2. AGENCY FOR COLLECTION.—A mere collecting agent can
relinquish no right of his principal, nor recognize any adverse claim
so as to bind him without express authority. (Ala.) Johnson v.
Wilson, 52.

3. AGENCY-Estoppel to Deny.-A purchaser of a note who per-
mits the payee named therein to collect the principal and interest
thereon, without notifying the maker of the note of his ownership,
is estopped to deny the agency of the named payee to collect the
money due on the note. (Idaho) Morgan v. Neal, 264.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

1. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Duty to Defend Actions or to
Represent His Cosurety.-A contract of suretyship imposes no duty
upon the sureties to defend their principal, gives the principal no
right to represent the sureties, and gives no surety any authority
to charge his fellows by virtue of his knowledge or his conduct.
(Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.

2. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Waiver of Defenses by.-The re-
fusal of sureties, in an an action against them and their principal,
to litigate a question of damages for which they are not answerable,
cannot preclude them, when sued, from asserting any defenses which
would have been available in favor of their principal, including a
claim for damages on his part against the plaintiff in the action.
(Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.

3. A JUDGMENT Against a Principal on a Promissory Note is
not Prima Facie Evidence Against His Surety. (Kan.) Park v.
Ensign, 352.

4. JUDGMENT, Attorney not Bound by When not a Formal
Party. A judgment in an action against a principal is not binding
on his sureties or either of them, though one of them, as an attorney
for the principal, conducted the defense of the action. (Kan.)
Park v. Ensign, 352.

5. A JUDGMENT Against a Principal does not Estop His Sure-
ties. Except in those cases where, upon a fair construction of the
contract, the surety may be held to have undertaken to be responsible
for the result of an action, a judgment against a principal is not con-
clusive against his surety. (Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.

Note.

See Attachment, 5, 6; Husband and Wife, 4.

PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.

See Executors and Administrators.

Probate Proceedings, decrees of, effect of as against persons not in
being, 767.

PROCESS.

See Corporations, 21-24; Judgments.

PROPERTY.

1. PROPERTY in Compiled Information and Reports.-One who
collects information in regard to the contemplated erection of public
and private buildings and the construction of sewers, waterworks,
and other undertakings of public utility as soon after their contem-

plation as possible, and compiles and distributes such information
daily to his customers under contracts with them, so that it is of
commercial value by reason of the speedy use which can be made
of it before the information contained therein has obtained general
publicity, has a property interest in such information in which he
is entitled to the protection of a court of equity. (Mass.) F. W.
Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 412.

2. REPORTS AND INFORMATION-Publication of, What is not.
The furnishing of reports and information to customers under a con-
tract with them that they shall hold the information in strict confi-
dence and for their purposes only, is not a publication thereof, so as
to dedicate the reports or information to the public, and deprive their
compiler and furnisher of his right of control. (Mass.) F. W.
Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 412.

3. REPORTS AND INFORMATION-Enjoining the Surreptitious
Obtaining and Using of.-Where information is obtained and compiled
by the expenditure of labor and money, and, in the form of reports,
is distributed to customers for a compensation, under a contract by
which they agree not to divulge such reports or information, a third
person may be enjoined from obtaining such reports or information
from one of such customers, contrary to such stipulation, and using
it for the purpose of conducting a rival business. (Mass.) F. W.
Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 412.

PROXIMATE CAUSE.

See Negligence.

PUBLIC LANDS.

1. LAND PATENT_Cancellation for Fraud.-A patent to land
should not be set aside for fraud in procuring it except upon the
most convincing evidence. (Iowa) Murray v. Quigley, 276.

2. LAND PATENT-Fraud, Knowledge of Presumed.-Persons al-
leging fraud in the issuance of a patent are conclusively presumed
to have discovered it at the time the patent was recorded, if they
have lived for years in the vicinity of the land, with knowledge of
the possession of the patentee, and at least some of them with
actual knowledge of his claims, and the character of his title has
been a frequent subject of discussion among those interested therein.
(Iowa) Murray v. Quigley, 276.

3. SWAMP LAND.-The Determination of Whether Land is
swamp, must, in the first instance, be by the federal government;
and, until such determination is made, a grantee has only an inchoate
right, not amounting to a title. (Iowa) Carr v. Moore, 292.

PUBLIC OFFICERS.
See Officers.

PUBLICATION OF REPORTS.
See Property.

QUARANTINE.

See Animals.

QUIETING TITLE.

1. QUIETING TITLE-Limitation of Action in Case of Fraud.—
Parties cannot, by naming their petition an action to quiet title, have
a conveyance annulled for fraud, when its fraudulent character has
been known to them for thirty years. (Iowa) Murray v. Quigley,

276.

2. QUIETING TITLE by Remainderman-Limitations.-Remain-
dermen out of possession, and while the life tenant is alive, are
authorized by the Iowa statutes to bring an action to determine
and quiet their title, but they must do so within the statutory
period. (Iowa) Murray v. Quigley, 276.

RAILROADS.

1. RAILWAYS.-Though a Person is Stealing a Ride on a railway
train, and is therefore a trespasser, neither the carrier nor its servant
has any right to inflict wanton and reckless injury upon him.
(Mass.) McKeon v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 437.

2. RAILWAY-Proximate Cause.-If One Stealing a Ride on a
Railway Train is Pushed Therefrom by an employé of the carrier, and
thereby injured, the act of the employé, rather than the stealing of
the ride, is the proximate cause of the injury. (Mass.) McKeon v.
New York etc. R. R. Co., 437.

