6. WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT as Defense to Conversion.-A
person who has unlawfully and wrongfully obtained the possession
of, and attached goods, and afterward sold them, under the judg
ment of a court which has no jurisdiction, cannot, in a suit for
their conversion by one entitled to their legal possession, justify
the seizure, possession and sale of the goods on the ground that
the claim of the person entitled to their legal possession is founded in
fraud of the rights of the former as a creditor. (Mo.) Rosencranz
v. Swofford Bros. etc. Co., 609.

7. TROVER AND CONVERSION Lien for Freight Charges as
Defense. A carrier's lien for freight charges cannot be sold or as-
signed, and if a creditor of the true owner of goods pays the
freight charges thereon and takes an assignment of the carrier's
lien, thereby obtaining possession of the goods, such lien is no de-
fense in a suit for the conversion of the goods by one who is en-
titled to the legal possession thereof. (Mo.) Rosencranz v. Swof-
ford Bros. etc. Co., 609.

8.

TROVER AND CONVERSION-Estoppel to Maintain-Wrong-
ful Attachment.-A statement by the purchaser of goods that he is
indebted to a certain creditor in a specified sum, who is willing
to carry the indebtedness and not allow it to bother the purchaser
or interfere with his paying other creditors, verified by such creditor,
after a sale of goods to such purchaser, does not estop such creditor
from maintaining an action for the conversion of the goods of the
purchaser in his legal possession, wrongfully attached by the cred-
itor making such sale and to whom the statement was made. (Mo.)
Rosencranz v. Swofford Bros. etc. Co., 609.

9. TROVER AND CONVERSION-Possession of Goods.—If goods
have been delivered to a carrier by a shipper to be transported
and delivered to himself as consignee, he has the possession of the
goods and by virtue thereof has the right to recover them or their
value from anyone who seizes them en route except the true owner,
and if a third person wrongfully obtains possession of them, he
cannot defeat the shipper's action of trover for their value, by
showing title in another, without connecting himself with the right
of such other. (Mo.) Rosencranz v. Swofford Bros. etc. Co., 609.

TRUST DEEDS.

See Building and Loan Associations, 3.

TRUSTS.

See Charities; Municipal Corporations, 6

USES AND TRUSTS.

See Charities.

USURY.

Rate"-"Contract

1. INTEREST-Usury-"Legal

Rate."—A

statute relating to usury and using the expression "legal rate of in-
terest,' means the statutory rate obtaining in absence of a con-
tract fixing the rate, and not the rate which may be legally con-
tracted for. The words therein, "contract rate,' mean any rate
above the "legal rate" which may be legally fixed by contract.
(Mo.) McDonnell v. De Soto Savings etc. Assn., 592.

2. USURY-Conflict of Laws.-If a contract is made in one state
to be performed in another, the parties may contract for the highest
rate of interest allowed by either state without offending against the
usury laws of the other, unless this is done as a subterfuge and device
to evade usury laws. (Ala.) United States Savings etc. Co. v.
Beckley, 19.

3. USURY-Conflict of Laws.-If a contract is not usurious in
the state where it is made and is to be performed, it will be en-
forced in another state notwithstanding it would have offended against
the usury laws of that state had it been made there. (Ala.) United
States Savings etc. Co. v. Beckley, 19.

4. USURY-Conflict of Laws Mortgage to Secure Loan.-The
taking of a mortgage on lands in one state to secure the payment
of money borrowed in another does not change the rule in respect
to the laws of the place which are to govern the transaction as to
usury. This is governed by the laws of the state where the money
is borrowed. (Ala.) United States Savings etc. Co. v. Beckley, 19.

5. USURY-Conflict of Laws.-Mortgages on land in one state
made to a corporation organized and acting in another state in the
usual and customary form adopted by such corporation in doing like
business, legal in its home state, and containing a stipulation that
they are to be governed by the laws of that state, are not mere de-
vices to evade the usury laws of the other state, or made for that pur-
pose, though opposed thereto. (Ala.) United States Savings etc.
Co. v. Beckley, 19.

See Building and Loan Associations.

VENDOR AND VENDEE.

1. A PURCHASER of an Equity Gets Only Such Title as the
Vendor has.-Such a purchaser, knowing that the legal title is out-
standing, is not a bona fide purchaser, and gets his equity subject
to all defenses existing against it in the hands of his vendor.
(W. Va.) Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller etc. Oil Co., 1027.

