renunciation of the relation of carrier is often shown by a connecting carrier, when the succeeding carrier unreasonably delays to receive the goods, by giving notice to the succeeding carrier that the goods will be kept or stored at its risk until compliance with the request to remove them; Reiss v. Texas etc. Ry. Co., 98 Fed. 533, 39 C. C. A. 149.

a.

IV. Goods Transported by Water.

Termination of Carrier's Liability. When goods transported by water reach their destination, the carrier's responsibility as such ordinarily continues until the consignee has notice of the arrival of the goods and a reasonable time and opportunity to accept and remove them: Graves v. Hartford etc. Steamboat Co., 38 Conn. 143, 9 Am. Rep. 369; McAndrew v. Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. Rep. 657; Solomon v. Philadelphia etc. Steamboat Co., 2 Daly (N. Y.), 104. Delivery of the goods on the wharf, without a tender or notice, is not sufficient to exonerate the carrier: Hemphill v. Chenie, 6 Watts & S. 62; Eagle v. White, 6 Whart. 505, 37 Am. Dec. 434. Compare Cope v. Cordova, 1 Rawle, 203. And while placing the goods on the wharf at a seasonable time and upon notice to the consignee may discharge the carrier from its stringent liability in many cases, yet the rule should not be enforced too rigorously: Segura v. Reed, 3 La. Ann. 695; Redmond v. Liverpool etc. Steamboat Co., 46 N. Y. 578, 7 Am. Rep. 390; Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Tangier, 3 Ware, 110, Fed. Cas. No. 12,267; De Grau v. Wilson, 17 Fed. 698; Richardson v. Goddard, 25 How. 28.

If the carrier would reduce his liability to that of a warehouseman, he must, if practicable, give the consignee notice of their arrival: Shenk v. Steam Propeller Co., 60 Pa. St. 109, 100 Am. Dec. 541; except where it is the uniform custom not to: Turner v. Huff, 46 Ark. 222, 55 Am. Rep. 580; or where it has been the accustomed course of dealing for the consignee to call daily and receive goods daily: Russell Mfg. Co. v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 52 N. Y. 657. And the carrier must, moreover, give the consignee a reasonable time to take charge of the goods: McAndrew v. Whitlock, 52 N. Y. 40, 11 Am. Rep. 657; The St. Laurent, 7 Ben. 7, Fed. Cas. No. 12,231; and, in unloading them on the wharf, it must place them so that they can be removed with reasonable convenience: Goodwin v. Baltimore etc. R. R. Co., 58 Barb. 195.

But the consignee cannot unreasonably prolong the extraordinary liability of the carrier. If he fails to take away the goods after notice of their arrival, and after having had a reasonable time and opportunity for taking possession of them, the carrier's liability be comes reduced to that of a warehouseman: Labar v. Taber, 35 Barb. 305; Brand v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 30 N. Y. Supp. 903, 10 Misc. Rep. 128; Wynantskill Knitting Co., v. Murray, 36 N. Y. Supp. 26, 90 Hun, 554; The Richard Winslow, 67 Fed. 259; The Titania, 124 Fed. 975. If the consignee requests that the carrier keep the good■

until demanded, its liability is changed to that of a warehouseman: National Line Steamship Co. v. Smart, 107 Pa. St. 492. And when goods are transported under a special contract that they remain on board for ninety days after arriving at their destination, a refusal by the consignee to receive them puts an end to the carrier's liability as such: Hathorn v. Ely, 28 N. Y. 78.

The law governing the termination of the liability of a carrier by water is stated by the New York court of appeals in this language: "The general principle that the duty and obligation of a common carrier by water does not, ipso facto, cease on the unloading of goods from the ship and their deposit upon the wharf, and especially where the place of discharge is also the terminus of the particular voyage, is the settled doctrine of this court and the generally accepted doctrine of the maritime law. The obligation of the ship owner is not only to carry the goods to the port of destination, but to deliver them there to the consignee. But a delivery which will discharge the carrier may be constructive and not actual. To constitute a constructive delivery the carrier must, if practicable, give notice to the consignee of the arrival, and when that has been done and the goods are discharged in the usual and proper place, and reasonable opportunity afforded to the consignee to remove them, the liability of the carrier as such terminates. The duty of the consignee to receive and take the goods is as imperative as the duty of the carrier to deliver. Both obligations are to be reasonably construed, having reference to the circumstances. The stringent liability of the carrier cannot be continued at the option, or to suit the convenience of the consignee. The consignee is bound to act promptly in taking the goods, and if he fails to do so, whatever other duty may rest upon the carrier in respect to the goods, his liability as insurer is by such failure terminated': Tarbell v. Royal Exchange Shipping Co., 110 N. Y. 170, 6 Am. St. Rep. 350, 17 N. E. 721, per Justice Andrews. See, also, Miller v. Steam Navigation Co., 10 N. Y. 431; King v. New Brunswick Steamboat Co., 73 N. Y. Supp. 999, 36 Misc. Rep. 555.

