A few days thereafter, the drawee bank suspended payment and went into the hands of a receiver, without having forwarded the amount of the check to the bank in Augusta. Suit was brought against the Augusta bank by the holder of the check, who had deposited it for collection, and the trial in the lower court resulted in favor of the defendant. The judgment was reversed on writ of error to this court, where it was held that the Augusta bank "became, in the absence of any express or implied contract to the contrary, liable for any neglect of duty whereby the collection of the check was defeated, whether such neglect arose from the default of its own officers or from that of its correspondent or agent to whom it may have sent the check for collection, and in such case it would be immaterial whether such correspondent or agent was the bank upon which the check was drawn or another." We do not, of course, lose sight of the fact that that was a suit by the indorsee of the check against the bank with which it had been deposited for collection, while this is a suit by the payee against the drawer of the check. The facts of that case, however, are very similar to those of the case at bar; and the principle there laid down is directly applicable as indicating where the liability in the present case rests: See, also, Comer v. Dufour, 95 Ga. 376, 51 Am. St. Rep. 89, 22 S. E. 543; Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N. Y. 735, 6 Am. Rep. 160. "A credit given for the amount of a check by the bank upon which it is drawn is equivalent to, and will be treated as, a payment of the check. It is the same as if the money had been paid over the counter on the check, and then immediately paid back again to the account or for the use for which the credit is given. This rule has been applied where the bank held the check for several 775 days, during which the drawer's account was not good, and then, the account becoming good, made the application: 2 Morse on Banks and Banking, 3d ed., sec. 451. And so, in this case, the entry on the books of the Barnesville Savings Bank, charging the account of its depositor with the amount of the check, was the same as if it had paid the money over its counter to itself as agent for the bank which had sent the check for collection; and the fact that it fraudulently withheld the money from that bank and failed to enter the proper credit to its account does not render any less complete the payment by the depositor. That money is now in the hands of the agents of the payee of the check, and the drawer is as completely discharged from any further liability on the debt for which it was given as if he had paid the actual money to one authorized by his creditor to collect it. Judgment affirmed. All the justices concur. As Bearing the Principal Case, see Bailie v. Augusta Sav. Bank, 95 Ga. 277, 51 Am. St. Rep. 74, 21 S. E. 717; Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N. Y. 735, 6 Am. Rep. 160. SMITH v. WILLIAMS. [117 Ga. 782, 45 S. E. 394.] SALE Breach of Warranty of Title.-The Measure of Damages on a breach of warranty of title to personal property, is the purchase money, with interest, and expenses properly incurred by the vendee in attempting to defend his title. (p. 221.) SALE. A Warranty of Title in a sale of personal property is not negotiable, and does not run with the article sold. (p. 222.) SALE Breach of Warranty of Title.-The Measure of Damages against the original warrantor of the title to personal property cannot be increased by reason of liabilities subsequently incurred by his vendee on account of independent warranties of the same property to later purchasers. (p. 222.) SALE-Breach of Warranty of Title.-Attorney's Fees cannot be recovered by a vendee in a suit for a breach of warranty of title, where there is no allegation that the vendor was guilty of fraud or bad faith when he made the sale. (p. 222.) Greene F. Johnson, for the plaintiff in error. 783 LAMAR, J. In 1900 Smith sold personal property to Williams with warranty; Williams sold to Newton with warranty; Harris on a title outstanding in 1896 recovered the property from Newton, who thereupon sued Williams on breach of warranty, claiming and recovering as damages the purchase money, attorney's fees and costs expended by Newton in defending against Harris' title, and attorney's fees for bringing the suit against Williams. Smith had notice of this suit, but failed to defend when requested so to do by Williams. Thereupon the latter sued Smith for the breach of warranty, claiming as damages all of the items recovered by Newton, and also attorney's fees for bringing the present action. Smith moved to strike all claims for costs and attorney's fees in the previous suits, and also the attorney's fees claimed for bringing the present suit; which motion being overruled, he excepted. Of course, the grantor of land is liable to his immediate grantee, who has been evicted, for the purchase money with interest, and expenses incurred by him in defending the title; but not for expenses incurred in a series of suits for breach of warranty by remote grantees holding under but not immediately from him. Where there have been successive sales with successive warranties, and a breach arising from an outstanding title existing at the time of the sale by the common grantor, it is evident that if separate suits be brought by each grantee, and the costs and attorney's fees are to be carried forward, and finally paid by the original warrantor, these items, as here, may finally become of as much importance as the liability for the purchase money. Each sale is a separate transaction. Each vendor is liable for his own contract, and to the extent thereof. 