Master and Servant, emergency, sudden, risks assumed in obeying
command given in, 898.

extrahazardous employment assumed by order of master, 897.
fear of discharge does not relieve servant from the assumption
of risks, 892, 893.

liability of a third person for inducing a servant to break his
contract, 923.

orders of master, positive and peremptory, risks assumed in
obeying, 898.

orders of master, right to rely on, 897.

orders of master, risk of obeying, when assumed by servant, 897.
risk assumed in acting on master's assurance of safety, 899.
risk assumed in doing what a prudent man would not do, 899.
risk assumed in work outside of servant's employment, 900.
risk of continuing to work with knowledge of negligence of
master, 888, 889.

risks, apparent, when assumed by servant, 892, 893.
risks, appreciation must concur with knowledge of, 893.

risks assumed by servant in adopting a dangerous method, 895,

896.

risks assumed by servant, age and experience, when must be
considered, 888.

risks assumed by servant in a dangerous employment, 887.

risks assumed by servant in obeying dangerous orders, 896, 897.
risks assumed by servant, statutes limiting, 891.

risks assumed by servant while acting under direction of his
master, 895, 896.

risks assumed from necessity or fear of discharge, 892, 893.
risks assumed when acting in a sudden emergency, 898.

risks, assumption of when master fails to perform a duty im-
posed by statute, 891.

risks, assumption of, when restricted to known dangers, 887.
risks, extraordinary or unusual, servant does not assume, 888.
risks, servant may rely on his master's judgment and knowledge,
894.

safety of servant, master is not an insurer of, 886.
unsafe places, right to employ persons to work in, 885.

waiver by servant of duty imposed on master by statute, $91,
892.

MEANDER LINES.

See Boundaries.

MECHANICS' LIENS.

MECHANICS' LIENS.-A Public Library Building, erected
by a town for a free public library, is not subject to a mechanic's
lien. (Mass.) Young v. Falmouth, 418.

MISNOMER.

See Indictment.

MONOPOLY.

See Municipal Corporations.

MORTGAGES.

1. MORTGAGES Release-Discharge-Notice.-A mortgagee by
releasing several parcels of land from his mortgage does not discharge
therefrom another parcel sold by the mortgagor prior to such release
when he has no notice of the sale or that the purchaser thereunder
is claiming rights sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man on
notice, and the record of such purchaser's deed is not sufficient as
constructive notice to such mortgagee. (Mich.) Balen v. Lewis, 499.
2. MORTGAGES Subsequent Purchase from Mortgagor-Notice.
The presence of the mortgagee's agent in the place where the mort-
gaged premises are located once or twice a year after a purchaser
from the mortgagor, has gone into possession of such premises, is
not sufficient to charge the mortgagee with notice of the purchaser's
occupancy. (Mich.) Balen v. Lewis, 499.

3. MORTGAGES-Application of Rents-Presumption.—If
mortgagor gives a trust deed to the mortgagee's husband for the
benefit of the former, authorizing him to sell, apply the proceeds
to the expenses of the trust, interest and principal, and reconvey
the remainder to the mortgagor, and such trust is accepted upon
express agreement that it shall not in any way affect or impair the
mortgage, it must be presumed that rents and proceeds of the prop-
erty thereafter collected by the mortgagor were applied in accordance
with the trust. (Mich.) Balen v. Lewis, 499.

4. MORTGAGES Record as Notice.-The record of a mortgage
executed in the name of A. W. Dixon, is not notice to purchasers
for value that J. W. Dixon executed it. (Ala.) Johnson v. Wilson,

52.

5. MORTGAGE Title and Possession of Mortgagee.-A pro-
vision in a mortgage that the mortgagee, upon default, shall be
entitled to the immediate possession of the premises is valid, and
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers are chargeable with no-
tice thereof. (Neb.) Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 646.

6. MORTGAGEE in Possession-Rents and Profits.-A subse-
quent purchaser or encumbrancer cannot maintain an action for the
rents and profits against a mortgagee who has taken possession of
the premises in accordance with the terms of the mortgage; while
he will be required to account for the rents and profits, such ac-
count should be taken in the suit to foreclose or redeem. (Neb.)
Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 646.

7. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE Concludes Rights to Rents and
Profits. The foreclosure of a mortgage, by the terms of which the
mortgagee, upon default, took possession of the premises, concludes
the parties to the proceedings as to the rents and profits. (Neb.)
Felino v. Newcomb Lumber Co., 646.