V. Goods Sent by Express.

a. Termination of Carriers' Liability. The liability of express companies as to goods arriving at the point of destination differs from that of railroad companies and carriers by water, in that actual delivery to the consignee is usually necessary to the termination of their responsibility as common carriers, whereas in the case of other carriers a constructive delivery by storage and opportunity to remove the goods is sufficient. "As to express companies, the rule seems to be well settled that, generally, they are required to deliver the goods or packages to the consignee at his residence or place of business. But this rule has received modification where the place of delivery is at small way stations, where the business will not justify the keeping of special delivery messengers and wagons, in which case

personal notice of the arrival of the goods or packages, and depositing them in a safe receptacle, if that be the known custom of the company, will be treated as a delivery, when the consignee has had a reasonable time, after such notice, to remove the goods or receive the packages': Southern Express Co. v. Holland, 109 Ala. 562, 19 South. 66. To the same effect, see Baldwin v. American Exp. Co., 23 Ill. 197, 74 Am. Dec. 190; American Exp. Co. v. Baldwin, 26 Ill. 504, 79 Am. Dec. 389; American Exp. Co. v. Hockett, 30 Ind. 250, 95 Am. Dec. 691; Witbeck v. Holland, 38 How. Pr. 273.

However, the duty of the express company to deliver and the duty of the consignee to receive are reciprocal. The liability of the company as carrier ends if the consignee is absent, and his whereabouts or place of business or residence cannot, after diligent inquiry, be ascertained: Adams Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20, 99 Am. Dec. 582. And its liability as carrier is terminated if the consignee requests that the goods be kept until the next day: Southern Exp. Co. v. Holland, 109 Ala. 362, 19 South. 66; or if the consignee refuses to receive the goods: Kremer v. Southern Exp. Co., 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 356.

When goods are sent C. O. D., the obligation of the express company is safely to carry them to their destination, notify the consignee of their arrival and to offer delivery upon payment of the amount due; and when such duty is fully performed, its liability as a common carrier terminates: Hasse v. American Exp. Co., 94 Mich. 133, 34 Am. St. Rep. 328, 53 N. W. 918. If the goods are tendered to the consignee and payment demanded, but after a reasonable time he fails to pay the charges and receive the goods, the express company thereafter becomes a warehouseman in respect to its duty and obligation: Weed v. Barney, 45 N. Y. 544, 6 Am. Rep. 96; Grossman v. Fargo, 6 Hun, 310. If the consignor, upon learning of the consignee's refusal to accept the goods, notifies the company to hold them until the consignor calls for them, the liability to him becomes that of a warehouseman: Byrne v. Fargo, 73 N. Y. Supp. 943, 36 Misc. Rep. 543.

VI. Baggage and Effects of Passengers.

a. Commencement of Liability as Carrier. The exact time at which a carrier becomes responsible as insurer for the baggage of a passenger is not easy to determine. It is clear, however, that such responsibility is not necessarily postponed until actual transportation begins, but that it attaches to baggage delivered at the station at such a time before the starting of the train as shall give the owner a reasonable opportunity to obtain his ticket, check his baggage, and the like: Goldberg v. Ahnapee etc. Ry. Co., 105 Wis. 1, 76 Am. St. Rep. 899, 80 N. W. 920. The liability as a common carrier attaches to baggage at the time of its delivery, when it is received, not for storage, but for transportation in the usual course of business: Shaw v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 40 Minn. 144. 41 N.

W. 548. And it is not necessary to the commencement of the liability, that the owner shall have placed himself in such a position that he cannot withdraw his baggage: Green v. Milwaukes etc. R. R. Co., 41 Iowa, 410.

But baggage received by a carrier for the accommodation or convenience of an intending passenger, at an unreasonable period of time before passage is to be taken, is held in the capacity of warehouseman only: Little Rock etc. Ry. Co. v. Hunter, 42 Ark. 200; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Tronstine, 64 Miss. 834, 2 South. 255. This rule finds illustration where baggage is brought to a depot under the impression that it can be carried by the first train, but upon learning that it must await the departure of a later train, the owner leaves it for such train: Goodbar v. Wabash Ry. Co., 53 Mo. App. 434; and where the owner leaves his trunks with the freight agent for storage over night, intending next day to take them to the passenger depot and have them checked for transportation: Van Gilder v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 548; and where a steamship company received a valise on Saturday for the convenience of the owner, who was to sail Monday, and by a rule of the company the baggage could not be checked until the presentation of a ticket, which was not done until Monday, when the valise was not to be found: Murray v. International Steamship Co., 170 Mass. 166, 64 Am. St. Rep. 290, 48 N. E. 1093.

