SENATE.] Removal of the Deposits. I may be permitted, Mr. President, to recall to the recollection of the Senate the solemn language of a great patriot and statesman of another country on an occasion not unlike the present. It was on the memorable impeachment of Warren Hastings, sir, that Edmund Burke, with the profound sagacity which belonged to his genius, held the following impressive language to the highest judicial and legislative body of his country: ecute the delinquents of India. To-morrow, the "To-day, the Commons of Great Britain prosdelinquents of India may be the Commons of Great Britain. We all know and feel the force of money, and we now call upon you for justice in this cause of money. We call upon you for the preservation of our manners-of our virtues. We call upon you for our national character. We call upon you for our liberties." [JANUARY, 1834. and propriety, had stood by, and renouncing | councils, but who is now in private life, and to the salutary control which the constitution had whom it affords me sincere gratification to have placed in his hands by the power of removal, this opportunity of paying the tribute of a corhad permitted his Secretary quietly to consum- dial and respectful remembrance, (Mr. S. C. mate his purpose, on the ground that the Presi- ALLEN, of Massachusetts,) has beautifully and dent had no right to interfere with a discre-philosophically said, that "associated wealth is tionary power intrusted by Congress to a head the dynasty of modern States." Sir, it is so. of a Department, what then would have been This modern dynasty is now seeking to estabsaid? We should have heard, sir, denuncia-lish its sway over us in the worst of all forms tions not less loud and vehement than those that of a great legal corporation, ramified which have been uttered on the present occa- and extended through the Union, directed by sion, thundering against him, but upon a differ- irresponsible authority, controlling the fortunes ent principle. We should then have been told, and the hopes of individuals and communities, sir, that the President had been recreant to his influencing the public press, dictating to the high trust; that he had been armed with the organs of the public will. power of removal expressly to protect the public interests from the faithlessness or incapacity of public officers, and that, in failing to exercise it, he had weakly and wickedly betrayed his duty to the constitution and to the country. Having thus reviewed, Mr. President, the doctrines, to me, I must say novel doctrines, of constitutional law which have been advanced by the honorable Senator from Kentucky, (Mr. CLAY,) I will detain the Senate but with a few words more. The honorable Senator told us, with a deep and mournful pathos, that we are in the midst of a revolution. I agree with him, sir; we are in the midst of a revolutiona happy and auspicious revolution, like the "civil revolution of 1800," which, according to Mr. Jefferson, was 66 as real a revolution in the principles, as that of '76 was in the form, of our Government." A like salutary revolution "in the principles of the Government," have seen accomplished during the last five years of its administration. In that time, sir, we have seen the Government brought back to its "republican tack," from the deviations of latitudinous power into which it had fatally fallen. We have seen an unconstitutional and corrupting system of internal improvements, under the patronage of the federal authority, arrested, and those great local interests remit-power exerted in the most dangerous of all ted to their natural and safe guardians, the Governments of the States. We have seen the bank, the "first-born" of federal usurpations, foiled in its efforts to perpetuate its existence, and to confirm its triumph over the sanctity of the constitution. We have seen, finally, the American System of the honorable Senator himself; a system which we of the South have felt to be one, not of protection, but oppression; we have seen that, too, partially overthrown and abandoned. Here, indeed, is a happy and glorious revolution for those who have cherished the cardinal principles of limited constitutional construction, of freedom of industry, of equality of public burdens. And for these great results, we are indebted to the firmness, the vigor, the patriotism, of the individual who now presides over the administration of the Government, sustained by the virtuous confidence of a free people. we A profound thinker, sir, with whom I have had the good fortune to serve in the public Sir, an American Senator, applying to his own times and country the solemn appeal of the British patriot, might well say: To-day the Congress of the United States sits in judgment on the monopolists of the bank. To-morrow the monopolists of the bank may be the Congress of the United States. All history hath taught us the dangerous power of moneyed corporations, and we now see and feel that forms, in assailing the purity of our republican manners, undermining the stability of our institutions, and awing the deliberations of our public councils. Sir, the American people— yes, sir, the people-when their true voice shall be heard, call upon us for justice in this great cause of money, violating and trampling upon the guarantees of freedom. They call upon us for the preservation of the public morals, exposed to a new and daring corruption. They call upon us for the vindication of our national character from the scandal of practices before unknown in our history. They call upon us for the rescue of their liberties from the grasp of a selfish and unrelenting moneyed despotism. They