County of Lancaster v. Lancaster County National Bank. able by the State. Bank v. Young, 25 Iowa, 311; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 451. In New Jersey, that a general exemption of the property of the corporation but subjecting the stock in the hands of the stockholders to taxation, exempts the surplus funds and lands of the corporation. State v. Tunis, 3 Zabr. 546. In Georgia, that exemption of capital stock exempts property of the company necessary to carry on business. Railroad Co. v. Mayor and Councils of Rome, 14 Ga. 275. In Kentucky, that where the charter of a bank exempts its property from all taxation, in consideration of the annual payment of a certain percentage on its capital, property of the bank cannot be taxed, either by the State or the county. Farmers' Bank v. Commonwealth, 6 Bush, 127. In Maryland, that the stock of a banking corporation is the representative of its whole property, and when a tax has been laid on the stock in the hands of the shareholders, the real and personal estate of the corporation becomes exempt from taxation, as to tax both the real and personal property and the capital stock would amount to a double tax, which is illegal and unjust. Gordon v. Mayor of Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316. In Minnesota and New York, that the banking office and lot owned and occupied as its place of business by a National bank is not liable to assessment and taxation as real estate against the bank, under laws of a State which taxes the shares of such bank at their actual value, without reduction for real estate. Commissioners of Rice County v. Citizens' National Bank, 23 Minn. 280; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 629 ; id. 300, 326. In Connecticut, see Town of New Haven v. Bank of New Haven, 31 Conn. 106. And we think the same may fairly be deduced from the decision of our own Supreme Court, as it will be found reported in Everitt's Appeal, 21 P. F. Smith, 216. The case stated, or special verdict, finds that this bank has, within the time prescribed by section 4 of the act of March 31 1870, paid into the State treasury a tax of one per centum upon VOL. II-53 County of Lancaster v. Lancaster County National Bank. the par value of all its shares; that part of its capital and profits are invested in its bank building. It has, therefore, as is shown by the case presented, paid a tax on the shares represented by its bank building — a building necessary to carry on its business, and in which its business is actually transacted. A banking-house is one of the indispensable accessories, and is necessarily incident to the business of banking. It is true that the case stated shows the house to be one of some size and pretensions, larger than is absolutely necessary for mere banking rooms or office, and that the cashier, an officer of the bank, resides in that portion thereof which is not necessarily used for the purposes of banking. It does not appear that he pays any rent for the portion of the house he occupies. Being of opinion that under the act of March 31, 1870, the decisions above cited, and the facts presented in the case stated, the banking-house of the Lancaster County National Bank, and the lot or piece of ground whereon the same is erected, is not subject to assessment and taxation for county purposes, we enter judgment for the defendant, with costs. Opinion by LIVINGSTON, P. J. NOTE BY THE REPORTER.-In De Soto Bank v. City of Memphis, 6 Baxt. 415; s. c., 32 Am. Rep. 530, it was held that under a statute exempting from taxation a lot of ground for the use of a private banking institution, the bank is not entitled to exemption of such parts of the banking-house as are leased to others. The court said: "Without discussing at length the argument or authorities cited in support of the exemption of the bank building, we content ourselves by extracting from one of the cases what we deem to be the true principle on this question, and the one held by a large preponderance of the authorities, which we have carefully examined. The company is a private corporation, created for banking purposes. It has not conferred on it the general power of purchasing or of becoming owner of real estate, but has the special grant of power to purchase and hold a lot of Hambright v. National Bank. the charter), to extend its operations, bank, for the convenient carrying on and hold property exempt from taxa- of its business as a banking institution, tion under the exempting clause, that and is so used. The balance must be limit must be fixed where the necessity held subject to taxation as other propends and mere convenience begins.' erty, and is not covered by the exempSee cases cited in the above case; see, tion clause of the charter." also, State v. Flarett, 4 Zabr. 371; 3 Harr. 73. We might cite numerous other cases in support of this principle, but deem it too clear to admit of any doubt. The only case cited in support of the exemption, and which we think sustains it, is the case of New Haven v. City Bank, 31 Conn. 108. With the reasoning of this opinion and conclusion of the court we are not satisfied; nor do we think it accords with the weight of authority on the question. "The bill in this case avers that the bank purchased in 1866 a lot of ground, and erected a building thereon, investing in lot and building $100,000 of its capital