no difficulty to be avoided; in the second place, if there were, this manner of avoiding it would be mere evasion.

But now, Sir, I come to a very important inquiry. The Constitution requires us to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy, if we establish any. What is this uniformity, or in what is it to consist? The honorable gentleman says that the meaning is, that the law must give a coercive power to creditors, as well as a voluntary power to debtors; that this is the constitutional uniformity. I deny this altogether. No idea of uniformity arises from any such consideration. The uniformity which the Constitution requires is merely a uniformity throughout all the States. It is a local uniformity, and nothing more. The words are perfectly plain, and the sense cannot be doubted. The authority is, to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States. Can any thing be clearer? To be uniform is to have one shape, one fashion, one form; and our bankrupt laws, if we pass them, are to have one shape, one fashion, and one form in every State. If this be not so, what is the sense of the concluding words of the clause, "throughout the United States"? My honorable friend from Kentucky has disposed of this whole question, if there ever could be a question about it, by asking the honorable gentleman from New Jersey what uniform means, in the very same clause of the Constitution, where the word is applied to rules of naturalization; and what it means in a previous clause, where it declares that all duties of impost shall be uniform throughout the United States.

It can hardly be necessary to discuss this point further. If it were, the whole history of the Constitution would show the object of the provision. Bankrupt laws were supposed to be closely connected with commercial regulations. They were considered to be laws nearly affecting the intercourse, trade, and dealing between citizens of different States; and for this reason it was thought wise to enable Congress to make them uniform. The Constitution provided that there should be but one coinage, and but one power to fix the value of foreign coins. The legal medium of payment, therefore, in fulfilment of contracts, was to be ascertained and fixed, for all the States, by Congress,

Mr. Crittenden.

and by Congress alone; and Congress, and Congress alone, was to have the power of providing a uniform mode in which contracts might be discharged without payment. Look to the discussion of the times; to the expositions of the Constitution by its friends when they urged its adoption; look to all within the Constitution, and all without it; look anywhere, or everywhere, and you will see one and the same purpose, one and the same meaning; and that meaning cannot be more clearly expressed than the words of the clause themselves express it, that laws to be established by Congress on the subject of bankruptcies shall be uniform throughout the United States.

Now, Sir, the gentleman's bill is not uniform. It proposes that there may be one law in Massachusetts, and another in New Jersey. The gentleman's bill includes corporations; but then it gives each State a power to exempt its own corporations, or any of them, from the operation of the law, if it shall so choose. It decides what shall be, in the case of banks, an act of bankruptcy; but then it provides that any State may say, nevertheless, that, in regard to its own banks, or any of them, this shall not be an act of bankruptcy.

Here is the provision:

"Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall apply to, or in any wise affect, any corporation or association of persons, incorporated or acting under a law of any State of the Union, or any Territory of the United States, where such corporation or association shall be authorized by their charter, or any express law of such State or Territory, to do or commit the act herein declared to be an act of bankruptcy, or where, by any such law of any such State or Territory, the said incorporation or association of persons shall or may be exempted from the provisions of this act.”

Pray, Sir, what sort of uniformity is this? A uniformity which consists in the authorized multiplication of varieties. Who will undertake to defend legislation of this kind, under our power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States? Not only is it in direct violation of the plain text of the Constitution, but it leaves the very evils, every one of them, which a provision in the Constitution intended to shut out. The Constitution says that Congress may establish uniform laws; the gentleman's bill says that Congress may propose a law, at least so far as corporations are concerned, but

that still each State may take what it likes, and reject the rest; and this, he contends, is establishing a uniform law.

I pray, Sir, where is this power of exemption to stop? If we may authorize States to exempt their corporations, may we not, with equal propriety, authorize them to exempt their individual citizens? May we not say that each State may decide for itself whether it will have any thing to do with the law, when we have passed it, or what parts it will adopt, and what parts it will refuse to adopt?

But, Sir, I must wait till some attempt is made to defend this part of the gentleman's bill. I must see some show of propriety, some plausibility, before I reason against it further. In the view I take of it at present, it appears to me utterly repugnant to the plain requirements of the Constitution, and destitute, not only of all argument for its support, but of all apology also. I see nothing in it but naked unconstitutionality.