call upon us, sir, for the performance of these high duties, and worthily, I trust, will the call be answered by the firmness, the constancy, and the patriotism of their representatives. JANUARY, 1834.] MONDAY, January 20. Public Distress. Public Distress-Removal of the Deposits. Mr. WEBSTER presented to the Senate a series of resolutions, adopted at a numerous meeting of the citizens of Boston, without distinction of party, held at Faneuil Hall, to consider the state of the currency and finances of the country. The resolutions having been read [SENATE. theless, to let my sentiments and my convic- Mr. WEBSTER said he wished to bear unequivocal and decided testimony to the respectability, intelligence,, and disinterestedness, of the long list of gentlemen at whose instance this meeting was assembled. The meeting, said Mr. W., was connected with no party purpose whatever. It had an object more sober, more cogent, more interesting to the whole community, than mere party questions. The Senate will perceive, in the tone of these resolutions, no intention to exaggerate or inflame; no disposition to get up excitement or to spread alarm. I hope the restrained and serious manner, the moderation of temper, and the exemplary candor, of these resolutions, in connection with the plain truths which they contain, will give them just weight with the Senate. I assure you, sir, the members composing this meeting were neither capitalists, nor speculators, nor alarmists. They are merchants, traders, mechanics, artisans, and others engaged in the active business of life. They are of the muscu- I am of opinion, therefore, that there is, unlar portion of society; and they desire to lay doubtedly, a very severe pressure on the combefore Congress an evil, which they feel to munity, which Congress ought to relieve if it press sorely on their occupations, their earn- can; and that this pressure is not an instance ings, their labor, and their property; and to of the ordinary reaction, or the ebbing and express their conscientious conviction of the flowing of commercial affairs; but is an extraorcauses of that evil. If intelligence, if pure in-dinary case, produced by an extraordinary cause. tention, if deep and widespread connection In the next place, sir, I agree entirely with with business, in its various branches, if thor- the 11th Boston resolution, as to the causes ough practical knowledge and experience-if of this embarrassment. We were in a state inseparable union between their own prosperity of high prosperity, commercial and agricultuand the prosperity of the whole country, au- ral. Every branch of business pushed far, and thorize men to speak, and give them a right to the credit, as well as the capital of the counbe heard, the sentiments of this meeting ought try, employed to near its utmost limits. In this to make an impression. For one, sir, I en-state of things, some degree of overtrading tirely concur in all their opinions. I adopt their first fourteen resolutions, without alteration or qualification, as setting forth truly the present state of things, stating truly its causes, and pointing to the true remedy. Mr. President, said Mr. W., now that I am speaking, I will use the opportunity to say a few words, which I intended to say, in the course of the morning, on the coming up of the resolution which now lies on the table; but which are as applicable to this occasion as to that. doubtless took place, which, however, if nothing else had occurred, would have been seasonably corrected by the ordinary and necessary operation of things. But, on this palmy state of things, the late measure of the Secretary fell, and has acted on it with powerful and lamentable effect. And I think, sir, that such a cause is entirely adequate to produce the effect; that it is wholly natural; and that it ought to have been foreseen that it would produce exactly such consequences. Those must have looked at the surface of things only, as it seems to me, who thought otherwise, and who expected that such an operation could be gone through with, without producing a very serious shock. An opportunity may, perhaps, be hereafter afforded me, of discussing the reasons given by the Secretary, for the very important measure, adopted by him, in removing the deposits. But, as I know not how near that time may be, Í [Mr. W. considered the restoration of the dedesire, in the meanwhile, to make my opinions known, without reserve, on the present state posits, and the recharter of the present Bank of of the country. Without intending to discuss the United States, as the adequate remedy for the any thing at present, I feel it my duty, never-present distress.] SENATE.] Removal of the Deposits. (JANUARY, 1834. Mr. EWING said: The removal of the Secre- | sir, without referring to the special designation tary of the Treasury from office I admit to be of the several powers which is found in the within the legal power of the President; but articles of the constitution containing the genthe object which was effected by that removal, eral grants of the legislative power, it would the control thus taken and exercised over the be difficult, if not impossible, to determine public treasure, I hold to be an infraction of what was intended to be included in each, es the constitution; and I shall now, by such pecially in the latter; for judicial power is arguments and authority as are in my mind more distinct in its character, and more capaconclusive, attempt to make good the position. ble of a precise designation. Those who maintain the power of the President over the Treasury, rest it upon an argument like this: The executive power is vested