public is an exacting and serious business, not mere vain and expensive trifling. A prospective traveler who purchases a railroad ticket with a view to going on a journey

does not thereby acquire a right to demand of the carrier that he be allowed to enter its waiting-room eight hours or so before the train he expects to take is due, and there go to sleep as a matter of course. To miss his train will not change his status from a waiting passenger into a guest entitled to demand a place wherein to sleep until the next train bound for his destination arrives, or transform the carrier into an innkeeper or proprietor of a lodging-house. Indeed, he would stand upon no better footing than would a patron of a public eating-house, who, after missing his supper through his own tardiness, might, simply because he was the holder of a meal ticket, unreasonably claim the priv ilege of occupying a chair at table in the room where meals were served, and there passing his time in sleep until the arrival of the breakfast hour. Accordingly, we hold without hesitation that a railway company may with propriety insist that such of its patrons as contemplate taking a morning train shall, if they desire to refresh themselves by slumber during the intervening night, find quarters other than its waiting-rooms.

3. According to the version given by the plaintiff himself touching what occurred prior to the time he was assaulted by the station agent, a finding against the defendant company was wholly unauthorized. Notwithstanding the plaintiff was pressly notified of the above-mentioned regulations of the company governing its waiting-room, he manifested a persistent determination to pay no regard to the same, and displayed a disposition to irritate and move to anger the official whose duty it was to enforce them. After being twice told by that official that passengers were not permitted to sleep in the waiting-room, the plaintiff confesses he waited until the official again left the room, and then "slipped back on the seat," where he could lay his head on the back of it, closed his eyes, and dropped off into slumber. While he says he "did not lay down that time," it is evident that he knew the official would protest, if present, against his thus assuming an undignified and sprawling attitude 933 which enabled him to use the back of the seat as a pillow and resume his nap at the point where it had been interrupted. He did not undertake to assume this position until the officer again. left the room, nor in good faith try to observe the rule against using the benches for a purpose other than that for which they were provided. From the beginning to the end of his altercation with this official, the plaintiff spoke and acted in a manner well calculated to bring down upon himself the harsh treatment he finally suffered at the hands of the company's agent. Should

it in good conscience be held responsible therefor? The reply to this inquiry is to be found in the report of the case in Peavy v. Georgia Ry. Co., 81 Ga. 485, 12 Am. St. Rep. 334, 8 S. E. 70, wherein it was pertinently remarked that: "It is unjust to a master wrongfully to unfit his servant for exercising the care and prudence which are essential in guarding the master's interest and performing the servant's duty." The doctrine laid down in that case was subsequently recognized and applied in City Electric Ry. Co. v. Shropshire, 101 Ga. 33, 28 S. E. 508, and in the cases cited on page 35, 101 Ga., and page 508, 28 S. E. In Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hopkins, 108 Ga. 324, 75 Am. St. Rep. 39, 33 S. E. 965, the plaintiff sought to recover damages because of an assault which the company's night watchman committed upon him while he was at the station waiting for a train; but it appearing that the plaintiff had himself been guilty of grossly improper conduct, and had exasperated the company's agent by the use of offensive and insulting language to and of him, this court held the company was not liable for the consequences of such assault, even though the agent may not have been fully excusable, and the battery inflicted was entirely disproportioned to the insult given. In the present case no physical injury was inflicted upon the plaintiff. His feelings were hurt; that is all. His sole griev ance is that the company's official used unnecessary force in undertaking to discharge his duties. By persistent disregard of the company's regulations, it is clear that the plaintiff forfeited his right to longer remain in its waiting-room, and might very properly have been ejected therefrom. Being himself in the wrong, he is not in a position to justly complain that, instead of being forcibly ejected from the room, he was wrongfully treated with unnecessary harshness by the official in charge, and then permitted to remain therein, since the plaintiff by his own misconduct so exasperated that official as to unfit him for performing in an irreproachable and conservative manner the duties assigned to him 934 by his master. This being the view we take of the case, we shall not specifically deal with other points made in the motion for a new trial, touching the propriety of charging the jury as to the law with regard to the recovery of punitive damages, etc. In our opinion, the plaintiff was entitled to no damages at all.

Judgment reversed. By five justices.

The Reasonableness of Rules Prescribed by Railroad companies is a question of law for the court: South Florida R. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 25 Fla. 40, 23 Am. St. Rep. 506, 5 South. 633; Barker v. Central Park etc. R. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 237, 56 Am. St. Rep. 626, 45 N. E. 550.

A Railroad Station-house is open to the traveling public, and any person desiring to go upon the cars has the right to go into such house at the proper time and remain there until the departure of the train: Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79, 73 Am. Dec. 337. And it is the duty of the company to keep the building in a comfortable, safe, and proper condition: St. Louis etc. Ry. v. Wilson, 70 Ark. 136, 91 Am. St. Rep. 74, 66 S. W. 661; Jordan v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 165 Mass. 546, 52 Am. St. Rep. 522, 43 N. E. 111; Fullerton v. Fordyce, 121 Mo. 1, 42 Am. St. Rep. 516, 25 S. W. 587.

A Railroad Company is Liable to Passengers for ill-treatment and assaults from its employés, whether willful and malicious or in the scope of their employment or not: Haver v. Central R. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 282, 72 Am. St. Rep. 648, 41 Atl. 916; Savannah etc. Ry. Co. V. Quo, 103 Ga. 125, 68 Am. St. Rep. 85, 29 S. E. 607; White v. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co., 115 N. C. 631, 44 Am. St. Rep. 489, 20 S. E. 191. A conductor must not assault a passenger for abusive words, or in revenge or punishment, under any circumstances. The fault of a passenger, short of producing a necessity to strike in self-defense, will neither justify a conductor in striking, nor relieve the carrier from liability for his acts: Birmingham Ry. etc. Co. v. Baird, 150 Ala. 334, 89 Am. St. Rep. 43, 30 South. 456; Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Barger, 80 Md. 23, 45 Am. St. Rep. 319, 30 Atl. 560. But see Georgia B. R. etc. Co. v. Hopkins, 108 Ga. 324, 75 Am. St. Rep. 39, 33 S. E. 965; Little Miami R. R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110, 2 Am. Rep. 373.