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ori, that are, at best, only a laborious trifling with words which either signify nothing or prove nothing, is more than, in our state of ignorance, independently of Revelation, we are entitled to assert. The unity, which alone, from the light of nature, we can with confidence assert, is hence not strictly exclusive, but wholly relative to that one design, which we are capable of tracing in the frame of the universe."

Nothing can be plainer, or more conclusive, than this passage, as to the point in question. Independently of the Scriptures, then, all the proof of divine unity is deduced from unity of design. But might not two or ten Divinities, endowed with like attributes and affections, have a unity of design? As to the persons, then, or rather distinctions in the creative and governing Power of the universe, the book of nature leaves us without any information.

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Dr. Brown has very justly estimated the metaphysical arguments for the "absolute and necessary unity of the divine power, as attempted to be proved a priori." Indeed these terms are truly a laborious trifling with words which signify nothing and prove nothing." For what is the absolute unity of the Deity? Absolute is the opposite of relative; and to say that the Deity is absolutely one, in this sense, would be to say that he is not relatively one; a proposition which either has no meaning, or which needs to have a right meaning assigned to it, in order to prevent its conveying a wrong one. Or if absolute mean, in such an assertion, complete, or perfect; then what, I ask, is a complete or perfect unity, when applied to the Godhead? Is it physical, metaphysical, or moral?

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can we judge, a priori, what a perfect unity of the Deity must be? As no rational man will contend for this; we may inquire, what is the perfect unity of the Deity, as shewn by the light of nature? We have already seen what light the book of nature casts on this topic of inquiry. The

only perfect Unity then, which we can discover, is that which the Scriptures reveal. But what is this Unity? This is to be proved not assumed. And when Unitarians assume it, they are exposed to the same accusation as the Trinitarian is, who assumes the distinction in the Godhead, or thinks it can be proved a priori; and then goes to the Scriptures to find confirmation of his opinions.

Does absolute unity, then, mean unlimited unity; for the word absolute has the sense of unlimited, in many phrases; as when we speak of absolute power? But the phrase unlimited unity is so incongruous, and so destitute of all meaning, that it would be wasting time to shew the impropriety of using it.

The phrase necessary unity is often employed to impress men's minds with the apprehension, that the very idea of a Supreme Power is necessarily accompanied by that of unity of the Source of Power. Is it so then? All nations living under the light of nature, have believed in some supreme Power; but has any nation, unenlightened by the Scriptures, ever yet believed in the existence of only one God? I need not repeat the answer. And among those, who enjoy the light of Revelation, what other necessity of the divine unity has been admitted, (I mean by those who examine things, and are not directed in their opinions by words,) except that which results from its being inculcated by the Scriptures, which are ac. knowledged to be of supreme authori ty, in regard to matters of belief? After all, then, the question returns back to the simple point, What kind of unity do the Scriptures teach? The answer to this inquiry must be obtained by an examination of the Scriptures themselves; it cannot be made out by assumption.

I have already observed, that the sacred writers do not appear to aim at asserting the physical or metaphysical unity of the Godhead. I must say something more upon this topic, to prevent being misunderstood.

When I speak of physical or metaphysical, I do not suppose that these, words, etymologically considered, essentially differ from each other, in respect to the sense which they convey. Both of them have been, and may be applied to designate a unity of substance or attributes in the Deity, which has respect rather to the simple nature or essence of these, than to the numerical unity (the only intelligible and defensible unity) of the complex Being, in whom divine substance and attributes are united.

The word physical, in its first import, has relation to the nature of a thing, considered as substance. The word metaphysical has been more commonly used to denote what has relation to the attributes of a thing, considered as real existences. The distinctive use of each, arose from the old philosophy, which separated between substance and attributes. I have comprized them both, merely to render my view of the subject more complete, according to a common use of these terms, than it would be if one of them were omitted.

Physical unity as treated of by philosophy, would be a unity of essence or substance, considered simply as such; and metaphysical unity a unity of attribute considered in respect to its nature. Indulge me in the expression of a few thoughts respecting each of them.

What then is unity of essence or substance, considered simply as such? Does it mean, that there is only one element, which constitutes the substance of the Godhead? Not to mention the grossness of such a speculation, which supposes the Divinity, like matter, to be capable of analysation-let me ask; Have the sacred writers ever undertaken to teach us, concerning the simple element of the Divine Substance? Every man who has the least respect for Revelation, from an acquaintance with it-Unitarian or Trinitarian-must answer, No.

Whence then do we derive the idea of a physical unity of the Deity or that the substance of the God

head is composed of one simple element? The book of nature and the book of Revelation are both destitute of one line, or one word, which can convey to us any instruction on this topic. We cannot make an assertion of this kind, respecting any particle of matter, nor of any created being in the Universe. Modern Chemistry. has demonstrated, that substances, believed by all former ages to be simple, are composite; and that there is not a single substance with which we are acquainted, respecting which an intelligent scientific man would venture to declare, that it is a simple substance. Shall we say then, that a power of analysation in philosophers, which has not yet reached even the most obvious piece of matter, has been extended so as to analyse, (pardon the expression,) the Spiritual and Eternal Being who made the Universe?