8. FORECLOSURE SALES.-Inadequacy of Price, in the ab-
sence of other considerations, is no ground for setting aside a fore-
closure sale under a deed of trust, unless it is so gross and uncon-
scionable as to shock the moral sense. (Mo.) McDonnell v. De
Soto Savings etc. Assn., 592.

Note.

See Chattel Mortgages.

Mortgages, foreclosure of as against persons not in being, 767.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Garbage Ordinance. In the
exercise of its police power, a city may make needful regulations

for the collection and removal of garbage, and for the licensing of
those who engage in the business. (Neb.) Iler v. Ross, 676.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Garbage, Exclusive Privilege
to Remove. A city may grant an exclusive privilege to one person
to collect and remove such noxious and unwholesome substances as
are nuisances in themselves, and a menace to the public health if
not promptly and properly disposed of. (Neb.) Iler v. Ross, 676.

3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Garbage, Exclusive Privilege
to Remove.-A city cannot grant an exclusive privilege to one per-
son to enter private premises and gather and remove, at the owner's
expense, rubbish and waste material which, unless allowed to ae-
cumulate in unreasonable quantities, are not per se nuisances. (Neb.)
Iler v. Ross, 676.

4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS_Void Contract.-A contract
entered into by the common council of a municipality concerning a
municipal matter for the benefit of one of the members of such
council is void. (Minn.) Stone v. Bevans, 506.

5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Contract of Officer with Re-
covery of Payments.-If a void contract is entered into between a
municipal council and one of its members under which the latter has
received money, it may be recovered for the municipality in a suit
by a taxpayer thereof. (Minn.) Stone v. Bevans, 506.

6. TRUST, Capacity of City to Hold Property in. Municipal cor-
porations may take and hold property in their own right by direct
gift, conveyance or devise, in trust, for purposes germane to the
objects of the corporation, or which will aid in carrying out those
objects. (Colo.) Clayton v. Hallett, 117.

7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Negligence of Employe.—If a
city, in the exercise of its police power, employs a person to cut the
weeds and grass in an alley, it is not answerable for his negligence
in operating the mower whereby a chill is injured. (Iowa) McFad-
den v. Town of Jewell, 321.

8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Negligence Dangerous
Streets. If a city negligently allows a public street to remain in a
dangerous condition, it must respond in damages to a property
owner who ventures thereon in search of recreation or when called
to do so by duty, and is injured through such danger while exer-
cising ordinary care. (Pa. St.) Evans v. Philadelphia, 732.

9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Public Highways of, Power of
the Legislature to Control. It is the duty of the state to lay out and
improve highways of travel. The performance of this duty in cities
rests on the state with the same obligation as in unincorporated
country districts, and the legislature may control the work necessary
in the performance of this public duty, whatsoever the agency em-
ployed in carrying it out. (Kan.) State v. Atkin, 343.

10. PUBLIC STREETS.-The Owner of Property Abutting on a
public street has a right to an interest in the street distinct and
different from that of the general public. (Iowa) Long v. Wilson,

315.

11. JUDGMENT Against City-Whether Binds Citizen.-An owner
of property abutting on a public street is not bound by a judgment
against the city fixing the boundaries of the street so as to interfere
with the use of his property, when he was not made a party to the
suit. (Iowa) Long v. Wilson, 315.

See Constitutional Law, 7.

Note.

Municipal Corporations, dead animals, power to give authority to ap-

propriate carcasses of, 691.

dead animals, power to limit right to remove, 691.

dead animals, property in cannot be destroyed by, 691.

exclusive privilege of removing garbage, whether may be
granted by, 688, 689.

garbage, power of to limit right of removal of to certain persons,
688.

legislative control over, 349, 350.

monopolies in the removal of garbage, power of to create, 689.
power to provide for the collection, removal, and disposition
of noxious substances, 688.

scavengers, power of to restrict business of to certain persons,
698.

work upon streets of, power of the legislature to control the
hours of, 350.

MURDER.

See Homicide.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. NEGLIGENCE.-Degrees of Negligence, such as slight, ordi-
nary, and gross, are not recognized in Colorado. (Colo.) Denver
etc. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 76.

2. NEGLIGENCE Must be the Proximate Cause of an Injury to
sustain a recovery therefor. (Tenn.) Chattanooga Light etc. Co. v.
Hodges, 844.