in the President-the custody of the public treasure is a portion of executive power; therefore, the custody of the public treasure is vested in the President; or, in this particular instance, they hold that, as the right to remove the deposits was vested by the bank charter in the Secretary of the Treasury, and as the Secretary of the Treasury is an executive officer, this special duty, which is assigned to him by law, falls under the general cognizance of the Executive head of the nation. These are the forms in which, if I understand them right, the arguments on the other side are pre-other; it would be reduced to the same simple sented. The fatal error in their whole process of reasoning arises from this-that they give to certain general expressions in the constitution a power and extent which, as limited by the other special powers in that instrument, they do not possess. The two provisions, that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States," and "he shall see that the laws are faithfully executed," are the basis of all the illimitable powers with which gentlemen seek to clothe the Chief Magistrate. What is executive power? I never saw a definition from which a distinct conception of its essence or qualities could be gathered. Indeed, it is not susceptible of any, varying as it does in its properties and extent, in every form and modification of government. M. Necker, an author respectable, but not of high authority, assimilates it to that mysterious principlé which, in the human frame, unites action to the will; the legislative power being the will. This would be intelligible enough, and practical also, if all power, as had been the case in France, centred in a single individual: there would be no clashing of those great separate powers, the one contravening or absorbing the principle as that of human will and human action; the will dictating, and the active principle moving in exact accordance with it. But when the will and the active principle exist in different bodies, and the active principle, as in the case of our executive, has a will also of his own, if it extend to and penetrate every portion of the body politic, that will, which is accompanied with efficient action, must, as a necessary consequence, overturn or absorb all the powers of the legislative will, which is destitute of action. This notion of executive It should be observed, that the separation of power will not do in a Government which, powers in the Constitution of the United States being free, intends to preserve its freedom; is by no means perfect, especially between the and it will be seen, by and by, that it is not the legislative and executive departments. The kind of executive power created by the framers first section of the first article of the constitu- of our constitution. It will not do to draw tion declares, that "all legislative power herein precedent from monarchical Governments to granted shall be vested in a Congress of the settle the extent of that power, unless we agree United States;" and yet, when we descend to with them to admit the divine right of kings, the special distribution of the powers which and let our Executive become, as theirs, sufollow, we find that all the legislative power preme and irresponsible. We must, then, extherein granted is not vested in the Congress, amine the constitution itself minutely, and see but that a most important portion of it is vest- if we can discover the meaning affixed to this ed in the President, namely, a veto power-a important term, "executive power," and what power which touches legislation nearly, vitally subjects properly fall within the scope of its -a power which has grown up to great im- influence. portance in the present day, and which threatens to absorb or paralyze all the powers of legislation. The second section of the second article of the constitution contains a general enumeration of the powers and duties of the President; it By the first section of the second article of makes him commander-in-chief of the army the constitution, "the executive power is vest- and navy, and of the militia, when called into ed in a President of the United States." The actual service; it gives him the power of apword "all" used in the section granting the pointment, by and with the advice and consent legislative power to Congress, is omitted in of the Senate; and directs him to receive amthis. I do not lay much stress upon the omis-bassadors and other public ministers; but it sion, but I am certainly warranted in saying that the grant of executive power is not in terms more comprehensive than is the grant of legislative power, to the universality of which I have shown one strong exception. Indeed, gives him no power over the Treasury, or the collection or disbursement of the revenue. But mark, sir, the duties specially assigned to Congress by the eighth section of the first article: to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and JANUARY, 1834.] Removal of the Deposits. [SENATE. committee, and they, after much consideration and lengthened debate, passed the several laws in their present forms. Two of them, that of War and of Foreign Affairs, are, in their titles, called "Executive Departments," the other is simply styled "the Treasury Department." nothing; that it cannot be used in giving it a construction. This, I admit, is true in the main; but taking into view the circumstances under which these acts were passed, and the high importance attached to them by the Congress and the people of that day, it could hardly be by accident that the title of these laws, reported by the same committee, and under consideration by the