2. ORAL RESCISSION OF CONTRACT for the Purchase of Land.
A contract for the purchase and sale of real property may be rescinded
by word of mouth, if the contract is destroyed pursuant to agree-
ment, or the possession is retained. The surrender to its maker of
the rights contracted for is tantamount to its actual destruction.
(W. Va.) Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller etc. Oil Co., 1027.

3. NOTICE TO PURCHASER.-Actual Possession of Land is
notice to a purchaser of the rights of a person in possession.
(W. Va.) Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller etc. Oil Co., 1027.

4. CONVEYANCE-Evidence Insufficient to Establish.-Testi-
mony that a witness contracted for and bought from another person
a "lifetime interest,'
," and that he does not remember the wording
of the deed, is too uncertain to establish a conveyance of any par-
ticular character, and does not warrant the submission of the case
to the jury on the assumption that any party might have acquired
rights through the conveyance. (Tex.) Cauble v. Worsham, 871.

5. PAROL GIFT OF REAL PROPERTY-Title of the Donee.-
One who enters upon real property by virtue of a parol gift thereof
and does such acts as entitle him to specific performance, acquires
an estate of freehold and inheritance, and may maintain trespass to
try title either against the vendor or other persons. (Tex.) Cauble
v. Worsham, 871.

See Covenants; Deeds.

WAREHOUSEMEN.

WAREHOUSEMAN'S Liability as Affected by Capacity and Wealth. The capacity of a warehouseman is not the true test of his liability; and the care required of him is the same, whether he is rich or poor. (Colo.) Denver etc. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 76.

Note.

Warehouseman, carrier's liability, when reduced to that of, 84-105. See Common Carriers.

WARRANTS.

See Bills and Notes, 4.

WARRANTY.

See Sales.

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

ACCRETION AND RELICTION-Drying up of Shallow Lake. A lake without definite shore line, having an outlet but no definite inlet nor subterranean source of supply, usually grown up with rushes and grass, generally not exceeding five or six feet in depth, and drying up and refilling with the variation of seasons, is not a lake such as to give occasion for the application to the doctrines of accretion and reliction. (Iowa) Carr v. Moore, 292.

See Boundaries.

WILLS.

1. WILLS-Construction-Contradictory Clauses. Of two contradictory clauses in a will, the first must give way, and the last take effect if both refer to the same subject matter, and the last is clearly inconsistent with the first. (Pa. St.) Phillips' Estate (No. 1), 743.

2. WILLS-Construction-Contradictory Clauses.-If the first and main provision in a will plainly covers the whole subject matter, and is defined in terms that exclude all doubt, and a subsequent subsidiary and contradictory provision may by conjecture be made either general or partial, and may be capable by constuction either of subverting entirely or of modifying the original gift, such subsidiary provision must ordinarily be confined to its partial and restricted operation. (Pa. St.) Phillips' Estate (No. 1), 743.

3. WILLS- Construction — Contradictory Clauses. The first clearly expressed purpose of a testator in his will, is not to be overborne by subsequent modifying directions therein, that are ambigu ous and equivocal, and may justify either of two opposite interpretations. Such directions are to be so construed as to support the testator's distinctly announced main intention. (Pa. St.) Phillips' Estate (No. 1), 743.

4. WILLS Construction of Doubtful Clauses-Intestacy.-In the construction of doubtful or inconsistent clauses in a will, that interpretation must be adopted, if possible, which avoids an intestacy. (Pa. St.) Phillips' Estate (No. 1), 743.

5. WILLS Construction-Contingent Remainders-Executory Devises.—A devise to a person named, "for life, with remainder to her children, share and share alike, the child or children of a deceased child to represent and take the parent's share,' "carries a vested transmissible interest in remainder to the child of the life tenant, and children born to such child during the life of the tenant for life take by way of executory devise. (S. C.) Rutledge v. Fishburne, 757.

6. WILLS-Subsequently Acquired Real Estate.-Under the common law a will passes only such real estate as the testator owned at the time of its execution, but under the Colorado statutes it passes after-acquired realty if such appears to be the testator's intention. (Colo.) Clayton v. Hallett, 117.

7. WILLS-Insane Delusions.-To justify the setting aside of a will on the ground that the testator was possessed of an insane delusion, it must be shown, not merely that he was the victim of such delusion, but also that he was controlled by it in the making of his will, and was led by it to improperly disregard his natural heirs. (Pa. St.) Buchanan v. Pierie, 725.