But if unity of element cannot be asserted of the substance, or, as they say, essence of the Deity, without asserting that about which we know nothing; is there any other sense in which physical unity can be asserted? I am unable to imagine any. Particles, monads, forms, belong only to matter: and to assert a unity of these, in any sense, as existing in the substance of the Divine Being, would be gross and repulsive materialism.

To assert a unity which is predicated of continuity of substance, would be equally absurd. We may say, indeed, that God has no parts or is indivisible; for this has a mere negative meaning. It is no more than to say, that he is not material, and, consequently, is not divisible.

Is there, then, any intelligible sense, in which we can assert physical unity of the Divine Substance? Is there any knowledge of this subject among the race of man? And if not, then we are safe in drawing the conclusion, that the sacred writers have not asserted it ; unless they have explained their assertion of the divine unity, as having reference to this subject. This no one will venture to affirm.

But if they have not asserted physieal unity, have they asserted metaphysical? The attributes of God, metaphysically considered, are scarcely capable of having unity predicated of them. What constitutes infinite wisdom? Is the idea simple or complex? Wisdom certainly denotes a complex attribute, made up of perception, and skill, and benevolence. What constitutes infinite power? Mere physical force? Or physical power, united with boundless knowledge of the possibilities of things? Or does something more still, enter into the composition of this attribute? Similar questions might be asked respecting all the other divine attributes. The metaphysical unity of their nature, then, we do not, and cannot understand. No Revelation has disclosed it. No man can have any claim to advance a proposition respecting it as it exceeds the boundaries of human knowledge.

Am I not safe, therefore, in avowing my belief, that the Scriptures have said nothing of the physical or metaphysical nature of God? If so, let us return from this maze, (if we have not already lost ourselves,) and askWhat is that unity which Revelation has predicated of God; and what is the unity, which we are capable of understanding and believing?

But before I proceed to this, I must beg the liberty to say, that although I have thus far conducted my disquisition on the ground of the old philosophy, which makes a distinction between essence and attributes, in order to conform to language which I have used in my Letters, and which is commonly employed in such disquisitions, yet, as Brown has demonstratively shewn, this whole distinction is a mere chimera. About the essence of things or beings, we all must admit that we know nothing. What we call attributes, are the only causes with which we are acquainted, that produce any effects; and therefore the only things with which we are acquainted. How then can we venture to affirm, that there is any distinction

between essence and attributes, when we have not the remotest idea of what essence is? Nothing but a revelation can warrant us in doing this.

I would apply the same reasoning to the Deity himself. What the divine essence is or what God in himself, absolutely considered, is, we know not. He has made no revelation of this. We know him, just as we do any other existence, only by the effects which he produces. These effects are exceedingly diversified. Hence we conclude, that he possesses attributes which are various. All men who know any thing of God, believe this. Unity, in the sense of possessing only a single attribute, certainly cannot be predicated of him. Neither can unity of element be predicated, of any attribute itself. God then is a Being of various attributes; but whether they are simple or complex in their nature, we may conjecture, but cannot know. To assert, therefore, that the divine substance is simple, or of one element, would be nothing less than trifling with words absolutely destitute of meaning. In what sense, then, (for the question recurs,) is God one? I answer; We have, and can have no other conception of his unity, than that the complex Being, in whom are united so many attributes, is one simply as to number, or numerically one. The idea after all, is negative. It is only saying, that there are not two or more instances in the universe, of the union of attributes which form the Divinity. This union occurs but once; or in respect to one Supreme Power. And having arrived here, I am unable to proceed one step beyond; or to con ceive any other sense in which it can be intelligibly asserted, that there is but one God.

In precisely this sense, I apprehend the Scriptures always assert the unity of the Godhead. "Jehovah our Lord, is one Jehovah;" that is, the plurality of Gods, asserted by the heathen, is an error: Polytheism is not true: There is but one Supreme Power, in whom the attributes of Di

vinity are united: There is only one instance of such a union of the complex attributes, which constitute the Divinity.

It will be admitted, that the Scriptures have never attempted to explain the idea of divine unity. The manner, however, in which it is asserted, viz. in opposition to the polytheism of the heathen; and the nature of the case, unless I have much erred in my discussion above, may serve to show, what kind of unity the sacred writers meant to assert.

And now does this numerical unity preclude the possibility of a distinction in the Godhead? The Reviewer seems to have felt a difficulty here; for he says, "It is possible to predicate a numerical oneness of the essence and attributes of God, which shall preclude the possibility of a numerical distinction."-p. 131. He meant to say, no doubt of a personal distinction; for the simple assertion that God is one, always, and of necessity, precludes a numerical distinction, which distinction of course would make two or more Gods. Understanding him then, as no doubt he meant to be understood, I cannot accede to the proposition which he presents; and as the ground of my dissent, I would assign the following rea

sons.