But, Mr. President, if these provisions were constitutional, they would still be in the highest degree unjust, inexpedient, and inadmissible. What is the object of bringing the banks into the bill at all? Certainly there can be no just object other than to insure the constant and punctual discharge of their duties, by always paying their notes on presentment. Clearly there can be no object but to prevent their suspensions of payment. And it might be said that this object was kept in view, if the law were uniform, peremptory, inflexible, and applying to all banks. But when you give the power of exemption to the States, you sanction the very evil which you propose to remedy. You profess to prescribe a general rule, and yet authorize and justify its violation. Do not the States now exempt their banks, and is not that the very evil from which we suffer? Is not suspension, under the authority of State exemption, the topic, the discussion of which every day nearly stuns us by its reverberation from the walls of this chamber? The charters of the banks are, in general, well enough. They require punctual specie payments, under severe penalties, and, in some cases, under the penalty of forfeiture. But under the pressure of circumstances, and from a real or supposed necessity, the States relieve the banks from these penalties, and forbear to enforce the forfeitures. And will they not, most assuredly, also relieve the banks in the same manner, and for the same reasons, if they have the power,

from the penalties of our bankrupt law? State permission, State indulgence, State exemption, is the very ground on which suspension now stands, and on which it is justified. And it is now proposed that Congress shall give its authority and sanction to all this. It is proposed that Congress shall solemnly recognize the principle, and approve and sanction the practice, of State exemption, of the suspension of specie payments by State authority. If the States will not enforce their own laws against the banks, can any one imagine that they will see the equally or still more severe penalties of our bankrupt law enforced, while they have the power to prevent it?

Some weeks ago, the honorable member from Pennsylvania' moved for a committee to inquire into the propriety of amending the Constitution, so as to insert a provision giving Congress power to restrain the circulation of small bank-notes. I did not concur in his measure, not thinking the Constitution needed amendment in that respect; but his argument was quite intelligible. He said that this abolition of small bills could not now be accomplished, because the States could not be brought to act in concert; yet they might all be brought to consent that Congress should establish a uniform rule upon the subject. That was a fair reasoning towards a proper object. It went for uniformity on a point of great commercial importance. But how is it here? We do not propose uniformity; we do not require that one rule may extend over all. Far otherwise; for we propose to authorize difference, according to the discretion and circumstances of the State. Having the power to establish uniformity, we delegate an authority to create variety. Charged by the Constitution to establish one rule, we ourselves, instead of performing that duty, call upon others to establish different and varying rules. All must see to what this leads, or rather, what this is; for it is a measure which would be perfect in its beginning; it would reach its destiny at its commencement, its mischievous tendencies would be accomplished at its birth. The passage of this bill would add the solemn sanction of Congress to the sanction by the States of the suspension of specie payments by the banks. That is the practical sum and substance, the long and the short of the whole matter. If our constitu

* Mr. Buchanan.

tional power enables us to embrace the banks in this bill, and if we see no insuperable or greatly formidable practical objections, then, I think, we ought to include them all, without any power

of escape.

Suppose the bill should be made uniform, then, and include all banks; have we the power, and is it expedient, to pass it in that shape?

On the motion for a committee, made some time ago by the member from Pennsylvania, to which I have already referred, I suggested the opinions which I entertain on one branch of the power of Congress connected with this subject. The constitutional point now arising I do not mean to treat, nor to decide; it is open to others, and will, no doubt, be discussed by them. But upon the expediency or propriety of including banks and other corporations in this bill, I will say a few words. The State with which I am connected can have as little objection to including banks in the bankrupt bill as any other State. Many persons in Massachusetts, quite respectable and well informed, are in favor of the measure. But it appears to me they have not well considered the practical difficulties. Let us look at what is proposed to be done.

There are eight hundred or a thousand State banks in the country, each with its charter conferring its rights, prescribing its duties, and enjoining penalties. They are banks of deposit,

banks of discount, and banks of circulation.

It is now generTheir legal exist

ally admitted that they are lawfully created. ence is established. They possess in the aggregate, I suppose, two hundred millions of capital. Some of them are founded entirely on private ownership, while in some others the States creating them are proprietors, and in some others, again, the States are sole proprietors. Some of them have a right to suspend specie payments for a limited time; others have not this right, the charter of each being its own constitution.

Such being the general state of things, it is now proposed to subject all these banks to the operation of a bankrupt law, so that, when they stop payment for a day or an hour, their property and effects may be seized for distribution among their creditors, and their operations broken up. It is proposed to do this, although the charters of the banks may expressly authorize them to do that very thing which is an act of bankruptcy under this