784 But he cannot enlarge his prior vendor's obligation beyond that fixed by law. The measure of damages is the purchase money with interest and expenses properly incurred by the vendee in attempting to defend his title; but not for expenses incurred by cthers in asserting or defending rights warranted by their immediate vendor, even though they be also derived by a chain of title from the remote warrantor. Such a rule would make Smith liable to Williams not only for expenses incurred under his warranty to Williams, but for those under Williams' warranty to Newton, and under Newton's warranty to his vendee, and so on ad infinitum. These increased elements of damage could not be collected even on a sale of land, here the benefit of the warranty and the right to sue thereon passes to each successive vendee: Civ. Code, secs. 3612, 3864. For a much stronger reason it would not apply to a sale of personal property with warranty. It is true that in Dukes v. Nelson, 27 Ga. 463, Benning, J., said that he could conceive of cases in which, in his opinion, the vendee would be entitled to the benefit of a warranty made to his vendor. Where personal property is sold, and there are defects latent and concealed, and unknown to the vendee, and a subsequent purchaser is injured by reason thereof, an action for damages sounding in tort may sometimes arise against the one negligently putting the thing into circulation: Longmeid v. Holliday 20 L. J. Ex. 430; Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 52 Am. St. Rep. 146, 43 Pac. 398. Compare Civil Code, sections 3864, 3865, as to sale of unwholesome provisions and adulterated drugs. But a warranty of soundness is not negotiable (Dukes v. Nelson, 27 Ga. 463); and if so, there is no reason why a warranty of title in the sale of personal property should stand on any different footing. A warranty does not run with the article sold. If the title is not good, the vendee must look to him from whom he purchased, and to whom he paid the consideration: Central Ry. Co. v. Ward, 37 Ga. 531. The remedy of the subsequent purchaser is against his immediate seller, and not against the original owner. We are not dealing with the rights of the holder of negotiable or quasi negotiable paper (Civ. Code, sec. 3685; McCay v. Barber, 37 Ga. 423; Lemmon v. Strong, 59 Conn. 448, 21 Am. St. Rep. 123, 22 Atl. 293); nor with the rights of the purchaser of a draft with bill of lading, elevator receipt, or papers described in the Civil Code, section 2956: Finch v. Gregg, 126 N. C. 176,35 S. E. 251. 785 Smith was not vouched into the suit by Harris against Newton, and is therefore not concluded by that judgment, even if the Civil Code, section 3617, applies to that class of cases. The fact that he was asked to intervene and defend in the suit by Newton against Williams for damages would not bind him for any element of damages for which he was not responsible, even though Newton sued Williams and recovered attorney's fees in that suit, and for fees and expenses previously paid by Newton in the effort to defend the title litigated in the Harris suit. Smith's liability and the measure of damages to be recovered against him on breach of the warranty was fixed by law at the time he sold, and could not be increased by reason of contracts or liabilities subsequently incurred or paid by his vendee. Nor is Smith liable for the attorney's fees incurred by Williams in bringing the present action. There is no charge that he knew that the title was defective when he made the sale; no allegation of fraud or deceit, or that he acted in bad faith: Civ. Code, sec. 3796. Judgment reversed. All the justices concurring. Warranties of Title in sales of personal property are discussed in the monographic note to Scott v. Hix, 62 Am. Dec. 460-468. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILWAY COMPANY v. MOTES. [117 Ga. 923, 43 S. E. 990.] CARRIERS.—The Reasonableness of a Regulation of a carrier, affecting the transportation of passengers, is a question of law for the court. (p. 229.) CARRIERS—Right to Sleep in Waiting-room.—A railway company may insist that such of its patrons as contemplate taking a morning train shall, if they desire to sleep, find quarters other than its waiting-rooms. (p. 231.) CARRIERS—Injury to Passenger by Employé.—A passenger who persists in sleeping in a waiting-room contrary to a regulation of the railway company, and so exasperates an employé of the company as to unfit him for his duty, cannot complain that, instead of being ejected from the room, he was wrongfully treated with unnecessary harshness and then permitted to stay there. (p. 232.) Hall & Wimberly, J. E. Hall and R. D. Feagin, for the plaintiff in error. H. A. Mathews and Guerry & Hall, for the defendant in error. ... 924 SIMMONS, C. J. An action sounding in tort was brought by Isaac Motes against the Central of Georgia Railway Company, to recover damages for an assault alleged to have been committed upon him by an employé of the company. On the trial of the case the plaintiff was introduced as a witness in his own behalf, and testified substantially as follows: About the 5th of January, 1901, he purchased at Griffin a ticket entitling him to be carried over the line of the defendant's road from that point to Fort Valley. He took passage upon an afternoon train, which ran as far as Macon, an intervening station, and arrived there about 7 o'clock. He was asleep when the train "rolled into the depot, and . . . . was not aroused until all the passengers were off," when "the conductor, or porter, or some official, came through and waked" him up. He then got off on the left-hand side of that train, and inquired of a man wearing the uniform of a porter what train he should take in order to reach his destination. Being directed to a train on the right-hand side of that he had left, he boarded the former; but after it had proceeded some distance from the depot, he learned that it was not "the right train to Fort Valley," and thereupon "got off the train and walked back." On his return to the station he made inquiry at the ticket-office concerning the train he should have taken, and was informed it had left, and he would be compelled to wait for the next train passing through Fort Valley, which |