prevent a man who holds a defective title from purchasing a better at a treasurer's sale for taxes."1 As between himself and any adverse claimant it is an unimportant consideration whether the one or the other was in possession. If the state, in taxing land, takes any notice of ownership, it is either for the convenience of the officers in making collections, or for information to parties concerned. The tax is upon every possible interest in the land; and all parties having interests are equally under obligation to the state to make payment. The penalty for failure is a forfeiture or sale which will cut them all off; and while, without doubt, any one may defeat such a sale who can give satisfactory reasons for an assertion that it would be unjust to him for the purchaser to be allowed to rely upon it, it is not perceived that any other person can well insist upon a right to do so. This, of course, is aside from any question of irregularities or defects; in general, any person may rely upon those when the tax title is made use of against him; as they go, or may go, to the power of the officer to sell at all.2 Bids by the state or county. It is not an uncommon provision that, if no bidders offer to take the land and pay the tax, it shall be bid in for the state or for the county. A purchase on such a bid would give the state or county the usual rights of a 1 Woodward, J., in Coxe v. Gibson, 27 Penn. St., 160, 165. And see Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 30 Mich., 118. It is held in California that one in possession of lands, if under no legal or moral obligation to pay the tax, may buy in the lands at tax sale. Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal., 38. The same ruling is made in Kansas. Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kans., 311, 332. In Blackwood v. Van Vlect, 30 Mich., 118, it is said that "to preclude any person from making and relying upon a purchase of lands at tax sale, there must be something in the circumstances of the case which imposes upon him a duty to the state to pay the tax, or something which renders it inequitable, as between himself and the holder of the exist ing title, that he should make the purchase." And it is denied that the mere fact, that one is in possession of the land when the tax is levied, should preclude his becoming purchaser when the land is not assessed to him, and he is bound by no contract relations to pay the tax. The person taxed cannot get a title at tax sale. Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal., 216; McMinn v. Whelan, 27 id., 300. A collusive purchase, made to cut off a mortgage, may be set aside. Savings and Loan Society v. Ordway, 38 Cal., 679; Stears v. Hollenbeck, 28 Iowa, 550. purchaser, and no more. Whether a deed would be requisite to carry into effect such a purchase must depend upon the statute.1 Different sales at the same time. Where the taxes of several years are delinquent at the same time, sales are sometimes permitted to be made separately for each year's tax. Such sales might raise serious questions as between purchasers, if two or more should severally buy the land at sales bearing the same date, and subject to the same redemption. In Iowa it seems that such separate sales are unauthorized. Such questions might and should be settled by statute. Certificate of sale. The sale is usually accompanied or followed by the issue to the purchaser of a certificate, which recites the fact of sale, and states the time when the purchaser will become entitled to a conveyance. No title passes until the time Russell v. Reed, 27 'Commissioners authorized to bid the amount of the tax on behalf of the county, if they bid more, may have the land left on their hands unless the county see fit to take it. The bid cuts off the prior title. Penn. St., 166. And see Cuttle v. Brockway, 32 id., 45. thorized to bid off land for the United States, unless some person will bid twothirds the appraised value, are not compelled to do so, and a sale to another bidder for less is not invalid. Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall., 553, 562. Where lands are bid in by a county at a tax sale, and the law provides for their being subsequently sold after a specified notice, a private sale without the notice is void. The provision for such a sale is to be regarded as a proceeding to collect taxes, and must be followed. Jenks v. Wright, 61 Penn. St., 410. In Kansas, the county treasurer holds a certificate of sale to the county until it can be sold to an individual, and then assigns the certificate. The county commissioners cannot control his action in this regard. State . Magill, 4 Kan., 415. Preston v. Van Gorder, 31 Iowa, 250; Shoemaker v. Lacey, 38 id., 277. In Iowa, where the treasurer, on the same day, made different sales of the same land for the