b. Termination of Liability as Carrier.-The strict liability of a carrier for the baggage of a passenger continues, upon its arrival at its destination, until the owner has been afforded a reasonable time and opportunity to remove it. After he has been given a reasonable time and a fair opportunity to take charge of his effects, but has failed to do so, the responsibility of the carrier becomes reduced to that of a warehouseman: Kansas City etc. Ry. Co. v. McGahey, 63 Ark. 344, 58 Am. St. Rep. 111, 38 S. W. 659; Pennsylvania Co. v. Liveright, 14 Ind. App. 518, 41 N. E. 350, 43 N. E. 162; Kansas City etc. R. R. Co. v. Patten, 3 Kan. App. 338, 45 Pac. 108; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Mahan, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 184; Wald v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 92 Ky. 645, 18 S. W. 850; Nealand v. Boston etc. R. R., 161 Mass. 67, 36 N. E. 592; Laffrey v. Grummond, 74 Mich. 186, 16 Am. St. Rep. 624, 41 N. W. 894; Cohen v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co., 59 Mo. App. 66; Blackmore v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 162 Mo. 455, 62 S. W. 993; Van Horn v. Kermitt, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 453; Torpey v. Williams, 3 Daly, 162; Klein v. Hamburg etc. Packet Co., 3 Daly, 390; Jones v. Norwich etc. Trans. Co., 50 Barb. 195; Mattison v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 552; Matteson v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 76 N. Y. 381; Kahn v. Railroad Co., 115 N. C. 638, 20 S. E. 169; Texas etc. Ry. Co. v. Capps, 2 Willson (Tex. App. Civ.), sec. 35; Hoeger v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 63 Wis. 100, 53 Am. Rep. 271, 25 N. W. 435.

What constitutes a reasonable time and opportunity for a passenger to remove his baggage upon its arrival at the journey's end

depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each particular ease. And if the facts are in dispute, it is a question for the jury; but if they are not, it is a question of law for the court: Kansas City etc. Ry. Co. v. McGahey, 63 Ark. 344, 58 Am. St. Rep. 111, 38 S. W. 659; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Mahan, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 184; Roth v. Buffalo etc. R. R. Co., 34 N. Y. 548, 90 Am. Dec. 736; Burgevin v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 69 Hun, 479, 25 N. Y. Supp. 415; Mortland v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 81 Hun, 473, 30 N. Y. Supp. 1021.

It is said that the reasonable time within which the owner must apply for his baggage, when it is transported on the same train on which himself traveled, is directly after its arrival and transfer to the platform, making due allowance for the confusion occasioned by the arrival and departure of the train, and for the delay necessarily caused by the crowded condition of the depot at the time: Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Addizoat, 17 Ill. App. 632; Ditman Boot etc. Co. v. Keokuk etc. R. R. Co., 91 Iowa, 416, 51 Am. St. Rep. 352, 59 N. W. 257. The customs of the railway and of the station, and the manner of transporting baggage therefrom must be considered: Mote v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 27 Iowa, 22, 1 Am. Rep. 212. It would seem, too, that regard should be had to the weight, quantity, and character of the baggage, and the facilities for having it deliv ered at the owner's residence or stopping place if it is so cumbersome that he cannot be expected to assume personal control of it.

The lateness of the hour at which the baggage arrives is held not to excuse the owner from promptly claiming it: Kansas City etc. Ry. Co. v. McGahey, 63 Ark. 344, 58 Am. St. Rep. 111, 58 S. W. 659; Ditman Boot etc. Co. v. Keokuk etc. R. R. Co., 91 Iowa, 416, 51 Am. St. Rep. 352, 59 N. W. 257; Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605, 84 Am. Dec. 646. If it arrives in the evening, and is not demanded or called for until the next morning, the responsibility of the carrier through the night is ordinarily held to be that of a warehouseman only: Graves v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 51 N. Y. Supp. 636, 29 App. Div. 591; Jacobs v. Tutt, 33 Fed. 412; Wiegand v. Central R. R. Co., 75 Fed. 370. But this rule must be relaxed to meet particular cases. Thus where a train arrives late, the night is inclement, and the number of passengers unusual, with a corresponding accumulation of baggage, a woman passenger is not bound to demand her baggage: Cary v. Cleveland etc. R. R. Co., 29 Barb. 35. And if it is customary for a carrier to close its depot so soon after the arrival and departure of an evening train that the baggage handlers do not customarily go to the depot at night, and, if the only way that baggage arriving on the train can be obtained is by special request, surrender of check, and having it left outside the depot, the owner of baggage so arriving is not guilty of negligence in leaving it in the depot over night without effort to remove it, and in case of its destruction during that time he may recover its value: Ditman Boot etc. Co. v. Keokuk etc. R. R. Co., 91 Iowa, 416, 51 Am. St. Rep. 352, 59 N. W. 257.