2. AGENCY FOR COLLECTION.—A mere collecting agent can relinquish no right of his principal, nor recognize any adverse claim so as to bind him without express authority. (Ala.) Johnson v. Wilson, 52.
3. AGENCY-Estoppel to Deny.-A purchaser of a note who per- mits the payee named therein to collect the principal and interest thereon, without notifying the maker of the note of his ownership, is estopped to deny the agency of the named payee to collect the money due on the note. (Idaho) Morgan v. Neal, 264.
1. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Duty to Defend Actions or to Represent His Cosurety.-A contract of suretyship imposes no duty upon the sureties to defend their principal, gives the principal no right to represent the sureties, and gives no surety any authority to charge his fellows by virtue of his knowledge or his conduct. (Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.
2. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Waiver of Defenses by.-The re- fusal of sureties, in an an action against them and their principal, to litigate a question of damages for which they are not answerable, cannot preclude them, when sued, from asserting any defenses which would have been available in favor of their principal, including a claim for damages on his part against the plaintiff in the action. (Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.
3. A JUDGMENT Against a Principal on a Promissory Note is not Prima Facie Evidence Against His Surety. (Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.
4. JUDGMENT, Attorney not Bound by When not a Formal Party. A judgment in an action against a principal is not binding on his sureties or either of them, though one of them, as an attorney for the principal, conducted the defense of the action. (Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.
5. A JUDGMENT Against a Principal does not Estop His Sure- ties. Except in those cases where, upon a fair construction of the contract, the surety may be held to have undertaken to be responsible for the result of an action, a judgment against a principal is not con- clusive against his surety. (Kan.) Park v. Ensign, 352.
See Attachment, 5, 6; Husband and Wife, 4.
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.
See Executors and Administrators.
Probate Proceedings, decrees of, effect of as against persons not in being, 767.
See Corporations, 21-24; Judgments.
1. PROPERTY in Compiled Information and Reports.-One who collects information in regard to the contemplated erection of public and private buildings and the construction of sewers, waterworks, and other undertakings of public utility as soon after their contem-
plation as possible, and compiles and distributes such information daily to his customers under contracts with them, so that it is of commercial value by reason of the speedy use which can be made of it before the information contained therein has obtained general publicity, has a property interest in such information in which he is entitled to the protection of a court of equity. (Mass.) F. W. Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 412.
2. REPORTS AND INFORMATION-Publication of, What is not. The furnishing of reports and information to customers under a con- tract with them that they shall hold the information in strict confi- dence and for their purposes only, is not a publication thereof, so as to dedicate the reports or information to the public, and deprive their compiler and furnisher of his right of control. (Mass.) F. W. Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 412.
3. REPORTS AND INFORMATION-Enjoining the Surreptitious Obtaining and Using of.-Where information is obtained and compiled by the expenditure of labor and money, and, in the form of reports, is distributed to customers for a compensation, under a contract by which they agree not to divulge such reports or information, a third person may be enjoined from obtaining such reports or information from one of such customers, contrary to such stipulation, and using it for the purpose of conducting a rival business. (Mass.) F. W. Dodge Co. v. Construction Information Co., 412.
PROXIMATE CAUSE.
See Negligence.
1. LAND PATENT_Cancellation for Fraud.-A patent to land should not be set aside for fraud in procuring it except upon the most convincing evidence. (Iowa) Murray v. Quigley, 276.
2. LAND PATENT-Fraud, Knowledge of Presumed.-Persons al- leging fraud in the issuance of a patent are conclusively presumed to have discovered it at the time the patent was recorded, if they have lived for years in the vicinity of the land, with knowledge of the possession of the patentee, and at least some of them with actual knowledge of his claims, and the character of his title has been a frequent subject of discussion among those interested therein. (Iowa) Murray v. Quigley, 276.
3. SWAMP LAND.-The Determination of Whether Land is swamp, must, in the first instance, be by the federal government; and, until such determination is made, a grantee has only an inchoate right, not amounting to a title. (Iowa) Carr v. Moore, 292.
PUBLIC OFFICERS. See Officers.
PUBLICATION OF REPORTS. See Property.
1. QUIETING TITLE-Limitation of Action in Case of Fraud.— Parties cannot, by naming their petition an action to quiet title, have a conveyance annulled for fraud, when its fraudulent character has been known to them for thirty years. (Iowa) Murray v. Quigley,
2. QUIETING TITLE by Remainderman-Limitations.-Remain- dermen out of possession, and while the life tenant is alive, are authorized by the Iowa statutes to bring an action to determine and quiet their title, but they must do so within the statutory period. (Iowa) Murray v. Quigley, 276.
1. RAILWAYS.-Though a Person is Stealing a Ride on a railway train, and is therefore a trespasser, neither the carrier nor its servant has any right to inflict wanton and reckless injury upon him. (Mass.) McKeon v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 437.
2. RAILWAY-Proximate Cause.-If One Stealing a Ride on a Railway Train is Pushed Therefrom by an employé of the carrier, and thereby injured, the act of the employé, rather than the stealing of the ride, is the proximate cause of the injury. (Mass.) McKeon v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 437.
