much against his measures, as the man; always tracing them beyond his ministers to the throne itself, and connecting them with a deliberate plan to overturn the balance of the constitution, and undermine the liberties of the people. He has expressed the same unpopular opinion respecting the impressing of seamen that Junius has done; which is rather singular in two men professing so strong an attachment to the liberty of the subject, and who so generally appealed to popular feelings. It is to be remembered, also, that Junius speaks of certain mysterious arrangements, and expresses himself concerning certain characters, in a tone of confidence and with a degree of asperity which could hardly be expected in any one who was not personally acquainted with the secrets of the cabinet. As to the differences of stile between Junius's letters and lord Chatham's speeches, though they are very great, I do not think they are so great but that they may be accounted for from the mere difference between writing and speaking. The materials themselves are not essentially different: the difference is in the manner of working them up. There is none of that pointed neatness, that brilliant contrast, that artificial modulation, and elaborate complexity in the style of lord Chatham's speeches that there is in Junius; and there is a flow, a rapidity, a vehemence and ardour in them, that is totally wanting in Junius. At the same time, I can easily conceive that a man like lord Chatham, who had gained the highest reputation as an orator, and was satisfied with the proofs he had given of the force and solidity of his mind, should take a pride in exciting the admiration of the public by the neatness and elegance of his compositions, by adding delicacy to strength, by the minute refinements and graceful ornaments of style: as your bold, dashing designers have generally (to shew the versatility of their talents) executed their small cabinet pieces in a style of the most highly finished correctness. On the other hand, it is not at all likely that lord Chatham, even supposing him to have been master of all the subtlety and exactness of Junius, would have spoken in any other manner than he did. It would have been nearly impossible to speak as Junius writes; and besides, he was a man of too much sense to forego the advantages which his person, voice, and manner afforded him in that impressive, simple, manly style which he adopted, and which they could not have afforded him equally in any other, for the reputation of an elegant speaker. As to the character which Junius gives of lord Chatham, it is just such a character as a man would give of himself. Both his silence and his praise are suspicious. Though I do not, on the whole, think it probable that Lord Chatham was the author of Junius, yet I think that he was by far the most likely person that has been named. He was about equal to the task. He had the same pith and nerve, the same acuteness and vigour : he worked in the same

metal as Junius, with a little less sharpness and fineness in the execution, and more boldness in the design. Burke was above it, Dunning was below it. It was physically impossible that Burke should have been the author. He could no more have written Junius, from the exuberance and originality of his mind, than Dunning could have written it, from the poverty of his. The speeches of the latter are "as dry as the remainder biscuit after a voyage." No human art could have moulded his stiff set meagre sentences, with all the technical formality and servile exactness of a legal document, into the harmonious combinations and graceful inflections of Junius's style. It is most likely that it will never be known who Junius really was, and I do not wish it ever should; it is a sort of singular phenomenon, and curious riddle in the history of literature. It is better that it should remain a secret, and be something to wonder at, than that by it's being explained, every one should become perfectly satisfied and perfectly indifferent about it.

On a motion of Lord Chatham's to address the King on the State of the Nation.

LORD MANSFIELD began with affirming, that he had never delivered any opinion upon the legality of the proceedings of the house of commons on the Middlesex election, nor should he now, notwithstanding any thing that might be expected from him. That he had locked it up in his own breast, and it should die with him that he wished to avoid speaking on the subject; but that the motion made by the noble lord (Chatham,) was of a nature too extraordinary, and too alarming, to suffer him to be silent. He acknowledged the unhappy distracted state of the nation; but he was happy enough to affirm, with a safe conscience, that he had no ways contributed to it. That in his own opinion, declarations of the law made by either house of parliament, were always attended with bad effects; he constantly opposed them whenever he had an opportunity, and in his judicial capacity, thought himself bound never to pay the least regard to them. That although thoroughly convinced of the illegality of general warrants (which indeed, naming no persons, were no warrants at