taxes of different years, and the owner, being aware of but one sale, had redeemed therefrom in good faith, he was held entitled to redeem from the other after the statutory time, by paying the amount for which the land was sold, with legal interest and penalty. Shoemaker v. Lacey, 38 Iowa, 277, citing Noble v. Bullis, 23 id., 559. In California, it is held that a sale for a city tax of one year will not cut off the tax for the preceding year. Cowell c. Washburn, 22 Cal., 519. The certificate is evidence of the sale, but the record of sale is better evidence. McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa, 356; Henderson v. Oliver, 32 id., 512; Clark v. Thompson, 37 id., 536. allowed for redemption, if any, has expired,' nor until the proper conveyance has been executed. Until then the purchaser has an inchoate right, which he might perhaps protect as a purchaser on execution might; but he has no title.3 The deed. The requirements of a deed are not uniform in the different states. In general it should recite enough to show an authority to sell, but it need not set out all the prior proceedings. The tax deed as evidence. It has been shown that, according to the principles of the common law, the purchaser at a tax sale when he attempts to enforce rights under his purchase, is under the necessity of taking upon himself the burden of showing that the purchase was made pursuant to law. To do this he must show the substantial regularity of all the proceedings. The deed of 'In Kansas it seems to be held that title passes at the sale, subject to be defeated by redemption. Stebbins v. Guthrie, 4 Kans., 353. 'See Ferguson v. Miles, 3 Gilm., 358; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug., Mich., 184. Under the Missouri statute it has been held that the tax deed does not relate back to the sale, where redemption was allowed afterwards. Donohoe v. Veal, 19 Mo., 331. Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick., 359; Hightown v. Freedle, 5 Sneed, 312; Alexander v. Bush, 46 Penn. St., 62; Stephens v. Holmes, 26 Ark., 48. A deed executed after the officer's term has expired is void. Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Penn. St., 444. But it is no objection that it was executed after the taxpayer's death. Curry . Fowler, 3 A. K. Marsh., 504. See Little . Herndon, 10 Wall., 26; Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich., 486; Elston T. Kennicott, 46 Ill., 187; Wetherbee v. Dunn, 32 Cal., 106; Large v. Fisher, 49 Mo., 307. Where a statute authorized a sale of real estate after fourteen days demand of payment, but required the deed to "state the cause of sa le," etc. and also the particulars of the proceedings preparatory to a sale: Held, that a deed was void which did not state that the taxes were not paid within fourteen days after demand. Harrington v. Worcester, 6 Allen, 576. Where notice is required by law to be given to the owner before a deed is made, the requirement must be strictly complied with. Denike v. Rourke, 3 Biss., 39. A tax deed is not void for slight irregularities or variances from the statutory form Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kans., 311; Haynes v. Heller, 12 id., 381. The recitals in a tax deed are in Kansas prima facie evidence of the facts recited. Hobson ↑. Dutton, 9 Kans., 477. The deed shows no title without acknowledgment. Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick., 359; Stierlin v. Daley, 37 Mo., 483; Dalton v. Fenn, 40 id., 109. In New York it seems that if the deed purports to be given on a sale of the lands as nonresident, when in fact they were assessed to a former owner, it is void. Ratler v. Worth, N. Y. Court of Appeals, 11 Albany Law Journal, 401. conveyance would not stand for this evidence. It would prove its own execution; nothing more. The power to execute it must be shown before the deed itself could have any force; for no officer can make out his own jurisdiction to act by the mere fact of acting. In all administrative proceedings the facts upon which jurisdiction depends must always be shown by him who claims. anything under its exercise. This principle is undisputed. It leads us inevitably to this conclusion; that whoever claims lands under a sale for delinquent taxes, must take upon himself the bur den of proving that taxes were duly assessed, which were a charge upon the land, and that the successive steps were taken which led to a lawful sale therefor, at which he or some one under whom he claims became the purchaser.1 The difficulty of making the complete showing in these cases has been thought to be so great as to render some modification of the rule reasonable, and statutes have from time to time been made in that direction. The early statutes were probably not as comprehensive in their terms as their authors intended; at least, 1 Stead's Lessee v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403; Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat., 77; McClung v. Ross, 5 id., 116; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 id., 119; Rondendorff . Taylor, 4 Pet., 349; Clarke v. Strickland, 2 Curt. C. C., 439; Minor . McLean, 4 McLean, 138; Moore v. Brown, 4 id., 211; same case in error, 11 How., 414; Mahew v. Davis, 4 McLean, 213; Parker v. Overman, 18 How., 137; Brown ɛ. Veazie, 25 Me., 359; Payson v. Hall, 30 id., 319; Loomis v. Pingree, 43 id., 299; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 id., 377; Williamsburgh v. Lord, 51 id., 599; French e. Patterson, 61 id,. 