same Congress, at the same time, should differ in so important a feature. But we may, on the strictest legal principles, refer to the body of the act, and insist that that shall fix its construction, and be taken as the index of the sense of the legislature which enacted it. excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the | jects relating to them were referred to the same common defence." Congress not only lays, but collects duties and imposts. Why collect? The Senator from Virginia (Mr. RIVES) pronounces the collection of the revenue an act appropriate to the Executive; and it might well be so, if the constitution had not vested the duty in another department of the Govern-But it is said, sir, that the title of an act proves ment; and there is no accidental misuse of language here, for it is carried through in all the provisions of the constitution whenever the fiscal concerns of the nation are the subject of provision; and not only the laying and collecting of taxes, but the disbursement of those taxes. Congress, not the President, has power to "pay the national debt;" but, in the same sentence vesting these powers, Congress is authorized to "provide for the common defence," not to defend, for that is one of the powers granted to the Executive. Again: in the ninth section of the same article, which relates to the power of Congress, is a provision that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law," and that "a regular statement of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time;" clearly evidencing that the whole control of the public funds, the levying, collecting, keeping, and disbursing, is intrusted fully to Congress, and not at all to the President. I might refer to numerous provisions of this instrument, showing the accurate manner in which the powers and duties of each of the great departments of Government were limited and defined in the particular enumeration of the powers of each. For example, Congress is "to provide and maintain a navy," not to command or control it; for that power is vested in the President; but, as the purse is in the hands of Congress, they alone can provide and maintain. To provide for calling forth the militia," not to call them forth; for that is the duty of the President. "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," not to organize, or arm them; for those are portions of the Executive duty. I have, sir, pursued this analysis far enough to show, (if, indeed, a doubt could ever seriously exist of the fact,) that, in all things relating to the public treasure, its levy, collection, safe-keeping, and disbursement, Executive interference has been carefully excluded by the framers of the constitution; and that the power of Congress extends to it throughout, in all its minutest details; but, on all subjects in which power is intended to be reposed in the Executive, Congress is merely required to provide the means by which that power may be exercised. This review of the provisions of the constitution was deemed necessary to give a full and distinct comprehension of the several acts creating the three (subsequently four) subordinate departments, whose duties and responsibilities are the more immediate subject of inquiry. The first Congress, which met in 1789, enacted the laws creating these departments; the sub The first section of the act establishing what is now called the Department of State, provides, "that there shall be an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs," and the chief officer of that department is required to "perform and execute such duties as shall, from time to time, be enjoined on, or intrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeably to the constitution, relative to correspondences, commissions, or instructions to or with public ministers," &c.; and, by reference to the act it will be seen that no single duty is annexed to his office, or a single trust reposed in him, which is not part and parcel of the duty of the President, as enjoined by the constitution in the special enumeration of his powers. This, then, is properly called an Executive Department, both in the title and the body of the act; and the officer at the head of this department is properly made obedient to the President within the sphere of his constitutional duties. Next in order is the Department of War. The first section of the act creating it denominates it also Executive: "That there shall be an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of War," and the principal officer therein is likewise charged with duties which the constitution had assigned to the Executive; and he is required to conduct the business of his department in such manner as the President of the United States shall, from time to time, order and direct. The act creating the Treasury Department does not, either in the title or body of the act, style it Executive. The first section provides "that there shall be a Department of the Treasury," and directs the appointment of a Secretary, who shall be head of the department. His duties, also, coincide in all respects with those which arise out of the powers granted to Congress by the constitution; none of them touch the prescribed functions of the Chief SENATE.] Removal of the Deposits. [JANUARY, 1834. Magistrate. He "shall digest and prepare plans | form it during vacation; they might appoint a for the improvement and management of the commission by law for the same purpose; or revenue, and for the support of public credit; they might do it as they have done, appoint an prepare and report estimates of public revenue officer, who should be emphatically theirs, and and expenditures; superintend the collection accountable to them to perform it. The same of the revenue," &c.