8. WILLS-Believers in Spiritualism, when testamentary capacity is in question, must be considered in the same light as those who share in any other religious belief. (Pa. St.) Buchanan v. Pierie, 725.

9. WILLS Spiritualism as Avoiding.-The will of one who believes in spiritualism is not, on that account alone, void; nor is it evidence of mental unsoundness. It must be shown, in order to avoid a will on that account, that it was the offspring of such belief. (Pa. St.) Buchanan v. Pierie, 725.

10. WILLS Spiritualism as Avoiding.-A mere belief of the testator that he could, through mediums, communicate with the spirits of the dead, is not sufficient to avoid his will, without proof that he believed or admitted that he was influenced in any way by spirits in making his will, especially when he has amply provided therein or his natural living heirs. (Pa. St.) Buchanan v. Pierie, 725.

See Power of Sale.

WITNESSES.

1. WITNESSES.—A Wife is not Competent to Testify, in replevin against her husband alone, that the property belongs to her. (Mo.) Layson v. Cooper, 545.

2. WITNESSES.-Conversations Between Husband and Wife a short time before he was shot are inadmissible in an action to recover his life insurance. (Iowa) Sutcliffe v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 298.

3. WITNESSES.-The Mere Presence of a Physician does not render inadmissible the admissions of a wounded man concerning his suicide, when not made to the physician nor connected with his professional duties. (Iowa) Sutcliffe v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 298.

4.

WITNESSES-Husband and Wife-Res Gestae.-Where a man is shot in the presence of his wife, what he did and said at the time concerning the shooting are considered parts of the res gestae, rather than communications betwen husband and wife, when, in an action on his life insurance policy, it is claimed that he committed suicide. (Iowa) Sutcliffe v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., 298.

Am. St. Rep., Vol. 97-72

5. TRIALS Right of Re-examination to Explain Answers Given
on Cross-examination.-If there is any occasion to explain an an-
swer given on cross-examination, the court should not exclude a ques-
tion by way of re-examination proposed for the purpose of eliciting
such explanation where there is no effort at undue repetition of the
same statement. (Tex.) Colorado etc. Ry. Co. v. Garren, 939.

6. JURY TRIAL-Instruction Relating to the Interest of a Wit-
ness, When May be Refused. The court may refuse an instruction
to the effect that the jury, in passing upon the testimony of a party,
may take into consideration his situation and his interest in the re-
sult of the verdict and all the circumstances surrounding him, and
give to it only such weight as they may deem it fairly entitled to,
if testimony against him has been given by a witness who is also
deeply interested in a moral sense, and no such direction as to his
testimony is included in the proposed instruction. (W. Va.) Tomp
kins v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1006.

Note.

See Evidence.

Witnesses, contracts by to furnish evidence, 145-149.

contracts to pay more than the legal fees to, 150, 151.
expert, contracts to pay for the services of, 149.

WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS.

1. A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS is Never Granted to
relieve from consequences arising after the judgment. The unvary.
ing test of the right to the writ is mistake or lack of knowledge of
facts inhering in the judgment itself. (Kan.) Collins v. State, 361.
2. A WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS Cannot be Employed to
obtain relief from the misfortune of being unable to prosecute an
appeal for the correction of errors of law. Hence, it cannot be
granted on the ground that the defendant was prevented from ap-
pealing his case because of his inability to make up a record embody-
ing his exceptions within the time allowed by law. (Kan.) Collins
v. State, 361.

Note.

Writs of Error Coram Nobis, affidavit or petition for, necessity and
requirements of, 366.

assignment of error in proceedings for, 366.

court to which returnable, 363.

coverture of party as a ground for, 370.

demurrer to petition or affidavit for, 367.

description of, 363, 364.

differences between and writs of error, 363.

differences between and writs of error coram vobis, 363, 364.
discretion of the courts to refuse, 365.

errors at law are not examinable upon, 369.

errors of fact appearing on the face of the record do not con-
stitute a ground for, 369.

errors of fact constitute the sole ground for, 369.

errors of fact relating to the death or disability of a party, 370.
in criminal cases cannot involve a re-examination of the evi-
dence of the crime, 368.

in criminal cases to set aside convictions based upon pleas
coerced from the accused, 371.

in criminal cases, when available, 371.