litary character of his subjects, and his interest in the prosecution of the present contest? From the admission of Tallien, corroborated by several members of the convention, the internal pressure of France was such, that it could not long be supported, unless the mass of paper currency was reduced, which could only be effected by the reduction of the military force. Was it then wise to abandon that mode of distressing the enemy, which, upon their own confession, will have the most sure operation? As it was probable the king of Prussia would not come forward with the same force as in the last campaign, this was a ground for double exertions on our part. The question was, whether or not we would be parties to the French scheme of policy, by allowing the emperor to withdraw his forces for want of pecuniary assistance? It was with the wish of pursuing the war with unabated rancour against this country, that they desired peace with the other powers of the confederacy. The proposition was, he said, attended with benefit to the navy, in favour of which an unanimous sentiment had pervaded the house. There were two ways by which we maintained our superiority at sea,-first, by increasing our navy to its utmost extent,and secondly, pursuing such measures as would tend to weaken the naval strength of the enemy. If, by the assistance given to the emperor, he could bring into the field 200,000 men, the French could not pay the attention to their marine which they otherwise would. With respect to the objections he had heard against the measure, the first, as to the reasonable assurances of the fulfil ment of the stipulations, and the chance of the burden falling ultimately upon us,-in support of the first, an argument had been adduced, which, if carried to its extent, would end in the annihilation of every system of alliance. Were we never to enter into a treaty with any monarch, because one had broken his faith? The general grounds of alliance between nations, Mr. Pitt stated to be confidence in their good faith, a common VOL. II.

63

interest, and an apparent sincere inclination to` fulfil their engagements. On these grounds. he defended the sincerity of Austria, and vindicated the character of that court, except during a period of two years, which had been a departure from her general conduct. It was the interest of the emperor to fulfil his engagements; and pride and honour called upon him to exert himself with effect. There was every reason to believe the emperor perfectly disposed to a co-operation with us. This was manifest from his applying to borrow money at a large rate of interest, after having been burdened with the expences of three campaigns, and after his having joined us in the defence of Holland and the Rhine; and he was now making the greatest exertions to obtain pe cuniary aid in his own dominions. As to the security, was the sum of six millions to be put in competition with the acquisition of the whole Austrian force? Comparing the sum with the assistance required, it was pur chasing assistance very reasonably. The force of Austria, without our assistance, must remain inactive; which, even if the whole of this expence fell upon us, it would not be wise or politic to suffer. He further argued the improbability of a breach of faith on the part of Austria, from her situation in Europe, which rendered it improbable she could do without loans on future occasions, which a failure in the present instance must prevent her obtaining. Mr. Pitt insisted upon the advantage of continental connections, and added, that the treaty would contain stipulations, that, for every 300 pounds advanced, an obligation for 400 pounds upon the bank of Vienna would be transmitted to this country; and the emperor might be sued in his own courts. He concluded by moving an address, thanking his majesty for the communication of the state of the negotiation,-that when his majesty shall be enabled to lay before the house the result and the arrangement relative to the temporary advances made in the latter part of the campaign, they should proceed further to consider it; that in the mean

time, the house entertained a strong sense of the advantages to be derived from the co-operation of an Austrian army in the next campaign, and that if it should appear that this advantage may be secured by enabling his majesty to guarantee, under proper conditions, a loan to be raised by the emperor, to such an amount as may be reasonable and proportioned to his efforts, the adoption of such a measure may be essentially conducive to the interests of his majesty's subjects at this time," and to the great object of re-establishing the peace and tranquillity of these kingdoms, and of Europe.

MR. GREY..

On moving for Peace.

He premised his motion by a long and laboured speech, in which he considered the vast importance of the question, which was to be decided on the broad basis of national interest, as it affected the happiness, the safety, possibly the very existence of the country. He observed, that, after two years of war, which had drained this country of its blood and treasure, we did not appear to be one point nearer to the object for which it was undertaken. From the words of the minister on a former occasion, Mr. Grey inferred, that the war was a war usque ad internecionem, and that nothing short of the utter ruin of this country would induce him to treat for peace. It was his intention, by the present motion, to put the point at issue, whether this opinion was countenanced by the house. It was the duty of

the house to lay aside every party prejudice, all animosity, all artifice and mystery, and declare to the people the danger with which they were threatened. The French also had a right to expect the house to come to a decision, and to know against what they were fighting. They ought to know whether they had the right of determining upon their own form of government; and, by holding out a placable disposition, they would see whether they are misled by their own rulers, should they be averse to pacific measures. It was also necessary to the minister to know whether the house was prepared to go to the lengths he chose. Were he to pursue his own wishes, he should move for an immediate negotiation with France; but the present motion only went to render it possible for the French, if so disposed, to nego tiate with us. The minister had declared the wording of the present motion satisfactory, and he therefore hoped that the question would not be evaded. He reverted to the thanks of the house which had been voted to his majesty, December 1792, posterior to the deposition of the French king, for abstaining from interfering with the internal affairs of France, to evince, that, though their conduct was as objectionable as it could now be, and their government republican, we had not thought it incompatible with our safety: nor did he remember any decision of the house which had negatived that opinion. It was not his intention to propose any thing incompatible with what the house had already done; but it became that assembly to consider whether they would impose upon themselves that responsibility which had hitherto been attached to administration solely. He contended that, though the declaration of war had arisen from the French, we had provoked it. If the house believed that the existence of this country depended upon forcing the French to abandon their present government, he could have nothing to offer against our trying to accomplish it; but he thought the contrary, and saw nothing to preclude our treating with them. With

out entering into the question of the right of one nation to interfere with the internal government of another-supposing the destruction of the present government of France was a desirable object to this country, it became us to inquire into the probable chance of success. This chance, he understood, was derived from the possibility of a counter-revolution, and the reduced state of their resources The people of France, were, he contended, too firmly attached to a republican government, to be likely to give it up, however they might change their leaders; and the moderation of their present government afforded little hopes of such a surrender. Alt hopes of a counter-revolution were, he contended, illfounded and fallacious. A dependence upon the decay of their finances, was, he contended, equally ill-founded. Both in the American war and the present, the affairs of the nation were in the hands of persons unable to distinguish between the fallacy of imperfect calculations, and the energy and enthusiasm of a people struggling for freedom. From the report of Johannot to the French convention concerning the finances of France, Mr. Grey contended that the resources of that country were very greatly superior to those of America, during the war against that country. The most exaggerated account of the probable debt of France amounted only to four hundred and twenty millions (about one hundred millions beyond the truth;) and the value of their landed estate was admitted to be above six hundred millions sterling. With this, was to be considered the addition of the money of Holland, the population of France, which was equal to that of one-sixth of the whole of Europe, and the distracted and impoverished state of our allies. Our own resources were, he doubted not, equal to every thing, to which they ought to be applied; but not equal to the conquest of France, or to a war of aggression. For the exhausted state of the emperor's finances, he appealed to his own memorial addressed