cannot think, although it might not in itself be valid, that it would destroy an obligation taken for a legitimate purpose. As the breach assigned is altogether in the non-payment of the money collected, we do not think, that, if a bond would be good taken for this single object, it is made bad by being extended also to the official conduct of the obligor.

The inquiry, then, is, whether, under a fair construction of the acts of congress, the postmaster general may take bonds to secure the payment of money due, or which may become due, to the general postoffice.

All the acts relative to the postoffice make it the duty of the postmaster general to superintend the department, to regulate the conduct and duties of his deputies, and to collect the moneys received by them for the general postoffice. May not these powers extend to taking bonds to the officer who is to perform them? May not these bonds be considered as means proper to be used in the collection of debts, and in securing them?

If this interpretation of the words should be too free for a judicial tribunal, yet, if the legislature has made it, if congress has explained its own meaning too unequivocally to be mistaken, their courts may be justified in adopting that meaning.

The twenty-second section of the act of 1799, after directing the postmaster general to sue for all balances due from his deputies, within six months after the expiration of the three months within which they ought to have been paid, enacts "that all suits, which shall be hereafter commenced for the recovery of debts or balances due to the general postoffice, whether they appear by bond or obligations made in the name of the existing or any preceding postmaster general, or otherwise, shall be instituted in the name of the postmaster general of the United States."

These words follow immediately the clause which makes it the duty of the postmaster general to sue for the money due from his deputies, and are obviously applied to the moneys in their hands. They show the sense of the legislature, that this

money may be a "debt" or a "balance," may "appear by bond or obligation," or otherwise; and are, we think, a legisla tive exposition of the words, describing the power and duty of the postmaster general in the superintendence of his department, and the means he may employ for collecting the money due from his deputies.

The thirty-first section of the same act repeals the previous laws for establishing the postoffice department, after the first day of the ensuing May; and adds a proviso to the repealing clause, that, as to "all bonds, contracts, debts, demands, rights, penalties, or punishments, which have been made, have arisen, or have been incurred," &c., "the said acts shall have the same effect as if this act had not been made."

It is said by the counsel for the defendants, that these words do not give efficacy to the bonds to which they refer, but leave them as they were anterior to the repealing act. This is true. But they explain the sense of the legislature respecting the powers of the postmaster general, and the manner in which he might execute those powers.

An additional proviso extends even to official bonds. After continuing the postmaster general and all his deputies in office, it adds, "and also the bonds, which they or either of them have or may give for the faithful execution of their several duties, shall continue to have the same force and effect, to all intents and purposes, after the first day of May next, as though this act had not been made."

This proviso, also, is no more than a recognition of the validity of those bonds; but it is a recognition of it, and goes the full extent of showing the legislative opinion that they might be taken. The act of 1810 repeals former acts, and contains the same provisions on this subject with the act of 1799.

The court has felt the pressure of this part of the case. There is always difficulty in extending the operation of words beyond their plain import; but the cardinal rule of construction. is, that, where any doubt exists, the intent of the legislature, if it can be plainly perceived, ought to be pursued. It is also a

rule that the whole law is to be taken together, and one part expounded by any other which may indicate the meaning annexed by the legislature itself to ambiguous phrases. The words describing the power and duty of the postmaster general may be expounded by other parts of the act showing the legisla tive opinion as to their extent; and if this be true, the sections which have been cited cannot be misunderstood. They show plainly that the legislature supposed it had given the postmaster general authority to take these bonds.

A case cannot exist in which effect may be given to the legislative intent more safely than in this. The bonds are taken in a case where no doubt can exist respecting the right and propriety of giving authority to take them; they are for money due to the United States; and the opinion of the legislature that authority was given is expressed in as plain words as can be used. The acts of congress sustain the opinion that they have been taken with the knowledge and approbation of the legislature from the first establishment of the offices; and provision is made by law for their being put in suit. The courts of the United States have, until very lately, uniformly given judg ments on them.

Under these circumstances we think ourselves justified in continuing to sustain them, and to certify in this case that the circuit court has jurisdiction of the cause.

12 Wh. 152.

BROWN AND OTHERS v. THE STATE OF MARY

LAND.

JANUARY TERM, 1827.

[12 Wheaton's Reports, 419-460.]

The facts and point of this case are fully presented in the opinion of the court, as delivered by Chief Justice Marshall as follows:

This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered in the court of appeals of Maryland, affirming a judgment of the city court of Baltimore, on an indictment found in that court against the plaintiffs in error, for violating an act of the legislature of Maryland. The indictment was founded on the second section of that act, which is in these words: "And be it enacted that all importers of foreign articles or commodities, of dry goods, wares, or merchandise, by bale or package, or of wine, rum, brandy, whiskey, and other distilled spiritous liquors, &c., and other persons selling the same by wholesale, bale, or package, hogshead, barrel, or tierce, shall,before they are authorized to sell, take out a license, as by the original act is directed, for which they shall pay fifty dollars; and in case of neglect or refusal to take out such license, shall be subject to the same penalties and forfeitures as are prescribed by the original act to which this is a supplement." The indictment charges the plaintiffs in error with having imported and sold one package of foreign dry goods without having license to do so. A judgment was rendered against them on demurrer for the penalty which the act prescribes for the offence; and that judgment is now before this court.

The cause depends entirely on the question, whether the legislature of a state can constitutionally require the importer

of foreign articles to take out a license from the state, before he shall be permitted to sell a bale or package so imported.

It has been truly said that the presumption is in favor of every legislative act, and that the whole burden of proof lies on him who denies its constitutionality. The plaintiffs in error take the burden upon themselves, and insist that the act under consideration is repugnant to two provisions in the constitution of the United States.

1. To that which declares that "no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts, or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.

2. To that which declares that congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."

1. The first inquiry is into the extent of the prohibition upon states "to lay any imposts, or duties on imports or exports." The counsel for the state of Maryland would confine this prohibition to laws imposing duties on the act of importation or exportation. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error give it a much wider scope.

In performing the delicate and important duty of construing clauses in the constitution of our country, which involve conflicting powers of the government of the union and of the respective states, it is proper to take a view of the literal meaning of the words to be expounded, of their connexion with other words, and of the general objects to be accomplished by the prohibitory clause, or by the grant of power.

What, then, is the meaning of the words, "imposts, or duties on imports or exports ?"

An impost, or duty on imports, is a custom or a tax levied on articles brought into a country, and is most usually secured before the importer is allowed to exercise his rights of ownership over them, because evasions of the law can be prevented more certainly by executing it while the articles are in its custody. It would not, however, be less an impost or duty on the