maritime jurisdiction to the territorial courts. Consequently, if that jurisdiction is exclusive, it is not made so by the reference to the district court of Kentucky.

It has been contended, that, by the constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and that the whole of this judicial power must be vested "in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as congress shall from time to time ordain and establish." Hence it has been argued that congress cannot vest admiralty jurisdiction in courts created by the territorial legislature.

We have only to pursue this subject one step further, to perceive that this provision of the constitution does not apply to it. The next sentence declares that "the judges both of the supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good behavior." The judges of the superior courts of Florida hold their offices for four years. These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the constitution on the general government can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the third article of the constitution; but is conferred by congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised, in the states, in those courts only which are established in pursuance of the third article of the constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a state government.

We think, then, that the act of the territorial legislature,

erecting the court by whose decree the cargo of the Point a Petre was sold, is not "inconsistent with the laws and constitu tion of the United States," and is valid. Consequently, the sale made in pursuance of it changed the property, and the decree of the circuit court, awarding restitution of the property to the claimant, ought to be affirmed with costs.

1 Pet. 546.

WESTON AND OTHERS. CITY OF CHARLESTON.

JANUARY TERM, 1829.

[2 Peters's Reports, 449-480.]

The city council of Charleston having taxed certain interestpaying stocks, including some issued by the United States for the national debt, Weston, as a holder of such stock, filed a suggestion in the court of common pleas to prohibit the collection of this tax as being unconstitutional. The prohibition being granted, the city council appealed to the constitutional court, the highest in the state, and that having decided the ordinance laying the tax to be constitutional, Weston sued out his writ of error to the supreme court of the United States, the opinion of which was delivered by the chief justice as follows:

This case was argued on its merits at a preceding term; but a doubt having arisen with the court respecting its jurisdiction in cases of prohibition, that doubt was suggested to the bar, and a reargument was requested. It has been reargued at this term.

The power of this court to revise the judgments of a state tribunal depends on the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act. That section enacts "that a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of law or equity of a state in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under," "any state, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of such, their validity ""may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States."

In this case the city ordinance of Charleston is the exercise

of an "authority under the state of South Carolina," "the validity of which has been drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution," and "the decision is in favor of its validity." The question, therefore, which was decided by the constitutional court, is the very question on which the revising power of this tribunal is to be exercised, and the only inquiry is, whether it has been decided in a case described in the section which authorizes the writ of error that has been awarded. Is a writ of prohibition a suit?

The term is certainly a very comprehensive one, and is understood to apply to any proceeding in a court of justice by which an individual pursues that remedy in a court of justice which the law affords him. The modes of proceeding may be various, but if a right is litigated between parties in a court of justice, the proceeding by which the decision of the court is sought is a suit. The question between the parties is precisely the same as it would have been in a writ of replevin, or in an action of trespass. The constitutionality of the ordinance is contested; the party aggrieved by it applies to a court; and at his suggestion, a writ of prohibition, the appropriate remedy, is issued. The opposite party appeals; and, in the highest court, the judgment is reversed and judgment given for the defendant. This judgment was, we think, rendered in a suit.

We think also that it was a final judgment, in the sense in which that term is used in the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act. If it were applicable to those judgments and decrees only in which the right was finally decided, and could never again be litigated between the parties, the provisions of the section would be confined within much narrower limits than the words import, or than congress could have intended. Judg. ments in actions of ejectment, and decrees in chancery dismissing a bill without prejudice, however deeply they might affect rights protected by the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, would not be subject to the revision of this court. A prohibition might issue, restraining a collector from collecting duties, and this court would not revise and correct

the judgment. The word "final" must be understood in the section under consideration as applying to all judgments and decrees which determine the particular cause.

We think, then, that the writ of error has brought the cause properly before this court.

This brings us to the main question. Is the stock issued for loans made to the government of the United States liable to be taxed by states and corporations?

Congress has power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States." The stock it issues is the evidence of a debt created by the exercise of this power. The tax in question is a tax upon the contract subsisting between the government and the individual. It bears directly upon that contract, while subsisting and in full force. The power operates upon the contract the instant it is framed, and must imply a right to affect that contract.

If the states and corporations throughout the union possess the power to tax a contract for the loan of money, what shall arrest this principle in its application to every other contract? What measure can government adopt which will not be exposed to its influence?

But it is unnecessary to pursue this principle through its diversified application to all the contracts, and to the various operations of government. No one can be selected which is of more vital interest to the community than this of borrowing money on the credit of the United States. No power has been conferred by the American people on their government, the free and unburdened exercise of which more deeply affects every member of our republic. In war, when the honor, the safety, the independence of the nation are to be defended, when all its resources are to be strained to the utmost, credit must be brought in aid of taxation, and the abundant revenue of peace and prosperity must be anticipated to supply the exigencies, the urgent demands of the moment. The people, for objects the most important which can occur in the progress of nations, have empowered their government to make these anticipations,