I have said that "God is numerically one in essence, and in attributes ;" and in saying this, it will not be improper for me to say, that I had reason to expect, that I should be understood to speak, in the current language of theology, I could not, from the manner in which my letters are composed, be supposed to have written merely in the way of a popular address. In the language of theology, then, what does the essence and attributes of God comprize? I answer, only what is essential to the Divine Nature, in such sense, that this Nature would not be divine, if it were wanting in respect to either; and what distinguishes this nature from all others. According to the commonly received philosophy, essence is that

in which the attributes inhere, or the substratum of the divine nature. But in regard to attributes; unity is not, in the language of scientific theology an attribute of the Deity; for unity belongs to other things beside the Godhead, and is not therefore that which is a criterion of divinity. Ia the same manner, distinction in the Godhead is not, of itself, an attribute; for distinction is not necessary to the idea of the divine nature, and may be predicated of other things besides the divinity. It is true, indeed, that neither the unity nor the distinction of the Godhead, may be, in all respects, like the unity or distinction of any other being. But this does not affect the question, as to what is the style of expression in theology.

God may, then, have other properties, which are neither essence nor attributes. In the usual style of the most scientific divines, he certainly has. For ample confirmation of the correctness of this statement, I refer now to an admirable work of Dr. K. G. Brettschneider, published at Leipzig, in 1819. The object of this work is to give a systematic explanation of all the ideas and terms, connected with doctrinal theology. In page 359, he treats of the unity of God; and afterwards, in another section, p. 361, of the attributes of God. Here he says expressly, that the older divines, (meaning those of the preceding generation, and their predecessors, among the Reformed Church,) use the word property (proprietas) in respect to the internal relation of the three persons of the Trinity, and NOT the word ATTRIBUTES, (attributa.) Immediately afterwards, he says, "All theologians teach unanimously, that the divine attributes are not accidents or predicates, i. e. what may be ascribed or not ascribed to God, without essentially affecting the idea of diversity, but are the essential and necessary qualities of divine nature.

Accordingly, in his view of the attributes of God, he includes neither unity, nor Trinity. The question is not whether in all respects, this mode

of treating the subject is correct. The question as it respects me is, whether I have, according to the usages of theological discussion, employed terms which are scientific, and which affirm or deny no more than I intend ed to do; or which necessarily exclude the idea of a distinction in the Godhead. I may well presume, that every person, who is conversant with the standard writers, to whom Brettschneider refers, in the passages adverted to, will be satisfied on this point.

I am aware, that some aver, that whatever is attributed to God, is properly an attribute. But this will not bear examination.

We attribute es

sence to him; is essence attribute? We attribute counsel, design, action, to him; are these attributes? You may say, "they ought to be called so:" but the theological usus loquendi does not make them so; and I may, without presumption, claim a right to be understood, as employing language, in its usual theological sense.

Thus much for the meaning of essence and attributes. Let me add a word, on the term numerical unity, which seems to create a difficulty, in the minds of some.

I did suppose, when I used the term, that I was using one which was, at least sufficiently common, not to appear peculiar. I remember to have met with it in Dr. Watts, and other English writers; but as my studies for several years have led me rather to read Latin than English writers on theology, I cannot venture to say that the phrase numerical unity is very common among the English. But among the scientific writers of the Reformed Churches on the continent of Europe, the term numerical unity has been of long and general usage. Thus, so long ago as the days of Buddaeus, we find in his Theology, (p. 216) that he speaks of God in the following terms "unicus MUNERO est." "The unity of God," says Brettschneider in the admirable works quoted above, p. 359, "is called numerical unity, in distinction

from specific unity." "Man nannte dreses unitatem numeri, zum unterscheide von der unstate specei ;” i. e. Man nannte, one calls, it is called. This is the usual and common mode of speaking. Such is truly the fact. The term numerical unity, in the writings of the Reformed Divines on the continent of Europe, has long been as common as the word Trinity. This is confined to no class of Theological writers. Lutherans, and Calvinists; Trinitarians and Unitarians habtiually employ it, when speaking of the subject of the divine unity. Brettscheneider himself, is a staunch defender of the doctrine of the Trinity; and is not exposed, therefore to the charge of neology, which might induce him to patronize new terms. The proposition itself, that God, in essence and attributes, is numerically one, is found in so many words, in a consummate Dissertation of Prof. Hall, Tübingen, de deitate Christi, presented by him in earlier life, and afterwards reprinted by special order of the University of Göttingen, in the days of that noble Institution, when the Deity of Christ was the subject of belief and adoration, instead of ridicule. Storr, Reinhard, Tittmann, Schroerkh, Walch, Münscher, and multitudes of writers like these, employ it.

I can only say, in defence of using it in an English work, that if it be not of theological use in English, it is greatly needed; and that there is no other expression as significant, which can be used by those who mean to disclaim specific unity.

But to return from this explanatory and apologetic digression:

If predicating numerical unity of the divine Being, preclude the possibility of a personal distinction, as the Reviewer is inclined to think; let me first ask, what sort of unity can we predicate of him unless it be numerical? Shall we resort, in order to predicate unity of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, to the unity of counsel, design, operation, and influence, the only unity which Socinians admit

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