rights, and the means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in ignorance; and how and when he first came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in his bill; otherwise the chancellor may justly refuse to consider his case, on his own showing, without inquiring whether there is a demurrer or formal plea of the statute of limitations contained in the answer.' All this time plaintiff remained passive permitting a succession of conveyances of the property according to the description in the conveyance made by her husband and herself to Ford, so that the property has passed into several hands since their conveyance. In Whittaker v. Improvement Co., 34 W. Va. 217, 12 S. E. 507, it is held, syllabus, point 3: "He who elects to set aside his contract for fraud must bring suit for the property without unreasonable delay after the discovery of the fraud, unless there be good reason to excuse it; otherwise his delay will deny him relief." And point 4, in same syllabus: "The defense of laches may be made by demurrer when the facts manifesting it appear in the bill." This question of laches is well discussed in the case last cited, at page 229, 34 W. Va., and at page 511, 12 S. E. after citing National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 567, where it is held: "Where it appears by the bill that the remedy is barred by lapse of time or by reason of laches he is not entitled to relief, the defendant may be denied to avail himself of the objection." The 548 judge speaking for the court says: "I am convinced that this defense of lashes is alone a complete bar to the plaintiff's bill. The option dates April 19, 1881, the deed November 12, 1881, the suit in May, 1887, a period of more than six years from the date of the option and five and a half from the date of the deed. Decisions of this court furnish emphatic authority on this subject. Trader v. Jarvis, 23 W. Va. 100, holds that 'delay in the assertion of a right, unless satisfactorily explained, even where it does not. constitute a positive statutory bar, operates in equity as evidence of assent, acquiescence, or waiver; and especially in such the case in suits to set aside transactions on account of fraud or infancy. Laches and neglect are always discountenanced in a court of equity." There was a delay of nearly seven years there." In Lansdale v. Smith, 106 U. S. 391, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, it is held: "A bill is bad on demurrer where it appears therefrom that there have been unreasonable delay and laches on the part of the complainant or those under whom he claims, in asserting the rights which he seeks to enforce." And in Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. 377, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610: “A court of equity will not assist one who has slept upon his rights and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them." And in Greenlees v. Greenlees, 62 Ala. 330: "It is settled in this state that in courts of equity lapse of time rendering a demand stale or statute of limitations, the bill disclosing that the claim or demand is obnoxious to either may be taken advantage of by answer or demurrer as well as by plea." See, also, Bercy v. Lovrette, 63 Ala. 374; Sublette v. Tinney, 9 Cal. 423. In 18 American and English Encyclopedia of Law, second edition, 107: "If a married woman is authorized to act in respect to her separate estates as if she were unmarried, she is equally subject to the imputation and consequences of laches as if she were a feme sole." In Gibson v. Herriott, 55 Ark. 85, 29 Am. St. Rep. 17, 17 S. W. 589, I quote from the opinion because it is so applicable to the case at bar under the changed conditions created by our statutes, as affecting the rights of married women: "At common law, while a married woman remained under the disability of coverture, she could not be guilty of laches. In equity she is considered in all respects as a feme sole in respect to property settled to her sole and separate use. Under the constitution of this state, her real and personal property, acquired in any manner, are and remain her separate 549 estate and property so long as she may choose, and can be devised, bequeathed, or conveyed by her the same as if she were a feme sole, and are not subject to the debts of her husband. Under our statutes property owned by her at the time of her marriage, or acquired by her afterward, is and remains her sole and separate property, and can be used by her in her own name, and is not subject to the interference or control of her husband. She can bargain, sell, assign and transfer her separate personal property, and carry on any trade or business and perform any labor or services on her sole and separate account; and her earnings from her trade, business, labor, or service are her sole and separate property, and can be used or invested by her in her own name. No bargain or contract made by her in respect to her separate property, or in or about her trade or business, under the statutes of this state, is binding upon her husband, or renders him or his property in any way liable therefor. She can be sued alone upon contracts made by her in respect to her sole and separate property, or in respect to any trade or business carried on by her, and can maintain an action in her own name for or on account of her sole or separate estate or property, business or services, or for dam ages against any person or body corporate for any injury to her person, character, or