all,) he was sorry to see the house of commons by their vote declare them to be illegal : that it looked like a legis. lativeact, which yet had no force nor effect as a law; for supposing the house had declared them to be legal, the courts in Westminster would nevertheless have been bound to declare the contrary; and consequently to throw a disre. spect upon the vote of the house. But he made a wide distinction between the general declarations of law, and the particular decision which might be made by either house, in their judicial capacity, upon a case coming regularly before them, and properly the subject of their jurisdiction. That here they did not act as legislators, pronouncing abstractedly and generally what the law was, and for the direction of others, but as judges drawing the law from the several sources from which it ought to be drawn, for their own guidance in deciding the particular question before them, and applying it strictly to the decision of that question. That for his own part, wherever the statute law was silent, he knew not where to look for the law of parliaments, or for a definition of the privileges of either house, except in the proceedings and decisions of each house respectively. That he knew of no parliamentary code to judge of questions depending upon the judicial authority of parliament, but the practices of each house, moderated or extended according to the wisdom of the house, and accommodated to the cases before them. That a question touching the seat of a member. in the lower house, could only be determined by that house; there was no other court where it could be tried, nor to which there could be an appeal from their decision. That wherever a court of justice is supreme, and their sentence final (which he apprehended no man would dispute was the case of the house of commons in mat ters touching elections) the determination of that court must be received and submitted to as the law of the land; for if there be no appeal from a judicial sentence, where shall that sentence be questioned, or how can it be reversed? He admitted that judges might be corrupt, and

their sentences erroneous; but these were cases for which, in respect to supreme courts, the constitution had provided no remedy. That if they wilfully determined wrong, it was iniquitous indeed, and in the highest degree detestible But it was a crime, of which no human tribunal could take cognizance, and it lay between God and their consciences. That he avoided entering into the merits of the late decision of the house of commons, because it was a subject he was convinced the lords had no right to enquire into or discuss. That the amendment proposed by the noble lord, threatened the most pernicious consequences to the nation, as it manifestly violated every form and law of parliament, was a gross attack upon the privileges of the house of commons, and instead of promoting that harmony which the king had recommended, must inevitably throw the whole country into a flame. That there never was an instance of the lords enquiring into the proceedings of the house of commons with respect to their own members; much less of their taking upon them to censure such proceedings, or of their advising the crown to take notice of them. If, indeed, it be the noble lord's design to quarrel with the house of commons, I confess it will have that effect, and immediately the lower house will undoubtedly assert their privileges, and give you vote for vote. I leave it, therefore, to your lordships, to consider the fatal effects which may arise in such a conjuncture as the present, either from an open breach between the two houses of parliament, or between the king and the house of commons. But, my lords, if I could suppose it were even advisable to promote a disagreement between the two houses, I would still recommend it to you to take care to'be in the right. Whenever I am forced into a quarrel, I will always endeavour to have justice on my side. Now, my lords, admitting the house of commons to have done wrong; will it mend the matter for your lordships to do ten times worse? and that I am clearly convinced would be the case, if your lordships were obliged to de

I

clare any opinion of your own, or offer any advice to the crown; a matter in which, by the constitution of this country, you have no right whatever to interfere. I will go further, my lords; I will affirm, that such a step would be as ineffectual as it would be irregular. Suppose the king, in consequence of our advice, should dissolve the parliament (for that, I presume, is the true object of the noble lord's amendment,) the next house of commons that meets, if they know any thing of their own privileges, or the laws of this country, will, undoubtedly, on the very first day of the session, take notice of our proceedings, and declare them to be a violation of the rights of the commons. They must do so, my lords, or they will shamefully betray their constituents and themselves. A noble lord (lord Marchmont) near me, has proposed, that we should demand a conference with the other house. It would be a more moderate step, I confess, but equally ineffectual. The commons would never submit to discuss their own privileges with the lords. They would not come to a conference upon such a subject; or if they did, they would soon break it up with indignation. If, then, the commons have done wrong, I know of no remedy, but either that the same power should undo the mischief they have done, or that the case should be provided for by an act of the legislature. That, indeed, might be effectual. But whether such a remedy be proper or necessary in the present case, or whether, indeed, it be attainable, considering that the other house must give their consent to it, is not a question now before us. If such a bill should be proposed, it will be regular and parliamentary, and we may then, with propriety, enter into the legal merits of the decision of the house of commons. As for the amendment proposed by the noble lord, I object to it as irregular and unparliamentary. I am persuaded, that it will be attended with very pernicious consequences to this country, and that it cannot possibly produce a single good one.

VOL. II.