3. NEGLIGENCE Proximate Cause-Injuries Received in At-
tempting a Rescue.-Where one person is exposed to peril of life or
limb by the negligence of another, the latter is liable for injuries
received by a third person in a reasonable effort to rescue the per-
son so imperiled, if the rescuer does not rashly or unnecessarily ex-
pose himself to danger. (Tenn.) Chattanooga Light etc. Co. v.
Hodges, 844.

4. NEGLIGENCE.-The Proximate Cause of an Injury is that
act or omission which immediately causes or fails to prevent the
injury; an act of omission occurring or concurring with another
which, had it not happened, the injury would not have been in-
flicted. (Conn.) Chattanooga Light etc. Co. v. Hodges, 844.

5. NEGLIGENCE Proximate Cause.-A wrongdoer is liable not
only for an injury which immediately results from his act, but for
such consequential injuries as, according to the common experience
of man, were likely to result. It will be sufficient to fix liability
on a wrongdoer if the particular result is one naturally connected,
either immediately or through a series of events, with the original
wrongful act. (Tenn.) Chattanooga Light etc. Co. v. Hodges, 844.
6. NEGLIGENCE Proximate Cause, What is not. Where a
result is such that no reasonable man would expect it to occur, and
no knowledge is shown in the person doing the negligent or wrongful
act that such state of facts exists as to make the danger probable,
the injury will not be regarded as actionable as against the wrong-
doer. Especially is this true where the injury results from an act
committed by the injured party, so obviously fraught with peril as
should be sufficient to deter one of reasonable intelligence. (Tenn.)
Chattanooga Light etc. Co. v. Hodges, 844.

7. NEGLIGENCE Proximate Cause-Interfering Act of the
Plaintiff. The plaintiff's interfering act, rather than the defend-
ant's negligence, may be regarded as the proximate cause of the
former's injury, whether he was guilty of contributory negligence
or not, if it was unexpected and of a character which could not have
been contemplated or foreseen and without which no injury would
have occurred. (Tenn.) Chattanooga Light etc. Co. v. Hodges, 844.

8. NEGLIGENCE Proximate or Intervening Cause, When a
Question for the Court.-Where the facts are fairly inferable, the
question of proximate or intervening cause is for the court. (Tenn.)
Chattanooga Light etc. Co. v. Hodges, 844.

9. NEGLIGENCE Proximate or Intervening Cause-Rash Ex-
posure to Injury.-If one has been guilty of an act of negligence ex-
posing his property to destruction by fire, and his employé, disre-
garding the espostulation of a third person characterizing his conduet
as foolhardiness, leaves a place of safety and goes through fire and
smoke to his mortal injury, this rashness, rather than the original
negligence, is the proximate cause of his injury. Hence, no recov
ery therefor can be sustained against the employer. (Tenn.) Chat-
tanooga Light etc. Co. v. Hodges, 844.

10. NEGLIGENCE, Contributory as a Bar to Actions of Contract.
In an action to recover damages for the breach of a contract, the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff ordinarily does not preclude
his recovery, as would be in the case of an action of tort. Such
negligence rarely releases the defendant from the obligation to per-
form his contract, but is always to be considered in fixing the
amount of the damages, i. e., so much of the damage as is attribu-
table to the plaintiff's negligence should be excluded from the re-
covery. (W. Va.) Hurxthal v. Boom Co., 954.

11. NEGLIGENCE Pleading.-A complaint, though not in terms
characterizing the failure to perform a plain duty as negligence on
the part of the defendant, yet averring facts which constitute negli-
gence per se, is sufficient as against demurrer. (Ala.) Southern
Bell Telephone etc. Co. v. McTyer, 62.

12. NEGLIGENCE-Evidence-Instructions.-If, in an action to
recover for negligence, the evidence tends to prove the injury com-
plained of and the casual connection between the wrong complained
of and the injury sustained, a general affirmative charge in favor of
the plaintiff is properly given, and a general affirmative charge in
favor of the defendant is properly refused. (Ala.) Southern Bell
Telephone etc. Co. v. McTyer, 62.

See Damages; Death; Highways.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

See Bills and Notes.

NEW TRIAL.

NEW TRIAL- Failure to File Motion for in Time.-A motion
for a new trial must be filed within the time prescribed by statute,
and if it is overruled because not filed within that time, all matters
included therein are unavailing on review by proceedings in error.
(Neb.) Harris v. Jennings, 635.