property. In an action brought or defended by her in her name, her husband or his property is not liable for the costs thereof or the recovery therein. Whenever judgment is recovered against her, it can be enforced against her sole and separate property to the same extent and in the same manner as if she were sole. The statutes clothe her with the same property rights, and, with few exceptions, subject her to the same liabilities as her husband. She can manage her own property and bind herself by contract, with the exceptions of contracts to convey land, in respect to her property, separate trade, or business, as fully and to the same extent as he can. Vested with the rights of property and the right to sue and be sued possessed by her husband, she is subject to the same rules which restrict and control his rights. For this reason, it has been held by this court that she is barred by the statute of limitations which prescribes the time within which actions to recover land sold at judicial sales shall be commenced. For the same reason she can be guilty 550 of laches. The disabilities of coverture in respect to her separate property having been removed, she is to the same extent relieved of its consequences: Steines v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 34 Fed. 441, 444; Burkle v. Levy, 70 Cal. 250, 254, 11 Pac. 643; Morrow v. Goudchaux, 41 La. Ann. 711, 6 South. 563; Lewis v. Barber, 21 Ill. App. 638, 641." For the reasons herein given the decree must be reversed, and this court proceeding to render such decree as the circuit court should have rendered, doth sustain the demurrer and dismiss the bill. That Laches is imputable to a married woman in respect to her separate property, see Gibson v. Herriott, 55 Ark. 852, 29 Am. St. Rep. 17, 17 8. W. 589. Estoppel against married women is the subject of a monographic note to Trimble v. State, 57 Am. St. Rep. 169-185. INDEX TO THE NOTES. Animals, bees, liability of owners for attacks of, 290, 291. classification of in respect to property in, 287. conflict between state and national legislation concerning transportation of, 247. department of agriculture, power of to suppress diseases of, construction of statutes concerning, 247. diseases among, state laws to suppress or prevent, 242. domestic, liability of owners for attacks of upon men and importation of diseased may be prohibited by the states, 246. prohibiting the bringing into the state from other states and prohibiting the bringing into a state, whether diseased or not, is unconstitutional, 244. sanitary boards and commissions, authority which the states may give to, 247, 248. sanitary boards and commissions, construction of rules and proceedings of, 248, 249. sheep, statutes requiring dipping of before bringing within the state, when unconstitutional, 246. statute making possessor of Texas cattle liable for damages accruing through their running at large, 245, 246. transportation of from one state to another, extent to which state legislation may interfere with, 243, 244, 246. transportation of from one state to another is controlled by congressional enactments, 247. wild, liability of owners for attacks of upon men and beasts, 288. Arbitration, guardian ad litem, power of to submit controversy to, · 1001. Attorneys' Fees, constitutionality of statutes allowing against insurance corporations, 632-634. Bees, care which owners of must exercise as to place of keeping, 291. keeping of is not necessarily a nuisance, but may become such, 291. liability for placing in the highways, 290. liability of owners of for injuries inflicted by, 290. Boundaries, surveys of public lands actually made control, 313. Carriers of Passengers are not insurers against accidents, 527. diligence which must exercise to protect, 527. incidental risks against which do not insure passengers, 527. notice to, that strikers or mobs are likely to endanger passen- passengers, care which must exercise to avoid injury of by strikers and mobs, 531. strangers, liability for injuries to passengers by, 529. strikers and robbers, duty of to give notice to passengers of strikers, liability for injuries to passengers by, 528-532. strikes, duty of to run cars during, 531, 532. trespassers, liability for injuries to passengers by, 528. Circumstantial Evidence. See Evidence. Common Carriers, baggage, liability of connecting and intermediate carriers for, 105. baggage, liability of for, when becomes that of warehouseman, 101, 102. baggage, removal of, reasonable time for, what is, 102-104. by water, liability of, when reduced to that of warehouseman, 99, 100. connecting, liability of, 96, 97. contracts limiting amount of recovery against, 720. delivery of goods to, what amounts to, 86, 87. express companies, liability of, when terminates, 100, 101. federal questions respecting contracts made in one state to be performed in another, 720, 721. liability of, arrival of goods at their destination does not terminate, 88. liability of, as warehousemen, when supersedes that as carriers, 90. liability of, continues while the goods are in their cars, 88, 89. liability of, delivery essential to commencement of, 85, 86. liability of, for baggage, 101, 102. liability of, for goods awaiting shipment, 84-87. liability of, for goods awaiting unloading, 88. liability of, for goods delivered for shipment to be kept until others are delivered, 86. liability of, for goods deposited in their warehouse awaiting shipment, 85. liability of, for goods in their possession awaiting orders for shipment, 96. |