stock, and have held and occupied it since for their business, but that the bank does not occupy the whole building for the purpose of the bank, but having constructed the building, the bank occupies a portion, and leases out the balance. Under the principle announced, the exemption can only reach and cover so much of said building as is necessary for the use of the In New Haven v. City Bank, 31 Conn. 106, it was held that the capital of a bank embraces all its property, real and personal; that where the capital stock of a bank is exempted from taxation by its charter, its banking-house is equally exempt with every other part of its capital; and that if a bank, in violation of its charter, has erected a building not needed for banking purposes, the building is not, for that reason, liable to taxation as the property of the bank when it otherwise would not be, but the bank is liable to be proceeded against by the State for the violation of its charter. In this case the bank leased part of its banking building. The court said: "The primary object of the bank in erecting the building was the accommodation of the proper business of the bank, and the temporary renting of the room was but an incident of the ownership, neither affecting the title to the property nor the right to hold it free from taxation." HAMBRIGHT v. NATIONAL Bank. (3 Lea, 40; 31 Am. Rep. 629.) Bill to recover usury. A bill in equity will not lie to recover usury from a National bank. BILL LL to recover usury. The opinion states the case. J. N. Aiken, for complainant. P. B. Mayfield, for defendant. The de Hambright v. National Bank. FREEMAN, J. This bill is filed to recover usury alleged to have been paid within the last six years. A demurrer was filed, on the ground that the party could only sue for, and recover under, the thirty-fourth section of the National Banking Act as therein provided, and that National banks were not subject to the regulations of the State on this subject. The chancellor overruled the demurrer on these points, but sustained it on another, to wit, that the defendant could not be called on to make a discovery that would expose it to penalties for violations of law. Both parties appealed. We have heretofore held, as ruled by the chancellor on the first question, and our court has taken jurisdiction of such questions. See case of Steadman v. Redfield, September term, 1874. The case of Farmers and Mechanics' Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 117, had not then been decided. This case distinctly holds the contrary doctrine to that laid down by this court. The syllabus of that case is as follows: "The provisions of the National Banking Act, imposing penalties upon National banks for taking usury, supersedes the State laws on that subject. That National banks organized under the act are instruments designated to be used to aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public service; and Congress, which is the sole judge of the necessity for their creation, having brought them into existence, the States can exercise no control over them, nor in anywise affect their operation, except in so far as it may see proper to permit." This being a Federal question, over which the Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction, we are compelled to yield to the authority of that court, and do so notwithstanding our previous holding to the contrary. The result is, that the decree of the chancellor is reversed, the demurrer sustained on the ground stated, and bill dismissed at the cost of complainant. in this court and court below. Dow v. Irasburgh National Bank of Orleans. Dow v. IRASBURGH NATIONAL BANK OF ORLEANS. (50 Vt. 112; 28 Am. Rep. 493.) Jurisdiction for State courts of suits for usury. State courts have jurisdiction of suits against National banks to recover money paid as usury.* A SSUMPSIT, to recover from the defendant, a National bank, moneys paid for usurious interest. The court rendered judgment for defendant for want of jurisdiction; to which the plaintiff excepted. W. D. Crane, for plaintiff. W. W. Grout and L. H. Thompson, for defendant. The District Courts of the United States are given jurisdiction of cases where National banks are parties. Rev. Stats. U. S., § 563, clauses 1, 15. Section 57 of the National Banking Act, which attempted to confer jurisdiction on State courts in suits brought against National banks to recover the penalty for taking usurious interest named in section 30 of the same act, is unconstitutional. Congress has no authority to confer upon State courts jurisdiction in suits to recover penalties for violation of the laws of the United States. 10 Am. Law Rev. 777-9; 1 Kent's Com. 397, 399, 402, 403; 2 Story's Const., §§ 1755, 1756. BARRETT, J. This is an action of assumpsit in the common counts. It is not questioned that State courts would have jurisdiction in this form of action where National banks are parties, for causes of action arising ex contractu in business transactions. So far as the cause of action set forth in the declaration is concerned, there is no ground for the motion. The specification shows that recovery is sought for money paid to the bank as interest in excess of six per cent. It is therefore claimed that the * See to same effect, Bletz v. Columbia Nat. Bank, ante, p. 366; Pickett v. Merchants' Nat. Bank of Memphis, ante, p. 209. |