1. RECEIVERS OF CORPORATIONS.-It is no Ground for Ap- pointment of a receiver of a corporation that the directors in office are holding over after the year for which they were elected in de- fault of the election of their successors. The cause of such default is of no consequence. (Ala.) Alabama Coal etc. Co. v. Shackelford,
2. RECEIVERS Corporations. It is No Ground for the appoint- ment of a receiver of a corporation that its directors have paid to the estate of a deceased kinsman director money of the corporation without authority, or that they have voted to themselves salaries as officers of the corporation in abuse of their trust, or that they have fraudulently sold the corporate lands. (Ala.) Alabama Coal etc. Co. v. Shackelford, 23.
3. RECEIVERS Corporations.-It is no Ground for the appoint- ment of a receiver for a corporation that its stockholders are not allowed access to the corporate books and papers, or that the directors refuse to disclose material facts connected with the corporate busi- ness. (Ala.) Alabama Coal etc. Co. v. Shackelford, 23.
4. RECEIVER FOR CORPORATION.-A stockholder in a cor- poration cannot invoke the action of a court of equity in appointing a receiver for the corporation to meet a necessity produced by his own wrong. (Ala.) Alabama Coal etc. Co. v. Shackelford, 23.
5. CORPORATIONS Creditor's Bill by Receiver.-Suit by a re- ceiver of a corporation on behalf of a judgment creditor to collect an assessment against stockholders is not prematurely brought, though all of the corporate debts have not been ascertained and leave has not been obtained to institute such suit. (Mich.) McBryan v. Universal Elevator Co., 453.
See Landlord and Tenant, 2; Mortgages, 4.
REHEARING.
See Appeal and Error.
Remaindermen. See Judgments Against Persons not in Being.
1. REPLEVIN-Title in Third Person as a Defense.-The rule that a defendant in replevin may show title in a third person, if it goes to disprove the plaintiff's claim, does not apply when the plaintiff claims under a deed from the defendant alone. (Mo.) Layson v. Cooper, 545.
2. REPLEVIN.-A Judgment for the Defendant for Costs, but Saying Nothing About the Return of the Property to Him in an ac- tion of replevin in which passession had been taken by a sheriff does not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining a subsequent action against the sheriff for the possession of such property. It is optional with the defendant in an action of replevin whether he will take a judgment for the return of the property or leave it to the result of some subsequent action. (Kan.) Johnson v. Boehme, 357.
RESCUING LIFE AND PROPERTY. See Negligence, 3, 9.
RES GESTAE.
See Homicide.
See Judgments, 12, 13; Parent and Child.
Res Judicata, habeas corpus proceedings for the custody of children, effect of decisions in, 403.
REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT. See Garnishment.
ROBBERY--Snatching a Purse from the Hand.-If one, with an intent to steal, suddenly snatches a purse secured by a chain around the owner's finger, breaking the chain and injuring the finger, the offense is robbery, and not larceny from the person. (Ga.) Smith v. State, 165.
RUNAWAY TEAM.
See Highways
See Master and Servant; Officers.
1. SALES-Warranty.-A manufacturer's printed warranty re- maining pasted on an article when sold by a dealer, who has pur- chased from such manufacturer and sold to a third person without any express representation or warranty does not bind such dealer. (Minn.) Pemberton v. Dean, 503.
2. SALE.—A Warranty of Title in a sale of personal property is not negotiable, and does not run with the article sold. (Ga.) Smith v. Williams, 220.
3. SALE Breach of Warranty of Title. The Measure of Dam- ages on a breach of warranty of title to personal property, is the purchase money, with interest, and expenses properly incurred by the vendee in attempting to defend his title. (Ga.) Smith v. Williams,
4. SALE-Breach of Warranty of Title.-The Measure of Dam- ages against the original warrantor of the title to personal property cannot be increased by reason of liabilities subsequently incurred by his vendee on account of independent warranties of the same property to later purchasers. (Ga.) Smith v. Williams, 220.
5. SALE Breach of Warranty of Title.-Attorney's Fees cannot be recovered by a vendee in a suit for a breach of warranty of title, where there is no allegation that the vendor was guilty of fraud or bad faith when he made the sale. (Ga.) Smith v. Williams, 220.
6. CONDITIONAL SALES Erroneous Judgment.-If a contract for the sale of personalty provides that title shall remain in the vendor until notes given for the purchase price are paid, that the vendor may retake the property for default in payment, that payments then made shall be considered as made for use, and that the rental value shall be a certain amount per month, and, in default of any payments on the notes the vendor retakes and sells the property, the consider- ation for the notes fails, and a judgment for the difference between the amount of the notes and the proceeds of the sale, is erroneous and cannot be sustained. (Mich.) McBryan v. Universal Elevator Co., 453.
See Constitutional Law, 3.
SALOON-KEEPER.
See Innkeepers.
See Banks and Banking, 4; Partnership, 3.
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