INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

We now come to Addison's political writings, which deserve a careful perusal. They are written with the easy elegance and natural grace of his best manner, with an under-current of exquisite humor, and when the occasion required it, a ready flow of wit and satire, which, though free from bitterness, must have been very annoying to those against whom it was directed.

The first of these pieces, 'The Present State of the War,' was written to support the whig administration, which was rapidly losing ground both at court and in the country. On the continent the allies had every where been unsuccessful: losing the battle of Almanza in Spain, the 'impreg nable lines' of Stalhofen in Germany, failing with the loss of half their army in the attempt upon Toulon, and seeing even the Duke of Marlborough kept at bay by the skilful manœuvres and judicious boldness of the Duke of Vendome. At court the arrogance of the Duchess of Marlborough had completely alienated the affections of the Queen, who, to borrow the severe expression of one who knew her well, "not having a stock of amity to serve above one object at a time" (V. Swift mem. relating to the change in Queen Anne's ministry), had transferred her confidence to Mrs. Masham, and through the new favorite, to Harley. The nation was dissatisfied, for nothing but brilliant success can reconcile a people to the burthen of a foreign war. For the moment, however, the ministry held their place; the war was continued: and Addison, who had not only a party feeling to gratify, but a place to preserve, may have flattered himself that his pamphlet was not without its share of influence upon this important occasion.

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In April 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht was announced to Parliament, calling forth such a flood of satires and libels that the ministry were compelled to introduce a measure for the more effectual suppression of libellous writings. This treaty which put an end to a long and desolating war, has been as bitterly condemned by recent writers as by the whigs of that day. But every lover of humanity will turn with pleasure from such views to the enlarged and philanthropic judgment of Sismondi: Si les ministres

whigs de la reine Anne l'avaient couronnée de plus de lauriers qui n'er remporta jamais la nation anglaise, les ministres tories, qui les remplacèrent. déployèrent pour rendre la paix au monde, une intelligence de la politique universelle, une sagesse, une modération, une puissance et une adresse, qui triomphèrent, en même temps, des faiblesses de leur souveraine, des passions de leurs alliés, et de l'aveuglement du public anglais." Sismondi Hist. des Français, ch. xli., p. 126.

Addison went, of course, with his party, and the following tract, which will always be read with pleasure for its ingenuity and wit, was a tribute to the policy which he had uniformly supported. The commercial advantages secured to England, great as they were, are the objects of his ridicule, in which he was joined by a large portion of the nation, still dazzled by a success of which the cost was to fall upon posterity.

The Asiento was an article of the treaty, extending to England the privilege of supplying the Spanish colonies with negroes during thirty years: and the grounds upon which Addison condemns it are a striking illustration of the changes in public opinion during the last century.-G.]

THT

PRESENT STATE OF THE WAR,

AND THE NECESSITY OF AN AUGMENTATION CONSIDERED.

PREFACE.

THE author of the following essay has endeavoured to draw into one continued scheme, the whole state of the present war, and the methods that appear to him the most proper for bringing it to a happy conclusion.

After having considered that the French are the constant and most dangerous enemies to the British nation, and that the danger from them is now greater than ever, and will still increase, till their present union with Spain be broken, he sets forth the several advantages which this union has already given France, and taken from Great Britain, in relation to the West Indies, the woollen manufacture, the trade of the Levant, and the naval power of the two nations.

He shows how these advantages will still rise higher after a peace, notwithstanding our present conquests, with new additions, should be confirmed to us; as well because the monarchy of Spain would not be weakened by such concessions, as because no

guarantee could be found sufficient to secure them to us. For which reasons, he lays it down as a fixed rule, that no peace is to be made without an entire disunion of the French and Spanish monarchies.

That this may be brought about, he endeavours to prove, from the progress we have already made towards it, and the suc cesses we have purchased in the present war, which are very considerable, if well pursued, but of no effect if we acquiesce in them.

In order to complete this disunion, in which we have gone so far, he would not have us rely upon exhausting the French treasury, attempts on the Spanish Indies, descents on France, but chiefly upon out-numbering them in troops, France being already drained of her best supplies, and the confederates masters of much greater forces for multitude and strength, both in men and horse, and provided with generals of greater fame and abilities.

He then considers the wrong measures we have hitherto taken in making too small levics after a successful campaign, in regulating their number by that of the enemies' forces, and hiring them of our confederates; shewing at the same time the inconveniences we suffer from such hired troops, and several advantages we might receive from employing those of our own nation.

He further recommends this augmentation of our forces, to prevent the keeping up a standing body of them in times of peace, to enable us to make an impression on the enemy in the present posture of the war, and to secure ourselves against a prince, who is now at the head of a powerful army, and has not yet declared himself.

In the last place, he answers by several considerations those two popular objections, that we furnish more towards the war than the rest of the allies, and, that we are not able to contribute more than we do already.