-all duties especially de- may be said of the other duties enjoined by law volved upon the Congress by the constitution, on this officer. In truth, sir, this very vague as I have already shown; and that his charac- and indefinite sense which gentlemen attach to ter may be more distinctly marked as the officer the term executive power and executive duty of Congress, and not of the President, he alone, -a term which may be extended so as to overof all the heads of Departments, is specially re- shadow all the other powers and functions of quired to "make report and give information Government-is proof, if any were wanting, of to either branch of the Legislature, in person the wisdom of the framers of our constitution or in writing, as he may be required, respecting in defining the term by a particular distribution all matters which may be referred to him by of specially enumerated powers. But the honthe Senate or House of Representatives, or orable Senator contends that it is an executive which shall appertain to his office." The mark-duty to report to Congress, because the Presied distinction in the character and duties of dent himself is required to report, or rather to these departments, designated by the law-the recommend to Congress, such matters as he fact that, while the Secretary of State and the shall think expedient. True, the constitution Secretary of War are made directly responsible imposes upon him a special duty by special desto the President, and required to perform their ignation; but this does not prove that it is several duties in obedience to his instructions therefore his, in consequence of the general and commands, the Secretary of the Treasury grant of executive power. The usual process is made subservient to no commands except of legal reasoning would prove directly the rethose of the Houses of Congress, and is charged verse: if it had been covered by the general with no duties except such as the constitution grant, it would not have been afterwards speenjoins upon them, would seem, according to cially designated. Sir, the reason for the differall acknowledged principles of interpretation, to ent frame and construction of the law, creating carry with it a strong negative of the claim of the three subordinate departments of Governpower which the President has assumed to ex-ment, must be already sufficiently obvious. ercise over the prescribed duties of the Secretary of the Treasury. That Secretary is not an executive officer, and the President has no more right to order and direct how he shall perform any of his appropriate duties, or take their performance out of his hands, than either House of Congress has to interfere with the discharge of the appropriate duties of the Secretary of State or of War. The subject-matter over which the two first have charge is executive in its nature, and is vested by the constitution in the President; the last having to do only with the finances of the country-a subject-matter, which to its fullest extent, and in all its modifications, is intrusted to Congress-is placed under the control of the Secretary of the Treasury. Congress could not, without a surrender of their most sacred trust, have rendered him an executive officer, and have required or permitted him to discharge his duties in such manner as he should be directed by the President. His duties, therefore, are to be performed under the direction of the Legislature, and the subject over which he performs them is a legislative trust. But the Senator from Virginia (Mr. RIVES) says that the duties of the Secretary of the Treasury are executive in their character, and he instanced the duty of digesting and preparing plans for the improvement of the revenue. Now, sir, with all due deference to the superior political knowledge and acumen of the honorable Senator, I am constrained to differ from By the bank charter of 1816, section 16, we him wholly and absolutely. There is nothing find another portion of the power of Congress more executive in its nature, in devising, and vested in the same officer; a power alike repreparing, a plan for the improvement of the lating to the finances, and for which he is, as revenue, than there is in devising, and prepar- in other cases, made responsible to Congress. ing, and enacting a law for the same purpose. The sixteenth section of the bank charter proBoth require the intellect, the mind, and judg- vides, "that the deposits of the money of the ment, rather than the mere active principle, to United States, in places in which the said bank bring them to pass. The duty enjoined on this and the branches thereof may be established, Secretary is not that executive act which fol- shall be made in said bank or branches thereof, lows legislation, and carries into effect the law, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at but it is legislation in its incipient stage, or any time otherwise order and direct; in which rather a gathering together, and arranging the case, the Secretary of the Treasury shall imelements out of which legislation is to arise.mediately lay before Congress, if in session, Now, it is obvious that this must be done by and, if not, immediately after the commencethose who bear the burden of legislation, and ment of the next session, the reasons of such they may do it themselves, or employ an ap-order and direction." Here, again, is a power propriate agent or agents to perform it; they vested in the Secretary of the Treasury over might direct a Committee of Congress to per- the finances-a power evidently subject to re |