203; Doe v. Roe, 2 Hawks, 17; Avery v. Rose, 4 Dev., 549; Love v. Gates, 4 Dev. & Bat., 353; Garrett & White, 3 Ired. Eq., 131; Jordan v. Rouse, 1 Jones, L., 119; Yancey v. Hopkins, 1 Munf., 419; Christy v. Minor, 4 id., 431; Nalle v. Fenwick, 4 Rand., 585; Allen v. Smith, 1 Leigh, 231; Chapman v. Doe, 2 id., 329; Polk v. Rose, 25 Md., 153; Beatty v. Mason, 30 id., 409; Dyer v. Boswell, 39 id., 465; Doe v .Insurance Co., 8 S. & M., 197; Natchez v. Minor, 10 id., 246; Rule v. Parker, Cooke, 278; Hamilton v. Burum, 3 Yerg., 355; Pope v. Headen, 5 Ala., 433; Lyons v. Hunt, 11 id., 295; Blakeney v. Ferguson, 8 Ark., 272; Shearer v. Woodburn, 10 Penn St., 511; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 id., 13; Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal., 67; Richardson v. Dorr, 5 Vt., 9; Fitch v. Casey, 2 Greene, Iowa, 300; Kellog v. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio, 114; McMillan v. Robbins, 5 id., 31; Williams v. State, 6 Blackf., 36; Doe v. Flagler, 1 Ind., 542; Doe v. Sweetzer, 2 id., 649; Barnes v. Doc, 4 id., 132; Kyle v. Malin, 8 id., 34; Atkins v. Kinman, 20 Wend., 241; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 595; Waldron v. McComb, 1 Hill, 107; Sharp v. Spier, 4 id., 76; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y., 66; Bennett v. Buffalo, 17 id., 383; Cruger v. Dougherty, 43 id., 107; Chicago v. Wright, 32 Ill., 192; Scammon v. Chicago, 40 id., 146. as construed by the courts, they did not change to any considerable extent the former rule. Thus, a statute which declared that the deed should be evidence of the regularity of the sale, was held to prove only the regularity of the proceedings at the sale, leaving the purchaser still under the necessity of showing the regularity of the prior proceedings.1 Where the statute makes the deed prima facie evidence that the requirements of the sale have been complied with, it is necessary first that the holder of the tax title should prove the performance by the assessor and collector of the several acts which are conditions precedent to the power to sell; and then the contestant is put to proof that the requirements of the law, as to time and manner of sale, were not complied with. So a statute which makes the deed evidence of a title in fee simple in the owner, is held to be evidence only of such a title after the right to give the deed has been shown by the proof of anterior proceedings that support it. In later statutes language has been chosen with more care, and the tax deed, given by a competent officer, has been declared prima facie evidence not only of the regularity of the sale, but of all prior proceedings, and of title in the purchaser. This, it will be seen, changes wholly the burden of proof, which before rested upon the purchaser, and casts it upon the party who would contest the sale. The purchaser is no longer under the necessity to show the correctness of the proceedings, but the contestant must show in what particular he claims them to be incorrect. The power to enact such laws has been denied in argument, but the decisions sustain them. These decisions are that the statutes 'Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y., 66; Striker v. Kelly, 2 Denio, 323; Doughty v. Hope, 3 id., 594; Beekman v. Bigham, 5 N. Y., 366; Westbrook v. Willey, 47 id., 457; Rowland v. Doty, Har. Ch., 3; Scott v. Young Men's Society, 1 Doug., Mich., 119; Latimer v. Lovett, 2 id., 204; Ives v. Kimball, 1 Mich., 308; Yenda . Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408; Wilson v. Lemon, 23 Ind., 433. 2 Robson v. Osborn, 13 Texas, 298. 3 See cases above cited. Also Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark., 331. A declaration in a tax law that the tax deed should be "good and effectual both at law and in equity," gives no special sanction to the conveyance beyond that derived from the general principles of law. The purchaser must show that all prerequisites were complied with. Hadley v. Tankersley, 8 Texas, 12. Pillow v. Roberts, 13 How., 472; Williams v. Kirtland, 13 Wall., 306, 310; Freeman v. Thayer, 33 Me., 76; Orono v. Veazie, 57 Me., 517; Hand v. Ballou, |