See Carriers.

RECEIVERS.

1. RECEIVERS OF CORPORATIONS.-It is no Ground for Ap-
pointment of a receiver of a corporation that the directors in office
are holding over after the year for which they were elected in de-
fault of the election of their successors. The cause of such default
is of no consequence. (Ala.) Alabama Coal etc. Co. v. Shackelford,

23.

2. RECEIVERS Corporations. It is No Ground for the appoint-
ment of a receiver of a corporation that its directors have paid to
the estate of a deceased kinsman director money of the corporation
without authority, or that they have voted to themselves salaries
as officers of the corporation in abuse of their trust, or that they
have fraudulently sold the corporate lands. (Ala.) Alabama Coal
etc. Co. v. Shackelford, 23.

3. RECEIVERS Corporations.-It is no Ground for the appoint-
ment of a receiver for a corporation that its stockholders are not
allowed access to the corporate books and papers, or that the directors
refuse to disclose material facts connected with the corporate busi-
ness. (Ala.) Alabama Coal etc. Co. v. Shackelford, 23.

4. RECEIVER FOR CORPORATION.-A stockholder in a cor-
poration cannot invoke the action of a court of equity in appointing
a receiver for the corporation to meet a necessity produced by his
own wrong. (Ala.) Alabama Coal etc. Co. v. Shackelford, 23.

5. CORPORATIONS Creditor's Bill by Receiver.-Suit by a re-
ceiver of a corporation on behalf of a judgment creditor to collect an
assessment against stockholders is not prematurely brought, though
all of the corporate debts have not been ascertained and leave has
not been obtained to institute such suit. (Mich.) McBryan v.
Universal Elevator Co., 453.

Note.

RECORDING.

See Landlord and Tenant, 2; Mortgages, 4.

REHEARING.

See Appeal and Error.

Remaindermen. See Judgments Against Persons not in Being.

REPLEVIN.

1. REPLEVIN-Title in Third Person as a Defense.-The rule
that a defendant in replevin may show title in a third person, if
it goes to disprove the plaintiff's claim, does not apply when the
plaintiff claims under a deed from the defendant alone. (Mo.)
Layson v. Cooper, 545.

2. REPLEVIN.-A Judgment for the Defendant for Costs, but
Saying Nothing About the Return of the Property to Him in an ac-
tion of replevin in which passession had been taken by a sheriff
does not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining a subsequent action
against the sheriff for the possession of such property. It is optional
with the defendant in an action of replevin whether he will take a
judgment for the return of the property or leave it to the result of
some subsequent action. (Kan.) Johnson v. Boehme, 357.

Note.

REPORTS AND INFORMATION.

See Property.

RESCUING LIFE AND PROPERTY.
See Negligence, 3, 9.

RES GESTAE.

See Homicide.

RES JUDICATA.

See Judgments, 12, 13; Parent and Child.

Res Judicata, habeas corpus proceedings for the custody of children,
effect of decisions in, 403.

REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT.
See Garnishment.

ROBBERY.

ROBBERY--Snatching a Purse from the Hand.-If one, with
an intent to steal, suddenly snatches a purse secured by a chain
around the owner's finger, breaking the chain and injuring the finger,
the offense is robbery, and not larceny from the person. (Ga.)
Smith v. State, 165.

RUNAWAY TEAM.

See Highways

SALARY.

See Master and Servant; Officers.

SALES.

1. SALES-Warranty.-A manufacturer's printed warranty re-
maining pasted on an article when sold by a dealer, who has pur-
chased from such manufacturer and sold to a third person without
any express representation or warranty does not bind such dealer.
(Minn.) Pemberton v. Dean, 503.

2. SALE.—A Warranty of Title in a sale of personal property is
not negotiable, and does not run with the article sold. (Ga.) Smith
v. Williams, 220.

3. SALE Breach of Warranty of Title. The Measure of Dam-
ages on a breach of warranty of title to personal property, is the
purchase money, with interest, and expenses properly incurred by the
vendee in attempting to defend his title. (Ga.) Smith v. Williams,

220.

4. SALE-Breach of Warranty of Title.-The Measure of Dam-
ages against the original warrantor of the title to personal property
cannot be increased by reason of liabilities subsequently incurred by
his vendee on account of independent warranties of the same property
to later purchasers. (Ga.) Smith v. Williams, 220.

5. SALE Breach of Warranty of Title.-Attorney's Fees cannot
be recovered by a vendee in a suit for a breach of warranty of title,
where there is no allegation that the vendor was guilty of fraud
or bad faith when he made the sale. (Ga.) Smith v. Williams, 220.

6. CONDITIONAL SALES Erroneous Judgment.-If a contract
for the sale of personalty provides that title shall remain in the vendor
until notes given for the purchase price are paid, that the vendor
may retake the property for default in payment, that payments then
made shall be considered as made for use, and that the rental value
shall be a certain amount per month, and, in default of any payments
on the notes the vendor retakes and sells the property, the consider-
ation for the notes fails, and a judgment for the difference between
the amount of the notes and the proceeds of the sale, is erroneous and
cannot be sustained. (Mich.) McBryan v. Universal Elevator Co.,
453.

See Constitutional Law, 3.

SALOON-KEEPER.

See Innkeepers.

SERVICE OF PROCESS.

See Process.

SETOFF.

See Banks and Banking, 4; Partnership, 3.